CHARACTERISTICKS.

VOLUME II.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

VIRTUE and MERIT.

THE

MORALISTS;

A

PHILOSOPHICAL RHAPSODY.

Printed in the Year MDCCLVIII.

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TREATISE IV.

VIZ.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

Virtue, *or* Merit.

Formerly Printed from an Imperfect Copy:
Now Corrected, and Publish'd intire.

——— *Amoto quæramus seria ludo.*
Hor. Sat. 1.

Printed first in the Year M.DC.XCIX.

AN INQUIRY, &c.

BOOK I.

PART I.

SECT. I.

RELIGION and VIRTUE appear in many reſpects ſo nearly related, that they are generally preſum'd inſeparable companions. And ſo willing we are to believe well of their *union*, that we hardly allow it juſt to ſpeak, or even think of 'em apart. It may however be queſtion'd, whether the practice of the world, in this reſpect, be anſwerable to our ſpeculation. 'Tis certain that we ſometimes meet with inſtances which ſeem to make againſt this general ſuppoſition. We have known people, who having the appearance of great zeal in *religion*, have yet wanted even the common affections of *humanity*, and ſhewn themſelves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others, again, who have paid little regard to religion, and been conſider'd as mere ATHEISTS, have yet been obſerv'd to practiſe the rules of *morality*, and act in many caſes with ſuch good meaning and affection towards mankind, as might ſeem to force an acknowledgment of their being *virtuous*. And, in general, we find mere moral principles of ſuch weight, that in our dealings with men, we are ſeldom ſatisfy'd by the fulleſt aſſurance given us of their zeal in religion, till we hear ſomething further of their character. If we are told,

Occaſion of this INQUIRY.

Book 1. a man is religious; we ſtill aſk, "What are his mo-
"rals?" But if we hear at firſt that he has honeſt
Occaſion of this INQUIRY. moral principles, and is a man of natural juſtice and good temper, we ſeldom think of the other queſtion, "Whether he be *religious* and *devout?*"

THIS has given occaſion to enquire, "What "*honeſty* or VIRTUE is, conſider'd by it-ſelf; and "in what manner it is influenc'd by religion: how "far *religion* neceſſarily implies *virtue;* and whe-"ther it be a true ſaying, *That it is impoſſible for* "*an Atheiſt to be virtuous, or ſhare any real degree* "*of honeſty, or* MERIT."

AND here it cannot juſtly be wonder'd at, if the *method* of explaining things ſhou'd appear ſome-what unuſual; ſince the *ſubject-matter* has been ſo little examin'd, and is of ſo nice and dangerous ſpeculation. For ſo much is the religious part of mankind alarm'd by the freedom of ſome late pens; and ſo great a jealouſy is rais'd every where on this account; that whatever an author may ſuggeſt in favour of *religion*, he will gain little credit in the cauſe, if he allows the leaſt advantage to any other principle. On the other ſide, the men of wit and raillery, whoſe pleaſanteſt entertainment is in the expoſing the weak ſides of religion, are ſo deſperately afraid of being drawn into any ſerious thoughts of it, that they look upon a man as guilty of foul play, who aſſumes the air of a *free writer*, and at the ſame time preſerves any regard for the principles of natural religion. They are apt to give as little quarter as they receive: and are reſolv'd to think as ill of the morals of their antagoniſts, as their antagoniſts can poſſibly think of theirs. Neither of 'em, it ſeems, will allow the leaſt advantage to the other. 'Tis as hard to perſuade one ſort, that there is any virtue in religion, as the other, that there is any virtue out of the verge of their particular community. So that, between both, an author muſt paſs his time ill, who dares plead for *religion* and *moral virtue*, without leſſening the force of either; but

allowing to each its proper province, and due rank, wou'd hinder their being made enemys by detraction. Part 1. § 2.

HOWEVER it be: if we wou'd pretend to give the leaſt new light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended compaſs of this *inquiry*; 'tis neceſſary to take things pretty deep; and endeavour, by ſome ſhort ſcheme, to repreſent the original of each opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the DEITY. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our philoſophy; the reſt, 'tis hop'd, may prove more plain and eaſy.

SECT. II.

State of Opinions.

IN THE whole of things (or in the univerſe) either all is according to a good order, and the moſt agreeable to a general intereſt: *or* there is that which is otherwiſe, and might poſſibly have been better conſtituted, more wiſely contriv'd, and with more advantage to the general intereſt of Beings, or of the whole.

IF every thing which exiſts be according to a good order, and *for the beſt*; then of neceſſity there is no ſuch thing as real ILL in the univerſe, nothing ILL with reſpect to the whole.

WHATSOEVER, then, *is* ſo as that it cou'd not really have *been* better, or any way *better order'd*, is perfectly *good*. Whatſoever in the order of the world can be call'd ILL, muſt imply a poſſibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contriv'd, or order'd. For if it cou'd not; it is perfect, and as it ſhou'd be.

WHATSOEVER is *really* ILL, therefore, muſt be caus'd or produc'd, either by *deſign* (that is to ſay, with knowledg and intelligence) or, in defect of this, by hazard, and mere *chance*.

IF there be any thing ILL in the univerſe from *deſign*, then that which diſpoſes all things, is no one

Book I. *State of Opinions.*

good designing principle. For either the *one* designing principle is it-self corrupt; or there is some *other* in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.

IF there be any ILL in the universe from mere *chance;* then a designing principle or mind, whether good or bad, cannot be the cause of *all* things. And consequently if there be suppos'd a designing principle, who is the cause only of good, but cannot prevent the ill which happens from chance, or from a contrary ill design; then there can be suppos'd in reality no such thing as a superior good design or mind, other than what is impotent and defective: for not to correct, or totally to exclude that ill of chance, or of a contrary ill design, must proceed either from *impotency*, or *ill-will*.

WHATSOEVER is superior in any degree over the world, or rules in nature with discernment and a mind, is what, by universal agreement, men call GOD. If there are several such superior minds, they are so many *gods:* but if that single, or those several superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of DÆMON.

TO believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing principle, or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect THEIST.

TO believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things, but *chance;* so that in nature neither the interest of *the whole*, nor of any *particulars*, can be said to be in the least design'd, pursu'd, or aim'd at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.

TO believe no *one* supreme designing principle or mind, but rather *two*, *three*, or more, (tho' in their nature *good*) is to be a POLYTHEIST.

TO believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confin'd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy; is to be a DÆMONIST.

THERE are few who think always consistently or

according to one certain hypotheſis, upon any ſubject ſo abſtruſe and intricate, as the *cauſe of all things*, and the *OEconomy or government of the univerſe*. For 'tis evident in the caſe of the moſt devout people, even by their own confeſſion, that there are times when their faith hardly can ſupport 'em in the belief of a ſupreme wiſdom; and that they are often tempted to judg diſadvantageouſly of a providence, and juſt adminiſtration in the whole. Part 1. §. 2.

THAT alone, therefore, is to be call'd a man's opinion, which is of any other the moſt habitual to him, and occurs upon moſt occaſions. So that 'tis hard to pronounce certainly of any man, that *he is an Atheiſt;* becauſe unleſs his whole thoughts are at all ſeaſons, and on all occaſions, ſteddily bent againſt all ſuppoſition or imagination of *deſign in things*, he is no *perfect* ATHEIST. In the ſame manner, if a man's thoughts are not at all times ſteddy and reſolute againſt all imagination of *chance*, *fortune*, or *ill deſign* in things, he is no *perfect* THEIST. But if any-one believes more of chance and confuſion than of deſign; he is to be eſteem'd more *an* ATHEIST than *a Theiſt*, from that which moſt predominates, or has the aſcendent. And in caſe he believes more of the prevalency of an ill-deſigning principle, than of a good one, he is rather a DÆMONIST; and may be juſtly ſo call'd, from the ſide to which the ballance of his judgment moſt inclines.

ALL theſe ſorts both of *Dæmoniſm*, *Polytheiſm*, *Atheiſm*, and *Theiſm*, may be * mix'd. Religion excludes only *perfect Atheiſm*. Perfect *Demoniſts* undoubtedly there are in religion; becauſe we know whole nations who worſhip a *Devil* or *Fiend*, to whom they ſacrifice and offer prayers and ſupplications, in reality on no other account than becauſe they

* As thus:

1. Theiſm with Daemoniſm: 2. Daemoniſm with Polytheiſm: 3. Theiſm with Atheiſm: 4. Daemoniſm with

Book 1. *State of Opinions.*

fear him. And we know very well that in ſome religions, there are thoſe who expreſly give no other idea of GOD, than of a Being arbitrary, violent, cauſing ill, and ordaining to miſery; which in effect is the ſame as to ſubſtitute a DÆMON, or *devil*, in his room.

Now ſince there are theſe ſeveral opinions concerning *a ſuperior power;* and ſince there may be found perhaps ſome perſons, who have no form'd opinion at all upon this ſubject; either thro' *Scepticiſm*, negligence of thought, or confuſion of judgment: the conſideration is, how any of theſe opinions, or this want of any opinion, may poſſibly conſiſt with VIRTUE and MERIT; or be compatible with an *honeſt* or *moral* character.

Atheiſm: 5. Polytheiſm with Atheiſm: 6. Theiſm (as it ſtands in oppoſition to Daemoniſm, and denotes goodneſs in the ſuperior *Deity*) with Polytheiſm: 7. The ſame Theiſm or Polytheiſm with Daemoniſm: 8. Or with Daemoniſm and Atheiſm.

1. As when *the one* chief mind, or ſovereign Being, is (in the believer's ſenſe) divided between a good and an ill nature, by being the cauſe of ill as well as good: or otherwiſe when *two* diſtinct and contrary principles ſubſiſt; one, the author of all good, the other of all ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *ſeveral* corrupt minds who govern; which opinion may be call'd *Polydaemoniſm*.

3. As when chance is not excluded; but God and chance divide.

4. As when an evil Daemon and chance divide.

5. As when many minds and chance divide.

6. As when there are more principal minds than one, but agreeing in good, with one and the ſame will and reaſon.

7. As when the ſame ſyſtem of Deity or correſponding deitys ſubſiſts, together with a contrary principle, or with ſeveral contrary principles or governing minds.

8. As when the laſt caſe is, together with chance.

PART II.

SECT. I.

A conſtitution.

WHEN we reflect on any ordinary frame or conſtitution either of art or nature; and conſider how hard it is to give the leaſt account of a particular *part*, without a competent knowledg of *the whole:* we need not wonder to find our-ſelves at a loſs in many things relating to the conſtitution and frame of *nature* her-ſelf. For to what end in nature many things, even whole ſpecies of creatures, refer; or to what purpoſe they ſerve; will be hard for any-one juſtly to determine: but to what end the many proportions and various ſhapes of parts in many creatures actually ſerve; we are able, by the help of ſtudy and obſervation, to demonſtrate, with great exactneſs.

Whole and parts.

WE know that every creature has a private good and intereſt of his own; which nature has compel'd him to ſeek, by all the advantages afforded him, within the compaſs of his make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong ſtate of every creature; and that his right-one is by nature forwarded, and by himſelf affectionately ſought. There being therefore in every creature a certain *intereſt* or *good;* there muſt be alſo a certain END, to which every thing in his conſtitution muſt *naturally* refer. To this END if any thing, either in his appetites, paſſions, or affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we muſt of neceſſity own it *ill* to him. And in this manner he is *ill, with reſpect to himſelf;* as he certainly is, *with reſpect to others of his kind,*

Intereſt or end in creatures.

Book 1. when any ſuch appetites or paſſions make him anyway injurious to 'em. Now, if by the natural conſtitution of any rational creature, the ſame irregularitys of appetite which make him ill *to others*, make him ill alſo to *himſelf;* and if the ſame regularity of affections, which cauſes him to be good in *one* ſenſe, cauſes him to be good alſo in *the other;* then is that goodneſs by which he is thus uſeful to others, a real good and advantage to himſelf. And thus *virtue* and *intereſt* may be found at laſt to agree.

Intereſt of the ſpecies.

Goodneſs.

OF this we ſhall conſider particularly in the latter part of our *inquiry*. Our firſt deſign is, to ſee if we can clearly determine what that quality is to which we give the name of *goodneſs*, or VIRTUE.

Private good.

SHOU'D a hiſtorian or traveller deſcribe to us a certain creature of a more ſolitary diſpoſition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither mate nor fellow of any kind; nothing of his own likeneſs, towards which he ſtood well-affected or inclin'd; nor any thing without, or beyond himſelf, for which he had the leaſt paſſion or concern: we might be apt to ſay perhaps, without much heſitation, "That this "was doubtleſs a very melancholy creature, and that "in this unſociable and ſullen ſtate he was like to "have a very diſconſolate kind of life." But if we were aſſur'd, that notwithſtanding all appearances, the creature enjoy'd himſelf extremely, had a great reliſh of life, and was in nothing wanting to his own good; we might acknowledg perhaps, "That the creature was no *monſter*, nor abſurdly "conſtituted *as to himſelf*." But we ſhou'd hardly, after all, be induc'd to ſay of him, "That he "was *a good creature*." However, ſhou'd it be urg'd againſt us, "That ſuch as he was, the "creature was ſtill *perfect in himſelf*, and therefore "to be eſteem'd good: *for what had he to do with* "*others?*" In this ſenſe, indeed, we might be forc'd to acknowledg, "That he was a "*good creature;* if he cou'd be underſtood to be "abſolute and compleat in himſelf; without any

Private SYSTEM.

" real relation to any thing in the univerſe beſides." For ſhou'd there be any where in nature *a ſyſtem*, of which this living creature was to be conſider'd as *a part*; then cou'd he no-wiſe be allow'd *good*; whilſt he plainly appear'd to be ſuch *a part*, as made rather to the harm than good of that ſyſtem or *whole* in which he was included. Part 2. §. 1. *Syſtem of the ſpecies.*

IF therefore, in the ſtructure of this or any other animal, there be any thing which points beyond himſelf, and by which he is plainly diſcover'd to have relation to ſome other being or nature beſides his own; then will this animal undoubtedly be eſteem'd *a part* of ſome other ſyſtem. For inſtance, if an animal has the proportions of a male, it ſhews he has relation to a female. And the reſpective proportions both of the male and female will be allow'd, doubtleſs, to have a joint-relation to another exiſtence and order of things beyond themſelves. So that the creatures are both of 'em to be conſider'd as parts of *another ſyſtem:* which is that of a particular race or ſpecies of living creatures, who have ſome one *common nature*, or are provided for, by ſome one *order* or *conſtitution* of things ſubſiſting together, and co-operating towards their conſervation and ſupport.

IN the ſame manner, if a whole ſpecies of animals contribute to the exiſtence or well-being of ſome other; then is that whole ſpecies, in general, *a part* only of ſome other ſyſtem. *Animal Syſtem.*

FOR inſtance; to the exiſtence of the ſpider, that of the fly is abſolutely neceſſary. The heedleſs flight, weak frame, and tender body of this latter inſect, fits and determines him as much *a prey*, as the rough make, watchfulneſs, and cunning of the former, fits him for rapine, and the enſnaring part. The web and wing are ſuted to each other. And in the ſtructure of each of theſe animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own bodys there is a relation of limbs and organs; or, as in the branches or leaves of a tree, we ſee a

Book I. relation of each to the other, and all, in common, to *one* root and trunk.

In the ſame manner are flys alſo neceſſary to the exiſtence of other creatures, both fowls and fiſh. And thus are other ſpecies or kinds ſubſervient to one another; as being *parts* of *a certain ſyſtem*, and included in one and the ſame *order* of Beings.

So that there is a ſyſtem of all animals; an *animal-order* or *OEconomy*, according to which the animal affairs are regulated and diſpos'd.

Syſtem of the earth. Now, if the whole ſyſtem of animals, together with that of vegetables, and all other things in this inferior world, be properly comprehended in *one ſyſtem* of a globe or earth: and if, again, this *globe* or *earth* it-ſelf appears to have a real dependence on ſomething ſtill beyond; as, for example, either on its ſun, the galaxy, or its fellow-planets: then is it in reality a PART only of ſome other ſyſtem. And if it be allow'd that there is in like manner a SYSTEM *of all things, and a univerſal nature*; there can be no particular being or ſyſtem which is not either good or ill in that *general one* of the *univerſe*: for if it be inſignificant and of no uſe, it is a fault or imperfection, and conſequently ill in the general ſyſtem.

Planetary ſyſtem.

Univerſal ſyſtem.

THEREFORE if any being be *wholly* and *really* ILL, it muſt be ill with reſpect to the univerſal ſyſtem; and then the ſyſtem of the univerſe is ill, or imperfect. But if the ill of one private ſyſtem be the good of others; if it makes ſtill to the good of the general ſyſtem (as when one creature lives by the deſtruction of another; one thing is generated from the corruption of another; or one planetary ſyſtem or *vortex* may ſwallow up another) then is the ill of that private ſyſtem no real ill in it-ſelf; any more than the pain of breeding teeth is ill, in a ſyſtem of body which is ſo conſtituted, that without this occaſion of pain, it wou'd ſuffer worſe, by being defective.

So that we cannot ſay of any being, that it is *wholly* and *abſolutely ill*, unleſs we can poſitively ſhew and aſcertain, that *what* we call ILL is no where GOOD beſides, in any other ſyſtem, or with reſpect to any other order or œconomy whatſoever. Part 2. §. 1. *Abſolute ILL.*

BUT were there in the world any intire ſpecies of animals deſtructive to every other, it might be juſtly call'd an *ill* ſpecies; as being ill in the *animal-ſyſtem*. And if in any ſpecies of animals (as in *men*, for example) one man is of a nature pernicious to the reſt, he is in this reſpect juſtly ſtil'd *an ill man*. *Relative ILL.*

WE do not however ſay of any-one, that he is an *ill man* becauſe he has the plague-ſpots upon him, or becauſe he has convulſive fits which make him ſtrike and wound ſuch as approach him. Nor do we ſay on the other ſide, that he is *a good man*, when having his hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from doing the miſchief he deſigns; or (which is in a manner the ſame) when he abſtains from executing his ill purpoſe, thro a fear of ſome impending puniſhment, or thro the allurement of ſome exterior reward. *Good and ill man.*

So that in a ſenſible creature, that which is not done thro any affection at all, makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature; who then only is ſuppos'd *good*; when the good or ill of the ſyſtem to which he has relation, is the immediate object of ſome paſſion or affection moving him.

SINCE it is therefore by affection merely that a creature is eſteem'd good or ill, *natural* or *unnatural*; our buſineſs will be, to examine which are the *good* and *natural*, and which the *ill* and *unnatural* affections. *Goodneſs thro affection.*

SECT. II.

Private or ſelf-affection.

IN the firſt place then, it may be obſerv'd, that if there be an affection towards any ſubject conſider'd as private good, which is * not really ſuch, but imaginary; this affection, as being ſuperfluous, and detracting from the force of other requiſite and good affections, is in it-ſelf vicious and ill, even in reſpect of the private intereſt or happineſs of the creature.

IF there can poſſibly be ſuppos'd in a creature ſuch an affection towards ſelf-good, as is actually, in its natural degree, conducing to his private intereſt, and at the ſame time inconſiſtent with the publick good; this may indeed be call'd ſtill a vitious affection: and on this ſuppoſition a creature * cannot really be good and natural in reſpect of his ſociety or publick, without being ill and unnatural towards himſelf. But if the affection be then only injurious to the ſociety, when it is immoderate, and not ſo when it is moderate, duly temper'd, and allay'd; then is the *immoderate* degree of the affection truly vitious, but not *the moderate*. And thus, if there be found in any creature a more than ordinary ſelf-concernment, or regard to private good, which is inconſiſtent with the intereſt of the ſpecies or publick; this muſt in every reſpect be eſteem'd an ill and vitious affection. And this is what we commonly call † SELFISHNESS, and diſapprove ſo much, in whatever creature we happen to diſcover it.

ON the other ſide, if the affection towards private or ſelf-good, however *ſelfiſh* it may be eſteem'd, is in reality not only conſiſtent with publick good, but in ſome meaſure contributing to it; if it be ſuch, perhaps, as for the good of the ſpecies in general, every individual ought to ſhare: 'tis ſo far from be-

* *Infra*, p. 52, &c. 107, 8, &c.

† VOL. I. *pag.* 81.

ing ill, or blameable in any ſenſe, that it muſt be acknowledg'd abſolutely neceſſary to conſtitute a creature *good*. For if the want of ſuch an affection as that towards ſelf-preſervation, be injurious to the ſpecies; a creature is ill and unnatural as well thro' this defect, as thro the want of any other natural affection. And this no-one would doubt to pronounce, if he ſaw a man who minded not any precipices which lay in his way, nor made any diſtinction of food, diet, clothing, or whatever elſe related to his health and being. The ſame would be aver'd of one who had a diſpoſition which render'd him averſe to any commerce with woman-kind, and of conſequence unfitted him thro *illneſs of temper* (and not merely thro *a defect of conſtitution*) for the propagation of his ſpecies or kind. Part 2. §. 2.

THUS the affection towards ſelf-good, may be a good affection, or an ill-one. For if this private affection be too ſtrong (as when the *exceſſive love of life* unfits a creature for any generous act) then is it undoubtedly vitious; and if vitious, the creature who is mov'd by it, is vitiouſly mov'd, and can never be otherwiſe than vitious in ſome degree, when mov'd by that affection. Therefore if thro ſuch an earneſt and paſſionate *love of life*, a creature be accidentally induc'd to do good (as he might be upon the ſame terms induc'd to do ILL) he is no more a good creature for this good he executes, than a man is the more an honeſt or good man either for pleading a juſt cauſe, or fighting in a good one, for the ſake merely of his fee or ſtipend.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the ſpecies, thro an affection merely towards ſelf-good, does not imply any more goodneſs in the creature than as the affection it-ſelf is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever ſo well; if at the bottom, it be that ſelfiſh affection alone which moves him; he is in himſelf ſtill vitious. Nor can any creature be conſider'd otherwiſe, when the paſſion towards ſelf-good, tho ever ſo moderate,

Book 1. is his real motive in the doing that, to which a natural affection for his kind ought by right to have inclin'd him.

Temper. And indeed whatever exterior helps or ſuccours an ill-diſpos'd creature may find, to puſh him on towards the performance of any one good action; there can no goodneſs ariſe in him till his *temper* be ſo far chang'd, that in the iſſue he comes in earneſt to be led by ſome immediate affection, *directly*, and not *accidentally*, to good, and againſt ill.

For inſtance; if one of thoſe creatures ſuppos'd to be by nature tame, gentle, and favourable to mankind, be, contrary to his natural conſtitution, fierce and ſavage; we inſtantly remark the breach of *temper*, and own the creature to be unnatural and corrupt. If at any time afterwards, the ſame creature, by good fortune or right management, comes to loſe his fierceneſs, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other creatures of his kind; 'tis acknowledg'd that the creature thus reſtor'd becomes good and natural. Suppoſe, now, that the creature has indeed a tame and gentle carriage; but that it proceeds only from *the fear of his keeper;* which if ſet aſide, his predominant paſſion inſtantly breaks out: then is his gentleneſs not his real temper; but his true and genuine *nature* or *natural temper* remaining juſt as it was, the creature is ſtill as *ill* as ever.

Nothing therefore being properly either goodneſs or illneſs in a creature, except what is from *natural temper;* "a good creature is ſuch a one as by "the natural temper or bent of his affections is car-"ry'd *primarily and immediately*, and not *ſecondarily and accidentally*, to good, and againſt ill:" And an *ill creature* is juſt the contrary; *viz.* "One "who is wanting in right affections, of force enough "to carry him *directly* towards good, and bear him "out againſt ill; or who is carry'd by other affecti-"ons directly to ill, and againſt good."

When in general, all the affections or paſſions are ſuted to the publick good, or good of the ſpecies, as

above-mention'd; then is the *natural temper* intirely good. If, on the contrary, any requiſite paſſion be wanting; or if there be any one ſupernumerary, or weak, or any-wiſe diſſerviceable, or contrary to that main end; then is the natural temper, and conſequently the creature himſelf, in ſome meaſure corrupt and *ill*. Part 2. §. 3.

THERE is no need of mentioning either *envy*, *malice*, *frowardneſs*, or other ſuch hateful paſſions; to ſhew in what manner they are ill, and conſtitute an *ill* creature. But it may be neceſſary perhaps to remark, that even as to *kindneſs* and *love* of the moſt natural ſort (ſuch as that of any creature for its offspring) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vitious. For thus over-great *tenderneſs* deſtroys the effect of love, and exceſſive *pity* renders us uncapable of giving ſuccour. Hence the exceſs of motherly love is own'd to be a *vitious fondneſs*; over-great pity, *effeminacy and weakneſs*; over-great concern for ſelf-preſervation, *meanneſs and cowardice*; too little, *raſhneſs*; and none at all, or that which is contrary (*viz.* a paſſion leading to ſelf-deſtruction) a *mad* and *deſperate depravity*.

SECT. III.

BUT to proceed from what is eſteem'd mere *goodneſs*, and lies within the reach and capacity of all *ſenſible creatures*, to that which is called VIRTUE or MERIT, and is allow'd to *man* only.

Reflex affection.

IN a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themſelves to the ſenſe, are the objects of the affection; but the very *actions* themſelves, and the *affections* of pity, kindneſs, gratitude, and their contrarys, being brought into the mind by reflection, become

Book 1. objects. So that, by means of this reflected ſenſe, there ariſes another kind of affection towards thoſe very affections themſelves, which have been already felt, and are now become the ſubject of a new liking or diſlike.

Reflex affection.

THE caſe is the ſame in the *mental* or *moral* ſubjects, as in the ordinary *bodys*, or common ſubjects of *ſenſe*. The ſhapes, motions, colours, and proportions of theſe latter being preſented to our eye; there neceſſarily reſults a * beauty or deformity, according to the different meaſure, arrangement and diſpoſition of their ſeveral parts. So in *behaviour* and *actions*, when preſented to our underſtanding, there muſt be found, of neceſſity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the ſubjects.

Moral beauty and deformity

THE MIND, which is ſpectator or auditor of *other minds*, cannot be without its *eye* and *ear*; ſo as to diſcern proportion, diſtinguiſh ſound, and ſcan each ſentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing eſcape its cenſure. It feels the ſoft and harſh, the agreeable and diſagreeable, in the affections; and finds a *foul* and *fair*, a *harmonious* and a *diſſonant*, as really and truly here, as in any muſical numbers, or in the outward forms or repreſentations of ſenſible things. Nor can it † with-hold its *admiration* and *extaſy*, its *averſion* and *ſcorn*, any more in what relates to one than to the other of theſe ſubjects. So that to deny the common and natural ſenſe of a SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in things, will appear an ‡ affectation merely, to any-one who conſiders duly of this affair.

Now as in the *ſenſible* kind of objects, the ſpecies or images of bodys, colours, and ſounds, are perpetually moving before our eyes, and acting on our ſenſes, even when we ſleep; ſo in the *moral* and *intellectual* kind, the forms and images of things

* *Infra*, pag. 268. † *Infra*, pag. 269, 271, 272, &c.
‡ VOL. I. *p.* 61, 2, 3. VOL. III. *p.* 26, &c.

are no leſs active and incumbent on the mind, at all ſeaſons, and even when the real objects themſelves are abſent. Part 2. §. 3.

IN theſe vagrant characters or pictures of *manners*, which the mind of neceſſity figures to it-ſelf, and carries ſtill about with it, the heart cannot poſſibly remain neutral; but conſtantly takes part one way or other. However falſe or corrupt it be within it-ſelf, it finds the difference, as to beauty and comelineſs, between one *heart* and another, one *turn of affection*, one *behaviour*, one *ſentiment* and another; and accordingly, in all diſintereſted caſes, muſt approve in ſome meaſure of what is natural and honeſt, and diſapprove what is diſhoneſt and corrupt.

THUS the ſeveral motions, inclinations, paſſions, diſpoſitions, and conſequent carriage and behaviour of creatures in the various parts of life, being in ſeveral views or perſpectives repreſented to the mind, which readily diſcerns the good and ill towards the ſpecies or publick; there ariſes a new trial or exerciſe of the heart: which muſt either rightly and ſoundly affect what is juſt and right, and diſaffect what is contrary; or, corruptly affect what is ill, and diſaffect what is worthy and good.

Public good an object.

AND in this caſe alone it is we call any creature *worthy* or *virtuous*, when it can have the notion of a publick intereſt, and can attain the ſpeculation or ſcience of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For tho we may vulgarly call an ill horſe *vitious*, yet we never ſay of a good one, nor of any mere beaſt, idiot, or changeling, tho ever ſo good-natur'd, that he is *worthy* or *virtuous*.

SO that if a creature be generous, kind, conſtant, compaſſionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himſelf does, or ſees others do, ſo as to take notice of what is *worthy* or *honeſt*; and make that notice or conception of *worth* and *honeſty* to be an object of his affection; he has not the character of being *vir-*

GOODNESS and VIRTUE.

Book 1. *tuous:* for thus, and no otherwiſe, he is capable of having a *ſenſe of right or wrong;* a ſentiment or judgment of what is done, thro juſt, equal, and good affection, or the contrary.

Unequal affection, or iniquity.

WHATSOEVER is done thro any unequal affection, is *iniquous*, *wicked*, and *wrong*. If the affection be equal, ſound, and good, and the ſubject of the affection ſuch as may with advantage to ſociety be ever in the ſame manner proſecuted, or affected; this muſt neceſſarily conſtitute what we call *equity* and *right* in any action. For, WRONG is not ſuch action as is barely the cauſe of harm (ſince at this rate a dutiful ſon aiming at an enemy, but by miſtake or ill chance happening to kill his father, wou'd do *a wrong*) but when any thing is done thro inſufficient or unequal affection (as when a ſon ſhews no concern for the ſafety of a father; or, where there is need of ſuccour, prefers an indifferent perſon to him) this is of the nature of *wrong*.

Impair'd ſenſe.

NEITHER can any weakneſs or imperfection in the ſenſes be the occaſion of *iniquity* or *wrong*; if the object of the mind it-ſelf be not at any time abſurdly fram'd, nor any way improper, but ſutable, juſt, and worthy of the opinion and affection apply'd to it. For if we will ſuppoſe a man, who being ſound and intire both in his reaſon and affection, has nevertheleſs ſo deprav'd a conſtitution or frame of body, that the natural objects are, thro his organs of ſenſe, as thro ill glaſſes, falſly convey'd and miſrepreſented; 'twill be ſoon obſerv'd, in ſuch a perſon's caſe, that ſince his failure is not in his principal or leading part; he cannot in himſelf be eſteem'd *iniquous*, or unjuſt.

Corrupt Opinion.

'TIS otherwiſe in what relates to *opinion*, belief or ſpeculation. For as the extravagance of judgment or belief is ſuch, that in ſome countrys even monkeys, cats, crocodiles, and other vile or deſtructive animals, have been eſteem'd *holy*, and worſhipp'd even as *Deitys*; ſhou'd it appear to anyone of the religion or belief of thoſe countrys, that

to ſave ſuch a creature as a cat, preferably to a parent, was *right*; and that other men, who had not the ſame religious opinion, were to be treated as enemys, till converted; this wou'd be certainly *wrong*, and wicked in the believer: and every action, grounded on this belief, wou'd be an *iniquous*, wicked and vitious action. Part 2. §. 3.

AND thus whatſoever cauſes a miſconception or miſapprehenſion of the worth or value of any object, ſo as to diminiſh a due, or raiſe any undue, irregular, or unſocial affection, muſt neceſſarily be the occaſion of *wrong*. Thus he who affects or loves a man for the ſake of ſomething which is reputed honourable, but which is in reality vitious, is himſelf vitious and ill. The beginnings of this corruption may be noted in many occurrences: as when an ambitious man, by the fame of his high attempts, a conqueror or a pirate by his boaſted enterprizes, raiſes in another perſon an eſteem and admiration of that immoral and inhuman character, which deſerves abhorrence: 'tis then that the hearer becomes corrupt, when he ſecretly approves the ill he hears. But on the other ſide, the man who loves and eſteems another, as believing him to have that virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account either vitious or corrupt. *Right and wrong.*

A MISTAKE therefore *in fact* being no cauſe or ſign of ill affection, can be no cauſe of vice. But a miſtake *of right* being the cauſe of unequal affection, muſt of neceſſity be the cauſe of vitious action, in every intelligent or rational being.

BUT as there are many occaſions where the matter of *right* may even to the moſt diſcerning part of mankind appear difficult, and of doubtful deciſion, 'tis not a ſlight miſtake of this kind which can deſtroy the character of *a virtuous or worthy man*. But when, either thro ſuperſtition or ill cuſtom, there come to be very groſs miſtakes in the aſſignment or application of the affection; when the miſtakes are either in their nature ſo groſs, or ſo complicated and *Right and wrong.*

Book I. frequent, that a creature cannot well live in a natural ſtate; nor with due affections, compatible with human ſociety and civil life; then is the character of VIRTUE forfeited.

VICE in opinion.

AND thus we find how far WORTH and VIRTUE depend on a knowledg of *right* and *wrong*, and on a uſe of reaſon, ſufficient to ſecure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing deſtructive of that natural affection by which the ſpecies or ſociety is upheld, may, on any account, or thro any principle or notion of honour or religion, be at any time affected or proſecuted as a good and proper object of eſteem. For ſuch a principle as this muſt be wholly vitious: and whatſoever is acted upon it, can be no other than vice and immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches men either treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, by divine warrant; or under colour and pretence of any preſent or future good to mankind: if there be any thing which teaches men to * perſecute their friends thro love; or to torment captives of war in ſport; or to offer † human ſacrifice; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themſelves, in a religious zeal, before their God; or to commit any ſort of barbarity, or brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it cuſtom which gives applauſe, or religion which gives a ſanction; this is not, nor ever can be *virtue*, of any kind, or in any ſenſe; but muſt remain ſtill horrid depravity, notwithſtanding any faſhion, law, cuſtom or religion, which may be ill and vitious *itſelf*; but can never alter the *eternal meaſures*, and immutable independent nature of *worth* and VIRTUE.

Vitious worſhip.

Vitious cuſtom.

* VOL. I. *p.* 13, 14. VOL. III. *p.* 81.

† VOL. III. *p.* 86.

Part 2.

SECT. IV. §. 4.

UPON the whole. As to thoſe creatures who are only capable of being mov'd by *ſenſible objects;* they are accordingly *good* or *vitious*, as the ſenſible affections ſtand with them. 'Tis otherwiſe in creatures capable of framing *rational objects* of moral good. For in one of this kind, ſhou'd the *ſenſible affections* ſtand ever ſo much amiſs; yet if they prevail not, becauſe of thoſe other *rational affections* ſpoken of; 'tis evident, the temper ſtill holds good in the main; and the perſon is with juſtice eſteem'd virtuous by all men. *Senſible and rational objects.*

MORE than this. If by temper any one is paſſionate, angry, fearful, amorous; yet reſiſts theſe paſſions, and notwithſtanding the force of their impreſſion, adheres to *virtue;* we ſay commonly in this caſe, *that the virtue is the greater:* and we ſay well. Tho if that which reſtrains the perſon, and holds him to a virtuous-like behaviour, be no affection towards goodneſs or virtue it-ſelf, but towards private good merely, he is not in reality the more virtuous; as has been ſhewn before. But this ſtill is evident, that if voluntarily, and without foreign conſtraint, an angry temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, ſo that neither any cruel or immodeſt action can be forc'd from ſuch a perſon, tho ever ſo ſtrongly tempted by his conſtitution; we applaud his virtue above what we ſhou'd naturally do, if he were free of this temptation, and theſe propenſitys. At the ſame time, there is no body will ſay that a propenſity to vice can be an ingredient in virtue, or any-way neceſſary to compleat a virtuous character. *Trial of virtue.*

THERE ſeems therefore to be ſome kind of difficulty in the caſe: but it amounts only to this. If there be any part of the temper in which ill paſſions or affections are ſeated, whilſt in another part the affections towards moral good are ſuch as abſolutely

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Trial of virtue.

to maſter thoſe attempts of their antagoniſts; this is the greateſt *proof* imaginable, that a ſtrong principle of virtue lies at the bottom, and has poſſeſs'd it-ſelf of the natural temper. Whereas if there be no ill paſſions ſtirring, a perſon may be indeed more *cheaply virtuous;* that is to ſay, he may conform himſelf to the known rules of virtue, without ſharing ſo much of a virtuous principle as another. Yet if that other perſon, who has the principle of virtue ſo ſtrongly implanted, comes at laſt to loſe thoſe contrary impediments ſuppos'd in him, he certainly loſes nothing in virtue; but on the contrary, loſing only what is vitious in his temper, is left more intire to virtue, and poſſeſſes it in a higher degree.

Degrees of virtue.

THUS is *virtue* ſhar'd in different degrees by rational creatures; ſuch at leaſt as are call'd *rational;* but who come ſhort of that ſound and well-eſtabliſh'd reaſon, which alone can conſtitute a *juſt affection*, a uniform and ſteddy *will* and *reſolution*. And thus vice and virtue are found variouſly mix'd, and alternately prevalent in the ſeveral characters of mankind. For it ſeems evident from our *inquiry*, that how ill ſoever the temper or paſſions may ſtand with reſpect either to the ſenſible or the moral objects; however paſſionate, furious, luſtful or cruel any creature may become; however vitious the mind be, or whatever ill rules or principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleneſs or favourable inclination towards the leaſt moral object, the leaſt appearance of moral good (as if there be any ſuch thing as *kindneſs*, *gratitude*, *bounty*, or *compaſſion*) there is ſtill ſomething of *virtue* left; and the creature is not wholly vitious and unnatural.

THUS a ruffian, who out of a ſenſe of fidelity and honour of any kind, refuſes to diſcover his aſſociates; and rather than betray them, is content to endure torments and death; has certainly ſome principle of virtue, however he may miſapply it. 'Twas the ſame caſe with that malefactor, who rather than do the office of executioner to his com-

panions, choſe to keep 'em company in their execution. Part 3.

In ſhort: as it ſeems hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is *abſolutely an atheiſt;*" ſo it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is *abſolutely corrupt or vitious;*" there being few, even of the horrideſt villains, who have not ſomething of *virtue* in this imperfect ſenſe. Nothing is more juſt than a known ſaying, "*That it is as "hard to find a man wholly ill, as wholly good:*" becauſe wherever there is any good affection left, there is certainly ſome *goodneſs* or *virtue* ſtill in being. §. 1.

And, having conſider'd thus of VIRTUE, *What it is in it-ſelf;* we may now conſider how it ſtands *with reſpect to the opinions concerning a* DEITY, as above-mention'd.

PART III.

SECT. I.

Cauſes of VICE.

THE nature of VIRTUE conſiſting (as has been explain'd) *in a certain juſt diſpoſition, or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong;* nothing can poſſibly in ſuch a creature exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what

1. EITHER takes away the *natural* and *juſt* ſenſe of right and wrong.

2. OR creates *a wrong* ſenſe of it.

3. OR cauſes the right ſenſe to be oppos'd, by *contrary* affections.

Of VIRTUE.

ON the other ſide, nothing can aſſiſt, or advance the principle of virtue, except what *either* in ſome manner nouriſhes and promotes a ſenſe of right and

Book 1. wrong; *or* preſerves it genuine and uncorrupt; *or* cauſes it, when ſuch, to be obey'd; by ſubduing and ſubjecting the other affections to it.

Of VIRTUE. WE are to conſider, therefore, how any of the above-mention'd opinions on the ſubject of a DEITY, may influence in theſe caſes, or produce either of theſe *three* effects.

Loſs of moral ſenſe. I. AS to *the firſt caſe;* THE TAKING AWAY THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

IT will not ſurely be underſtood, that by this is meant *the taking away the notion of what is* good *or* ill *in the ſpecies, or ſociety.* For of the reality of ſuch a *good* and *ill,* no rational creature can poſſibly be inſenſible. Every-one diſcerns and owns a publick intereſt, and is conſcious of what affects his fellowſhip or community. When we ſay therefore of a creature, "That he has wholly loſt the ſenſe of "right and wrong;" we ſuppoſe that being able to diſcern the *good* and *ill* of his ſpecies, he has at the ſame time no concern for either, nor any ſenſe of excellency or baſeneſs in any moral action, relating to one or the other. So that except merely with reſpect to a private and narrowly-confin'd ſelf-good, 'tis ſuppos'd there is in ſuch a creature no *liking* or *diſlike* of manners; no admiration, or love of any thing as morally good; nor hatred of any thing as morally ill; be it ever ſo unnatural or deform'd.

Moral ſenſe. THERE is in reality no rational creature whatſoever, who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any-one, he cannot fail to create an apprehenſion and fear of like harm, and conſequently a reſentment and animoſity in every creature who obſerves him. So that the offender muſt needs be conſcious of being liable to ſuch treatment from every-one, as if he had in ſome degree offended all.

THUS offence and injury are always known as puniſhable by every-one; and equal behaviour (which is therefore call'd MERIT) as rewardable and well-deſerving from every-one. Of this even the wickedeſt

creature living must have a *sense*. So that if there be any further meaning in this *sense* of right and wrong; if in reality there be any *sense* of this kind which an absolute wicked creature has not; it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to *injustice* or *wrong*, and in a real affection or love towards *equity* and *right*, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural beauty and worth. Part 3. §. 1.

'Tis impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature originally so ill-constituted, and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be try'd by sensible objects, he shou'd have no one good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of pity, love, kindness, or social affection. 'Tis full as impossible to conceive, that a rational creature coming first to be try'd by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, shou'd have no *liking* of these, or *dislike* of their contrarys; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as well be without *sense*, as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledg. Coming therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colours. If there be no *real* amiableness or deformity in moral acts, there is at least *an imaginary one* of full force. Tho perhaps the thing it-self shou'd not be allow'd in nature, the imagination or fancy of it must be allow'd to be from nature alone. Nor can any thing besides art and strong endeavour, with long practice and meditation, overcome such a *natural prevention*, or * *prepossession* of the mind, in favour of this moral distinction.

SENSE of right and wrong therefore, being as natural to us as *natural affection* it-self, and being *How impair'd:*

* *Infra*, p. 267, 272, 273.

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How impair'd:

By oppoſite affection, or antipathy;

a firſt principle in our conſtitution and make; there is no ſpeculative opinion, perſuaſion or belief, which is capable *immediately* or *directly* to exclude or deſtroy it. That which is of original and pure nature, nothing beſide contrary habit and cuſtom (a ſecond nature) is able to diſplace. And this affection being *an original one* of earlieſt riſe in the ſoul or affectionate part; nothing beſide contrary affection, by frequent check and controul, can operate upon it, ſo as either to diminiſh it in part, or deſtroy it in the whole.

'Tis evident in what relates to the frame and order of our *bodys;* that no particular odd mein or geſture, which is either natural to us, and conſequent to our make, or accidental and by habit acquir'd, can poſſibly be overcome by our immediate diſapprobation, or the contrary bent of our will, ever ſo ſtrongly ſet againſt it. Such a change cannot be effected without extraordinary means, and the intervention of art and method, a ſtrict attention, and repeated check. And even thus, nature, we find, is hardly maſter'd; but lies ſullen, and ready to revolt, on the firſt occaſion. Much more is this *the mind's* caſe in reſpect of that natural affection and anticipating fancy, which makes the ſenſe of right and wrong. 'Tis impoſſible that this can inſtantly, or without much force and violence, be effac'd, or ſtruck out of the natural temper, even by means of the moſt extravagant belief or opinion in the world.

Not by opinion merely.

Neither *Theiſm* therefore, nor *Atheiſm*, nor *Dæmoniſm*, nor any religious or irreligious belief of any kind, being able to operate immediately or directly in this caſe, but indirectly, by the intervention of oppoſite or of favourable affections caſually excited by any ſuch belief; we may conſider of this effect in our laſt caſe, where we come to examine the agreement or diſagreement of other affections with this natural and moral one which relates to right and wrong.

SECT. II. §. 2.

II. AS to the ſecond caſe, *viz.* THE WRONG SENSE OR FALSE IMAGINATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG. *Corruption of moral ſenſe.*

THIS can proceed only from the force of cuſtom and education in oppoſition to nature; as may be noted in thoſe countrys where, according to cuſtom or politick inſtitution, certain actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly view'd with applauſe, and honour aſcrib'd to them. For thus 'tis poſſible that a man, forcing himſelf, may eat the fleſh of his enemys, not only againſt his ſtomach, but againſt his nature, and think it nevertheleſs both right and honourable; as ſuppoſing it to be of conſiderable ſervice to his community, and capable of advancing the name, and ſpreading the terror of his nation.

BUT to ſpeak of the opinions relating to a DEITY; and what effect they may have in this place. As to *Atheiſm*, it does not ſeem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the ſetting up a falſe ſpecies of right or wrong. For notwithſtanding a man may thro cuſtom, or by licentiouſneſs of practice, favour'd by atheiſm, come in time to loſe much of his natural *moral ſenſe;* yet it does not ſeem that atheiſm ſhou'd *of it-ſelf* be the cauſe of any eſtimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deſerving, which was the contrary. It can never, for inſtance, make it be thought that the being able to eat man's fleſh, or commit beſtiality, *is good and excellent in it-ſelf.* But this is certain, that by means of *corrupt religion*, or SUPERSTITION, many things the moſt horridly unnatural and inhuman, come to be receiv'd as excellent, good, and laudable *in themſelves.* *Cauſes of this corruption.* *Cuſtom.* *Superſtition.*

NOR is this a wonder. For where-ever any thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by religion advanc'd, as the ſuppos'd will or pleaſure of

Book 1. *a ſupreme Deity;* if in the eye of the believer it appears not indeed in any reſpect the leſs ill or odious on this account; then muſt *the Deity* of neceſſity bear the blame, and be conſider'd as a being naturally ill and odious, however courted, and ſollicited, thro miſtruſt and fear. But this is what religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every-where preſcribes eſteem and honour in company with worſhip and adoration. Whenſoever therefore it teaches the love and admiration of a DEITY, who has any apparent character of *ill*; it teaches at the ſame time a love and admiration of *that ill*, and cauſes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in it-ſelf horrid and deteſtable.

Superſtition.

FOR inſtance: if JUPITER be he who is ador'd and reverenc'd; and if his hiſtory repreſents him amorouſly inclin'd, and permitting his deſires of this kind to wander in the looſeſt manner; 'tis certain that his worſhippers, believing this hiſtory to be literally and ſtrictly true, muſt of courſe be taught a greater love of amorous and wanton acts. If there be a religion which teaches the adoration and love of a GOD, whoſe character it is to be captious, and of high reſentment, ſubject to wrath and anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himſelf, when offended, on others than thoſe who gave the offence: and if there be added to the character of this GOD, a fraudulent diſpoſition, encouraging deceit and treachery amongſt men; favourable to a few, tho for ſlight cauſes, and cruel to the reſt: 'tis evident that ſuch a religion as this being ſtrongly enforc'd, muſt of neceſſity raiſe even an approbation and reſpect towards the vices of this kind, and breed a ſutable diſpoſition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful temper. For even *irregularitys* and *enormitys* of a heinous kind muſt in many caſes appear illuſtrious to one, who conſiders them in a being admir'd and contemplated with the higheſt honour and veneration.

Part 3. §. 2.

THIS indeed muſt be allow'd; that if in the *cult* or worſhip of ſuch a Deity there be nothing beyond common form, nothing beſide what proceeds from mere example, cuſtom, conſtraint, or fear; if there be, at the bottom, no real heartineſs, no eſteem or love imply'd; the worſhipper perhaps may not be much miſled as to his notion of right and wrong. If in following the precepts of his ſuppos'd GOD, or doing what he eſteems neceſſary towards the ſatisfying of ſuch his DEITY, he is compel'd only by *fear*, and, contrary to his inclination, performs an act which he ſecretly deteſts as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an apprehenſion or *ſenſe* ſtill of right and wrong, and, according to what has been already obſerv'd, is ſenſible of ill in the character of his GOD; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this ſubject, or ſo thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct opinion in the caſe. But if by inſenſible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious faith and devout exerciſe, he comes to be more and more reconcil'd to the malignity, arbitrarineſs, partiality, or revengefulneſs of his believ'd DEITY; his reconciliation with theſe qualitys themſelves will ſoon grow in proportion; and the moſt cruel, unjuſt, and barbarous acts, will, by the power of this example, be often conſider'd by him, not only as juſt and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of imitation.

FOR whoever thinks there is a GOD, and pretends formally to believe that he is *juſt* and *good*, muſt ſuppoſe that there is ſuch a thing as *juſtice* and *injuſtice*, *truth* and *falſhood*, *right* and *wrong*; according to which he pronounces that *God is juſt*, *righteous*, and *true*. If the mere *will*, *decree*, or *law* of God be ſaid abſolutely to conſtitute *right* and *wrong*, then are theſe latter words of no ſignificancy at all. For thus if each part of a contradiction were affirm'd for truth by the ſupreme power, they wou'd conſequently become *true*. Thus

Book 1. if one perſon were decreed to ſuffer for another's fault, the ſentence wou'd be *juſt* and *equitable*. And thus, in the ſame manner, if arbitrarily, and without reaſon, ſome beings were deſtin'd to endure perpetual ill, and others as conſtantly to enjoy good; this alſo wou'd paſs under the ſame denomination. But to ſay of any thing that it is *juſt* or *unjuſt*, on ſuch a foundation as this, is to ſay nothing, or to ſpeak without a meaning.

Superſtition.

AND thus it appears, that where a real devotion and hearty worſhip is paid to a ſupreme being, who in his hiſtory or character is repreſented otherwiſe than as really and truly juſt and good; there muſt enſue a loſs of rectitude, a diſturbance of thought, and a corruption of temper and manners in the believer. His honeſty will, of neceſſity, be ſupplanted by his zeal, whilſt he is thus unnaturally influenc'd, and render'd thus immorally devout.

Influence of religion.

To this we need only add, that as the *ill character* of a GOD does injury to the affections of men, and diſturbs and impairs the natural ſenſe of right and wrong; ſo, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right apprehenſions, and a ſound judgment or ſenſe of right and wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, repreſented ſuch as to be actually a true model and example of the moſt exact juſtice, and higheſt goodneſs and worth. Such a view of divine providence and bounty, extended to *all*, and expreſs'd in a conſtant good affection towards *the whole*, muſt of neceſſity engage us, within our compaſs and ſphere, to act by a like principle and affection. And having once the good of our ſpecies or publick in view, as our end or aim, 'tis impoſſible we ſhou'd be miſguided by any means to a falſe apprehenſion or ſenſe of right or wrong.

AS to this ſecond caſe therefore; RELIGION (according as the kind may prove) is capable of doing great good or harm; and ATHEISM nothing po-

ſitive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occaſion of mens loſing a good and ſufficient ſenſe of right and wrong; it will not, *as Atheiſm merely*, be the occaſion of ſetting up a falſe ſpecies of it; which only falſe religion, or fantaſtical opinion, deriv'd commonly from ſuperſtition and credulity, is able to effect. Part 3. §. 3.

SECT. III.

NOW as to the laſt caſe, THE OPPOSITION MADE BY OTHER AFFECTIONS TO THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. *Oppoſition of the affections.*

'TIS evident, that a creature having this ſort of SENSE or *good affection* in any degree, muſt neceſſarily act according to it; if it happens not to be oppos'd, either by ſome ſettled ſedate affection towards a conceiv'd *private good*, or by ſome ſudden, ſtrong and forcible paſſion, as of *luſt* or *anger*; which may not only ſubdue the ſenſe of right and wrong, but the very ſenſe of private good it-ſelf; and overrule even the moſt familiar and receiv'd opinion of what is conducing to ſelf-intereſt.

BUT it is not our buſineſs in this place to examine the ſeveral means or methods by which this corruption is introduc'd or increas'd. We are to conſider only how the opinions concerning *a Deity* can influence one way or another.

THAT it is poſſible for a creature capable of uſing reflection, to have a liking or diſlike of moral actions, and conſequently a ſenſe of right and wrong, before ſuch time as he may have any ſettled notion of A GOD, is what will hardly be queſtion'd: it being a thing not expected, or any-way poſſible, that a creature ſuch as *man*, ariſing from his childhood ſlowly and gradually, to ſeveral degrees of reaſon and reflection, ſhou'd, at the very firſt, be taken up with thoſe ſpeculations, or more refin'd ſort of reflections, about the ſubject of GOD's exiſtence. *Riſe of moral ſenſe.*

Book I.

Riſe of moral ſenſe.

LET us ſuppoſe a creature, who wanting reaſon and being unable to reflect, has, notwithſtanding many good qualitys and affections; as love to kind, courage, gratitude, or pity. 'Tis certain that if you give to this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the ſame inſtant approve of gratitude, kindneſs and pity; be taken with any ſhew or repreſentation of the ſocial paſſion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is *to be capable of* VIRTUE, and *to have a ſenſe of* RIGHT *and* WRONG.

BEFORE the time, therefore, that a creature can have any plain or poſitive notion one way or other, concerning the ſubject of a GOD, he may be ſuppos'd to have an apprehenſion or ſenſe of *right* and *wrong*, and be poſſeſs'd of *virtue* and *vice* in different degrees; as we know by experience of thoſe, who having liv'd in ſuch places, and in ſuch a manner as never to have enter'd into any ſerious thoughts of religion, are nevertheleſs very different among themſelves, as to their characters of honeſty and worth: ſome being naturally *modeſt*, *kind*, *friendly*, and conſequently lovers of *kind* and *friendly actions*; others *proud*, *harſh*, *cruel*, and conſequently inclin'd to admire rather the acts of *violence* and mere *power*.

DEITY.

NOW, as to the belief of a DEITY, and how men are influenc'd by it; we may conſider, in the firſt place, on what account men yield obedience, and act in conformity to ſuch a ſupreme Being. It muſt be either *in the way of his* POWER, as preſuppoſing ſome diſadvantage or benefit to accrue from him: or *in the way of his* EXCELLENCY and WORTH, as thinking it the perfection of nature to imitate and reſemble him.

Hope and *fear.*

IF (as in the firſt caſe) there be a belief or conception of a DEITY, who is conſider'd only as *powerful* over his creature, and inforcing obedience to his *abſolute will* by particular rewards and puniſhments; and if on this account, thro hope

merely of *reward*, or fear of *puniſhment*, the creature be incited to do the good he hates, or reſtrain'd from doing the ill to which he is not otherwiſe in the leaſt degree averſe; there is in this caſe (as has been already ſhewn) no virtue or goodneſs whatſoever. The creature, notwithſtanding his good conduct, is intrinſecally of as little worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any ſort. There is no more of *rectitude*, *piety*, or *ſanctity* in a creature thus reform'd, than there is *meekneſs* or *gentleneſs* in a tiger ſtrongly chain'd, or *innocence* and *ſobriety* in a monkey under the diſcipline of the whip. For however orderly and well thoſe animals, or man himſelf upon like terms, may be induc'd to act, whilſt the will is neither gain'd, nor the inclination wrought upon, but *awe* alone prevails and forces obedience; the obedience is *ſervile*, and all which is done thro it, merely *ſervile*. The greater degree of ſuch a ſubmiſſion or obedience, is only the greater *ſervility*; whatever may be the object. For whether ſuch a creature has a good maſter, or an ill one, he is neither more or leſs ſervile in his own nature. Be the maſter or ſuperior ever ſo perfect, or excellent, yet the greater ſubmiſſion caus'd in this caſe, thro this ſole principle or motive, is only the lower and more abject ſervitude, and implies the greater wretchedneſs and meanneſs in the creature, who has thoſe paſſions of ſelf-love ſo predominant, and is in his temper ſo vitious and defective, as has been explain'd.

Part 3. §. 3.

Fear.

As to the ſecond caſe. If there be a belief or conception of a DEITY, who is conſider'd as *worthy* and *good*, and admir'd and reverenc'd as ſuch; being underſtood to have, beſides mere power and knowledg, the higheſt excellence of nature, ſuch as renders him juſtly amiable to all; and if in the manner this ſovereign and mighty Being is repreſented, or, as he is hiſtorically deſcrib'd, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what

Honour and love.

Book 1. is good and excellent, a concern for the good of *all*, and an affection of benevolence and love towards *the whole*; ſuch an example muſt undoubtedly ſerve (as above explain'd) to raiſe and increaſe the affection towards virtue, and help to ſubmit and ſubdue all other affections to that alone.

Divine example.

NOR is this good effected by *example* merely. For where the theiſtical belief is intire and perfect, there muſt be a ſteddy opinion of the ſuperintendency of a ſupreme being, a witneſs and ſpectator of human life, and conſcious of whatſoever is felt or acted in the univerſe: ſo that in the perfecteſt receſs, or deepeſt ſolitude, there muſt be *one* ſtill preſum'd remaining with us; whoſe preſence ſingly muſt be of more moment than that of the moſt auguſt aſſembly on earth. In ſuch a preſence, 'tis evident, that as the *ſhame* of guilty actions muſt be the greateſt of any; ſo muſt the *honour* be, of well-doing, even under the unjuſt cenſure of a world. And in this caſe, 'tis very apparent how conducing a *perfect Theiſm* muſt be to virtue, and how great deficiency there is in *Atheiſm*.

Divine preſence.

Fear and *hope.*

WHAT the FEAR *of future puniſhment*, and HOPE *of future reward*, added to this belief, may further contribute towards virtue, we come now to conſider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gather'd from what has been ſaid above; that neither this *fear* or *hope* can poſſibly be of the kind call'd *good affections*, ſuch as are acknowledg'd the ſprings and ſources of all actions truly *good*. Nor can this fear or hope, as above intimated, conſiſt in reality with virtue, or goodneſs; if it either ſtands as *eſſential* to any moral performance, or as *a conſiderable motive* to any act, of which ſome better affection ought, *alone*, to have been *a ſufficient cauſe*.

Self-love,

How advanc'd.

IT may be conſider'd withal; that, in this religious ſort of diſcipline, the principle of *ſelf-love*, which is naturally ſo prevailing in us, being noway moderated or reſtrain'd, but rather improv'd

and made ſtronger every day, by the exerciſe of the paſſions in a ſubject of more extended ſelf-intereſt; there may be reaſon to apprehend leſt the temper of this kind ſhou'd extend it-ſelf in general thro all the parts of life. For if the habit be ſuch as to occaſion, in every particular, a ſtricter attention to ſelf-good, and private intereſt; it muſt inſenſibly diminiſh the affections towards publick good, or the intereſt of ſociety; and introduce a certain narrowneſs of ſpirit, which (as ſome pretend) is peculiarly obſervable in the devout perſons and zealots of almoſt every religious perſuaſion. Part 3. §. 3.

THIS, too, muſt be confeſs'd; that if it be *true piety*, to love GOD *for his own ſake;* the over-ſollicitous regard to private good expected from him, muſt of neceſſity prove a diminution of piety. For whilſt *God* is belov'd only as the cauſe of private good, he is no otherwiſe belov'd than as any other inſtrument or means of pleaſure by any vitious creature. Now the more there is of this violent affection towards *private good*, the leſs room is there for the other ſort towards *goodneſs it-ſelf*, or any good and deſerving object, worthy of love and admiration for its own ſake; ſuch as GOD is univerſally acknowleg'd, or at leaſt by the generality of civiliz'd or refin'd worſhippers. *Its effects in religion.*

'TIS in this reſpect that the ſtrong deſire and *love of life* may alſo prove an obſtacle to piety, as well as to virtue and publick love. For the ſtronger this affection is in any-one, the leſs will he be able to have true *reſignation*, or ſubmiſſion to the rule and order of THE DEITY. And if that which he calls *reſignation* depends only on the expectation of infinite retribution or reward, he diſcovers no more worth or virtue here, than in any other bargain of intereſt: the meaning of his reſignation being only this, "That he "reſigns his preſent life and pleaſures, condi- *False reſignation.*

Book I. " tionally for THAT which he himſelf confeſſes to " be beyond an equivalent; *eternal living in a* " *ſtate of higheſt pleaſure and enjoyment.*"

BUT notwithſtanding the injury which the principle of virtue may poſſibly ſuffer, by the increaſe of the ſelfiſh paſſion, in the way we have been mentioning; 'tis certain, on the other ſide, that the principle of *fear of future puniſhment*, and *hope of future reward*, how mercenary or ſervile ſoever it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumſtances, a great advantage, ſecurity, and ſupport to *virtue*.

Belief of future life;

How advantageous.

IT has been already conſider'd, that notwithſtanding there may be implanted in the heart a real ſenſe of right and wrong, a real good affection towards the ſpecies or ſociety; yet by the violence of rage, luſt, or any other counter-working paſſion, this good affection may frequently be controul'd and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the mind capable to render ſuch ill paſſions the objects of its averſion, and cauſe them earneſtly to be oppos'd; 'tis apparent how much a good temper in time muſt ſuffer, and a character by degrees change for the worſe. But if religion interpoſing, creates a belief that the ill *paſſions* of this kind, no leſs than their conſequent *actions*, are the objects of a Deity's animadverſion; 'tis certain that ſuch a belief muſt prove a ſeaſonable remedy againſt vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to virtue. For a belief of this kind muſt be ſuppos'd to tend conſiderably towards the calming of the mind, and diſpoſing or fitting the perſon to a better recollection of himſelf, and to a ſtricter obſervance of that good and virtuous principle, which needs only his attention, to engage him wholly in its party and intereſt.

Supporting.

Saving.

AND as this belief of a future reward and puniſhment is capable of ſupporting thoſe who thro *ill practice* are like to apoſtatize from virtue; ſo

when by *ill opinion* and wrong thought, the mind it-ſelf is bent againſt the honeſt courſe, and debauch'd even to an eſteem, and deliberate preference of a vitious one; the belief of the kind mention'd may prove on this occaſion the only relief and ſafety. Part 3. §. 3.

A PERSON, for inſtance, who has much of goodneſs and natural rectitude in his temper, but withal, ſo much ſoftneſs, or effeminacy, as unfits him to bear poverty, croſſes or adverſity; if by ill fortune he meets with many trials of this kind, it muſt certainly give a ſourneſs and diſtaſte to his temper, and make him exceedingly averſe to that which he may falſly preſume the occaſion of ſuch calamity or ill. Now if his own thoughts, or the corrupt inſinuations of other men, preſent it often to his mind, "*That his* HONESTY *is the occaſion* "*of this calamity*, and *that if he were deliver'd* "*from this reſtraint of* VIRTUE *and* HONESTY, "*he might be much happier:*" 'tis very obvious that his eſteem of theſe good qualitys muſt in proportion diminiſh every day, as the temper grows uneaſy, and quarrels with it-ſelf. But if he oppoſes to this thought the conſideration, "That "honeſty carrys with it, if not *a preſent*, at leaſt "*a future* advantage, ſuch as to compenſate that "loſs of private good which he regrets;" then may this injury to his good temper and honeſt principle be prevented, and his love or affection towards honeſty and virtue remain as it was before. *Belief of future life;*

IN the ſame manner, where inſtead of *regard* or *love*, there is rather *an averſion* to what is good and virtuous (as, for inſtance, where *lenity* and *forgiveneſs* are deſpis'd, and *revenge* highly thought of, and belov'd) if there be this conſideration added, "That *lenity* is, by its rewards, made the cauſe "of a greater ſelf-good and enjoyment than what "is found in revenge;" that very affection of *lenity* and *mildneſs* may come to be induſtriouſly *Improving.*

Book 1. nouriſh'd, and the contrary paſſion depreſs'd. And thus *temperance*, *modeſty*, *candour*, *benignity*, and other good affections, however deſpis'd at firſt, may come at laſt to be valu'd *for their own ſakes*, the contrary ſpecies rejected, and the good and proper object belov'd and proſecuted, when the reward or puniſhment is not ſo much as thought of.

Rewards and puniſhments, In the ſtate.

THUS in *a civil* STATE OR PUBLICK, we ſee that a virtuous adminiſtration, and an equal and juſt diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments, is of the higheſt ſervice; not only by reſtraining the vitious, and forcing them to act uſefully to ſociety; but by making virtue to be apparently the intereſt of every-one, ſo as to remove all prejudices againſt it, create a fair reception for it, and lead men into that path which afterwards they cannot eaſily quit. For thus a people rais'd from barbarity or deſpotick rule, civiliz'd by laws, and made virtuous by the long courſe of a lawful and juſt adminiſtration; if they chance to fall ſuddenly under any miſgovernment of unjuſt and arbitrary power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a ſtronger virtue, in oppoſition to ſuch violence and corruption. And even where, by long and continu'd arts of a prevailing tyranny, ſuch a people are at laſt totally oppreſs'd, the ſcatter'd ſeeds of virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a ſecond generation; e'er the utmoſt force of miſapply'd rewards and puniſhments can bring them to the abject and compliant ſtate of long-accuſtom'd ſlaves.

BUT tho a right diſtribution of juſtice in a government be ſo eſſential a cauſe of virtue, we muſt obſerve in this caſe, that it is *example* which chiefly influences mankind, and forms the character and diſpoſition of a people. For a virtuous adminiſtration is in a manner neceſſarily accompany'd with virtue in the magiſtrate. Otherwiſe it cou'd be of little effect, and of no long duration. But where it is ſincere and well eſtabliſh'd,

there virtue and the laws muſt neceſſarily be reſpected and belov'd. So that as to puniſhments and rewards, their efficacy is not ſo much from the fear or expectation which they raiſe, as from a natural eſteem of *virtue*, and deteſtation of *villany*, which is awaken'd and excited by theſe publick expreſſions of the approbation and hatred of mankind in each caſe. For in the publick executions of the greateſt villains, we ſee generally that the infamy and odiouſneſs of their crime, and the ſhame of it before mankind, contribute more to their miſery than all beſides; and that it is not the immediate pain, or death it-ſelf, which raiſes ſo much horror either in the ſufferers or ſpectators, as that ignominious kind of death which is inflicted for publick crimes, and violations of juſtice and humanity. Part 3. §. 3.

AND as the caſe of reward and puniſhment ſtands thus in the publick, ſo, in the ſame manner, as to *private familys*. For ſlaves and mercenary ſervants, reſtrain'd and made orderly by puniſhment, and the ſeverity of their maſter, are not on this account made good or honeſt. Yet the ſame maſter of the family uſing proper rewards and gentle puniſhments towards his children, teaches them goodneſs, and by this help inſtructs them in a virtue, which afterwards they practiſe upon other grounds, and without thinking of a penalty or bribe. And this is what we call *a liberal education* and *a liberal ſervice:* the contrary ſervice and obedience, whether towards God or man, being *illiberal*, and unworthy of any honour or commendation. *In the family.*

IN the caſe of religion, however, it muſt be conſidered, that if by the *hope of reward* be underſtood the love and deſire of virtuous enjoyment, or of the very practice and exerciſe of virtue in another life; the expectation or hope of this kind is ſo far from being derogatory to virtue, that it is an evidence of our loving it the more ſincerely and *for its own ſake*. Nor can this prin- *In religion.*

Book 1. ciple be juſtly call'd *ſelfiſh:* for if the love of virtue be not mere ſelf-intereſt, the love and deſire of life for virtue's ſake, cannot be eſteem'd ſo. But if the deſire of life be only thro the violence of that natural averſion to death; if it be thro the love of ſomething elſe than virtuous affection, or thro the unwillingneſs of parting with ſomething elſe than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any ſign or token of real virtue.

THUS a perſon loving life for life's ſake, and virtue not at all, may by the promiſe or hope of life, and fear of death, or other evil, be induc'd to practiſe virtue, and even *endeavour* to be truly virtuous, by a love of what he practiſes. Yet neither is *this very endeavour* to be eſteem'd *a virtue.* For tho he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become ſo, for having only intended, or aim'd at it, thro love of the reward. But as ſoon as he is come to have any affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect ſuch good *for its own ſake,* as good and amiable *in it-ſelf*; then is he in ſome degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

Security to virtue.

SUCH are the advantages or diſadvantages which accrue to virtue from reflection upon private good or intereſt. For tho the habit of *ſelfiſhneſs,* and the multiplicity of *intereſted views,* are of little improvement to real *merit* or *virtue;* yet there is a neceſſity for the preſervation of *virtue,* that it ſhou'd be thought to have no quarrel with *true intereſt,* and *ſelf-enjoyment.*

WHOEVER therefore, by any ſtrong perſuaſion or ſettled judgment, thinks in the main, *that virtue cauſes happineſs, and vice miſery,* carrys with him that ſecurity and aſſiſtance to virtue which is requir'd. Or tho he has no ſuch thought, nor can believe virtue his real intereſt, either with reſpect to his own nature and conſtitution, or the circumſtances of human life; yet if he believes any ſupreme powers concern'd in the *preſent* affairs of

mankind, and *immediately* interpoſing in behalf of the honeſt and virtuous, againſt the impious and unjuſt; this will ſerve to preſerve in him, however, that juſt eſteem of virtue, which might otherwiſe conſiderably diminiſh. Or ſhou'd he ſtill believe little of the *immediate* interpoſition of providence in the affairs of *this preſent life*; yet if he believes a God diſpenſing rewards and puniſhments to vice and virtue in *a future*; he carrys with him ſtill the ſame advantage and ſecurity; whilſt his belief is ſteddy, and no-wiſe wavering or doubtful. For it muſt be obſerv'd, that an expectation and dependency, ſo miraculous and great as this, muſt naturally take off from other inferior dependencys and encouragements. Where infinite rewards are thus inforc'd, and the imagination ſtrongly turn'd towards them, the other common and natural motives to goodneſs are apt to be neglected, and loſe much by diſ-uſe. Other intereſts are hardly ſo much as computed, whilſt the mind is thus tranſported in the purſuit of a high advantage and ſelf-intereſt, ſo narrowly confin d within our-ſelves. On this account, all other affections towards friends, relations, or mankind, are often ſlightly regarded, as being *worldly*, and of little moment, in reſpect of the intereſt of *our ſoul*. And ſo little thought is there of any immediate ſatisfaction ariſing from ſuch good offices of life, that it is cuſtomary with many devout people zealouſly to decry all temporal advantages of goodneſs, all natural benefits of virtue; and magnifying the contrary happineſs of a vitious ſtate, to declare, "that "except only for the ſake of future reward, and "fear of future puniſhment, they wou'd diveſt "themſelves of all goodneſs at once, and freely "allow themſelves to be moſt immoral and pro-"fligate." From whence it appears, that in ſome reſpects there can be nothing more * fatal to vir-

Part 3. §. 3.

Caution.

Imprudent zeal.

* VOL. I. *p.* 66, &c.

Book 1. tue, than the weak and uncommon belief of a future reward and puniſhment. For the ſtreſs being laid wholly here, if this foundation come to fail, there is no further prop or ſecurity to mens morals. And thus virtue is ſupplanted and betray'd.

Atheiſm. NOW as to ATHEISM: tho it be plainly deficient, and without remedy, in the caſe of *ill judgment on the happineſs of virtue;* yet it is not, indeed, of neceſſity the cauſe of any ſuch *ill judgment*. For without an abſolute aſſent to any hypotheſis of *Theiſm*, the advantages of virtue may poſſibly be ſeen and own'd, and a high opinion of it eſtabliſh'd in the mind. However, it muſt be confeſs'd, that the natural tendency of atheiſm is very different.

'TIS in a manner impoſſible, to have any great opinion of the happineſs of virtue, without conceiving high thoughts of the ſatisfactions reſulting from the generous admiration and love of it: and nothing beſide the experience of ſuch a love is likely to make this ſatisfaction credited. The chief ground and ſupport therefore of this opinion of *happineſs in virtue*, muſt ariſe from the powerful feeling of this generous moral affection, and the knowledg of its power and ſtrength. But this is certain, that it can be no great ſtrengthning to the moral affection, no great ſupport to the pure love of goodneſs and virtue, to ſuppoſe there is neither *goodneſs* nor *beauty* in the WHOLE it-ſelf; nor any example, or precedent of good affection in any ſuperior being. Such a belief muſt tend rather to the weaning the affections from any thing amiable or ſelf-worthy, and to the ſuppreſſing the very habit and familiar cuſtom of admiring natural beautys, or whatever in the order of things is according to juſt deſign, harmony, and proportion. For how little diſpos'd muſt a perſon be, to love or admire any thing as *orderly* in the univerſe, who thinks the univerſe it-ſelf a pattern of *diſorder?* how unapt

to reverence or reſpect any particular ſubordinate beauty of *a part;* when even THE WHOLE it-ſelf is thought to want perfection, and to be only a vaſt and infinite deformity? Part 3. §. 3.

NOTHING indeed can be more melancholy, than the thought of living in a diſtracted univerſe, from whence many ills may be ſuſpected, and where there is nothing good or lovely which preſents itſelf, nothing which can ſatisfy in contemplation, or raiſe any paſſion beſides that of contempt, hatred, or diſlike. Such an opinion as this may by degrees imbitter the temper, and not only make the love of virtue to be leſs felt, but help to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, *viz. natural* and *kind affection*.

UPON the whole; whoever has a firm belief of a GOD, whom he does not merely *call* good, but of whom in reality he *believes* nothing beſide *real good*, nothing beſide what is truly ſutable to the exacteſt character of benignity and goodneſs; ſuch a perſon believing rewards or retributions in another life, muſt believe them annex'd to real goodneſs and merit, real villany and baſeneſs, and not to any accidental qualitys or circumſtances; in which reſpect they cannot properly be ſtil'd *rewards* or *puniſhments*, but *capricious diſtributions of happineſs or unhappineſs to creatures*. Theſe are the only terms on which the belief of a world to come, can happily influence the believer. And on theſe terms, and by virtue of this belief, man perhaps may retain his virtue and integrity, even under the hardeſt thoughts of human nature; when either by any ill circumſtance or untoward doctrine, he is brought to that unfortunate opinion of *virtue's being naturally an enemy to happineſs in life*. *Theiſm.*

THIS, however, is an opinion which cannot be ſuppos'd conſiſtent with ſound *Theiſm*. For whatever be decided as to a future life, or the rewards and puniſhments of hereafter; he who, as a ſound *Theiſt*, believes a reigning mind, ſovereign in nature, and ruling all things with the higheſt perfec-

Book 1. tion of goodneſs, as well as of wiſdom and powe
muſt neceſſarily believe virtue to be naturally goo
Theiſm. and advantageous. For what cou'd more ſtrongl
imply an unjuſt ordinance, a blot and imperfectio
in the general conſtitution of things, than to ſup
poſe virtue the natural ill, and vice the natura
good of any creature?

Atheiſm and Theiſm. AND now laſt of all, there remains for us t
conſider a yet further advantage to virtue, in th
Theiſtical belief above the *Atheiſtical*. The propo
ſition may at firſt ſight appear over-refin'd, and o
a ſort which is eſteem'd too nicely philoſophical
But after what has been already examin'd, the ſub
ject perhaps may be more eaſily explain'd.

Effects of each. THERE is no creature, according to what ha
been already prov'd, who muſt not of neceſſity be
ill in ſome degree, by having any affection or aver
ſion in a ſtronger degree than is ſuitable to his own
private good, or that of the ſyſtem to which he is
join'd. For in either caſe the affection is *ill* and
vitious. Now if a rational creature has that de
gree of averſion which is requiſite to arm him
againſt any particular misfortune, and alarm him
againſt the approach of any calamity; this is re
gular and well. But if after the misfortune is hap
pen'd, his averſion continues ſtill, and his paſſion
rather grows upon him; whilſt he rages at the ac
cident, and exclaims againſt his private fortune or
lot; this will be acknowledg'd both vitious *in pre
ſent*, and *for the future;* as it affects the temper,
and diſturbs that eaſy courſe of the affections on
which virtue and goodneſs ſo much depend. On
the other ſide, the patient enduring of the calamity,
and the bearing up the mind under it, muſt be ac
knowledg'd *immediately* virtuous, and *preſervative*
Of A-theiſm. *of virtue*. Now, according to the hypotheſis of
thoſe who exclude a general mind, it muſt be con
feſs'd, there can nothing happen in the courſe of
things to deſerve either our admiration, and love,
or our anger, and abhorrence. However, as there

can be no ſatisfaction at the beſt in thinking upon what *atoms and chance* produce; ſo upon diſaſterous occaſions, and under the circumſtances of a calamitous and hard fortune, 'tis ſcarce poſſible to prevent a natural kind of abhorrence and ſpleen, which will be entertain'd and kept alive by the imagination of ſo perverſe an order of things. But in another hypotheſis (that of perfect *Theiſm*) it is underſtood, "*That whatever the order of the world produces, "is in the main both juſt and good.*" Therefore in the courſe of things in this world, whatever hardſhip of events may ſeem to force from any rational creature a hard cenſure of his private condition or *lot*; he may by reflection nevertheleſs, come to have patience, and to acquieſce in it. Nor is this all. He may go further ſtill in this reconciliation; and from the ſame principle may make the *lot* itſelf an object of his good affection; whilſt he ſtrives to maintain this generous fealty, and ſtands ſo well-diſpos'd towards the laws and government of his higher country.

Part 3. §. 3. *Of Theiſm.*

SUCH an affection muſt needs create the higheſt conſtancy in any ſtate of ſufferance, and make us in the beſt manner ſupport whatever hardſhips are to be endur'd for virtue's ſake. And as this affection muſt of neceſſity cauſe a greater acquieſcence and complacency with reſpect to ill accidents, ill men, and injurys; ſo of courſe it cannot fail of producing ſtill a greater equality, gentleneſs, and benignity in the temper. Conſequently the affection muſt be a truly good one, and a creature the more truly good and virtuous, by poſſeſſing it. For whatſoever is the occaſion or means of more affectionately uniting a rational creature to his PART in ſociety, and cauſes him to proſecute the publick good, or intereſt of his ſpecies, with more zeal and affection than ordinary; is undoubtedly the cauſe of more than ordinary virtue in ſuch a perſon.

THIS too is certain; that the admiration and love of order, harmony and proportion, in what-

Contemplation.

Book I. ever kind, is naturally improving to the temper, advantageous to ſocial affection, and highly aſſiſtant to *virtue*; which is it-ſelf no other than the love of order and beauty in ſociety. In the meaneſt ſubjects of the world, the appearance of *order* gains upon the mind, and draws the affection towards it. But if *the order of the world it-ſelf* appears juſt and beautiful; the admiration and eſteem of *order* muſt run higher, and the elegant paſſion or love of beauty, which is ſo advantageous to virtue, muſt be the more improv'd by its exerciſe in ſo ample and magnificent a ſubject. For 'tis impoſſible that ſuch *a divine order* ſhou'd be contemplated without * extaſy and rapture; ſince in the common ſubjects of ſcience, and the liberal arts, whatever is according to juſt harmony and proportion, is ſo tranſporting to thoſe who have any knowledg or practice in the kind.

Religious affection.

Now if the ſubject and ground of this divine paſſion be not really juſt or adequate (the hypotheſis of *Theiſm* being ſuppos'd falſe) the paſſion ſtill in itſelf is ſo far natural and good, as it proves an advantage to virtue and goodneſs; according to what has been above demonſtrated. But if, on the other ſide, the ſubject of this paſſion be really adequate and juſt (the hypotheſis of *Theiſm* being real, and not imaginary) then is the paſſion alſo juſt, and becomes abſolutely *due* and *requiſite* in every rational creature.

Concluſion. HENCE we may determine juſtly the relation which VIRTUE has to PIETY; the *firſt* being not compleat but in the *latter*: ſince where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the ſame benignity, firmneſs, or conſtancy; the ſame good compoſure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.

AND thus the perfection and height of VIRTUE muſt be owing to *the belief of a* GOD.

* *Infra*, pag. 256, 259, *&c.* And VOL. III. *p.* 24, *&c.*

BOOK II.

PART I.

SECT. I.

Obligation to VIRTUE.

WE have conſider'd *what* VIRTUE *is*, and to whom the character belongs. It remains to inquire, *what obligation* there is *to* VIRTUE; or *what reaſon* to embrace it.

WE have found, that to deſerve the name of *good* or *virtuous*, a creature muſt have all his inclinations and affections, his diſpoſitions of mind and temper, ſuitable, and agreeing with the good of his *kind*, or of that *ſyſtem* in which he is included, and of which he conſtitutes a PART. To ſtand thus well affected, and to have one's affections *right* and *intire*, not only in reſpect of one's ſelf, but of ſociety and the publick: this is *rectitude*, *integrity*, or VIRTUE. And to be wanting in any of theſe, or to have their contrarys, is *depravity*, *corruption*, and VICE.

Difficulty ſtated.

IT has been already ſhewn, that in the paſſions and affections of particular creatures, there is a conſtant relation to the intereſt of *a ſpecies*, or *common nature*. This has been demonſtrated in the caſe of *natural affection*, parental kindneſs, zeal for poſterity, concern for the propagation and nurture of the young, love of fellowſhip and company, compaſſion, mutual ſuccour, and the reſt of this kind. Nor will any-one deny that this affection of a creature towards the good of the ſpecies or common nature, is as *proper* and *natural* to him, as it is to any organ, part or member of an animal body, or mere

Book 2. vegetable, to work in its known courſe, and regular way of growth. 'Tis not more *natural* for the ſtomach to digeſt, the lungs to breathe, the glands to ſeparate juices, or other intrails to perform their ſeveral offices; however they may by particular impediments be ſometimes diſorder'd or obſtructed in their operations.

Union with a kind or ſpecies.

THERE being allow'd therefore in a creature ſuch affections as theſe towards *the common nature*, or *ſyſtem of the kind*, together with thoſe other which regard *the private nature*, or *ſelf ſyſtem*; it will appear that in following the *firſt* of theſe affections, the creature muſt on many occaſions contradict and go againſt *the latter*. How elſe ſhou'd the ſpecies be preſerv'd? or what wou'd ſignify that implanted *natural affection*, by which a creature thro ſo many difficultys and hazards preſerves its offspring, and ſupports its kind?

Oppoſition from ſelf-intereſt.

IT may therefore be imagin'd, perhaps, that there is a plain and abſolute oppoſition between theſe *two* habits or affections. It may be preſum'd, that the purſuing the common intereſt or publick good thro the affections of *one kind*, muſt be a hindrance to the attainment of private good thro the affections of *another*. For it being taken for granted, that hazards and hardſhips, of whatever ſort, are naturally the *ill* of the private ſtate; and it being certainly the nature of thoſe publick affections to lead often to the greateſt hardſhips and hazards of every kind; 'tis preſently infer'd, "That "'tis the creature's intereſt to be without any pub-"lick affection whatſoever."

THIS we know for certain; that all ſocial love, friendſhip, gratitude, or whatever elſe is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the ſelf-intereſting paſſions, draws us out of our-ſelves, and makes us diſregardful of our own convenience and ſafety. So that according to a known * way of

* VOL. I. *p.* 61, &c. 78, 79, 80, 81.

reaſoning on *ſelf-intereſt*, that which is of a ſocial kind in us, ſhou'd of right be aboliſh'd. Thus kindneſs of every ſort, indulgence, tenderneſs, compaſſion, and in ſhort, all natural affection ſhou'd be induſtriouſly ſuppreſs'd, and, as mere folly, and weakneſs of nature, be reſiſted and overcome; that, by this means, there might be nothing remaining in us, which was contrary to a direct *ſelf-end;* nothing which might ſtand in oppoſition to a ſteddy and deliberate purſuit of the moſt narrowly confin'd *ſelf-intereſt*. Part 1. §. 1.

ACCORDING to this extraordinary hypotheſis, it muſt be taken for granted, "That in the ſyſtem "of a kind or ſpecies, the intereſt of *the private* "*nature* is directly oppoſite to that of *the common* "*one;* the intereſt of *particulars* directly oppoſite "to that of *the publick in general.*" —- A ſtrange conſtitution! in which it muſt be confeſs'd there is much diſorder and untowardneſs; unlike to what we obſerve elſewhere in nature. As if in any vegetable or animal body, the *part* or member cou'd be ſuppos'd in a good and proſperous ſtate *as to itſelf*, when under a contrary diſpoſition, and in an unnatural growth or habit *as to its* WHOLE.

Now that this is in reality quite otherwiſe, we ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate; ſo as to make appear, "That what men repreſent as an ill order "and conſtitution in the univerſe, by making mo- "ral rectitude appear *the ill*, and depravity *the* "*good* or advantage of a creature, is in nature juſt "the contrary. That to be well affected towards "the *publick intereſt* and *one's own*, is not only "conſiſtent, but inſeparable: and that moral recti- "tude, or *virtue*, muſt accordingly be the advan- "tage, and *vice* the injury and diſadvantage of e- "very creature." *Reconciliation.*

SECT. II.

Contradictory notions.

THERE are few perhaps, who when they conſider a creature void of natural affection, and wholly deſtitute of a communicative or ſocial principle, will ſuppoſe him, at the ſame time, either tolerably happy in himſelf, or as he ſtands abroad, with reſpect to his fellow-creatures or kind. 'Tis generally thought, that ſuch a creature as this, feels ſlender joy in life, and finds little ſatisfaction in the mere ſenſual pleaſures which remain with him, after the loſs of ſocial enjoyment, and whatever can be call'd *humanity* or *good-nature*. We know that to ſuch a creature as this, 'tis not only *incident*, to be moroſe, rancorous and malignant; but that, *of neceſſity*, a mind or temper thus deſtitute of mildneſs and benignity, muſt turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by paſſions of a different kind. Such a heart as this muſt be a continual ſeat of perverſe inclinations and bitter averſions, rais'd from a conſtant ill humour, ſourneſs, and diſquiet. The conſciouſneſs of ſuch a nature, ſo obnoxious to mankind, and to all beings which approach it, muſt overcloud the mind with dark ſuſpicion and jealouſy, alarm it with fears and horror, and raiſe in it a continual diſturbance, even in the moſt ſeeming fair and ſecure ſtate of fortune, and in the higheſt degree of outward proſperity.

Diſſolute or immoral ſtate.

In whole.

THIS, as to the *compleat* immoral ſtate, is what, of their own accord, men readily remark. Where there is this *abſolute* degeneracy, this *total* apoſtacy from all candour, equity, truſt, ſociableneſs, or friendſhip; there are few who do not ſee and acknowledg the miſery which is conſequent. Seldom is the caſe miſconſtru'd, when *at worſt*. The misfortune is, we look not on this depravity, nor conſider how it ſtands *in leſs degrees*. The calamity, we think, does not of neceſſity, hold proportion with the injuſtice or iniquity. As if to be *abſolute-*

In part

ly immoral and inhuman, were indeed the greateſt misfortune and miſery; but that to be ſo, in *a little degree*, ſhou'd be no miſery nor harm at all! Which to allow, is juſt as reaſonable as to own, that 'tis the greateſt ill of a body to be in the utmoſt manner diſtorted and maim'd; but that to loſe the uſe only of *one* limb, or to be impair'd in ſome *one ſingle* organ or member, is no inconvenience or ill worthy the leaſt notice. Part I. §. 2.

THE parts and proportions of *the mind*, their mutual relation and dependency, the connexion and frame of thoſe paſſions which conſtitute the ſoul or temper, may eaſily be underſtood by any-one who thinks it worth his while to ſtudy this inward anatomy. 'Tis certain that the order or ſymmetry of this *inward part* is, in it-ſelf, no leſs real and exact, than that of the *body*. However, 'tis apparent that few of us endeavour to become *Anatomiſts* of this ſort. Nor is any-one aſham'd of the deepeſt ignorance in ſuch a ſubject. For tho the greateſt miſery and ill is generally own'd to be from *diſpoſition*, and *temper;* tho 'tis allow'd that *temper* may often change, and that it actually varys on many occaſions, much to our diſadvantage; yet how this matter is brought about, we inquire not. We never trouble our-ſelves to conſider thorowly by what means or methods our *inward conſtitution* comes at any time to be impair'd or injur'd. The *Solutio continui*, which bodily ſurgeons talk of, is never apply'd in this caſe, by ſurgeons of another ſort. The notion of *a whole* and *parts* is not apprehended in this ſcience. We know not what the effect is, of ſtraining any affection, indulging any wrong paſſion, or relaxing any proper and natural habit, or good inclination. Nor can we conceive how a particular action ſhou'd have ſuch a ſudden influence on the whole mind, as to make the perſon an immediate ſufferer. We ſuppoſe rather that a man may violate his faith, commit any wickedneſs

Inward proportion.

Continuity.

Book 2. unfamiliar to him before, engage in any vice or villany, without the leaſt prejudice to *himſelf*, or any miſery *naturally* following from the ill action.

'Tis thus we hear it often ſaid, "ſuch a perſon "has done ill indeed: but what is he the worſe "for it?" Yet ſpeaking of any nature thorowly ſavage, curſt, and inveterate, we ſay truly, "ſuch "a one is a plague and torment to himſelf:" and we allow, "That thro certain *humours*, or *paſ-* "*ſions*, and from *temper* merely, a man may be "compleatly miſerable; let his outward *circumſtan-* "*ces* be ever ſo fortunate." Theſe different judgments ſufficiently demonſtrate that we are not accuſtom'd to think with much coherency on theſe moral ſubjects; and that our notions, in this reſpect, are not a little confus'd, and contradictory.

Fabrick or ſyſtem of the affections.

Now if the fabrick of the mind or temper appear'd ſuch to us as it really is; if we ſaw it impoſſible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or introduce any ill or diſorderly one, without drawing on, *in ſome degree*, that diſſolute ſtate, which *at its height* is confeſs'd to be ſo miſerable: 'twou'd then undoubtedly be confeſs'd, that ſince no ill, immoral, or unjuſt action cou'd be committed without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and paſſions, or a farther advancing of that execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good-nature, or worth, wou'd of neceſſity act with greater cruelty towards himſelf, than he who ſcrupled not to ſwallow what was poiſonous, or who with his own hands ſhou'd voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or conſtitution, natural limbs or body.

SECT III.

SYSTEM explain'd.

IT has been ſhewn before, that no animal can be ſaid properly *to act*, otherwiſe than thro affections or paſſions, ſuch as are proper to an animal.

For in convulsive fits, where a creature strikes either himself or others, 'tis a simple mechanism, an engine, or piece of clock-work, which acts, and not the animal. Part 1. §. 3.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done or acted by any animal *as such*, is done only thro some affection or passion, as of fear, love, or hatred moving him. *Spring of actions.*

AND as it is impossible that a weaker affection shou'd overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the affections or passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable party, either by their force or number; thither the animal must incline: and according to this *ballance* he must be govern'd, and led to action.

THE affections or passions which must influence and govern the animal, are either, *Affections, three kinds.*

1. THE *natural affections*, which lead to the good of THE PUBLICK.

2. OR the *self-affections*, which lead only to the good of THE PRIVATE.

3. OR such as are neither of these; nor tending either to any good of THE PUBLICK or PRIVATE; but contrary-wise: and which may therefore be justly styl'd *unnatural affections*.

So that according as these affections stand, a creature must be virtuous or vitious, good or ill.

THE *latter* sort of these affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vitious. The *two former* may be vitious or virtuous, according to their degree.

IT may seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natural affections as *too strong*, or of self-affections as *too weak*. But to clear this difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explain'd, "That "*natural affection* may, in particular cases, be ex- "cessive, and in an unnatural degree:" As when pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief requir'd; or as when love to the offspring proves such a fondness as destroys the parent, and consequently the offspring *Degrees of affection.*

Book 2. it-ſelf. And notwithſtanding it may ſeem harſh to call that *unnatural* and *vitious*, which is only an extreme of ſome natural and kind affection; yet 'tis moſt certain, that where-ever any ſingle good affection of this ſort is over-great, it muſt be injurious to the reſt, and detract in ſome meaſure from their force and natural operation. For a creature poſſeſs'd with ſuch an immoderate degree of paſſion, muſt of neceſſity allow too much to that *one*, and too little to *others* of the ſame character, and equally natural and uſeful as to their end. And this muſt neceſſarily be the occaſion of partiality and injuſtice, whilſt only *one duty* or *natural part* is earneſtly follow'd; and *other parts* or *dutys* neglected, which ſhou'd accompany it, and perhaps take place and be prefer'd.

Degrees of affection.

THIS may well be allow'd true in all other reſpects; ſince even RELIGION it-ſelf, conſider'd as *a paſſion*, not of the *ſelfiſh* but *nobler* kind, may in ſome characters be ſtrain'd beyond its natural proportion, and be ſaid alſo to be *in too high a degree*. For as the end of religion is to render us more perfect, and accompliſh'd in all moral dutys and performances; if by the height of devout extaſy and contemplation we are rather diſabled in this reſpect, and render'd more unapt to the real dutys and offices of civil life; it may be ſaid that RELIGION indeed is then *too ſtrong* in us. For how, poſſibly, can we call this SUPERSTITION, whilſt the object of the devotion is acknowledg'd juſt, and the faith orthodox? 'Tis only the exceſs of zeal, which, in this caſe, is ſo tranſporting, as to render the devout perſon more remiſs in ſecular affairs, and leſs concern'd for the inferior and temporal intereſts of mankind.

NOW as in particular caſes, *publick affection*, on the one hand, may be *too high*; ſo *private affection* may, on the other hand, be *too weak*. For if a creature be ſelf-neglectful, and inſenſible of danger; or if he want ſuch a degree of paſſion in any kind, as

is uſeful to preſerve, ſuſtain, or defend himſelf; this must certainly be eſteem'd vitious, in regard of the deſign and end of nature. She her-ſelf diſcovers this in her known method and ſtated rule of operation. 'Tis certain, that her proviſionary care and concern for the whole animal, muſt at leaſt be equal to her concern for a ſingle part or member. Now to the ſeveral parts ſhe has given, we ſee, proper affections, ſutable to their intereſt and ſecurity; ſo that even without our conſciouſneſs, they act in their own defence, and for their own benefit and preſervation. Thus *an eye*, in its natural ſtate, fails not to ſhut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar caution and timidity; which if it wanted, however we might intend the preſervation of our eye, we ſhou'd not in effect be able to preſerve it, by any obſervation or forecaſt of our own. To be wanting therefore in thoſe principal affections, which reſpect the good of the whole conſtitution, muſt be a vice and imperfection, as great ſurely in the principal part (the ſoul or temper) as it is in any of thoſe inferior and ſubordinate parts to want the ſelf-preſerving affections which are proper to them.

Part 1. §. 3.

Degrees of affection.

AND thus the affections towards private good become neceſſary and eſſential to goodneſs. For tho no creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for poſſeſſing theſe affections; yet ſince it is impoſſible that the publick good, or good of the ſyſtem, can be preſerv'd without them; it follows that a creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in ſome degree to goodneſs and natural rectitude; and may thus be eſteem'd vitious and defective.

'TIS thus we ſay of a creature, in a kind way of reproof, that he is *too good;* when his affection towards others is ſo warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his *part;* or when he really acts beyond it, not thro too warm a paſſion of that ſort, but thro an over-cool one of another, or thro

Book 2. want of ſome ſelf-paſſion to reſtrain him within due bounds.

IT may be objected here, that the having the natural affections too ſtrong, (where the ſelf-affections are overmuch ſo) or the having the ſelf-affections defective or weak (where the natural affections are alſo weak) may prove upon occaſion the only cauſe of a creature's acting honeſtly and in moral proportion. For, thus, one who is to a fault regardleſs of his life, may with the ſmalleſt degree of natural affection do all which can be expected from the higheſt pitch of ſocial love, or zealous friendſhip. And thus, on the other hand, a creature exceſſively timorous may, by as exceeding a degree of natural affection, perform whatever the perfecteſt courage is able to inſpire.

TO this it is anſwer'd, that whenever we arraign any paſſion as *too ſtrong*, or complain of any as *too weak*; we muſt ſpeak with reſpect to a certain conſtitution or *OEconomy* of a particular creature, or ſpecies. For if a paſſion, leading to any right end, be only ſo much the more ſerviceable and effectual for being ſtrong; if we may be aſſur'd that the ſtrength of it will not be the occaſion of any diſturbance within, nor of any diſproportion between itſelf and other affections; then conſequently the paſſion, however ſtrong, cannot be condemn'd as vitious. But if to have *all* the paſſions in equal proportion with it, be what the conſtitution of the creature cannot bear; ſo that only *ſome* paſſions are rais'd to this height, whilſt *others* are not, nor can poſſibly be wrought up to the ſame proportion; then may thoſe ſtrong paſſions, tho of the better kind, be call'd exceſſive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and cauſing an *ill ballance* in the affection at large, they muſt of courſe be the occaſion of inequality in the conduct, and incline the party to a wrong moral practice.

Degrees of affection.

BUT to ſhew more particularly what is meant by the *OEconomy of the paſſions*, from inſtances in the ſpecies or * kinds below us. As for the creatures who have no manner of power or means given them by nature for their defence againſt violence, nor any-thing by which they can make themſelves formidable to ſuch as injure or offend them; 'tis neceſſary they ſhou'd have an extraordinary degree of fear, but little or no animoſity, ſuch as might cauſe 'em to make reſiſtance, or incline 'em to delay their flight. For in this their ſafety lies, and to this the paſſion of fear is ſerviceable, by keeping the ſenſes on the watch, and holding the ſpirits in readineſs to give the ſtart. Part 1. §. 3. *OEconomy of the paſſions.*

AND thus *timorouſneſs*, and an habitual ſtrong paſſion of fear, may be *according to the OEconomy* of a particular creature, both with reſpect to himſelf, and to the reſt of his ſpecies. On the other hand, *courage* may be *contrary to his OEconomy*, and therefore vitious. Even in one and the ſame ſpecies, this is by nature differently order'd, with reſpect to different ſexes, ages, and growths. The tamer creatures of the grazing kind, who live in herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in pairs only, apart from company, as is natural and ſutable to their rapacious life. Yet is there found, even among the former inoffenſive kind, a *courage* proportionable to their make and ſtrength. At a time of danger, when the whole herd flies, the *bull* alone makes head againſt the lion, or whatever other invading beaſt of prey, and ſhews himſelf conſcious of his *make*. Even the female of this kind is arm'd, we ſee, by nature, in ſome degree, to reſiſt violence; ſo as not to fly a common danger. As for a hind, or doe, or any other inoffenſive and mere defenceleſs creature; 'tis no way unnatural or vitious in them, when the enemy approaches, to

* *Infra*, p. 86, 200, 201, &c. And VOL. III. p. 143, 149, &c.

Book 2. desert their offspring, and fly for safety. But for creatures who are able to make resistance, and are by nature arm'd offensively; be they of the poorest insect-kind, such as bees or wasps; 'tis natural to 'em to be rouz'd with fury, and at the hazard of their lives, oppose any enemy or invader of their species. For by this known passion in the creature, the species it-self is secur'd; when by experience 'tis found that the creature, tho unable to repel the injury, yet voluntarily exposes his life for the punishment of the invader; and suffers not his kind to be injur'd with impunity. And of all other creatures, *man* is in this sense the most formidable: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his country's cause, revenge an injury on any-one living; and by throwing away his own life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often serv'd to restrain those in power, from using it to the utmost extent, and urging their inferiors to extremity.

Œconomy of the passions.

Measure. Tone.

UPON the whole: it may be said properly to be the same with the affections or passions in an animal constitution, as with the cords or strings of a musical instrument. If these, tho in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd beyond a certain degree, 'tis more than the instrument will bear: the lute or lyre is abus'd, and its effect lost. On the other hand, if while some of the strings are duly strain'd, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the instrument still in disorder, and its part ill perform'd. The several species of creatures are like different sorts of instruments: and even in the same species of creatures (as in the same sort of instrument) *one* is not intirely like the *other*, nor will the same strings fit each. The same degree of strength which winds up *one*, and fits the several strings to a just harmony and consort, may in *another* burst both the strings and instrument it-

ſelf. Thus men who have the livelieſt ſenſe, and are the eaſieſt affected with pain or pleaſure, have need of the ſtrongeſt influence or force of other affections, ſuch as tenderneſs, love, ſociableneſs, compaſſion, in order to preſerve *a right* BALLANCE *within*, and to maintain them in their duty, and in the juſt performance of their part: whilſt others, who are of a cooler blood, or lower key, need not the ſame allay or counter-part; nor are made by nature to feel thoſe tender and indearing affections in ſo exquiſite a degree. Part 1. §. 3. *Ballance.*

IT might be agreeable, one wou'd think, to inquire thus into the different *tunings* of the paſſions, the various mixtures and allays by which men become ſo different from one another. For as the higheſt improvements of temper are made in human kind; ſo the greateſt corruptions and degeneracys are diſcoverable in this race. In the other ſpecies of creatures around us, there is found generally an exact proportionableneſs, conſtancy and regularity in all their paſſions and affections; no failure in the care of the offspring, or of the ſociety, to which they are united; no proſtitution of themſelves; no intemperance, or exceſs, in any kind. The ſmaller creatures, who live as it were in citys (as bees and ants) continue the ſame train and harmony of life: nor are they ever falſe to thoſe affections, which move them to operate towards their publick good. Even thoſe creatures of prey, who live the fartheſt out of ſociety, maintain, we ſee, ſuch a conduct towards one another, as is exactly ſuitable to the good of their own ſpecies. Whilſt man, notwithſtanding the aſſiſtance of religion, and the direction of laws, is often found to live in leſs conformity with nature; and by means of religion it ſelf, is often render'd the more barbarous and inhuman. Marks are ſet on men: diſtinctions form'd: opinions decreed, under the ſevereſt penaltys: antipathys inſtill'd, and averſions rais'd in *TEMPER.* *Bad or worſt in* man.

Book 2. men againſt the generality of their own ſpecies. So that 'tis hard to find in any region a human ſociety which has *human* laws. No wonder if in ſuch ſocietys 'tis ſo hard to find a man who lives NATURALLY, and as a man.

State of the argument.

BUT having ſhewn what is meant by a paſſion's being *in too high*, or *in too low* a degree; and that, "To have any natural affection too high, or any "ſelf-affection too low," tho it be often approv'd as *virtue*, is yet, ſtrictly ſpeaking, a *vice* and *imperfection:* we come now to the plainer and more eſſential part of VICE, and which alone deſerves to be conſider'd *as ſuch:* that is to ſay,

1. "WHEN *either* the publick affections are "weak or deficient:

2. "OR the private and ſelf-affections too ſtrong.

3. "OR that ſuch affections ariſe as are neither "of theſe, nor in any degree tending to the ſup- "port either of the publick or private ſyſtem."

OTHERWISE than *thus*, it is impoſſible any creature can be ſuch as we call ILL or VITIOUS. So that if once we prove that it is really not the creature's intereſt to be thus *vitiouſly* affected, but contrariwiſe; we ſhall then have prov'd, "That it "is his intereſt to be wholly GOOD and VIRTU- "OUS:" Since in a wholeſom and ſound ſtate of his affections, ſuch as we have deſcrib'd, he cannot poſſibly be other than ſound, *good* and *virtuous*, in his action and behaviour.

OUR buſineſs, therefore, will be, to prove;

I. "THAT *to have the* NATURAL, KINDLY, "*or* GENEROUS AFFECTIONS *ſtrong and power-* "*ful towards the good of the publick, is to have* "*the chief means and power of ſelf-enjoyment.*" And, "*That to want them, is certain miſery and* "*ill.*"

II. "THAT *to have* THE PRIVATE *or* SELF- Part 2.
"AFFECTIONS *too ſtrong, or beyond their degree* §. 1.
"*of ſubordinacy to the kindly and natural, is alſo*
"*miſerable.*"

III. AND, "*That to have* THE UNNATURAL
"AFFECTIONS (*viz.* ſuch as are neither founded
"on the intereſt of the kind, or *publick*; nor of
"the *private* perſon, or creature himſelf) *is to be*
"*miſerable in the higheſt degree.*"

PART II.

SECT. I.

TO begin therefore with this proof, "THAT *FIRST*
"TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFECTI- *proof,*
"ONS (ſuch as are founded in love, com- *from the*
"placency, good-will, and in a ſympathy with the *natural*
"kind or ſpecies) IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF *affections.*
"MEANS AND POWER OF SELF-ENJOYMENT:
"*and* THAT TO WANT THEM IS CERTAIN
"MISERY AND ILL."

WE may inquire, firſt, what thoſe are, which we call *pleaſures* or *ſatisfactions*; from whence *Pleaſures*
happineſs is generally computed. They are (ac- *of the BO-*
cording to the common diſtinction) ſatisfactions and *DY and*
pleaſures either *of the body*, or *of the mind*. *MIND.*

THAT *the latter of theſe ſatisfactions are the* *The latter*
greateſt, is allow'd by moſt people, and may be *preferable.*
prov'd by this: That whenever the mind, having conceiv'd a high opinion of the worth of any action or behaviour, has receiv'd the ſtrongeſt impreſſion of this ſort, and is wrought up to the higheſt pitch or degree of paſſion towards the ſubject; at ſuch time it ſets it-ſelf above all bodily pain as well as pleaſure, and can be no-way diverted from its

Book 2. purpoſe by flattery or terror of any kind. Thus we ſee *Indians*, *Barbarians*, *malefactors*, and even the moſt execrable *villains*, for the ſake of a particular gang or ſociety, or thro ſome cheriſh'd notion or principle of honour or gallantry, revenge, or gratitude, embrace any manner of hardſhip, and defy torments and death. Whereas, on the other hand, a perſon being plac'd in all the happy circumſtances of outward enjoyment, ſurrounded with every thing which can allure or charm the ſenſe, and being then actually in the very moment of ſuch a pleaſing indulgence; yet no ſooner is there any thing amiſs *within*, no ſooner has he conceiv'd any *internal ail* or *diſorder*, any thing *inwardly* vexatious or diſtemper'd, than inſtantly his enjoyment ceaſes, the pleaſure of ſenſe is at an end; and every means of that ſort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneaſy, and ſubject to give diſtaſte.

Inference. THE *pleaſures of the mind* being allow'd, therefore, ſuperior to thoſe of *the body*; it follows, "That "whatever can create in any intelligent being a "conſtant flowing ſeries or train of mental enjoy- "ments, or pleaſures of the mind, is more con- "ſiderable to his happineſs, than that which can "create to him a like conſtant courſe or train of "ſenſual enjoyments, or pleaſures of the body."

Mental enjoyments, whence. NOW the mental enjoyments are either actually *the very natural affections themſelves in their immediate operation*: or they wholly in a manner *proceed from them*, and are no other than *their effects*.

IF ſo; it follows, that the natural affections duly eſtabliſh'd in a rational creature, being the only means which can procure him a conſtant ſeries or ſucceſſion of the mental enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and ſolid *happineſs*.

Energy of natural affections. NOW, in the firſt place, to explain, "How "much *the natural affections are in themſelves the* "*higheſt pleaſures and enjoyments*:" There ſhou'd

methinks be little need of proving this to any-one of human kind, who has ever known the condition of the mind under a lively affection of love, gratitude, bounty, generoſity, pity, ſuccour, or whatever elſe is of a ſocial or friendly ſort. He who has ever ſo little knowledg of human nature, is ſenſible what pleaſure the mind perceives when it is touch'd in this generous way. The difference we find between ſolitude and company, between a common company and that of friends; the reference of almoſt all our pleaſures to mutual converſe, and the dependence they have on ſociety either preſent or imagin'd; all theſe are ſufficient proofs in our behalf. Part 2. §. 1.

How much the ſocial pleaſures are ſuperior to any other, may be known by viſible tokens and effects. The very outward features, the marks and ſigns which attend this ſort of joy, are expreſſive of a more intenſe, clear, and undiſturb'd pleaſure, than thoſe which attend the ſatisfaction of thirſt, hunger, and other ardent appetites. But more particularly ſtill may this ſuperiority be known, from the actual prevalence and aſcendency of this ſort of affection over all beſides. Wherever it preſents it-ſelf with any advantage, it ſilences and appeaſes every other motion of pleaſure. No joy, merely of ſenſe, can be a match for it. Whoever is judg of *both* the pleaſures, will ever give the preference to *the former*. But to be able to judg of both, 'tis neceſſary to have a ſenſe of each. The honeſt man indeed can judg of *ſenſual pleaſure*, and knows its utmoſt force. For neither is his taſte, or ſenſe, the duller; but, on the contrary, the more intenſe and clear, on the account of his temperance, and a moderate uſe of appetite. But the immoral and profligate man can by no means be allow'd a good judg of *ſocial pleaſure*, to which he is ſo mere a ſtranger by his nature.

NOR is it any objection here: that in many natures the good affection, tho really preſent, is found

Book 2. to be of insufficient force. For where it is not *in its natural degree*, 'tis the same indeed as if it were *not*, or had *never been*. The less there is of this good affection in any untoward creature, the greater the wonder is, that it shou'd *at any time* prevail, as in the very worst of creatures it sometimes will. And if it prevails but for *once*, in any *single* instance; it shews evidently, that if the affection were thorowly experienc'd or known, it wou'd prevail *in all*.

THUS *the* CHARM of kind affection is superior to all other pleasure: since it has the power of drawing from every other appetite or inclination. And thus in the case of love to the offspring, and a thousand other instances, *the charm* is found to operate so strongly on the temper, as, in the midst of other temptations, to render it susceptible of this passion alone; which remains as the *master-pleasure* and *conqueror* of the rest.

Energy of natural affections.

THERE is no-one who, by the least progress in science or learning, has come to know barely the principles of *Mathematicks*, but has found, that in the exercise of his mind on the discoverys he there makes, tho merely of speculative truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of sense. When we have thorowly search'd into the nature of this contemplative delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private interest of the creature, nor has for its object any self-good or advantage of the private system. The admiration, joy, or love, turns wholly upon what is exterior, and foreign to our-selves. And tho the reflected joy or pleasure, which arises from the notice of this pleasure once perceiv'd, may be interpreted a *self passion*, or *interested regard*: yet the original satisfaction can be no other than what results from the love of truth, proportion, order, and symmetry, in the things without. If this be the case, the passion ought in reality to be rank'd with *natural affection*. For having no object within the

compaſs of the private ſyſtem; it muſt either be eſteem'd ſuperfluous and *unnatural* (as having no tendency towards the advantage or good of any thing in nature) or it muſt be judg'd to be, what it truly is, * "A natural joy in the contemplation of "thoſe *numbers*, that *harmony*, *proportion*, and "*concord*, which ſupports the univerſal nature, "and is eſſential in the conſtitution and form of "every particular ſpecies, or order of beings." Part 2. §. 1.

BUT this ſpeculative pleaſure, however conſiderable and valuable it may be, or however ſuperior to any motion of mere ſenſe; muſt yet be far ſurpaſs'd by *virtuous motion*, and *the exerciſe of benignity and goodneſs*; where, together with the moſt delightful affection of the ſoul, there is join'd a pleaſing aſſent and approbation of the mind to what is acted in this good diſpoſition and honeſt bent. For where is there on earth a fairer matter of ſpeculation, a goodlier view or contemplation, than that of a *beautiful*, *proportion'd*, and *becoming* action? Or what is there relating to us, of which the conſciouſneſs and memory is more ſolidly and laſtingly entertaining?

WE may obſerve that in the paſſion of love between the ſexes, where, together with the affection of a *vulgar* ſort, there is a mixture of the *kind and friendly*, the ſenſe or feeling of this *latter* is in reality ſuperior to the *former*; ſince often thro this affection, and for the ſake of the perſon belov'd, the greateſt hardſhips in the world have been ſubmitted to, and even death it-ſelf voluntarily imbrac'd, without any expected *compenſation*. For where ſhou'd the ground of ſuch an expectation lie? Not *here*, in *this world* ſurely; for death puts an end to all. Nor yet *hereafter*, in *any other*: for who has ever thought of providing a heaven or future recompence for the ſuffering virtue of lovers? *Energy of natural affections.*

* VOL. III. *p.* 24.

Book 2. WE may obſerve, withal, in favour of the natural affections, that it is not only when joy and ſprightlineſs are mix'd with them, that they carry a real enjoyment above that of the ſenſual kind. The very diſturbances which belong to natural affection, tho they may be thought wholly contrary to pleaſure, yield ſtill a contentment and ſatisfaction greater than the pleaſures of indulg'd ſenſe. And where a ſeries or continu'd ſucceſſion of the tender and kind affections can be carry'd on, even thro fears, horrors, ſorrows, griefs; the emotion of the ſoul is ſtill agreeable. We continue pleas'd even with this melancholy aſpect or ſenſe of virtue. Her beauty ſupports it-ſelf under a cloud, and in the midſt of ſurrounding calamitys. For thus, when by mere illuſion, as in *a Tragedy*, the paſſions of this kind are ſkilfully excited in us; we prefer the entertainment to any other of equal duration. We find by our-ſelves, that the moving our paſſions in this mournful way, the engaging them in behalf of merit and worth, and the exerting whatever we have of ſocial affection, and human ſympathy, is of the higheſt delight; and affords a greater enjoyment in the way of *thought* and *ſentiment*, than any thing beſides can do in a way of *ſenſe* and *common appetite*. And after this manner it appears, "How much *the mental enjoyments are* "*actually the very natural affections themſelves.*"

Effects of natural affection.

NOW, in the next place, to explain, "How "they *proceed from them*, as their natural *effects*:" we may conſider firſt, that the EFFECTS of love or kind affection, in a way of mental pleaſure, are, "*An enjoyment of good by communication. A re-* "*ceiving it, as it were, by reflection, or by way* "*of participation in the good of others.*" And "*A* "*pleaſing conſciouſneſs of the actual love, merited* "*eſteem or approbation of others.*"

How conſiderable a part of happineſs ariſes from the former of theſe *effects*, will be eaſily appre-

hended by one who is not exceedingly ill-natur'd. It will be conſider'd how many the pleaſures are, of *ſharing contentment and delight with others*; of receiving it in fellowſhip and company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleas'd and happy ſtates of thoſe around us, from accounts and relations of ſuch happineſſes, from the very countenances, geſtures, voices and ſounds, even of creatures foreign to our kind, whoſe ſigns of joy and contentment we can any-way diſcern. So inſinuating are theſe pleaſures of ſympathy, and ſo widely diffus'd thro our whole lives, that there is hardly ſuch a thing as ſatisfaction or contentment, of which they make not an eſſential part. Part 2. §. 1.

As for that other *effect* of ſocial love, viz. *the conſciouſneſs of merited kindneſs or eſteem*; 'tis not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental pleaſure, and conſtitutes the chief enjoyment and happineſs of thoſe who are, in the narroweſt ſenſe, *voluptuous*. How natural is it for the moſt ſelfiſh among us, to be continually drawing ſome ſort of ſatisfaction from a character, and pleaſing ourſelves in the fancy of deſerv'd admiration and eſteem? For tho it be mere fancy, we endeavour ſtill to believe it truth, and flatter our-ſelves, all we can, with the thought of *merit* of ſome kind, and the perſuaſion of our deſerving well from ſome few at leaſt, with whom we happen to have a more intimate and familiar commerce.

WHAT tyrant is there, what robber, or open violator of the laws of ſociety, who has not a companion, or ſome particular ſet, either of his own kindred, or ſuch as he calls friends; with whom he gladly ſhares his good; in whoſe welfare he delights; and whoſe joy and ſatisfaction he makes *his own?* What perſon in the world is there, who receives not ſome impreſſions from the flattery or kindneſs of ſuch as are familiar with him? 'Tis to this ſoothing hope and expectation of friendſhip,

Book 2. that almoſt all our actions have ſome reference. 'Tis this which goes thro our whole lives, and mixes it-ſelf even with moſt of our vices. (For this, *vanity*, *ambition*, and *luxury*, have a ſhare; and many other diſorders of our life partake. Even the unchaſteſt *love* borrows largely from this ſource. So that were pleaſure to be computed in the ſame way as other things commonly are; it might properly be ſaid, that out of theſe two branches (viz. *community or participation in the pleaſures of others*, and *belief of meriting well from others*) would ariſe more than nine tenths of whatever is enjoy'd in life. And thus in the main ſum of happineſs, there is ſcarce a ſingle article, but what derives itſelf from ſocial love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind affections.

Now ſuch as CAUSES are, ſuch muſt be their EFFECTS. And therefore as *natural affection* or *ſocial love* is perfect, or imperfect; ſo muſt be the *content* and *happineſs* depending on it.

Partial affection examin'd.

BUT leſt any ſhou'd imagine with themſelves that an *inferior* degree of natural affection, or an *imperfect impartial* regard of this ſort, can ſupply the place of an *intire*, *ſincere*, and *truly moral* one; leſt a ſmall tincture of ſocial inclination ſhou'd be thought ſufficient to anſwer the end of pleaſure in ſociety, and give us that enjoyment of *participation* and *community* which is ſo eſſential to our happineſs; we may conſider firſt, that PARTIAL AFFECTION, or ſocial love *in part*, without regard to a compleat ſociety or *whole*, is in it-ſelf an inconſiſtency, and implies an abſolute contradiction. Whatever affection we have towards any thing beſides *our-ſelves*; if it be not of the *natural ſort* towards the ſyſtem, or kind; it muſt be, of all other affections, the moſt *diſſociable*, and deſtructive of the enjoyments of ſociety: if it be really of the natural ſort, and apply'd

only to ſome *one* part of ſociety, or of a ſpecies, but not to the ſpecies or ſociety *it ſelf*; there can be no more account given of it, than of the moſt odd, capricious, or humourſom paſſion which may ariſe. The perſon, therefore, who is conſcious of this affection, can be conſcious of no *merit* or *worth* on the account of it. Nor can the perſons on whom this capricious affection has chanc'd to fall, be in any manner ſecure of its continuance or force. As it has no foundation or eſtabliſhment *in reaſon*; ſo it muſt be eaſily removable, and ſubject to alteration, *without reaſon*. Now the variableneſs of ſuch ſort of paſſion, which depends ſolely on capriciouſneſs and humour, and undergoes the frequent ſucceſſions of alternate hatred and love, averſion and inclination, muſt of neceſſity create continual diſturbance and diſguſt, give an allay to what is immediately enjoy'd in the way of friendſhip and ſociety, and in the end extinguiſh, in a manner, the very inclination towards friendſhip and human commerce. Whereas, on the other hand, INTIRE AFFECTION (from whence *integrity* has its name) as it is anſwerable to it ſelf, proportionable, and rational; ſo it is irrefragable, ſolid, and durable, and as in the caſe of *partiality*, or vitious friendſhip, which has no rule or order, every reflection of the mind neceſſarily makes to its diſadvantage, and leſſens the enjoyment; ſo in the caſe of *integrity*, the conſciouſneſs of juſt behaviour towards mankind in general, caſts a good reflection on each friendly affection in particular, and raiſes the enjoyment of friendſhip ſtill the higher, in the way of *community* or *participation* above mention'd.

Part 2. §. 1.

Partial affection.

AND in the next place, as PARTIAL AFFECTION is fitted only to a ſhort and ſlender enjoyment of thoſe pleaſures of *ſympathy* or *participation with others*; ſo neither is it able to derive any conſiderable enjoyment from that other principal branch of human happineſs, *viz. Conſciouſneſs of*

Book 2. *the actual or merited eſteem of others.* From whence ſhou'd this *eſteem* ariſe? The *merit*, ſurely, muſt in it-ſelf be mean, whilſt the affection is ſo precarious and uncertain. What truſt can there be to a mere *caſual inclination* or *capricious liking?* Who can depend on ſuch a friendſhip as is founded on no moral rule, but fantaſtically aſſign'd to ſome ſingle perſon, or ſmall *part* of mankind, excluſive of ſociety, and *the whole?*

IT may be conſider'd, withal, as a thing impoſſible; that they who eſteem or love by any other rule than that of *virtue*, ſhou'd place their affection on ſuch ſubjects as they can long eſteem or love. 'Twill be hard for them, in the number of their ſo belov'd friends, to find any, in whom they can heartily rejoice; or whoſe reciprocal love or eſteem they can ſincerely prize, and enjoy. Nor can thoſe pleaſures be ſound or laſting, which are gather'd from a ſelf-flattery, and falſe perſuaſion of the eſteem and love of others, who are incapable of any ſound eſteem or love. It appears therefore how much the men of narrow or *partial* affection muſt be loſers in this ſenſe, and of neceſſity fall ſhort in this ſecond principal part of mental enjoyment.

Intire affection. MEAN while *intire affection* has all the oppoſite advantages. It is equal, conſtant, accountable to it-ſelf, ever ſatisfactory, and pleaſing. It gains applauſe and love from the *beſt;* and in all diſintereſted caſes, from the very *worſt* of men. We may ſay of it, with juſtice, that it carrys with it a conſciouſneſs of merited love and approbation from all ſociety, from all intelligent creatures, and from whatever is original to all other intelligence. And if there be in nature any ſuch *original;* we may add, that the ſatisfaction which attends *intire affection*, is full and noble, in proportion to its *final object*, which contains all perfection; according to the ſenſe of *Theiſm* above-noted. For this, as has been ſhewn, is the reſult of *virtue.* And to have this INTIRE

AFFECTION or INTEGRITY of mind, is *to live according to nature*, and the dictates and rules of *supreme wisdom*. This is morality, justice, piety, and natural religion. Part 2. §. 1.

BUT lest this argument shou'd appear perhaps too *scholastically* stated, and in terms and phrases, which are not of familiar use; we may try whether possibly we can set it yet in a plainer light.

LET any-one, then, consider well those pleasures which he receives either in private retirement, contemplation, study, and converse *with himself*; or in mirth, jollity, and entertainment, with *others*; and he will find, that they are wholly founded in *an easy temper, free of harshness, bitterness, or distaste*; and in *A mind or reason well compos'd, quiet, easy within it-self, and such as can freely bear its own inspection and review*. Now such A MIND, and such A TEMPER, which fit and qualify for the enjoyment of the pleasures mention'd, must of necessity be owing to the *natural* and *good affections*. *Mind and temper.*

As to what relates to TEMPER, it may be consider'd thus. There is no state of outward prosperity, or flowing fortune, where *inclination* and *desire* are always satisfy'd, *fancy* and *humour* pleas'd. There are almost hourly some impediments or crosses to the appetite; some accidents or other *from without*; or something *from within*, to check the licentious course of the indulg'd affections. They are not always to be satisfy'd by mere indulgence. And when a life is guided by *fancy* only, there is sufficient ground of contrariety and disturbance. The very ordinary lassitudes, uneasinesses, and defects of disposition in the soundest body; the interrupted course of the humours, or spirits in the healthiest people; and the accidental disorders common to every constitution, are sufficient, we know, on many occasions, to breed uneasiness and distaste. And this, in time, must grow *TEMPER.*

Book 2. into a habit; where there is nothing to oppoſe its progreſs, and hinder its prevailing on the temper. Now the only ſound oppoſite to ILL HUMOUR, is *natural* and *kind affection*. For we may obſerve, that when the mind, upon reflection, reſolves at any time to ſuppreſs this diſturbance already riſen in the temper, and ſets about this reforming work with heartineſs, and in good earneſt; it can no otherwiſe accompliſh the undertaking, than by introducing into the affectionate part ſome gentle feeling of the ſocial and friendly kind; ſome enlivening motion of kindneſs, fellowſhip, complacency or love, to allay and convert that contrary motion of impatience and diſcontent.

Temper. If it be ſaid perhaps, that in the caſe before us, *religious affection* or *devotion* is a ſufficient and proper remedy; we anſwer, That 'tis according as the kind may happily prove. For if it be of the pleaſant and chearful ſort, 'tis of the very kind of *natural affection* it-ſelf: if it be of the * diſmal or fearful ſort; if it brings along with it any affection oppoſite to manhood, generoſity, courage, or free-thought; there will be nothing gain'd by this application: and the *remedy* will, in the iſſue, be undoubtedly found *worſe than the diſeaſe*. The ſevereſt reflections on our *duty*, and the conſideration merely of what is *by authority* and *under penalty* enjoin'd, will not by any means ſerve to calm us on this occaſion. The more diſmal our thoughts are on ſuch a ſubject, the worſe our temper will be, and the readier to diſcover it-ſelf in hartſineſs, and auſterity. If, perhaps, by compulſion, or thro any neceſſity or fear incumbent, a different carriage be at any time affected, or different maxims own'd; the practice at the bottom will be ſtill the ſame. If *the countenance* be compos'd; *the heart*, however, will not be chang'd. The ill paſſion may for the time be with-held from breaking into ac-

* VOL. I. *p.* 22, 23. And VOL. III. *p.* 81, 82, 86—90.

tion; but will not be ſubdu'd, or in the leaſt debilitated againſt the next occaſion. So that in ſuch a breaſt as this, whatever *devotion* there may be; 'tis likely there will in time be little of *an eaſy ſpirit*, or *good temper* remaining; and conſequently few ſlender enjoyments of *a mental kind*. Part 2. §. 1.

IF it be objected, on the other hand, that tho in melancholy circumſtances ill humour may prevail, yet in a courſe of outward proſperity, and in the height of fortune, there can nothing probably occur which ſhou'd thus ſour *the temper*, and give it ſuch diſreliſh as is ſuggeſted; we may conſider, that the moſt humour'd and indulg'd ſtate is apt to receive the moſt diſturbance from every diſappointment or ſmalleſt ail. And if provocations are eaſieſt rais'd, and the paſſions of anger, offence, and enmity, are found the higheſt in the moſt indulg'd ſtate of will and humour; there is ſtill the greater need of a ſupply from *ſocial affection*, to preſerve *the temper* from running into ſavageneſs and inhumanity. And this, the caſe of tyrants, and moſt unlimited potentates, may ſufficiently verify and demonſtrate.

NOW as to the other part of our conſideration, which relates to a MIND *or reaſon well compos'd and eaſy within it-ſelf*; upon what account this happineſs may be thought owing to *natural affection*, we may poſſibly reſolve our-ſelves, after this manner. It will be acknowledg'd that a creature, ſuch as man, who from ſeveral degrees of reflection has riſen to that capacity which we call reaſon and underſtanding; muſt in the very uſe of this his reaſoning faculty, be forc'd to receive reflections back into his mind of what paſſes in it-ſelf, as well as in the affections, or will; in ſhort, of whatſoever relates to his character, conduct, or behaviour amidſt his fellow-creatures, and in ſociety. Or ſhou'd he be of himſelf unapt; there are others ready to remind him, and refreſh his memory, in *MIND.* *Reflection.*

Book 2. this way of criticiſm. We have all of us remembrancers enow to help us in this work. Nor are the greateſt favourites of fortune exempted from this taſk of ſelf-inſpection. Even flattery it-ſelf, by making the view agreeable, renders us more attentive this way, and inſnares us in the habit. The vainer any perſon is, the more he has his eye inwardly fix'd upon himſelf; and is, after a certain manner, employ'd in this home-ſurvey. And when a true regard to our-ſelves cannot oblige us to this inſpection, a falſe regard to others, and a fondneſs for reputation raiſes a watchful jealouſy, and furniſhes us ſufficiently with acts of reflection on our own character and conduct.

In whatever manner we conſider of this, we ſhall find ſtill, that every reaſoning or reflecting creature is, by his nature, forc'd to endure the *review* of his own mind, and actions; and to have repreſentations of himſelf, and his inward affairs, conſtantly paſſing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his mind. Now as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off *natural affection*; ſo nothing can be more delightful to one who has preſerv'd it with ſincerity.

Conſcience. There are two things, which to a rational creature muſt be horridly offenſive and grievous; *viz.* "To have the reflection in his mind of any "*unjuſt* action or behaviour, which he knows to "be naturally *odious* and *ill-deſerving*: or, of any "fooliſh action or behaviour, which he knows to "be prejudicial to his own *intereſt* or *happineſs*."

Moral conſcience. The former of theſe is alone properly call'd conscience; whether in a moral, or religious ſenſe. For to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of it-ſelf, imply conſcience. No one is eſteem'd the more conſcientious for the fear of evil ſpirits, conjurations, enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjuſt, capricious, or deviliſh nature. Now to fear God any otherwiſe than as in conſequence of ſome juſtly blameable and im-

putable act, is to fear *a deviliſh* nature, not *a divine* one. Nor does the fear of hell, or a thouſand *terrors* of *the* DEITY imply conſcience; unleſs where there is an apprehenſion of what is *wrong*, *odious*, *morally deform'd*, and *ill-deſerving*. And where this is the caſe, there *conſcience* muſt have effect, and puniſhment of neceſſity be apprehended; even tho it be not expreſly threaten'd. Part 2. §. 1.

AND thus *religious conſcience* ſuppoſes *moral* or *natural conſcience*. And tho the former be underſtood to carry with it the fear of divine puniſhment; it has its force however from the apprehended moral deformity and odiouſneſs of any act, with reſpect purely to the divine preſence, and the natural veneration due to ſuch a ſuppos'd being. For in ſuch a preſence, the ſhame of villany or vice muſt have its force, independently on that further apprehenſion of the magiſterial capacity of ſuch a being, and his diſpenſation of particular rewards or puniſhments in a future ſtate.

IT has been already ſaid, that no creature can maliciouſly and intentionally *do ill*, without being ſenſible, at the ſame time, that he *deſerves ill*. And in this reſpect, every ſenſible creature may be ſaid to have *conſcience*. For with all mankind, and all intelligent creatures, this muſt ever hold, "That "*what* they know they deſerve from every-one, *that* "they neceſſarily muſt fear and expect from all." And thus ſuſpicions and ill apprehenſions muſt ariſe, with terror both of men and of *the* DEITY. But beſides this, there muſt in every rational creature, be yet farther *conſcience; viz.* from ſenſe of *deformity in what is thus ill-deſerving and unnatural*: and from *a conſequent ſhame or regret of incurring what is odious, and moves averſion.*

THERE ſcarcely is, or can be any creature, whom conſciouſneſs of villany, *as ſuch merely*, does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinouſly imputable, move, or affect. If there be ſuch a one; 'tis evident he muſt be abſolutely indif-

Book 2. ferent towards moral good or ill. If this indeed be his caſe; 'twill be allow'd he can be no-way capable of natural affection: if not of that, then neither of any ſocial pleaſure, or mental enjoyment, as ſhewn above; but on the contrary, he muſt be ſubject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill affection. So that to want CONSCIENCE, or *natural ſenſe of the odiouſneſs of crime and injuſtice*, is to be moſt of all miſerable in life: but where *conſcience*, or *ſenſe* of this ſort, remains; there, conſequently, whatever is committed againſt it, muſt of neceſſity, by means of reflection, as we have ſhewn, be continually ſhameful, grievous and offenſive.

Moral conſcience.

A MAN who in a paſſion happens to kill his companion, relents immediately on the ſight of what he has done. His revenge is chang'd into pity, and his hatred turn'd againſt himſelf. And this merely by the power of the object. On this account he ſuffers agonys; the ſubject of this continually occurs to him; and of this he has a conſtant ill remembrance and diſpleaſing conſciouſneſs. If on the other ſide, we ſuppoſe him *not* to relent or ſuffer any real concern or ſhame; then, either he has no ſenſe of the deformity of the crime and injuſtice, no natural affection, and conſequently no happineſs or peace within: or if he has any ſenſe of moral worth or goodneſs, it muſt be of a perplex'd and contradictory kind. He muſt purſue an inconſiſtent notion, idolize ſome *falſe ſpecies* of virtue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and abſurd. And how tormenting this muſt be to him, is eaſy to conceive. For never can ſuch *a phantom* as this be reduc'd to any certain form. Never can this PROTEUS of *honour* be held ſteddy, to one ſhape. The purſuit of it can only be vexatious and diſtracting. There is nothing beſides real virtue (as has been ſhewn) which can poſſibly hold any proportion to eſteem, approbation, or good conſcience. And he who, being led by falſe religion or prevailing cuſtom, has learnt to

Falſe conſcience.

eſteem or admire any thing as virtue which is not really ſuch; muſt either thro the inconſiſtency of ſuch an eſteem, and the perpetual immoralitys occaſion'd by it, come at laſt to loſe all conſcience, and ſo be miſerable in the worſt way: or, if he retains any conſcience at all, it muſt be of a kind never ſatisfactory, or able to beſtow content. For 'tis impoſſible that a cruel enthuaſiſt, or *bigot*, a perſecutor, or murderer, a *bravo*, a pirate, or any villain of leſs degree, who is falſe to the ſociety of mankind in general, and contradicts natural affection; ſhou'd have any fix'd principle at all, any real ſtandard or meaſure by which he can regulate his eſteem, or any ſolid reaſon by which to form his approbation of *any one* moral act. And thus the more he ſets up *honour*, or advances *zeal*; the worſe he renders his nature, and the more deteſtable his character. The more he engages in the love or admiration of any action or practice, as great and glorious, which is in it-ſelf morally ill and vitious; the more contradiction and ſelf-diſapprobation he muſt incur. For there being nothing more certain than this, "That no natural affection can "be contradicted, nor no unnatural one advanc'd, "without a prejudice in ſome degree to all natural "affection in general:" it muſt follow, "That "inward deformity growing greater, by the in- "couragement of unnatural affection; there muſt "be ſo much the more ſubject for diſſatisfactory re- "flection, the more any falſe principle of honour, "any falſe religion, or ſuperſtition prevails."

Part 2. §. 1.

Falſe conſcience.

So that whatever notions of this kind are cheriſh'd; or whatever character affected, which is contrary to moral equity, and leads to inhumanity, thro *a falſe conſcience*, or *wrong ſenſe of honour*, ſerves only to bring a man the more under the laſh of *real* and *juſt conſcience*, ſhame, and ſelf-reproach. Nor can any one, who, by any pretended authority, commits one ſingle immorality, be able to ſatisfy himſelf with any reaſon, why he ſhou'd not

Cauſes reproach from true.

Book 2. at another time be carry'd further, into all manner of villany; ſuch perhaps as he even abhors to think of. And this is a reproach which a mind muſt of neceſſity make to it-ſelf upon the leaſt violation of natural conſcience; in doing what is *morally deform'd, and ill-deſerving;* tho warranted by any example or precedent amongſt men, or by any ſuppos'd injunction or command of higher powers.

Conſcience from intereſt.

Now as for that other part of conſcience, *viz.* the remembrance of *what was at any time unreaſonably and fooliſhly done, in prejudice of one's real intereſt or happineſs:* This diſſatisfactory reflection muſt follow ſtill and have effect, whereſoever there is a ſenſe of moral deformity, contracted by crime, and injuſtice. For even where there is no ſenſe of moral deformity, as *ſuch merely;* there muſt be ſtill a ſenſe of the ill merit of it with reſpect to God and man. Or tho there were a poſſibility of excluding for ever all thoughts or ſuſpicions of any ſuperior powers, yet conſidering that this inſenſibility towards moral good or ill implies a total defect in natural affection, and that this defect can by no diſſimulation be conceal'd; 'tis evident that a man of this unhappy character muſt ſuffer a very ſenſible loſs in the friendſhip, truſt, and confidence of other men; and conſequently muſt ſuffer in his intereſt and outward happineſs. Nor can the ſenſe of this diſadvantage fail to occur to him; when he ſees, with regret, and envy, the better and more grateful terms of friendſhip, and eſteem, on which better people live with the reſt of mankind. Even therefore where natural affection is wanting; 'tis certain ſtill, that by immorality, neceſſarily happening thro want of ſuch affection, there muſt be diſturbance from conſcience of this ſort, *viz.* from *Senſe of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real intereſt and advantage.*

FROM all this we may eaſily conclude, how much our happineſs depends on *natural and good affection*. For if the chief happineſs be from the MENTAL PLASURES; and the chief *mental pleaſures* are ſuch as we have deſcrib'd, and are founded in *natural affection*; it follows, "That *to have* "*the natural affections, is to have the chief means* "*and power of ſelf-enjoyment, the higheſt poſſeſſi-* "*on and happineſs of life.*" Part 2. §. 1. *Concluſion drawn from the* MENTAL PLEASURES.

NOW as to the *pleaſures of* THE BODY, and the ſatisfactions belonging to *mere* SENSE; 'tis evident, they cannot poſſibly have their effect, or afford any valuable enjoyment, otherwiſe than by the means of *ſocial and natural affection*. *Pleaſures of the* SENSE. *Dependent alſo on natural affection.*

To *live well*, has no other meaning with ſome people, than to *eat* and *drink well*. And methinks 'tis an unwary conceſſion we make in favour of theſe pretended *good livers*, when we join with 'em, in honouring their way of life with the title of *living faſt*. As if they liv'd the faſteſt who took the greateſt pains to enjoy leaſt of life: for if our account of happineſs be right; the greateſt enjoyments in life are ſuch as theſe men paſs over in their haſte, and have ſcarce ever allow'd themſelves the liberty of taſting. *Vulgar Epicuriſm.*

BUT as conſiderable a part of voluptuouſneſs as is founded in *the palat*; and as notable as the ſcience is, which depends on it; one may juſtly preſume that the oſtentation of elegance, and a certain emulation and ſtudy how to excel in this ſumptuous art of living, goes very far in the raiſing ſuch a high idea of it, as is obſerv'd among the men of pleaſure. For were the circumſtances of a table and company, equipages, ſervices, and the reſt of the management withdrawn; there wou'd be hardly left any pleaſure worth acceptance, even in the opinion of the moſt debauch'd themſelves. *Imagination, fancy.*

THE very notion of *a debauch* (which is a ſally into whatever can be imagin'd of pleaſure and vo- *A debauch.*

Book 2. luptuouſneſs) carrys with it a plain reference to ſociety, or fellowſhip. It may be call'd a *ſurfeit*, or *exceſs of eating and drinking*, but hardly a *debauch* of that kind, when the exceſs is committed ſeparately, out of all ſociety, or fellowſhip. And one who abuſes himſelf in this way, is often call'd a *ſot*, but never a *debauchee*. The courtizans, and even the commoneſt of women, who live by proſtitution, know very well how neceſſary it is, that everyone whom they entertain with their beauty, ſhou'd believe there are ſatisfactions reciprocal; and that pleaſures are no leſs *given* than *receiv'd*. And were this imagination to be wholly taken away, there wou'd be hardly any of the groſſer ſort of mankind, who wou'd not perceive their remaining pleaſure to be of ſlender eſtimation.

Pleaſures of the ſenſe. Women.

WHO is there can well or long enjoy any thing, when *alone*, and abſtracted perfectly, even in his very mind and thought, from every thing belonging to ſociety? Who wou'd not, on ſuch terms as theſe, be preſently cloy'd by any ſenſual indulgence? Who wou'd not ſoon grow uneaſy with his pleaſure, however exquiſite, till he had found means to impart it, and make it *truly pleaſant* to him, by communicating, and ſharing it at leaſt with ſome *one* ſingle perſon? Let men imagine what they pleaſe; let 'em ſuppoſe themſelves ever ſo ſelfiſh; or deſire ever ſo much to follow the dictates of that narrow principle, by which they wou'd bring nature under reſtraint: nature will break out; and in agonys, diſquiets, and a diſtemper'd ſtate, demonſtrate evidently the ill conſequence of ſuch violence, the abſurdity of ſuch a device, and the puniſhment which belongs to ſuch a monſtrous and horrid endeavour.

Pleaſures of the ſenſe.

THUS, therefore, not only the *pleaſures of the mind*, but even thoſe of *the body*, depend on natural affection: inſomuch that where this is wanting, they not only loſe their force, but are in a manner converted into uneaſineſs and diſguſt.

The ſenſations which ſhou'd naturally afford contentment and delight, produce rather diſcontent and ſourneſs, and breed a weariſomneſs and reſtleſneſs in the diſpoſition. This we may perceive by the perpetual inconſtancy, and love of change, ſo remarkable in thoſe who have nothing communicative or friendly in their pleaſures. *Good fellowſhip*, in its abus'd ſenſe, ſeems indeed to have ſomething more conſtant and determining. The company ſupports the humour. 'Tis the ſame in *love*. A certain tenderneſs and generoſity of affection ſupports the paſſion, which otherwiſe wou'd inſtantly be chang'd. The perfecteſt beauty cannot, of it-ſelf, retain, or fix it. And that love which has no other foundation, but relies on this exterior kind, is ſoon turn'd into averſion. Satiety, perpetual diſguſt, and feveriſhneſs of deſire, attend thoſe who paſſionately ſtudy pleaſure. They beſt enjoy, who ſtudy to regulate their paſſions. And by this they will come to know how abſolute an incapacity there is in any thing ſenſual to pleaſe, or give contentment, where it depends not on ſomething friendly or ſocial, ſomething conjoin'd, and in affinity with *kind* or *natural affection*.

Part 2. §. 1.

Convertible into diſguſt; Variable: Inſupportable.

Pleaſures of the ſenſe.

BUT E'ER we conclude this article of *ſocial* or *natural affection*, we may take a general view of it, and bring it, once for all, into the ſcale; to prove what kind of * BALLANCE it helps to make *within*; and what the conſequence may be, of its *deficiency*, or *light weight*.

Ballance of the affections.

THERE is no-one of ever ſo little underſtanding in what belongs to a human conſtitution, who knows not that without action, motion, and employment, *the body* languiſhes, and is oppreſs'd; its nouriſhment turns to diſeaſe; the ſpirits, un-

* *Supra, p.* 60, 61.

Book 2. imploy'd abroad, help to consume the parts within; and nature, as it were, preys upon herself. In the same manner, the sensible and living part, *the soul* or *mind*, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burden'd and diseas'd. Its thoughts and passions being unnaturally with-held from their due objects, turn against it-self, and create the highest impatience and ill-humour.

Ballance of the affections.

In * *Brutes*, and other creatures, who have not the use of reason or reflection (at least not after the manner of mankind) 'tis so order'd in nature, that by their daily search after food, and their application either towards the business of their livelihood, or the affairs of their species or kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full imployment for their passion, according to that degree of agitation to which they are fitted, and which their constitution requires. If any one of these creatures be taken out of his natural laborious state, and plac'd amidst such a plenty as can profusely administer to all his appetites and wants; it may be observ'd, that as his circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his temper and passions have the same growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the accommodations of life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by nature, he is made to pay dear for 'em in another way; by losing his natural good disposition, and the orderliness of his kind or species.

Instance in the animal kinds.

This needs not to be demonstrated by particular instances. Whoever has the least knowledg of natural history, or has been an observer of the several breeds of creatures, and their ways of life and propagation, will easily understand this difference of orderliness between the *wild* and the *tame* of the same species. The latter acquire new habits;

* *Supra*, p. 60, 61. And *Infra*, p. 200, 201, &c. And VOL. III. *p.* 148, 149, &c.

and deviate from their original nature. They loſe even the common inſtinct and ordinary ingenuity of their kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilſt they continue in this pamper'd ſtate: but being turn'd to ſhift abroad, they reſume the natural affection and ſagacity of their ſpecies. They learn to unite in ſtricter fellowſhip; and grow more concern'd for their offſpring. They provide againſt the ſeaſons, and make the moſt of every advantage given by nature for the ſupport and maintenance of their particular ſpecies, againſt ſuch as are foreign and hoſtile. And thus as they grow buſy and imploy'd, they grow regular and good. Their petulancy and vice forſakes them with their idleneſs and eaſe. Part 2. §. 1. *Animal kinds.*

IT happens with *mankind*, that whilſt ſome are by neceſſity confin'd to labour, others are provided with abundance of all things, by the pains and labour of inferiors. Now, if among the ſuperior and eaſy ſort, there be not ſomething of fit and proper imployment rais'd in the room of what is wanting in common labour and toil; if inſtead of an application to any ſort of work, ſuch as has a good and honeſt end in ſociety, (as letters, ſciences, arts, huſbandry, publick affairs, œconomy, or the like) there be a thorow neglect of all duty or imployment; a ſettled idleneſs, ſupineneſs, and inactivity; this of neceſſity muſt occaſion a moſt relax'd and diſſolute ſtate: it muſt produce a total diſorder of the paſſions, and break out in the ſtrangeſt irregularitys imaginable. *Mankind.*

WE ſee the enormous growth of luxury in capital citys, ſuch as have been long the ſeat of empire. We ſee what improvements are made in vice of every kind, where numbers of men are maintain'd in lazy opulence, and wanton plenty. 'Tis otherwiſe with thoſe who are taken up in honeſt and due imployment, and have been well inur'd to it from their youth. This we may obſerve in the hardy

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Ballance of the affections.

remote provincials, the inhabitants of ſmaller towns, and the induſtrious ſort of common people; where 'tis rare to meet with any inſtances of thoſe irregularitys, which are known in courts and palaces, and in the rich foundations of eaſy and pamper'd prieſts.

Now if what we have advanc'd concerning an *inward conſtitution* be real and juſt; if it be true that nature works by a juſt order and regulation as well in the paſſions and affections, as in the limbs and organs which ſhe forms; if it appears withal, that ſhe has ſo conſtituted this *inward part*, that nothing is ſo eſſential to it as *exerciſe*; and no exerciſe ſo eſſential as that of *ſocial* or *natural affection*: it follows, that where this is remov'd or weaken'd, the *inward part* muſt neceſſarily ſuffer and be impair'd. Let indolence, indifference, or inſenſibility, be ſtudy'd as an art, or cultivated with the utmoſt care; the paſſions thus reſtrain'd will force their priſon, and in one way or another procure their liberty, and find full employment. They will be ſure to create to themſelves *unuſual* and *unnatural* exerciſe, where they are cut off from ſuch as is *natural* and *good*. And thus in the room of orderly and natural affection, new and unnatural muſt be rais'd, and all *inward order* and *OEconomy* deſtroy'd.

OEconomy.

One muſt have a very imperfect idea of the order of nature in the formation and ſtructure of animals, to imagine that ſo great a *principle*, ſo fundamental a part as that of *natural affection* ſhou'd poſſibly be loſt or impair'd, without any inward ruin or ſubverſion of the temper and frame of mind.

Fabrick.

Whoever is the leaſt vers'd in this moral kind of architecture, will find the inward *Fabrick* ſo adjuſted, and *the whole* ſo nicely built; that the barely extending of a ſingle paſſion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable ruin and miſery. He will find this

experienc'd in the ordinary caſe of phrenzy, and diſtraction; when the mind, dwelling too long upon *one* ſubject (whether proſperous or calamitous) ſinks under the weight of it, and proves what the neceſſity is, of a due *ballance*, and counterpoiſe in the affections. He will find, that in every different creature, and diſtinct ſex, there is a different and diſtinct *order*, *ſet*, or *ſuit* of paſſions; proportionable to the different order of life, the different functions and capacitys aſſign'd to each. As the operations and effects are different, ſo are the ſprings and cauſes in each ſyſtem. The inſide work is fitted to the outward action and performance. So that where habits or affections are diſlodg'd, miſplac'd, or chang'd; where thoſe belonging to one ſpecies are intermix'd with thoſe belonging to another, there muſt of neceſſity be confuſion and diſturbance within. Part 2. §. 1. *Ballance of the affections.*

ALL this we may obſerve eaſily, by comparing the more perfect with the imperfect natures, ſuch as are imperfect from their birth, by having ſuffer'd violence *within*, in their earlieſt *form*, and inmoſt *matrix*. We know how it is with *monſters*, ſuch as are compounded of different kinds, or different ſexes. Nor are they leſs *monſters*, who are miſhapen or diſtorted in an inward part. The ordinary animals appear unnatural and monſtrous, when they loſe their proper inſtincts, forſake their kind, neglect their offspring, and pervert thoſe functions or capacitys beſtow'd by nature. How wretched muſt it be, therefore, for MAN, of all other creatures, to loſe that *ſenſe*, and *feeling*, which is proper to him *as a* MAN, and ſutable to his character, and genius? How unfortunate muſt it be for a creature, whoſe dependance on ſociety is greater than any others, to loſe that *natural affection* by which he is prompted to the good and intereſt of his ſpecies, and community? Such indeed is man's natural ſhare of this *affection*, that *Monſters.*

Book 2. *he*, of all other creatures, is plainly the leaſt able to bear ſolitude. Nor is any thing more apparent, than that there is naturally in every man ſuch a degree of ſocial affection as inclines him to ſeek the familiarity and friendſhip of his fellows. 'Tis here that he lets looſe his paſſion, and gives reins to a deſire which can hardly by any ſtruggle or inward violence be with-held; or if it be, is ſure to create a ſadneſs, dejection, and melancholy in the mind. For whoever is unſociable, and voluntarily ſhuns ſociety, or commerce with the world, muſt of neceſſity be moroſe and ill-natur'd. He, on the other ſide, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his temper the ill effects of this reſtraint. The inclination, when ſuppreſs'd, breeds diſcontent; and on the contrary affords a healing and enlivening joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full ſcope: as we may ſee particularly, when after a time of ſolitude and long abſence, the heart is open'd, the mind diſburden'd, and the ſecrets of the breaſt unfolded to a boſom-friend.

THIS we ſee yet more remarkably inſtanc'd in perſons of the moſt elevated ſtations; even in princes, monarchs, and thoſe who ſeem by their condition to be above ordinary human commerce, and who affect a ſort of diſtant ſtrangeneſs from the reſt of mankind. But their carriage is not the ſame towards *all* men. The wiſer and better ſort, it's true, are often held at a diſtance; as unfit for their intimacy, or ſecret truſt. But to compenſate this, there are others ſubſtituted in their room, who tho they have the leaſt merit, and are perhaps the moſt vile and contemptible of men, are ſufficient, however, to ſerve the purpoſe of an imaginary friendſhip, and can become *favourites* in form. Theſe are the ſubjects of humanity in *the great*. For theſe we ſee them often in concern and pain: in theſe they eaſily confide: to theſe they can with pleaſure communicate their power

Ballance of the affections.

and greatneſs, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful; as rejoicing in the action it-ſelf: having no intention or aim beyond it; and their intereſt, in reſpect of policy, often ſtanding a quite contrary way. But where neither the love of mankind, nor the paſſion for favourites prevails, the tyrannical temper fails not to ſhew it-ſelf in its proper colours, and to the life, with all the bitterneſs, cruelty, and miſtruſt, which belong to that ſolitary and gloomy ſtate of un-communicative and un-friendly greatneſs. Nor needs there any particular proof from hiſtory, or preſent time, to ſecond this remark. Part 2. §. 2.

THUS it may appear, how much NATURAL AFFECTION is predominant; how it is inwardly join'd to us, and implanted in our natures; how interwoven with our other paſſions; and how eſſential to that regular motion and courſe of our affections, on which our happineſs and ſelf-enjoyment ſo immediately depend.

AND thus we have demonſtrated, That as, *on one ſide*, TO HAVE THE NATURAL AND GOOD AFFECTIONS, IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF MEANS AND POWER OF SELF-ENJOYMENT: So, *on the other ſide*, TO WANT THEM, IS CERTAIN MISERY, AND ILL.

SECT. II.

WE are now to prove, That BY HAVING THE SELF-PASSIONS TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE BECOMES MISERABLE. *SECOND proof; from the ſelf-paſſions.*

IN order to this, we muſt, according to method, enumerate thoſe home-affections, which redate to the private intereſt or ſeparate œconomy of the creature: ſuch as *love of life*;——*reſentment of injury*;——*pleaſure, or appetite towards nouriſhment and the means of generation*;——*intereſt, or*

Book 2. *desire* of those *conveniences*, by which we are well *provided for*, and *maintain'd*;——*emulation*, or *love of praise and honour*;——*indolence*, or *love of ease and rest*.——These are the affections which relate to the private system, and constitute whatever we call *interestedness* or *self-love*.

Self-passions.

Now these affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to social life, nor a hindrance to virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become *cowardice*,—*revengefulness*,—*luxury*,—*avarice*,—*vanity* and *ambition*,—*sloth*;——and, as such, are own'd vitious and ill, with respect to human society. How they are ill also with respect to the private person, and are to his own disadvantage as well as that of the publick, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

Love of life;

IF THERE were any of these self-passions, which for the good and happiness of the creature might be oppos'd to *natural affection*, and allow'd to over-ballance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE wou'd have the best pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no passion which, by having much allow'd to it, is the occasion of more disorder and misery.

THERE is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed than this; "that *life* may some-"times be even a misfortune and misery." To inforce the continuance of it in creatures reduc'd to such extremity, is esteem'd the greatest cruelty. And tho religion forbids that any-one shou'd be his own reliever, yet if by some fortunate accident, death offers *of it-self*, it is embrac'd as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest friends and relations often rejoice at the release of one intirely belov'd; even tho he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline death, and endeavour the utmost prolongment of his own un-eligible state.

SINCE *life*, therefore, may frequently prove a misfortune and misery; and since it naturally becomes so, by being only prolong'd to the infirmitys of old age; since there is nothing, withal, more common than to see life over-valu'd, and purchas'd at such a cost as it can never justly be thought worth: it follows evidently, that the passion itself (viz. *the love of life*, and *abhorrence or dread of death*) if beyond a certain degree, and over-ballancing in the temper of any creature, must lead him directly against his own interest; make him, upon occasion, become the greatest enemy to himself; and necessitate him to act as such. Part 2. §. 2. *Love of life.*

BUT tho it were allow'd the interest and good of a creature, by all courses and means whatsoever, in any circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve *life*; yet wou'd it be against his interest still to have this passion in a high degree. For it wou'd by this means prove ineffectual, and no-way conducing to its end. Various instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive *fear* betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? 'Tis impossible for any-one to act sensibly, and with presence of mind, even in his own preservation and defence, when he is strongly press'd by such a passion. On all extraordinary emergences, 'tis *courage* and *resolution* saves; whilst *cowardice* robs us of the means of safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive facultys, but even runs us to the brink of ruin, and makes us meet that evil which of it-self wou'd never have invaded us.

BUT were the *consequences* of this passion less injurious than we have represented; it must be allow'd still that *in it-self* it can be no other than miserable; if it be misery to feel cowardice, and be haunted by those specters and horrors which are proper to the character of one who has a thorow dread of death. For 'tis not only when dangers

Book 2. happen, and hazards are incurr'd, that this ſort of *fear* oppreſſes and diſtracts. If it in the leaſt prevails, it gives no quarter, ſo much as at the ſafeſt ſtilleſt hour of retreat and quiet. Every object ſuggeſts thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is leaſt obſerv'd by others; and enters at all times into the pleaſanteſt parts of life; ſo as to corrupt and poiſon all enjoyment, and content. One may ſafely aver, that by reaſon of this paſſion alone, many a life, if inwardly and cloſely view'd, wou'd be found to be thorowly miſerable, tho attended with all other circumſtances which in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this, the meanneſſes, and baſe condeſcenſions, occaſion'd by ſuch a paſſionate concern for living; when we conſider how by means of it we are driven to actions we can never view without diſlike, and forc'd by degrees from our natural conduct, into ſtill greater crookedneſſes and perplexity; there is no-one, ſurely, ſo diſingenuous as not to allow, that *life*, in this caſe, becomes a ſorry purchaſe, and is paſs'd with little freedom or ſatisfaction. For how can this be otherwiſe, whilſt every thing which is generous and worthy, even the chief *reliſh*, *happineſs*, and *good* of life, is *for life's ſake* abandon'd and renounc'd?

Love of life.

AND thus it ſeems evident, "That to have this "affection of DESIRE and LOVE OF LIFE, too "intenſe, or beyond a moderate degree, is againſt "the intereſt of a creature, and contrary to his "*happineſs* and *good*."

Reſentment. THERE is another paſſion very different from that of *fear*, and which in a certain degree is equally preſervative to us, and conducing to our ſafety. As *that* is ſerviceable, in prompting us to ſhun danger; ſo is *this*, in fortifying us againſt it, and enabling us to repel injury, and reſiſt violence when offer'd. 'Tis true, that according to ſtrict

virtue, and a juſt regulation of the affections in a wiſe and virtuous man, ſuch efforts towards action amount not to what is juſtly ſtil'd *paſſion* or *commotion*. A man of courage may be cautious without real *fear*. And a man of temper may reſiſt or puniſh without *anger*. But in ordinary characters there muſt neceſſarily be ſome mixture of the real paſſions themſelves; which however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus ANGER in a manner becomes neceſſary. 'Tis by this paſſion that one creature offering violence to another, is deter'd from the execution; whilſt he obſerves how the attempt affects his fellow; and knows by the very ſigns which accompany this riſing motion, that if the injury be carry'd further, it will not paſs eaſily, or with impunity. 'Tis this paſſion withal, which after violence and hoſtility executed, rouzes a creature in oppoſition, and aſſiſts him in returning like hoſtility and harm on the invader. For thus, as *rage* and *deſpair* increaſe, a creature grows ſtill more terrible; and being urg'd to the greateſt extremity, finds a degree of ſtrength and boldneſs unexperienc'd till then, and which had never riſen except thro the height of provocation. As to this affection therefore, notwithſtanding its immediate aim be indeed *the ill* or puniſhment *of another*, yet it is plainly of the ſort of thoſe which tend to the advantage and intereſt of the ſelf-ſyſtem, *the animal himſelf*; and is withal in other reſpects contributing to the good and intereſt of the ſpecies. But there is hardly need we ſhould explain how miſchievous and ſelf-deſtructive ANGER is, if it be what we commonly underſtand by that word: if it be ſuch a paſſion as is raſh, and violent in the inſtant of provocation; or ſuch as imprints it-ſelf deeply, and cauſes a ſettled *revenge*, and an eager vindicative purſuit. No wonder indeed that ſo much is done in mere *revenge*, and under the weight of a deep *reſentment*,

Part 2. §. 2.

Reſentment.

Book 2. when the relief and ſatisfaction found in that indulgence is no other than the aſſuaging of the moſt torturous pain, and alleviating the moſt weighty and preſſing ſenſation of miſery. The pain of this ſort being for a-while remov'd or alleviated by the accompliſhment of the deſire, in the ill of another, leaves indeed behind it the perception of a delicious eaſe, and an overflowing of ſoft and pleaſing ſenſation. Yet is this, in truth, no better than the *rack* it-ſelf. For whoever has experienc'd racking pains, can tell in what manner a ſudden ceſſation or reſpite is us'd to affect him. From hence are thoſe untoward delights of perverſeneſs, frowardneſs, and an envenom'd malignant diſpoſition, acting at its liberty. For this is only *a perpetual aſſuaging of* ANGER *perpetually renew'd*. In other characters, the *paſſion* ariſes not ſo ſuddenly, or on ſlight cauſes; but being once mov'd, is not ſo eaſily quieted. The dormant *fury*, REVENGE, being rais'd once, and wrought up to her higheſt pitch, reſts not till ſhe attains her end; and that attain'd, is eaſy, and repoſes; making our ſucceeding relief and eaſe ſo much the more enjoy'd, as our preceding anguiſh and incumbent pain was of long duration, and bitter ſenſe. Certainly if among *lovers*, and in the language of gallantry, the ſucceſs of ardent love is call'd the *aſſuaging of a pain*; this other ſucceſs may be far more juſtly term'd ſo. However ſoft or flattering the former pain may be eſteem'd, this latter ſurely can be *no pleaſing one*: nor can it be poſſibly eſteem'd other than ſound and thorow wretchedneſs, a grating and diſguſtful feeling, without the leaſt mixture of any thing ſoft, gentle, or agreeable.

'Tis not very neceſſary to mention the ill effects of this paſſion, in reſpect of our *minds*, or *bodys*, our private condition, or *circumſtances* of life. By theſe particulars we may grow too tedious. Theſe are of the moral ſort of ſubjects, join'd commonly

with religion, and treated ſo rhetorically, and with ſuch inforc'd repetition in publick, as to be apt to raiſe the ſatiety of mankind. What has been ſaid, may be enough perhaps to make this evident, "That to be ſubject to ſuch a paſſion as we have "been mentioning, is, in reality, to be very un-"happy." And, "That the habit it-ſelf is a *diſ-"eaſe* of the worſt ſort; from which *miſery* is in-"ſeparable." Part 2. §. 2.

NOW AS to *luxury*, and what the world calls PLEASURE: were it true (as has been prov'd the contrary) that the moſt conſiderable enjoyments were thoſe merely of *the ſenſe;* and were it true, withal, that thoſe enjoyments of the ſenſe lay in certain outward things capable of yielding always a due and certain portion of pleaſure, according to their degree and quality; it wou'd then follow, that the certain way to obtain happineſs, wou'd be to procure largely of theſe ſubjects, to which happineſs and pleaſure were thus infallibly annex'd. But however faſhionably we may apply the notion of *good living*, 'twill hardly be found that our inward facultys are able to keep pace with theſe outward ſupplys of a luxuriant fortune. And if the natural diſpoſition and aptneſs *from within* be not concurring; 'twill be in vain that theſe ſubjects are thus multiply'd *from abroad*, and acquir'd with ever ſo great facility. *PLEASURE. Luxury.*

IT may be obſerv'd in thoſe who by exceſs have gain'd a conſtant nauſeating and diſtaſte, that they have nevertheleſs as conſtant a craving or eagerneſs of ſtomach. But the *appetite* of this kind is *falſe* and *unnatural*; as is that of thirſt ariſing from a fever, or contracted by habitual debauch. Now the ſatisfactions of the *natural appetite*, in a plain way, are infinitely beyond thoſe indulgences of the moſt refin'd and elegant *luxury*. This is often perceiv'd by the luxurious themſelves. It has been experienc'd in people bred after the ſumptuous way,

Book 2. and us'd never to wait, but to prevent appetite; that when by any new turn of life they came to fall into a more natural courſe, or for a while, as on a journey, or a day of ſport, came accidentally to experience the ſweet of a plain diet, recommended by due abſtinence and exerciſe; they have with freedom own'd, that it was then they receiv'd the higheſt ſatisfaction and delight which *a table* cou'd poſſibly afford.

On the other ſide, it has been as often remark'd in perſons accuſtom'd to an active life, and healthful exerciſe; that having once thorowly experienc'd this plainer and more natural diet, they have upon a following change of life regretted their loſs, and undervalu'd the pleaſures receiv'd from all the delicacys of *luxury*, in compariſon with thoſe remember'd ſatisfactions of a preceding ſtate. 'Tis plain, that by urging nature, forcing the appetite, and inciting ſenſe, the keenneſs of the natural ſenſations is loſt. And tho thro vice or ill habit the ſame ſubjects of appetite may, every day, be ſought with greater ardour; they are enjoy'd with leſs ſatisfaction. Tho the impatience of abſtaining be greater; the pleaſure of indulgence is really leſs. The *palls* or *nauſeatings* which continually intervene, are of the worſt and moſt hateful kind of ſenſation. Hardly is there any thing taſted which is wholly free from this ill reliſh of a ſurfeited ſenſe and ruin'd appetite. So that inſtead of a conſtant and flowing delight afforded in ſuch a ſtate of life, the very ſtate it-ſelf is in reality a ſickneſs and infirmity, a corruption of pleaſure, and deſtructive of every natural and agreeable ſenſation. So far is it from being true; "That in this licentious courſe we "*enjoy* LIFE *beſt*, or are likely to *make the moſt* "of it."

PLEASURE.

Luxury.

As to the conſequences of ſuch an indulgence; how fatal to *the body*, by diſeaſes of many kinds, and to *the mind*, by ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity; this needs not any explanation.

THE conſequences *as to intereſt* are plain enough. Such a ſtate of impotent and unreſtrain'd deſire, as it increaſes our wants, ſo it muſt ſubject us to a greater dependence on others. Our private circumſtances, however plentiful or eaſy they may be, can leſs eaſily content us. Ways and means muſt be invented to procure what may adminiſter to ſuch an imperious *luxury*, as forces us to ſacrifice honour to fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of conduct. The injurys we do ourſelves, by exceſs and unforbearance, are then ſurely apparent, when thro an impotence of this ſort, and an impoſſibility of reſtraint, we do what we our-ſelves declare to be deſtructive to us. But theſe are matters obvious of themſelves. And from leſs than what has been ſaid, 'tis eaſy to conclude, "That *luxury*, "*riot*, and *debauch*, are contrary to real intereſt, "and to the true enjoyment of life." Part 2. §. 2. PLEASURE.

THERE is another *luxury* ſuperior to the kind we have been mentioning, and which in ſtrictneſs can ſcarce be call'd a *ſelf-paſſion*, ſince the ſole end of it is the advantage and promotion of the ſpecies. But whereas all other ſocial affections are join'd only with *a mental pleaſure*, and founded in mere kindneſs and love; this has more added to it, and is join'd with *a pleaſure of ſenſe*. Such concern and care has nature ſhewn for the ſupport and maintenance of the ſeveral ſpecies, that by a certain *indigence* and kind of neceſſity of their natures, they are made to regard the propagation of their kind. Now whether it be the intereſt or good of the animal to feel this *indigence* beyond a natural and ordinary degree; is what we may conſider. AMOURS.

HAVING already ſaid ſo much concerning *natural* and *unnatural appetite*, there needs leſs to be ſaid on this occaſion. If it be allow'd, that to all other pleaſures there is a meaſure of appetite belonging, which cannot poſſibly be exceeded without prejudice to the creature, even in his very capa- PLEASURE. AMOURS.

Book 2. city of enjoying pleaſure; it will hardly be thought that there is no certain limit or juſt boundary of this other appetite of *the* AMOROUS *kind*. There are other ſorts of ardent ſenſations accidentally experienc'd, which we find pleaſant and acceptable whilſt they are held within a certain degree; but which, as they increaſe, grow oppreſſive and intolerable. *Laughter* provok'd by titillation, grows an exceſſive pain; tho it retains ſtill the ſame features of delight and pleaſure. And tho in the caſe of that particular kind of *itch* which belongs to a diſtemper nam'd from that defect, there are ſome who, far from diſliking the ſenſation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed ſuch among the more refin'd ſort, even of thoſe who make pleaſure their chief ſtudy, and higheſt good.

Now if there be in every ſenſation of mere pleaſure, a certain pitch or degree of ardour, which by being further advanc'd, comes the nearer to mere rage and fury; if there be indeed a neceſſity of ſtopping *ſomewhere*, and determining on *ſome* boundary for the paſſion; where can we fix our ſtandard, or how regulate our-ſelves but *with regard to nature*, beyond which there is no meaſure or rule of things? Now *nature* may be known from what we ſee of the natural ſtate of creatures, and of man himſelf, when unprejudic'd by vitious education.

WHERE happily any-one is bred to a natural life, inur'd to honeſt induſtry and ſobriety, and un-accuſtom'd to any thing immoderate or intemperate; he is found to have his appetites and inclinations of this ſort at command. Nor are they on this account leſs able to afford him the pleaſure or enjoyment of each kind. On the contrary; as they are more ſound, healthy, and un-injur'd by exceſs and abuſe, they muſt afford him proportionate ſatisfaction. So that were both theſe ſenſations to be experimentally compar'd; that of *a vitious courſe* which belong'd to one who liv'd a na-

tural and regular life, and that of *a vitious course* which belong'd to one who was relax'd and diſſolute; there is no queſtion but judgment wou'd be given in favour of the former, without regard to conſequences, and only with reſpect to the very pleaſure of ſenſe it-ſelf. Part 2. §. 2.

As to the conſequences of this vice, with reſpect to the health and vigour of *the body*; there is no need to mention any thing. The injury it does *the mind*, tho leſs notic'd, is yet greater. The hinderance of all improvement, the wretched waſte of time, the effeminacy, ſloth, ſupineneſs, the diſorder and looſeneſs of a thouſand paſſions, thro ſuch a relaxation and enervating of the mind; are all of them effects ſufficiently apparent, when reflected on. *PLEASURE. Amours.*

WHAT the diſadvantages are of this intemperance, in reſpect of intereſt, ſociety, and the world; and what the advantages are of a contrary ſobriety, and ſelf-command, wou'd be to little purpoſe to mention. 'Tis well known there can be no ſlavery greater than what is conſequent to the dominion and rule of ſuch a paſſion. Of all other, it is the leaſt manageable by favour or conceſſion, and aſſumes the moſt from privilege and indulgence. What it coſts us in *the modeſty* and *ingenuity* of our natures, and in the faith and honeſty of our characters, is as eaſily apprehended by any-one who will reflect. And it will from hence appear, "That there is no paſſion, which in its extrava-"gance and exceſs more neceſſarily occaſions diſ-"order and unhappineſs."

NOW AS to that paſſion which is eſteem'd peculiarly *intereſting*; as having for its aim the poſſeſſion of wealth, and what we call a *ſettlement* or *fortune* in the world: if the regard towards this kind be moderate, and in a reaſonable degree; if it occaſions no paſſionate purſuit, nor raiſes any ardent deſire or appetite, there is nothing in this caſe *INTEREST.*

Book 2. which is not compatible with virtue, and even ſuitable and beneficial to ſociety. The publick as well as private ſyſtem is advanc'd by the induſtry, which this affection excites. But if it grows at length into a real *paſſion;* the injury and miſchief it does the publick, is not greater than that which it creates to the perſon himſelf. Such a one is in reality a ſelf-oppreſſor, and lies heavier on himſelf than he can ever do on mankind.

How far a COVETING or AVARITIOUS TEMPER is miſerable, needs not, ſurely, be explain'd. Who knows not how ſmall a portion of worldly matters is ſufficient for a man's ſingle uſe and convenience; and how much his occaſions and wants might be contracted and reduc'd, if a juſt frugality were ſtudy'd, and temperance and a natural life came once to be purſu'd with half that application, induſtry and art, which is beſtow'd on ſumptuouſneſs and luxury? Now if temperance be in reality ſo advantageous, and the practice as well as the conſequences of it ſo pleaſing and happy, as has been before expreſs'd; there is little need, on the other ſide, to mention any thing of the miſerys attending thoſe covetous and eager deſires after things which have no bounds or rule; as being out of *nature*, beyond which there can be no limits to deſire. For where ſhall we once ſtop, when we are beyond this boundary? How ſhall we fix or aſcertain a thing wholly *unnatural* and *unreaſonable?* Or what method, what regulation ſhall we ſet to mere imagination, or the exorbitancy of fancy, in adding expence to expence, or poſſeſſion to poſſeſſion?

Intereſt.

HENCE that known reſtleſneſs of *covetous* and eager minds, in whatever ſtate or degree of fortune they are plac'd; there being no thorow or real ſatisfaction, but a kind of infatiableneſs belonging to this condition. For 'tis impoſſible there ſhou'd be any *real enjoyment*, except in conſequence of *na-*

tural and *juſt appetite*. Nor do we readily call that an *enjoyment* of wealth or of honour, when thro covetouſneſs or ambition, the deſire is ſtill forward, and can never reſt ſatisfy'd with its gains. But againſt this vice of COVETOUSNESS, there is enough ſaid continually in the world; and in our common way of ſpeaking, "*A covetous*, and *a* "*miſerable temper*, has, in reality, one and the "ſame ſignification." Part 2. §. 2.

NOR IS there leſs ſaid, abroad, as to the ills of that other aſpiring temper, which exceeds an honeſt *emulation*, or *love of praiſe*, and paſſes the bounds even of *vanity* and *conceit*. Such is that paſſion which breaks into an enormous PRIDE and AMBITION. Now if we conſider once the eaſe, happineſs, and ſecurity which attend a *modeſt diſpoſition* and *quiet mind*, ſuch as is of eaſy ſelf-command, fitted to every ſtation in ſociety, and able to ſute it-ſelf with any reaſonable circumſtances whatever; 'twill, on the firſt view, preſent us with the moſt agreeable and winning character. Nor will it be found neceſſary after this to call to mind the excellence and good of *moderation*, or the miſchief and ſelf-injury of immoderate deſires, and conceited fond imaginations of perſonal advantage, in ſuch things as titles, honours, precedencys, fame, *glory*, or *vulgar aſtoniſhment, admiration and applauſe*. *Emulation.*

THIS too is obvious, that as the deſires of this kind are rais'd, and become impetuous, and out of our command; ſo the averſions and fears of the contrary part, grow proportionably ſtrong and violent, and the temper accordingly ſuſpicious, jealous, captious, ſubject to apprehenſions from all events, and uncapable of bearing the leaſt repulſe or ordinary diſappointment. And hence it may be concluded, "That all reſt and ſecurity *as to what is* "*future*, and all peace, contentedneſs and eaſe *as to* "*what is preſent*, is forfeited by the aſpiring paſ-

Book 2. " ſions of this emulous kind; and by having the
" appetites towards *glory* and *outward appearance*
" thus tranſporting and beyond command."

Indolence. THERE is a certain temper plac'd often in oppoſition to thoſe eager and aſpiring aims of which we have been ſpeaking. Not that it really excludes either the paſſion of *covetouſneſs* or *ambition;* but becauſe it hinders their effects, and keeps them from breaking into open action. 'Tis this paſſion, which by ſoothing the mind, and ſoftning it into an EXCESSIVE LOVE of REST and INDOLENCE, renders high attempts impracticable, and repreſents as inſuperable the difficultys of a painful and laborious courſe towards wealth and honours. Now tho an inclination to eaſe, and a love of moderate receſs and reſt from action, be as natural and uſeful to us as the inclination we have towards ſleep; yet an exceſſive love of reſt, and a contracted averſion to action and imployment, muſt be a diſeaſe in the mind equal to that of a lethargy in the body.

How neceſſary action and exerciſe are to the body, may be judg'd by the difference we find between thoſe conſtitutions which are accuſtom'd, and thoſe which are wholly ſtrangers to it; and by the different health and complexion which labour and due exerciſe create, in compariſon with that habit of body we ſee conſequent to an indulg'd ſtate of indolence and reſt. Nor is the lazy habit ruinous to *the body* only. The languiſhing diſeaſe corrupts all the enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy ſenſe, and carrys its infection into *the mind;* where it ſpreads a worſe contagion. For however the body may for a-while hold out, 'tis impoſſible that the mind, in which the diſtemper is ſeated, can eſcape without an immediate affliction and diſorder. The habit begets a tediouſneſs and anxiety, which influences the whole temper, and converts the unnatural reſt into an un-

happy ſort of activity, ill humour, and ſpleen: of which there has been enough ſaid above, where we conſider'd the want of a due *ballance* in the affections. Part 2. §. 2. *Indolence.*

'TIS certain that as in *the body*, when no labour or natural exerciſe is us'd, the ſpirits which want their due imployment, turn againſt the conſtitution, and find work for themſelves in a deſtructive way; ſo in *a ſoul*, or *mind*, unexercis'd, and which languiſhes for want of proper action and employment, the thoughts and affections being obſtructed in their due courſe, and depriv'd of their natural energy, raiſe diſquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerneſs and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more impotent in paſſion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepar'd fuel, readily takes fire by the leaſt ſpark.

As to *intereſt*, how far it is here concern'd; how wretched that ſtate is, in which by this habit a man is plac'd, towards all the circumſtances and affairs of life, when at any time he is call'd to action; how ſubjected he muſt be to all inconveniences, wanting to himſelf, and depriv'd of the aſſiſtance of others; whilſt being unfit for all offices and dutys of ſociety, he yet of any other perſon moſt needs the help of it, as being leaſt able to aſſiſt and ſupport himſelf; all this is obvious. And thus 'tis evident, "That to have this over-biaſſing "inclination towards *reſt*, this *ſlothful*, *ſoft*, or "*effeminate* temper, averſe to labour and imploy-"ment, is to have an unavoidable *miſchief*, and "*attendant plague*."

THUS have we conſider'd the *ſelf-paſſions*; and what the conſequence is of their riſing beyond a moderate degree. Theſe affections, as ſelf-intereſting as they are, can often, we ſee, become contrary to our real intereſt. They betray us into moſt misfortunes, and into the greateſt of unhappineſſes, that of *Self-paſſions in general.*

Book 2. a profligate and abject character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occaſion that a creature in proportion becomes mean and low. They are original to that which we call *ſelfiſhneſs*, and give riſe to that ſordid diſpoſition of which we have already ſpoken. It appears there can be nothing ſo miſerable in it-ſelf, or ſo wretched in its conſequence, as to be thus impotent in temper, thus maſter'd by paſſion, and, by means of it, brought under the moſt ſervile ſubjection to the world.

Self-paſſions in general.

'Tis evident withal, that as this *ſelfiſhneſs* increaſes in us, ſo muſt a *ſubtlety*, and *feignedneſs* of carriage, which naturally accompanys it. And thus the candour and ingenuity of our natures, the eaſe and freedom of our minds muſt be forfeited; all *truſt* and *confidence* in a manner loſt; and *ſuſpicions*, *jealouſys*, and *envys* multiply'd. A *ſeparate end* and *intereſt* muſt be every day more ſtrongly form'd in us; *generous views* and *motives* laid aſide: and the more we are thus ſenſibly diſjoin'd every day from ſociety and our fellows; the worſe opinion we ſhall have of thoſe uniting paſſions which bind us in ſtrict alliance and amity with others. Upon theſe terms we muſt of courſe endeavour to ſilence and ſuppreſs our natural and good affections: ſince they are ſuch as wou'd carry us to the good of ſociety, againſt what we fondly conceive to be our private good and intereſt; as has been ſhewn.

Now if theſe SELFISH PASSIONS, beſides what other ill they are the occaſion of, are withal the certain means of loſing us our *natural affections*; then (by what has been prov'd before) 'tis evident,

" That they muſt be the certain means of loſing us
" the chief enjoyment of life, and raiſing in us
" thoſe horrid and *unnatural paſſions*, and that ſa-
" vageneſs of temper, which makes THE GREAT-
" EST OF MISERYS, and the moſt wretched ſtate
" of life:" as remains for us to explain.

Part 2.

SECT. III.

§. 3.

THE paſſions therefore, which, in the laſt place, we are to examine, are thoſe which lead neither to *a publick* nor *a private* good; and are neither of any advantage to the ſpecies in general, or the creature in particular. Theſe, in oppoſition to the *ſocial and natural*, we call the UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS. *THIRD proof; from the unnatural affections.*

OF this kind is that UNNATURAL *and* INHUMAN DELIGHT *in beholding torments*, and in viewing diſtreſs, calamity, blood, maſſacre and deſtruction, with a peculiar joy and pleaſure. This has been the reigning paſſion of many tyrants, and barbarous nations; and belongs, in ſome degree, to ſuch tempers as have thrown off that courteouſneſs of behaviour which retains in us a juſt reverence of mankind, and prevents the growth of harſhneſs and brutality. This paſſion enters not where civility or affable manners have the leaſt place. Such is the nature of what we call *good breeding*, that in the midſt of many other corruptions, it admits not of INHUMANITY, or *ſavage pleaſure*. To ſee the ſufferance of an enemy with cruel delight, may proceed from the height of anger, revenge, fear, and other extended ſelf-paſſions: but to delight in the torture and pain of other creatures indifferently, natives or foreigners, of our own, or of another ſpecies, kindred or no kindred, known or unknown; to feed, as it were, on death, and be entertain'd with dying agonys; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of ſelf-intereſt or private good above-mention'd, but is wholly and abſolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miſerable. *Inhumanity.*

THERE is another affection nearly related to this, which is *a gay* and *frolickſome delight* in what is injurious to others; a ſort of WANTON MISCHIEVOUSNESS, and pleaſure in what is deſtruc- *Petulancy.*

Book 2. tive; a paſſion which, inſtead of being reſtrain'd, is uſually encourag'd in children: ſo that 'tis indeed no wonder if the effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the world. For 'twill be hard, perhaps, for any-one to give a reaſon why that temper which was us'd to delight in diſorder and ravage, when in a nurſery; ſhou'd not afterwards find delight in other diſturbances, and be the occaſion of equal miſchief in familys, amongſt friends, and in the publick it ſelf. But of this paſſion there is not any foundation in nature; as has been explain'd.

Malignity. MALICE, MALIGNITY, or ILL-WILL, ſuch as is grounded on no ſelf-conſideration, and where there is no ſubject of anger or jealouſy, nor any thing to provoke or cauſe ſuch a deſire of doing ill to another; this alſo is of that kind of paſſion.

Envy. ENVY too, when it is ſuch as ariſes from the proſperity or happineſs of another creature no ways interfering with ours, is of the ſame kind of paſſion.

Moroſeneſs. THERE is alſo among theſe, a ſort of HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY; a paſſion which has been known perfectly reigning in ſome men, and has had a peculiar name given to it. A large ſhare of this belongs to thoſe who have long indulg'd themſelves in a habitual *moroſeneſs*, or who by force of ill nature, and ill-breeding, have contracted ſuch a reverſe of affability, and civil manners, that to ſee or meet a ſtranger is offenſive. The very aſpect of mankind is a diſturbance to 'em, and they are ſure always to hate at firſt ſight. The diſtemper of this kind is ſometimes found to be in a manner *national*; but peculiar to the more ſavage nations, and a plain *characteriſtick* of unciviliz'd manners, and barbarity. This is the immediate oppoſite to that noble affection, which, in antient language, was term'd * *hoſpitality*, *viz.* extenſive love of mankind, and relief of ſtrangers.

MISANTHROPY.

Inhoſpitality, barbarity.

* VOL. III. *pag.* 106, 107. in the notes.

Part 2. §. 3. *Superſtition.*

WE may add likewiſe to the number of the *unnatural paſſions*, all thoſe which are rais'd from SUPERSTITION (as before-mention'd) and from the *cuſtoms* of barbarous countrys: all which are too horrid and odious in themſelves, to need any proof of their being miſerable.

Unnatural luſts.

THERE might be other paſſions nam'd, ſuch as *unnatural luſts* in *foreign* kinds or ſpecies, with other perverſions of the amorous deſire within *our own*. But as to theſe depravitys of appetite, we need add nothing here; after what has been already ſaid, on the ſubject of the more *natural* paſſion.

SUCH as theſe are the only affections or paſſions we can ſtrictly call *unnatural*, *ill*, and of no tendency ſo much as to any ſeparate or private good. Others indeed there are which have this tendency, but are ſo exorbitant and out of meaſure, ſo beyond the common bent of any ordinary *ſelf-paſſion*, and ſo utterly contrary and abhorrent to all *ſocial* and *natural affection*, that they are generally call'd, and may be juſtly eſteem'd *unnatural* and *monſtrous*.

Tyranny.

AMONG theſe may be reckon'd ſuch an ENORMOUS PRIDE OR AMBITION, ſuch an ARROGANCE and TYRANNY, as wou'd willingly leave nothing eminent, nothing free, nothing proſperous in the world: ſuch an ANGER as wou'd ſacrifice every thing to it-ſelf: ſuch a REVENGE as is never to be extinguiſh'd, nor ever ſatisfy'd without the greateſt cruelrys: ſuch an INVETERACY and RANCOUR as ſeeks, as it were, occaſion to exert it-ſelf; and lays hold of the leaſt ſubject, ſo as often to make the weight of its malevolence fall even upon ſuch as are mere objects of pity and compaſſion.

Treachery, ingratitude.

TREACHERY and INGRATITUDE are in ſtrictneſs mere negative vices; and in themſelves, no real paſſions; having neither averſion or inclination belonging to them; but are deriv'd from the defect, unſoundneſs, or corruption of the affections in general. But when theſe vices become re-

Book 2. markable in a character, and ariſe in a manner from inclination and choice; when they are ſo forward and active, as to appear of their own accord, without any preſſing occaſion; 'tis apparent they borrow ſomething of the mere *unnatural* paſſions, and are deriv'd from *malice*, *envy*, and *inveteracy*; as explain'd above.

Unnatural pleaſure in general.

IT MAY be objected here, that theſe paſſions, *unnatural* as they are, carry ſtill a ſort of *pleaſure* with them; and that however barbarous a pleaſure it be, yet ſtill it is a pleaſure and *ſatisfaction* which is found in pride, or tyranny, revenge, malice, or cruelty exerted. Now if it be poſſible in nature, that any-one can feel a barbarous or malicious joy, otherwiſe than in conſequence of mere anguiſh and torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of ſatisfaction to be call'd *pleaſure* or *delight*. But the caſe is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind; to have ſocial or natural affection, complacency and good-will, is to feel immediate ſatisfaction and genuine content. 'Tis in it-ſelf *original joy*, depending on no preceding pain or uneaſineſs; and producing nothing beſide ſatisfaction merely. On the other ſide, animoſity, hatred and bitterneſs, is *original miſery* and *torment*, producing no other pleaſure or ſatisfaction, than as the unnatural deſire is for the inſtant ſatisfy'd by ſomething which appeaſes it. How ſtrong ſoever this pleaſure, therefore, may appear; it only the more implies the miſery of that ſtate which produces it. For as the cruelleſt bodily pains do by intervals of aſſuagement, produce (as has been ſhewn) the higheſt bodily pleaſure; ſo the fierceſt and moſt raging torments of the mind, do, by certain moments of relief, afford the greateſt of mental enjoyments, to thoſe who know little of the truer kind.

Unnatural ſtate.

THE men of gentleſt diſpoſitions, and beſt of tempers, have at ſome time or other been ſuffi-

ciently acquainted with thoſe diſturbances, which, at ill hours, even ſmall occaſions are apt to raiſe. From theſe ſlender experiences of harſhneſs and ill-humour, they fully know and will confeſs the ill moments which are paſs'd, when the temper is ever ſo little gall'd or fretted. How muſt it fare, therefore, with thoſe who hardly know any better hours in life; and who, for the greateſt part of it, are agitated by a thorow active ſpleen, a cloſe and ſettled malignity, and rancour? How lively muſt be the ſenſe of every thwarting and controuling accident? How great muſt be the ſhocks of diſappointment, the ſtings of affront, and the agonys of a working antipathy, againſt the multiply'd objects of offence? Nor can it be wonder'd at, if to perſons thus agitated and oppreſs'd, it ſeems a high delight to appeaſe and allay for the while thoſe furious and rough motions, by an indulgence of their paſſion in miſchief and revenge. Part 2. §. 3. *Unnatural ſtate.*

Now as to the conſequences of this *unnatural ſtate*, in reſpect of intereſt, and the common circumſtances of life; upon what terms a perſon who has in this manner loſt all which we call *nature*, can be ſuppos'd to ſtand, in reſpect of the ſociety of mankind; how he feels himſelf in it; what ſenſe he has of his own diſpoſition towards others, and of the mutual diſpoſition of others towards himſelf: this is eaſily conceiv'd.

WHAT injoyment or reſt is there for one who is not conſcious of the merited affection or love, but, on the contrary, of the ill-will and hatred of every human ſoul? What ground muſt this afford for horror and deſpair? What foundation of fear, and continual apprehenſion from mankind, and from ſuperior powers? How thorow and deep muſt be that *melancholy*, which being once mov'd, has nothing ſoft or pleaſing from the ſide of friendſhip, to allay or divert it? Where-ever ſuch a creature turns himſelf; which-ever way he caſts his eye; every thing around muſt appear ghaſtly and horrid;

Book 2. every thing hoſtile, and, as it were, *bent* againſt a private and ſingle being, who is thus divided from every thing, and at defiance and war with the reſt of nature.

'TIS thus, at laſt, that A MIND becomes a *wilderneſs*; where all is laid waſte, every thing *fair* and *goodly* remov'd, and nothing extant beſide what is ſavage and deform'd. Now if baniſhment from one's country, removal to a foreign place, or any thing which looks like ſolitude or deſertion, be ſo heavy to endure; what muſt it be to feel this *inward baniſhment*, this real *eſtrangement* from human commerce; and to be after this manner in a deſart, and in the horrideſt of ſolitudes, even when in the midſt of ſociety? What muſt it be to live in this *diſagreement* with every thing, this *irreconcilableneſs* and *oppoſition* to the order and government of the univerſe?

HENCE it appears, That the greateſt of miſerys accompanys *that ſtate* which is conſequent to the loſs of natural affection; and That TO HAVE THOSE HORRID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO BE MISERABLE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

CONCLUSION.

THUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And ſince in the common and known ſenſe of *vice* and *illneſs*, no one can be vitious or ill, except either,

1. By the deficiency or weakneſs of *natural affections*;

OR, 2. by the violence of *the ſelfiſh*;

OR, 3. by ſuch as are plainly *unnatural*:

IT muſt follow, that if each of theſe are pernicious and deſtructive to the creature, inſomuch that his compleateſt ſtate of miſery is made from hence;

TO BE WICKED OR VITIOUS, IS TO BE MISERABLE AND UNHAPPY. Part 2.

AND ſince every vitious action muſt in proportion, more or leſs, help towards this miſchief, and *ſelf-ill*; it muſt follow That EVERY VITIOUS ACTION MUST BE SELF-INJURIOUS AND ILL.

ON the other ſide; *the happineſs* and *good* of VIRTUE has been prov'd from the contrary effect of other affections, ſuch as are according to *nature*, and the œconomy of the ſpecies or kind. We have caſt up all thoſe particulars, from whence (as by way of addition and ſubſtraction) the main *ſum* or general account of happineſs, is either augmented or diminiſh'd. And if there be no article exceptionable in this ſcheme of *moral arithmetick*; the ſubject treated may be ſaid to have an evidence as great as that which is found in numbers, or mathematicks. For let us carry *ſcepticiſm* ever ſo far, let us doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we cannot doubt of what paſſes *within our-ſelves*. Our paſſions and affections are known to us. *They* are certain, whatever the *objects* may be, on which they are employ'd. Nor is it of any concern to our argument, how theſe exterior objects ſtand; whether they are realitys, or mere illuſions; whether we wake or dream. For *ill dreams* will be equally diſturbing: and a good *dream* (if life be nothing elſe) will be eaſily and happily paſs'd. In this dream of life, therefore, our demonſtrations have the ſame force; our *ballance* and *œconomy* hold good, and our obligation to VIRTUE is in every reſpect the ſame.

UPON the whole: there is not, I preſume, the leaſt degree of certainty wanting, in what has been ſaid concerning the preferableneſs of *the mental pleaſures to the ſenſual*; and even *of the ſenſual, accompany'd with good affection, and under a temperate and right uſe*, to thoſe which are *no ways reſtrain'd, nor ſupported by any thing ſocial or affectionate*. *Concluſion.*

NOR is there leſs evidence in what has been ſaid, of *the united ſtructure and fabrick of the mind*,

Book 2. and of thoſe paſſions which conſtitute *the temper*, or ſoul; and on which its happineſs or miſery ſo immediately depend. It has been ſhewn, that in *this conſtitution*, the imparing of any one part muſt inſtantly tend to the diſorder and ruin of other parts, and of the whole it-ſelf; thro the neceſſary *connexion* and *ballance* of the affections: that thoſe very paſſions thro which men are vitious, are of themſelves a torment and diſeaſe; and that whatſoever is done which is knowingly *ill*, muſt be of *ill conſciouſneſs*; and in proportion, as the act is ill, muſt impair and corrupt ſocial enjoyment, and deſtroy both *the capacity of kind affection*, and *the conſciouſneſs of meriting any ſuch*. So that neither can we *participate* thus in joy or happineſs with others, or receive ſatisfaction *from the mutual kindneſs or imagin'd love of others*: on which, however, the greateſt of all our pleaſures are founded.

IF this be the caſe of moral delinquency; and if the ſtate which is conſequent to this *defection* from nature, be of all other the moſt horrid, oppreſſive, and miſerable; 'twill appear, "*That to yield or* "*conſent to any thing ill or immoral, is a breach* "*of intereſt, and leads to the greateſt ills:*" and, "That, on the other ſide, *every thing which is* "*an improvement of virtue, or an eſtabliſhment* "*of right affection and integrity, is an advance-* "*ment of intereſt, and leads to the greateſt and* "*moſt ſolid happineſs and enjoyment.*"

THUS the wiſdom of what rules, and is FIRST and CHIEF *in nature*, has made it to be according to the *private intereſt* and *good* of every-one, to work towards the *general good*; which if a creature ceaſes to promote, he is actually ſo far wanting to himſelf, and ceaſes to promote his own happineſs and welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own enemy: nor can he any otherwiſe be good or uſeful to himſelf, than as he continues good to ſociety, and to that *whole* of which he is himſelf *a part*. So that VIRTUE, which of all excellencys

and beautys is the chief, and moſt amiable; *that* which is the prop and ornament of human affairs; which upholds communitys, maintains union, friendſhip, and correſpondence amongſt men; *that* by which countrys, as well as private familys, flouriſh and are happy; and for want of which, every-thing comely, conſpicuous, great and worthy, muſt periſh, and go to ruin; *that ſingle quality*, thus beneficial to all ſociety, and to mankind *in general*, is found equally a happineſs and good to each creature *in particular*; and is *that* by which alone man can be happy, and without which he muſt be miſerable. Part 2. *Concluſion.*

AND, thus, VIRTUE is *the good*, and VICE *the ill* of every-one.

TREATISE V.

VIZ.

THE

MORALISTS,

A

PHILOSOPHICAL RHAPSODY.

BEING

A RECITAL of certain converſations on *natural* and *moral* ſubjects.

—— *Inter ſilvas academi quærere verum.*
Hor. Ep. 2. Lib. 2.

Publiſh'd in the Year M.DCC.IX.

THE

MORALISTS, &c.

PART I.

PHILOCLES *to* PALEMON.

WHAT mortal, if he had never chanc'd to hear your character, PALEMON, cou'd imagine that a genius fitted for the greateſt affairs, and form'd amidſt courts and camps, ſhou'd have ſo violent a turn towards philoſophy and the ſchools? Who is there cou'd poſſibly believe that one of your rank and credit in the *faſhionable* world, ſhou'd be ſo thorowly converſant in the *learned* one, and deeply intereſted in the affairs of a people ſo diſagreeable to the generality of mankind and humour of the age?

I BELIEVE truly, you are the only well-bred man who wou'd have taken the fancy to talk philoſophy in ſuch a circle of good company as we had round us yeſterday, when we were in your coach together, in *the park*. How you cou'd reconcile the objects there, to ſuch ſubjects as theſe, was unaccountable. I cou'd only conclude, that either you had an extravagant paſſion for philoſophy,

Part I. to quit ſo many charms for it; or that ſome of thoſe tender charms had an extravagant effect, which ſent you to philoſophy for relief.

In either caſe I pity'd you; thinking it a milder fate, to be, as I truly was, for my own part, *a more indifferent lover*. 'Twas better, I told you, to admire beauty and wiſdom a little more moderately. 'Twas better, I maintain'd, to ingage ſo cautiouſly as to be ſure of coming off with a whole heart, and a fancy as ſtrong as ever towards all the pretty entertainments and diverſions of the world. For theſe, methought, were things one wou'd not willingly part with, for a fine romantick paſſion of one of thoſe gentlemen whom they call'd *virtuoſo's*.

The name I took to belong in common to your *lover* and *philoſopher*. No matter what the object was; whether poetry, muſick, philoſophy, or *the fair*. All who were enamour'd any-way, were in the ſame condition. You might perceive it (I told you) by their looks, their admiration, their profound thoughtfulneſs, their waking ever and anon as out of a dream, their talking ſtill of one thing, and ſcarce minding what they ſaid on any other ſubject.——Sad indications!

But all this warning ſerv'd not to deter you. For you, Palemon, are one of the adventurous, whom danger rather animates than diſcourages. And now nothing leſs will ſatisfy you than to have our philoſophical adventures recorded. All muſt be laid before you, and ſum'd in one compleat account; to remain, it ſeems, as a monument of that unſeaſonable converſation, ſo oppoſite to the reigning genius of *gallantry* and *pleaſure*.

I MUST own, indeed, 'tis become faſhionable in our nation to talk politicks in every company, and mix the diſcourſes of ſtate-affairs with thoſe of pleaſure and entertainment. However, 'tis certain we approve of no ſuch freedom in Philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY.

Nor do we look upon *politicks* to be of her province, or in the leaſt related to her. So much have we moderns degraded her, and ſtripp'd her of her chief rights. Sect. 1.

YOU muſt allow me, PALEMON, thus to bemoan *philoſophy*; ſince you have forc'd me to ingage with her at a time when her credit runs ſo low. She is no longer *active* in the world; nor can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the publick *ſtage*. We have immur'd her (poor lady!) in colleges and cells; and have ſet her ſervilely to ſuch works as thoſe in the mines. Empiricks, and pedantick ſophiſts are her chief pupils. The *ſchool-syllogiſm*, and *elixir*, are the choiceſt of her products. So far is ſhe from producing ſtateſmen, as of old, that hardly any man of note in the publick cares to own the leaſt obligation to her. If ſome few maintain their acquaintance, and come now and then to her receſſes, 'tis as the diſciple of quality *came* to his Lord and Maſter; "*ſecretly*, "and *by night*."

BUT as low as PHILOSOPHY is reduc'd; if *morals* be allow'd belonging to her, *politicks* muſt undeniably be hers. For to underſtand the manners and conſtitutions of men *in common*, 'tis neceſſary to ſtudy MAN *in particular*, and know the creature, as he is in himſelf, before we conſider him in company, as he is intereſted in the ſtate, or join'd to any city or community. Nothing is more familiar than to reaſon concerning man in his *confederate* ſtate and *national* relation; as he ſtands ingag'd to this or that ſociety, by birth or naturalization: yet, to conſider him as a *citizen*, or *commoner of the world*, to trace his pedigree a ſtep higher, and view his end and conſtitution in *nature* it-ſelf, muſt paſs, it ſeems, for ſome intricate or over-refin'd ſpeculation. *Morals.*

IT may be properly alledg'd perhaps, as a reaſon for this general ſhyneſs in *moral inquirys*; that the people to whom it has principally belong'd to handle theſe ſubjects, have done it in ſuch a manner as to

Part 1. put the better ſort out of countenance with the undertaking. The appropriating this concern to mere *ſcholaſticks*, has brought their faſhion and air into the very ſubject. There are formal *ſet*-places, where, we reckon, there is enough ſaid and taught on the head of theſe graver ſubjects. We can give no quarter to any thing like it in good company. The leaſt mention of ſuch matters gives us a diſguſt, and puts us out of humour. If learning comes a-
Language. croſs us, we count it *pedantry;* if morality, 'tis *preaching*.

One muſt own this, however, as a real diſadvantage of our modern converſations; that by ſuch a ſcrupulous nicety they loſe thoſe maſculine helps of learning and ſound reaſon. Even the *fair ſex*, in whoſe favour we pretend to make this condeſcenſion, may with reaſon deſpiſe us for it, and laugh at us for aiming at their peculiar ſoftneſs. 'Tis no compliment to them, to affect their manners, and be *effeminate*. Our ſenſe, language, and ſtyle, as well as our voice, and perſon, ſhou'd have ſome-thing of that male-feature, and natural roughneſs, by which our ſex is diſtinguiſh'd. And whatever *politeneſs* we may pretend to, 'tis more a diſfigurement than any real refinement of diſcourſe, to render it thus delicate.

Style. No work of wit can be eſteem'd perfect without that ſtrength and boldneſs of hand, which gives it body and proportions. A good piece, the painters ſay, muſt have good *muſcling* as well as *colouring* and *drapery*. And ſurely no writing or diſcourſe, of any great moment, can ſeem other than enervated, when neither ſtrong reaſon, nor antiquity, nor the records of things, nor the natural hiſtory of man, nor any-thing which can be call'd *knowledg*, dares accompany it; except perhaps in ſome ridiculous habit, which may give it an air of play and dalliance.

THIS brings to my mind a reaſon I have often ſought for; why we moderns, who abound ſo much in *treatiſes* and *eſſays*, are ſo ſparing in the way of * DIALOGUE; which heretofore was found the politeſt and beſt way of managing even the graver ſubjects. The truth is; 'twou'd be an abominable falſhood and belying of the age, to put ſo much good ſenſe together in any *one* converſation, as might make it hold out ſteddily, and with plain coherence, for an hour's time, till any *one* ſubject had been rationally examin'd. Sect. 1. *DIALOGUE.*

To lay colours, to draw, or deſcribe, againſt the appearance of nature and truth, is a liberty neither permitted the painter nor the poet. Much leſs can *the philoſopher* have ſuch a privilege; eſpecially *in his own caſe*. If he repreſents his philoſophy as making any figure in converſation; if he triumphs in the debate, and gives his own wiſdom the advantage over the world's; he may be liable to ſound raillery, and poſſibly be made *a fable* of.

'TIS ſaid of *the lion*, that being in civil conference with *the man*, he wiſely refus'd to yield the ſuperiority of ſtrength to him; when, inſtead of fact, the man produc'd only certain figures and repreſentations of human victorys over the lion-kind. Theſe maſter-pieces of art the beaſt diſcover'd to be wholly of human forgery: and from theſe he had good right to appeal. Indeed had he ever in his life been witneſs to any ſuch combats as the man repreſented to him in the way of art; poſſibly the example might have mov'd him. But old ſtatues of a HERCULES, a THESEUS, or other beaſt-ſubduers, cou'd have little power over him, whilſt he neither ſaw nor felt any ſuch living antagoniſt capable to diſpute the field with him. *A fable.*

WE need not wonder, therefore, that the ſort of moral painting, by way of *dialogue*, is ſo much out of faſhion; and that we ſee no more of theſe philo-

* VOL. I. *pag.* 131, 2, 3, 4, &c. VOL. III. *pag.* 198, &c.

Part I. ſophical portraitures now-a-days. For where are *the originals?* Or what tho you (PALEMON) or I, by chance, have lighted on ſuch a one; and pleas'd our-ſelves with *the life?* Can you imagine it ſhou'd make *a good picture?*

Academiſts. YOU know too, that in this *academick* philoſophy I am to preſent you with, there is a certain way of queſtioning and doubting, which no-way ſutes the genius of our age. Men love to take party inſtantly. They can't bear being kept in ſuſpence. The examination torments 'em. They want to be rid of it, upon the eaſieſt terms. 'Tis as if men fancy'd themſelves drowning, whenever they dare truſt to the current of reaſon. They ſeem hurrying away, they know not whither; and are ready to catch at the firſt twig. There they chuſe afterwards to hang, tho ever ſo inſecurely, rather than truſt their ſtrength to bear them above water. He who has got hold of an *hypotheſis*, how ſlight ſoever, is ſatisfy'd. He can preſently anſwer every objection, and, with a few terms of art, give an account of every thing without trouble.

Alchymiſts. 'TIS no wonder if in this age the philoſophy of the *alchymiſts* prevails ſo much: ſince it promiſes ſuch wonders, and requires more the labours of hands than brains. We have a ſtrange fancy to be creators, a violent deſire at leaſt to know the knack or ſecret by which nature does all. The reſt of our philoſophers only aim at that in ſpeculation, which our alchymiſts aſpire to in practice. For with ſome of theſe it has been actually under deliberation how to make *man*, by other mediums than nature has hitherto provided. Every ſect has a *recipe*. When you know it, you are maſter of nature: you ſolve all her * *phænomena*: you ſee all her deſigns, and can account for all her operations. If need were, you might, perchance too, be of her la-

* See VOL. III. *p.* 111.

boratory, and work for her. At leaſt one wou'd imagine the partizans of each modern ſect had this conceit. They are all ARCHIMEDES's in their way, and can *make* a world upon eaſier terms than he offer'd to *move* one. Sect. 1.

IN ſhort; there are good reaſons for our being thus ſuperficial, and conſequently thus dogmatical in philoſophy. We are too lazy and effeminate, and withal a little too cowardly, to dare *doubt*. The deciſive way beſt becomes our manners. It ſutes as well with our vices as with our ſuperſtition. Whichever we are fond of, is ſecur'd by it. If in favour of religion we have eſpous'd an hypotheſis, on which our faith, we think, depends; we are ſuperſtitiouſly careful not to be looſen'd in it. If, by means of our ill morals, we are broken with religion; 'tis the ſame caſe ſtill: we are as much afraid of *doubting*. We muſt be ſure to ſay, "*It cannot* "*be;*" and, "*'Tis demonſtrable:* for otherwiſe "*who knows?* And not to *know*, is to *yield!*"—— *Dogmatiſts.*

THUS we will needs *know* every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing. Of all philoſophy, therefore, how abſolutely the moſt diſagreeable muſt *that* appear, which goes upon no eſtabliſh'd hypotheſis, nor preſents us with any flattering ſcheme, talks only of probabilitys, ſuſpence of judgment, inquiry, ſearch, and caution not to be impos'd on, or deceiv'd? This is that *academick* diſcipline in which formerly * the youth were train'd: when not only horſemanſhip and military arts had their publick places of exerciſe; but philoſophy too had its wreſtlers in repute. Reaſon and wit had their *academy*, and underwent this trial; not in a formal way, apart from the world; but openly, among the better ſort, and as an exerciſe of the genteeler kind. This the greateſt men were not aſham'd to practiſe, in the intervals of publick affairs, in the higheſt ſtations and employments, and *Antients.*

* VOL. I. *p.* 224, &c. and notes.

Part I. at the lateſt hour of their lives. Hence that way of DIALOGUE, and patience of debate and reaſoning, of which we have ſcarce a reſemblance left in any of our converſations, at this ſeaſon of the world.

CONSIDER then, PALEMON, what *our picture* is like to prove: and how it will appear; eſpecially in the light you have unluckily choſen to ſet it. For who wou'd thus have confronted philoſophy with the gaiety, wit, and humour of the age?—— If this, however, can be for your credit, I am content. The project is your own. 'Tis you who have match'd *philoſophy* thus unequally. Therefore leaving you to anſwer for the ſucceſs, I begin this inauſpicious work, which my ill ſtars and you have aſſign'd me; and in which I hardly dare aſk ſuccour of *the muſes*, as poetical as I am oblig'd to ſhew my-ſelf in this enterprize.

SECT. II.

"O WRETCHED ſtate of mankind!—— "hapleſs nature, thus to have err'd in thy "chief workmanſhip!—— Whence ſprang this "fatal weakneſs? What chance or deſtiny ſhall "we accuſe? Or ſhall we mind the poets, when "they ſing thy tragedy (PROMETHEUS!) who "with thy ſtoln celeſtial fire, mix'd with vile clay, "didſt mock heaven's countenance, and in abuſive "likeneſs of the immortals mad'ſt the compound "MAN; that wretched mortal, *ill* to himſelf, and "cauſe of *ill* to all."——

WHAT ſay you, PALEMON, to this *rant*, now upon ſecond thoughts? Or have you forgot 'twas juſt in ſuch a romantick ſtrain that you broke out againſt *human kind*, upon a day when every thing look'd pleaſing, and the *kind* it-ſelf (I thought) never appear'd fairer, or made a better ſhew?

BUT 'twas not the whole creation you thus quarrel'd with: nor were you ſo out of conceit with all

beauty. The verdure of the field, the diſtant pro- Sect. 2.
ſpects, the gilded horizon, and purple ſky, form'd
by a ſetting ſun, had charms in abundance, and
were able to make impreſſion on you. Here, PA-
LEMON, you allow'd me to admire as much as I
pleas'd; when, at the ſame inſtant, you wou'd not
bear my talking to you of thoſe nearer beautys of
our own kind, which I thought more natural for
men at our age to admire. Your ſeverity however
cou'd not ſilence me upon this ſubject. I continu'd
to plead the cauſe of *the fair*, and advance their
charms above all thoſe other beautys of nature.
And when you took advantage from this oppoſition,
to ſhew how little there was of *nature*, and how
much of *art* in what I admir'd, I made the beſt apo-
logy I cou'd; and fighting for beauty, kept the
field as long as there was one *fair-one* preſent.

CONSIDERING how your genius ſtood inclin'd *Gallantry.*
to poetry, I wonder'd moſt to find you on a ſudden
grown ſo out of conceit with our modern poets, and
galante writers; whom I quoted to you, as better
authoritys than any antient in behalf of the fair ſex,
and their prerogative. But this you treated ſlightly.
You acknowledg'd it to be true indeed, what had
been obſerv'd by ſome late wits, "That GAL-
"LANTRY *was of a modern growth.*" And well
it might be ſo, you thought, without diſhonour to
the ancients; who underſtood *truth* and *nature* too
well, to admit ſo ridiculous an invention.

'TWAS in vain, therefore, that I held up this
ſhield in my defence. I did my cauſe no ſervice,
when in behalf of *the fair* I pleaded all the fine
things which are uſually ſaid, in this romantick way,
to their advantage. You attack'd the very fortreſs
of *gallantry*, ridicul'd *the point of honour*, with all
thoſe nice ſentiments and ceremonials belonging to
it. You damn'd even our favourite *novels*; thoſe
dear ſweet natural pieces, writ moſt of 'em by the
fair ſex themſelves. In ſhort, this whole order
and ſcheme of wit you condemn'd abſolutely, as

Part 1. *falſe*, *monſtrous*, and GOTHICK; quite out of the way of nature, and ſprung from the mere dregs of *chivalry* or *knight-errantry*; a thing which in itſelf you prefer'd, as of a better taſte than that which reigns at preſent in its ſtead. For at a time when this myſtery of *gallantry* carry'd along with it the notion of doughty knighthood; when *the fair* were made witneſſes, and, in a manner, partys to feats of arms, enter'd into all the points of war and combat, and were won by dint of launce and manly proweſs; 'twas not altogether abſurd (you thought) on ſuch a foundation as this, to pay 'em homage and adoration, make 'em the ſtandard of wit and manners, and bring mankind under their laws. But in a country where no *ſhe-ſaints* were worſhip'd by any authority from religion, 'twas as impertinent and ſenſleſs, as it was profane, to deify the ſex, raiſe 'em to a capacity above what nature had allow'd, and treat 'em with *a reſpect* which in the natural way of love they themſelves were the apteſt to complain of.

INDEED as for the *moral* part, 'twas wonderful (you ſaid) to obſerve the licentiouſneſs which this foppiſh courtly humour had eſtabliſh'd in the world. What ſuch a flattering way of addreſs to all the ſex in common cou'd mean, you knew not; unleſs it were to render 'em wholly *common* indeed, and make each fair-one apprehend that the publick had a right to her; and that beauty was too communicative and divine a thing, to be made a property, and confin'd to *one* at once.

Gallantry.

MEAN while our company began to leave us. The *beau-monde*, whom you had been thus ſeverely cenſuring, drew off apace: for it grew late. I took notice that the approaching objects of the night were the more agreeable to you, for the ſolitude they introduc'd; and that the moon and planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only proper company for a man in your

humour. For now you began to talk with much satisfaction of natural things, and of all orders of beautys, MAN only excepted. Never did I hear a finer description than you made of the order of the heavenly luminarys, the circles of the planets, and their attendent *satellites*. And you who wou'd allow nothing to those fair earthly luminarys in the circles which just now we mov'd in; you, PALEMON, who seem'd to overlook the pride of that theatre, began now to look out with ravishment on this other, and triumph in the new philosophical scene of worlds unknown. Here, when you had pretty well spent the first fire of your imagination, I wou'd have got you to reason more calmly with me upon that other part of the creation, your own kind; to which (I told you) you discover'd so much aversion, as wou'd make one believe you a compleat TIMON, or *man-hater*. Sect. 2. *Misanthropy.*

"CAN you then, O PHILOCLES," (said you in a high strain, and with a moving air of passion) "Can "you believe me of that character? Or can you "think it of me in earnest, that being MAN, and "conscious of my nature, I shou'd have yet so little of "humanity, as not to feel the affections of *a man?* "Or feeling what is natural towards my kind, that "I shou'd hold their interest light, and be indiffe-"rently affected with what affects or seriously con-"cerns them? Am I so ill a lover of *my country?* "Or is it that you find me indeed so ill *a friend?* "For what are all relations else? What are the "ties of private friendship, if that to *mankind* be "not obliging? Can there be yet a bond in na-"ture, if *that* be none? O PHILOCLES! believe "me when I say I feel it one, and fully prove its "power within me. Think not that I wou'd wil-"lingly break my chain: nor count me so dege-"nerate or unnatural, as whilst I hold this form, "and wear a human heart, I shou'd throw off "love, compassion, kindness, and not befriend

Part I. " *mankind.*——But O what treacherys! what
" diſorders! And how corrupt is all!——Did you
" not obſerve e'en now, when all this ſpace was
" fill'd with goodly rows of company, how peace-
" ful all appear'd.——What charms there are in
" publick companys! What harmony in courts and
" courtly places! How pleas'd is every face! How
" courteous and humane the general carriage and
" behaviour!——What creature capable of re-
" flection, if he thus ſaw us mankind, and ſaw no
" more, wou'd not believe our earth *a very hea-*
" *ven?* What foreigner (the inhabitant, ſuppoſe,
" of ſome near planet) when he had travel'd hi-
" ther, and ſurvey'd this outward face of things,
" wou'd think of what lay hid beneath the maſk?
" ——But let him ſtay a-while. Allow him lei-
" ſure; till he has gain'd a nearer view, and fol-
" lowing our diſſolv'd aſſemblys to their particu-
" lar *receſſes*, he has the power of ſeeing 'em in
" this new aſpect.——Here he may behold thoſe
" great men of the miniſtry, who not at an hour
" ago in publick appear'd ſuch friends, now plot-
" ting craftily each other's ruin, with the ruin
" of the ſtate it-ſelf, a ſacrifice to their ambiti-
" on. Here he may ſee too thoſe of a ſofter
" kind, who knowing not ambition, follow only
" *love*. Yet (PHILOCLES) who wou'd think
" it?" ——

AT theſe words, you may remember, I diſco-ver'd the lightneſs of my temper, and laugh'd a-loud; which I could hardly hope you wou'd have pardon'd, had I not freely told you the true reaſon. 'Twas not for want of being affected with what you ſpoke. I only imagin'd a more particular cauſe had provok'd you, when having paſs'd over the ambitious, you were coming full-charg'd againſt the people of a ſofter paſſion. At firſt, I look'd on you as deeply *in the ſpleen:* but now I concluded you *in love*, and ſo unhappily engag'd as to have reaſon to complain of infidelity. " This, thought I,

" has mov'd PALEMON thus. Hence the *ſad* Sect. 2.
" *world!* Here was that *corruption*, and thoſe
" *diſorders* he lamented!"

AFTER I had begg'd pardon for my rude mirth, which had the good fortune however to make ſome change in your humour; we fell naturally into cool reaſoning about the nature and cauſe of ILL in general: " Thro what *contingency*, what *chance;* by " what fatal *neceſſity*, what *will*, or what *permiſſi-* " *on* it came upon the world; or being come once, " ſhou'd ſtill ſubſiſt." This * *inquiry*, which with ſlight reaſoners is eaſily got over, ſtuck hard, I found, with one of your cloſe judgment and penetration. And this inſenſibly led us into a nice criticiſm of NATURE; whom you ſharply arraign'd for many abſurditys you thought her guilty of, in relation to *mankind*, and his peculiar ſtate. *Cauſe of ill.*

FAIN wou'd I have perſuaded you to think with more equality of NATURE, and to proportion her defects a little better. My notion was, that the grievance lay not altogether in *one* part, as you plac'd it; but that *every thing* had its ſhare of inconvenience. Pleaſure and pain, beauty and deformity, good and ill, ſeem'd to me every-where interwoven; and one with another made, I thought, a pretty mixture, agreeable enough, in the main. 'Twas the ſame, I fancy'd, as in ſome of thoſe rich ſtuffs, where the flowers and ground were oddly put together, with ſuch irregular work, and contrary colours, as look'd ill *in the pattern*, but mighty natural and well *in the piece*.

BUT you were ſtill upon extremes. Nothing wou'd ſerve to excuſe the faults or blemiſhes of this part of the creation, MANKIND; even tho all beſides were fair, without a blemiſh. The very ſtorms and tempeſts had their beauty in your

* Treatiſe IV. See the beginning.

Part 1. account, thoſe alone excepted which aroſe in human breaſts. 'Twas only for this turbulent race of mortals you offer'd to accuſe nature. And I now found why you had been ſo tranſported with the ſtory of PROMETHEUS. You wanted ſuch an operator as this for mankind: and you were tempted to wiſh the ſtory cou'd have been confirm'd in modern divinity; that clearing the ſupreme powers of any concern or hand in the ill workmanſhip, you might have the liberty of inveighing againſt it, without profaneneſs.

Cauſe of ill.

THIS however, I told you, was but a ſlight evaſion of the religious poets among the antients. 'Twas eaſy to anſwer every objection by a PROMETHEUS: as, "Why had mankind *originally* ſo "much folly and perverſeneſs? Why ſo much "pride, ſuch ambition, and ſtrange appetites? "Why ſo many plagues, and curſes, entail'd on "him and his poſterity?"——PROMETHEUS was the cauſe. The plaſtick artiſt, with his unlucky hand, ſolv'd all. "'Twas *his* contrivance "(they ſay) and *he* was to anſwer for it." They reckon'd it a fair game, if they cou'd gain *a ſingle remove*, and put the *evil cauſe* farther off. If the people aſk'd a queſtion, they told 'em *a tale*, and ſent 'em away ſatisfy'd. None beſides a few philoſophers wou'd be ſuch buſy-bodys (they thought) as to look beyond, or aſk a ſecond queſtion.

AND in reality, continu'd I, 'tis not to be imagin'd how ſerviceable *a tale* is, to amuſe others beſides mere children; and how much eaſier the generality of men are paid in this paper-coin, than in ſterling reaſon. We ought not to laugh ſo readily at the *Indian* philoſophers, who to ſatisfy their people how this huge frame of the world is ſupported, tell 'em 'tis by an elephant.——And the elephant how?——A ſhreud queſtion! but which by no means ſhou'd be anſwer'd. 'Tis here only that our *Indian* philoſophers are to blame. They ſhou'd be contented with *the elephant*, and

go no further. But they have *a tortoiſe* in reſerve; whoſe back, they think, is broad enough. So the tortoiſe muſt bear the new load: and thus the matter ſtands worſe than before. Sect. 2.

THE heathen ſtory of PROMETHEUS was, I told you, much the ſame with this *Indian* one: only the heathen mythologiſts were ſo wiſe as not to go beyond *the firſt remove*. A ſingle PROMETHEUS was enough to take the weight from JOVE. They fairly made JOVE a ſtander-by. He reſolv'd, it ſeems, to be neuter; and ſee what wou'd come of this notable experiment; how the dangerous man-moulder wou'd proceed; and what wou'd be the event of his tampering.——Excellent account, to ſatisfy the heathen *vulgar!* But how, think you, wou'd a *philoſopher* digeſt this? "For the gods "(he wou'd ſay preſently) either cou'd have hin- "der'd PROMETHEUS's creation, or they cou'd "not. If they cou'd, they were anſwerable for "the conſequences; if they cou'd not, they were "no longer gods, being thus limited and con- "troul'd. And whether PROMETHEUS were a "name for *chance*, *deſtiny*, a *plaſtick nature*, or an "*evil Daemon;* whatever was deſign'd by it; "'twas ſtill the ſame breach of OMNIPOTENCE."

THAT ſuch a hazardous affair as this of *creation* ſhou'd have been undertaken by thoſe who had not perfect foreſight as well as command, you own'd was neither wiſe nor juſt. But you ſtood to foreſight. You allow'd the *conſequences* to have been underſtood by the creating powers, when they undertook their work: and you deny'd that it wou'd have been better for them to have omitted it; tho they knew what wou'd be the event. "'Twas *Cauſe of ill.* "better ſtill that the project ſhou'd be executed, "whatever might become of mankind, or how hard "ſoever ſuch a creation was like to fall on the ge- "nerality of this miſerable race. For 'twas im- "poſſible, you thought, that heaven ſhou'd have

Part I. " acted otherwiſe than *for the beſt*. So that even
" from this miſery and ILL of *man*, there was un-
" doubtedly ſome GOOD ariſing; ſomething which
" over-ballanc'd all, and made full amends."

THIS was a confeſſion I wonder'd indeed how I came to draw from you: and ſoon afterwards I found you ſomewhat uneaſy under it. For here I took up your own part againſt you; and ſetting all thoſe villanys and corruptions of human kind in the ſame light you had done juſt before, I put it upon you to tell, where poſſibly cou'd be the advantage or good ariſing hence; or what excellence or beauty cou'd redound from thoſe tragical pictures you your-ſelf had drawn ſo well after the life. Whether it muſt not be a very ſtrong philoſophical faith, which ſhou'd perſuade one that thoſe diſmal parts you ſet to view were only the neceſſary ſhades of a fine piece, to be reckon'd among the beautys of the creation: or whether poſſibly you might look upon that maxim as very fit for heaven, which I was ſure you did not approve at all in mankind; " *To do* ILL, *that* GOOD *might follow*."

THIS, I ſaid, made me think of the manner of our modern PROMETHEUS's, *the mountebanks*, who perform'd ſuch wonders of many kinds, here on our earthly ſtages. They cou'd create diſeaſes, and make miſchief, in order *to heal*, and *to reſtore*. But ſhou'd we aſſign ſuch a practice as this to heaven? Shou'd we dare to make ſuch *empiricks* of the gods, and ſuch *a patient* of poor nature? " Was this a reaſon for nature's ſicklineſs? Or
" how elſe came ſhe (poor innocent!) to fall ſick,
" or run aſtray? Had ſhe been *originally* healthy,
" or created ſound *at firſt*; ſhe had *ſtill* continu'd
" ſo. 'Twas no credit to the gods to leave her
" deſtitute, or with a flaw which wou'd coſt dear
" the mending, and make them ſufferers for their
" own work."——

I WAS going to bring HOMER to witneſs for the many troubles of JOVE, the death of SARPEDON, and the frequent croſſes heaven met with, from the fatal ſiſters. But this diſcourſe, I ſaw, diſpleas'd you. I had by this time plainly diſcover'd my inclination to SCEPTICISM. And here not only *religion* was objected to me, but I was reproach'd too on the account of that *gallantry* which I had ſome time before defended. Both were join'd together in the charge you made againſt me, when you ſaw I adher'd to nothing: but was now as ready to declaim againſt *the fair*, as I had been before to plead their cauſe, and defend the moral of lovers. This, you ſaid, was my conſtant way in all debates: I was as well pleas'd with the reaſon on one ſide, as on the other: I never troubled my-ſelf about the ſucceſs of the argument, but laugh'd ſtill, whatever way it went; and even when I convinc'd others, never ſeem'd as if I was convinc'd my-ſelf. Sect. 2. *Scepticiſm.*

I OWN'D to you, PALEMON, there was truth enough in your charge. For above all things I lov'd eaſe; and of all philoſophers thoſe who reaſon'd moſt at their eaſe, and were never angry or diſturb'd; as thoſe call'd SCEPTICKS, you own'd, never were. I look'd upon this kind of *philoſophy* as the prettieſt, agreeableſt, roving exerciſe of the mind, poſſible to be imagin'd. The other kind, I thought, was painful and laborious; "To keep al-"ways in the limits of *one* path; to drive always "*at a point*; and hold preciſely to what men, at "a venture, call'd THE TRUTH: a *point*, in all "appearance, very unfix'd, and hard to aſcertain." Beſides, my way hurt no body. I was always the firſt to comply on any occaſion; and for matters of religion, was further from profaneneſs and erroneous doctrine than any-one. I cou'd never have the ſufficiency to ſhock my ſpiritual and learned ſuperiors. I was the furtheſt from leaning to my

Part I. own underſtanding: nor was I one who exalted *reaſon* above *faith*, or inſiſted much upon what the
Scepticiſm. dogmatical men call *demonſtration*, and dare oppoſe to the ſacred myſterys of religion. And to ſhew you (continu'd I) how impoſſible it is for the men of our ſort ever to err from the catholick and eſtabliſh'd faith, pray conſider; that whereas *others* pretend to ſee with their own eyes, what is propereſt and beſt for 'em in religion; *we*, for our parts, pretend not to ſee with any other than thoſe of our ſpiritual guides. Neither do we preſume to judg thoſe guides our-ſelves; but ſubmit to them, as they are appointed us by our juſt ſuperiors. In ſhort, you who are *rationaliſts*, and walk by reaſon in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilſt you believe little or nothing: we for our parts *know* nothing, and *believe* all.

HERE I ended; and, in return, you only aſk'd me coldly, "Whether with that fine SCEPTICISM "of mine, I made no more diſtinction between "ſincerity and inſincerity *in actions*, than I did "between truth and falſhood, right and wrong, *in* "*arguments?*"

I DURST not aſk what your queſtion drove at. I was afraid I ſaw it too plainly; and that by this looſe way of talking, which I had learnt in ſome faſhionable converſations of the world, I had given you occaſion to ſuſpect me of the worſt ſort of *Scepticiſm*, ſuch as ſpar'd nothing; but overthrew all principles, *moral* and *divine*.

FORGIVE me (ſaid I) good PALEMON: you are offended, I ſee, and not without cauſe. But what if I ſhou'd endeavour to compenſate my *Sceptical* miſbehaviour, by uſing a known *Sceptick privilege*, and aſſerting ſtrenuouſly the cauſe I have hitherto oppos'd? Do not imagine that I dare aſpire ſo high as to defend reveal'd religion, or the holy myſterys of the chriſtian faith. I am unworthy of ſuch a taſk, and ſhou'd profane the ſubject. 'Tis

of mere *philoſophy* I ſpeak: and my fancy is only to try what I can muſter up thence, to make head againſt the chief arguments of *Atheiſm*, and re-eſtabliſh what I have offer'd to looſen in the ſyſtem of *Theiſm*. Sect. 2.

YOUR project, ſaid you, bids fair to reconcile me to your character, which I was beginning to miſtruſt. For as averſe as I am to the cauſe of *Theiſm*, or name of DEIST, when taken in a ſenſe excluſive of revelation; I conſider ſtill that, in ſtrictneſs, the root of all is THEISM; and that to be a ſettled chriſtian, it is neceſſary to be firſt of all *a good* THEIST. For *Theiſm* can only be oppos'd to * *Polytheiſm*, or *Atheiſm*. Nor have I patience to hear the name of DEIST (the higheſt of all names) decry'd, and ſet in oppoſition to *chriſtianity*. "As "if our religion was a kind of *magick*, which de-"pended not on the belief of a ſingle ſupreme be-"ing. Or as if the firm and rational belief of ſuch "a being, on philoſophical grounds, was an im-"proper qualification for believing any thing fur-"ther." Excellent preſumption, for thoſe who naturally incline to the diſbelief of revelation, or who thro vanity affect a freedom of this kind!— *Deiſm.*

BUT let me hear (continu'd you) whether in good earneſt, and thorow ſincerity, you intend to advance any thing in favour of that opinion which is fundamental to all religion; or whether you deſign only to divert your-ſelf with the ſubject, as you have done hitherto? "Whatever your thoughts "are, PHILOCLES, I am reſolv'd to force 'em "from you. You can no longer plead the unſut-"ableneſs of the time or place to ſuch grave ſub-"jects. The gaudy ſcene is over with the day. "Our company have long ſince quitted the field. "And the ſolemn majeſty of ſuch a night as this,

* "To *Polytheiſm (Daemoniſm)* or *Atheiſm*:" as a-bove, *pag.* 10.

Part I. " may juſtly ſute with the profoundeſt meditation,
" or moſt ſerious diſcourſe."

THUS, PALEMON, you continu'd to urge me; till by neceſſity I was drawn into the following vein of *philoſophical enthuſiaſm*.

SECT. III.

YOU ſhall find then, ſaid I (taking a grave air) that it is poſſible for me to be ſerious; and that 'tis probable I am growing ſo, for good and all. Your over-ſeriouſneſs a-while ſince, at ſuch an unſeaſonable time, may have driven me perhaps into a contrary extreme, by oppoſition to your melancholy humour. But I have now a better idea of that *melancholy* you diſcover'd; and notwithſtanding the humorous turn you were pleas'd to give it, I am perſuaded it has a different foundation from any of thoſe fantaſtical cauſes I then aſ-
LOVE. ſign'd to it. " LOVE, doubtleſs, is at the bot-
" tom: but a nobler love than ſuch as common
" beautys inſpire."——

HERE, in my turn, I began to raiſe my voice, and imitate the ſolemn way you had been teaching me. " *Knowing* as you are, continu'd I, *well-*
" *knowing* and experienc'd in all the degrees and
Beauty. " orders of beauty, in all the myſterious charms of
" the particular forms; you riſe to what is more
" general; and with a larger heart, and mind more
" comprehenſive, you generouſly ſeek that which is
" higheſt in the kind. Not captivated by the line-
" aments of a fair face, or the well-drawn pro-
" portions of a human body, you view *the life* it-
" ſelf, and embrace rather *the mind* which adds
" the luſtre, and renders chiefly amiable.

Society. " NOR is the enjoyment of ſuch a ſingle beauty
" ſufficient to ſatisfy ſuch an aſpiring ſoul. It ſeeks
" how to combine more beautys, and by what co-
" alition of theſe, to form a beautiful ſociety. It
" views communitys, friendſhips, relations, dutys;

" and conſiders by what harmony of particular Sect. 3.
" minds the general harmony is compos'd, and
" *commonweal* eſtabliſh'd.

" NOR ſatisfy'd even with publick good in *one*
" community of men, it frames it-ſelf a nobler ob-
" ject, and with enlarg'd affection ſeeks *the good*
" *of mankind*. It dwells with pleaſure amidſt that *Virtue.*
" reaſon, and thoſe orders on which this fair cor-
" reſpondence and goodly intereſt is eſtabliſh'd.
" Laws, conſtitutions, civil and religious rites;
" whatever civilizes or poliſhes rude mankind; the
" ſciences and arts, philoſophy, morals, virtue;
" the flouriſhing ſtate of human affairs, and the
" perfection of human nature; theſe are its de-
" lightful proſpects, and this the charm of beauty
" which attracts it.

" STILL ardent in this purſuit (ſuch is its love *Univerſe.*
" of order and perfection) it reſts not here; nor
" ſatisfys it-ſelf with the beauty of a part; but
" extending further its communicative bounty,
" ſeeks the good of all, and affects the intereſt and
" proſperity of *the whole*. True to its native world
" and higher country, 'tis here it ſeeks order and
" perfection; wiſhing the beſt, and hoping ſtill to
" find a juſt and wiſe adminiſtration.

" AND ſince all hope of this were vain and idle, *GOD.*
" if no *univerſal mind* preſided; ſince without
" ſuch a ſupreme intelligence and providential care,
" the diſtracted univerſe muſt be condemn'd to
" ſuffer infinite calamitys; 'tis here the generous
" mind labours to diſcover that *healing cauſe* by
" which the intereſt of *the whole* is ſecurely eſta-
" bliſh'd, the beauty of things, and the univerſal
" order happily ſuſtain'd.

" THIS, PALEMON, is the labour of your ſoul: Ill *natural*
" and this its *melancholy*; when unſucceſsfully pur- *and moral.*
" ſuing the ſupreme beauty, it meets with darkning
" clouds which intercept its ſight. Monſters ariſe,
" not thoſe from *Lybian* deſarts, but from the

Part I. " heart of man more fertile; and with their horrid
" aſpect caſt an unſeemly reflection upon NATURE.
Ill *natural and moral.* " She, helpleſs (as ſhe is thought) and working
" thus abſurdly, is contemn'd, the government
" of the world arraign'd, and DEITY made
" void.

" MUCH is alledg'd in anſwer, to ſhew why
" *nature* errs, and how ſhe came thus impotent
" and erring from an unerring hand. But I deny
" ſhe errs; and when ſhe ſeems moſt ignorant or
" perverſe in her productions, I aſſert her even
" then as wiſe and provident, as in her goodlieſt
" works. For 'tis not then that men complain of
" the world's order, or abhor the face of things,
" when they ſee various intereſts mix'd and inter-
" fering; natures ſubordinate, of different kinds,
" oppos'd one to another, and in their different
" operations ſubmitted, the higher to the lower.
" 'Tis on the contrary, from this order of infe-
" or and ſuperior things, that we admire the *
" world's beauty, founded thus *on contrarieties*:
" whilſt from ſuch various and diſagreeing princi-
" ples, *a univerſal concord* is eſtabliſh'd.

" THUS in the ſeveral orders of terreſtrial
" forms, *a reſignation* is requir'd, a ſacrifice and
" mutual yielding of natures one to another. The
" vegetables by their death ſuſtain the animals:
" and animal bodys diſſolv'd, enrich the earth, and
" raiſe again the vegetable world. The numerous
" inſects are reduc'd by the ſuperior kinds of birds
" and beaſts: and theſe again are check'd by man;
" who in his turn ſubmits to other natures, and
" reſigns his form a ſacrifice in common to the reſt
" of things. And if in natures ſo little exalted or
" pre-eminent above each other, the ſacrifice of in-
" tereſt can appear ſo juſt; how much more rea-

* See VOL. III. *p.* 179, 180. what is cited in the notes from the antient author on *the world.*

" ſonably may all inferior natures be ſubjected to Sect. 3.
" *the ſuperior nature* of the world! That world,
" PALEMON, which even now tranſported you,
" when the ſun's fainting light gave way to theſe
" bright conſtellations, and left you this wide ſyſ-
" tem to contemplate.

" HERE are thoſe *laws* which ought not, nor
" can ſubmit to any thing below. The central
" powers, which hold the laſting orbs in their juſt
" poize and movement, muſt not be controul'd to
" ſave a fleeting form, and reſcue from the preci-
" pice a puny animal, whoſe brittle frame, how-
" e'er protected, muſt of it-ſelf ſo ſoon diſſolve.
" The ambient air, the inward vapours, the im-
" pending meteors, or whatever elſe is nutrimental
" or preſervative of this earth, muſt operate in a
" natural courſe: and other conſtitutions muſt ſub-
" mit to the good habit and conſtitution of the all-
" ſuſtaining globe.

" LET us not therefore wonder, if by earth-
" quakes, ſtorms, peſtilential blaſts, nether or up-
" per fires, or floods, the animal kinds are oft af-
" flicted, and whole ſpecies perhaps involv'd at
" once in common ruin: but much leſs let us ac- Ill *natural*
" count it ſtrange, if either by outward ſhock, or *and moral.*
" ſome interior wound from hoſtile matter, parti-
" cular animals are deform'd even in their firſt con-
" ception, when the diſeaſe invades the ſeats of
" generation, and ſeminal parts are injur'd and
" obſtructed in their accurate labours. 'Tis then
" alone that monſtrous ſhapes are ſeen: nature ſtill
" working as before, and not perverſly or errone-
" ouſly; not faintly, or with feeble endeavours;
" but o'erpower'd by *a ſuperior rival*, and by an-
" other nature's *juſtly* conquering force.

" NOR need we wonder, if the interior form,
" *the ſoul* and *temper*, partakes of this occaſional
" deformity, and ſympathizes often with its cloſe
" partner. Who is there can wonder either at the

Part I. " ſickneſſes of ſenſe, or the depravity of minds in-
" clos'd in ſuch frail bodys, and dependent on ſuch
" pervertible organs?

Good. " HERE then is that ſolution you require: and
" hence thoſe ſeeming blemiſhes caſt upon nature.
" Nor is there ought in this beſide what is natural
" and good. 'Tis *good* which is predominant; and
" every corruptible and mortal nature by its morta-
" lity and corruption yields only to ſome better,
" and all in common to that *beſt and higheſt na-*
" *ture*, which is incorruptible and immortal."

I SCARCE had ended theſe words, e'er you broke out in admiration; aſking what had befall'n me, that of a ſudden I had thus chang'd my character, and enter'd into thoughts which muſt certainly, you ſuppos'd, have ſome foundation in me, ſince I cou'd expreſs them with ſuch ſeeming affection as I had done.

O, SAID I, PALEMON! that it had been my fortune to have met you the other day, juſt at my return out of the country, from *a friend* whoſe converſation had in one day or *two* made ſuch an impreſſion on me, that I ſhou'd have ſuted you to a miracle. You wou'd have thought indeed that I had been cur'd of my *ſcepticiſm* and levity, ſo as never to have rally'd more, at that wild rate, on any ſubject, much leſs on theſe which are ſo ſerious.

TRULY, ſaid you, I cou'd wiſh I had met you rather at that time, or that thoſe good and ſerious impreſſions of your *friend* had without interruption laſted with you till this moment.

WHATEVER they were, I told you, PALEMON, I had not ſo loſt 'em neither, as not eaſily you ſaw, to revive 'em on occaſion; were I not afraid.

Afraid! ſaid you. For whoſe ſake, good PHILOCLES, I intreat you? For mine or your own?

For both, reply'd I. For tho I was like to be perfectly cur'd of my *ſcepticiſm*; 'twas by what I

thought worſe, downright *Enthuſiaſm*. You never knew a more agreeable ENTHUSIAST? Sect. 3.

Enthuſiaſt.

WERE he my friend (ſaid you) I ſhou'd hardly treat him in ſo free a manner. Nor ſhou'd I, perhaps, judg that to be *Enthuſiaſm* which you ſo freely term ſo. I have a ſtrong ſuſpicion that you injure him. Nor can I be ſatisfy'd till I hear further of that ſerious converſation for which you tax him as *Enthuſiaſtick*.

I MUST confeſs (ſaid I) he had nothing of that ſavage air of the vulgar enthuſiaſtick kind. All was ſerene, ſoft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleaſing tranſports of thoſe antient *poets* you are often charm'd with, than after the fierce unſociable way of modern *zealots*; thoſe ſtarch'd gruff gentlemen, who guard religion as bullys do a miſtreſs, and give us the while a very indifferent opinion of their lady's merit, and their own wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be inſpected by others, nor care themſelves to examine in a fair light. But here I'll anſwer for it; there was nothing of diſguiſe or paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as nature her-ſelf. 'Twas *nature* he was in love with: 'twas *nature* he ſung: and if any-one might be ſaid to have *a natural* miſtreſs, my friend certainly might, whoſe heart was thus ingag'd. But LOVE, I found, was everywhere the ſame. And tho the object here was very fine, and the paſſion it created very noble; yet *liberty*, I thought, was finer than all: and I who never car'd to engage in other loves of the leaſt continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of this which had ſuch a power with my poor *friend*, as to make him appear the perfecteſt ENTHUSIAST in the world, *ill-humour* only excepted. For this was ſingular in him, "That tho he had all of the *Enthuſiaſt*, he "had nothing of the *bigot*. He heard every thing with "mildneſs and delight; and bore with me when I "treated all his thoughts as viſionary; and when, "ſceptick-like, I unravel'd all his ſyſtems."

Part 2. *Enthuſiaſt.*

HERE was that *character* and *deſcription* which ſo highly pleas'd you, that you wou'd hardly ſuffer me to come to a concluſion. 'Twas impoſſible, I found, to give you ſatisfaction, without reciting the main of what paſs'd in thoſe *two* days between my *friend* and me, in our country-retirement. Again and again I bid you beware: "You knew not the "danger of this *philoſophical paſſion:* nor conſider'd "what you might poſſibly draw upon your-ſelf, "and make me the author of. I was far enough "engag'd already: and you were puſhing me fur-"ther, at your own hazard."

ALL I cou'd ſay made not the leaſt impreſſion on you. But rather than proceed any further this night, I engag'd, for your ſake, to turn *writer*, and draw up the memoirs of thoſe *two* philoſophical days; beginning with what had paſs'd this *laſt* day between ourſelves; as I have accordingly done (you ſee) by way of *introduction* to my ſtory.

BY this time, being got late to town, ſome hours after the lateſt of our company, you ſet me down at my own lodging; and thus we bad good-night.

PART II.

PHILOCLES *to* PALEMON.

AFTER ſuch a day as yeſterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awak'd the next morning, to find my-ſelf under poſitive engagements of proceeding in the ſame philoſophical way, without intermiſſion, and upon harder terms than ever. For 'twas no longer the agreeable part of *a companion* which I had now to bear. Your converſation, PALEMON, which had hitherto ſupported me, was

at an end. I was now *alone*; confin'd to my cloſet; oblig'd to meditate by my-ſelf; and reduc'd to the hard circumſtances of *an author*, and *hiſtorian*, in the moſt difficult ſubject. Sect. 1.

BUT here, methought, propitious heaven, in ſome manner, aſſiſted me. For if *dreams* were, as HOMER teaches, ſent from the throne of JOVE; I might conclude I had a favourable one, of the *true* ſort, towards the *morning-light*; which, as I recollected my-ſelf, gave me a clear and perfect idea of what I deſir'd ſo earneſtly to bring back to my memory.

I FOUND myſelf tranſported to a diſtant country, which preſented a pompous *rural ſcene*. It was a mountain not far from the ſea, its brow adorn'd with antient wood, and at its foot a river and well-inhabited plain: beyond which the ſea appearing, clos'd the proſpect.

No ſooner had I conſider'd the place, than I diſcern'd it to be the very ſame where I had talk'd with THEOCLES the ſecond day I was with him in the country. I look'd about to ſee if I cou'd find my friend; and calling THEOCLES! I awak'd. But ſo powerful was the impreſſion of my dream, and ſo perfect the idea rais'd in me, of the perſon, words, and manner of my friend, that I cou'd now fancy my-ſelf philoſophically inſpir'd, as that ROMAN *ſage* by his ÆGERIA, and invited, on this occaſion, to try my *hiſtorical* MUSE. For juſtly might I hope for ſuch aſſiſtance in behalf of THEOCLES, who ſo lov'd *the muſes*, and was, I thought, no leſs belov'd by them.

TO RETURN therefore to that *original* rural ſcene, and that *heroick* GENIUS, the companion and guide of my firſt thoughts in theſe profounder ſubjects: I found him the firſt morning with his belov'd *Mantuan* MUSE, roving in the fields; where, as I had been inform'd at his houſe, he was gone out, after his uſual way, to read. The moment he ſaw me, his book vaniſh'd, and he came with friendly

Part 2. haſte to meet me. After we had embrac'd, I diſcover'd my curioſity to know what he was reading; and aſk'd, "if it were of a ſecret kind, to which I "cou'd not be admitted." On this he ſhew'd me his poet; and looking pleaſantly, now tell me truly, ſaid he, PHILOCLES, did you not expect ſome more myſterious book than this? I own'd I did, conſidering his character, which I took to be of ſo contemplative a kind. And do you think, ſaid he, that without being contemplative, one can truly reliſh theſe diviner poets? Indeed (ſaid I) I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the world, to read VIRGIL or HORACE.

Retirement. YOU have nam'd *two*, ſaid he, who can hardly be thought ſo very *like*; tho they were friends, and equally good poets. Yet joining 'em, as you are pleas'd to do, I wou'd willingly learn from you, whether in your opinion there be any diſpoſition ſo fitted for reading 'em, as that in which they writ themſelves. In this, I am ſure, they both join'd heartily; to love *retirement*: when for the ſake of ſuch a life and habit as you call *contemplative*, they were willing to ſacrifice the higheſt advantages, pleaſures, and favour of a court. But I will venture to ſay more in favour of *retirement*: "That not only the "beſt authors, but the beſt company, require this "ſeaſoning." Society it-ſelf cannot be rightly enjoy'd without ſome abſtinence and ſeparate thought. All grows inſipid, dull, and tireſom, without the help of ſome intervals of retirement. Say, PHILOCLES, whether you your-ſelf have not often found it ſo? Do you think thoſe lovers underſtand the intereſts of their loves, who by their good-will wou'd never be parted for a moment? Or wou'd they be diſcreet friends, think you, who wou'd chuſe to live together on ſuch terms? What reliſh then muſt the world have (that common world of mix'd and undiſtinguiſh'd company) without a little ſolitude; without ſtepping now and then aſide, out of the

road and *beaten track* of life, that tedious circle of noiſe and ſhow, which forces weary'd mankind to ſeek relief from every poor diverſion? Sect. 1.

BY your rule, ſaid I, THEOCLES, there ſhou'd be no ſuch thing as *happineſs* or *good* in life, ſince every enjoyment wears out ſo ſoon; and growing painful, is diverted by ſome *other* thing; and that again by ſome *other*; and ſo on. I am ſure, if ſolitude ſerves as a remedy or diverſion to any thing in the world, there is nothing which may not ſerve as diverſion to ſolitude; which wants it more than any thing beſides. And thus there can be no *good* which is regular or conſtant. Happineſs is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandring.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, I rejoice to find you in the purſuit of *happineſs* and *good*; however you may wander. Nay, tho you doubt whether there be *that thing*; yet if you reaſon, 'tis ſufficient; there is hope ſtill. But ſee how you have unawares engag'd your-ſelf! For if you have deſtroy'd all *good*, becauſe in all you can think of, there is nothing will conſtantly hold ſo; then you have ſet it as a maxim (and very juſtly in my opinion) "That *nothing can be good but what is conſtant.*" *Happineſs. Good.*

I OWN, ſaid I, that all I know of worldly ſatisfaction is inconſtant. The things which give it, are never at a ſtay; and the *good* itſelf, whatever it be, depends no leſs on humour than on fortune. For that which chance may often ſpare, time will not. Age, change of temper, other thoughts, a different paſſion, new engagements, a new turn of life, or converſation, the leaſt of theſe are fatal, and alone ſufficient to deſtroy enjoyment. Tho *the object* be the ſame, *the reliſh* changes, and the ſhort-liv'd GOOD expires. But I ſhou'd wonder much if you cou'd tell me any thing in life which was not of as changeable a nature, and ſubject to the ſame common fate of ſatiety and diſguſt.

Part 2. *Pleaſure.*

I FIND then, reply'd he, that the current notion of *good* is not ſufficient to ſatisfy you. You can afford to *ſcepticize*, where no-one elſe will ſo much as heſitate. For almoſt every-one philoſophizes dogmatically on this head. All are poſitive in this, "That our real *good* is PLEASURE."

IF they wou'd inform us "*Which* (ſaid I) or "*what ſort*," and aſcertain once the very ſpecies and diſtinct kind; ſuch as muſt conſtantly remain *the ſame*, and *equally eligible* at all times; I ſhou'd then perhaps be better ſatisfy'd. But when *will* and *pleaſure* are ſynonymous; when every thing which * *pleaſes us* is call'd PLEASURE, and we never chuſe or prefer but *as we pleaſe*, 'tis trifling to ſay, "*Pleaſure is our good.*" For this has as little meaning as to ſay, "*We chuſe what we think eli-*"*gible:*" and "*We are pleas'd with what delights*"*or pleaſes us.*" The queſtion is, "Whether we "are *rightly pleas'd*, and chuſe as we *ſhou'd* do?" For as highly *pleas'd* as children are with baubles, or with whatever affects their tender ſenſes; we cannot in our hearts ſincerely admire their *enjoyment*, or imagine 'em poſſeſſors of any extraordinary *good*. Yet are their ſenſes, we know, as keen and ſuſceptible of *pleaſure* as our own. The ſame reflection is of force as to mere animals, who in reſpect of the livelineſs and delicacy of ſenſation, have many of 'em the advantage of us. And as for ſome low and ſordid *pleaſures* of human kind; ſhou'd they be ever ſo laſtingly enjoy'd, and in the higheſt credit with their enjoyers; I ſhou'd never afford 'em the name of *happineſs* or *good*.

WOU'D you then appeal, ſaid he, from the immediate feeling and experience of one who is *pleas'd*, and ſatisfy'd with what he *enjoys?*

MOST certainly I ſhou'd appeal, ſaid I (continuing the ſame zeal which THEOCLES had ſtirr'd in

* VOL. I. *pag.* 208. VOL. III. *pag.* 137.

miſs againſt thoſe dogmatizers on *pleaſure.*) For is there that ſordid creature on earth, who does not prize his own *enjoyment?* Does not the frowardeſt, the moſt rancorous diſtemper'd creature do as much? Is not malice and cruelty of the higheſt reliſh with ſome natures? Is not a hoggiſh life the height of ſome mens wiſhes? You wou'd not aſk me ſurely to enumerate the ſeveral ſpecies of ſenſations, which men of certain taſtes have adopted, and own'd for their chief *pleaſure* and delight. For with ſome men even diſeaſes have been thought valuable and worth the cheriſhing, merely for the pleaſure found in allaying the ardor of an irritating ſenſation. And to theſe abſurd *Epicures* thoſe other are near a-kin, who by ſtudy'd provocatives raiſe unnatural thirſt and appetite; and to make way for freſh repletion, prepare *Emeticks*, as the laſt deſert; the ſooner to renew the feaſt. 'Tis ſaid, I know, proverbially, "That *taſtes are different, and muſt not be diſput-* "*ed.*" And I remember ſome ſuch motto as this plac'd once on a deviſe, which was found ſutable to the notion. A *fly* was repreſented feeding on a certain lump. The food, however vile, was natural to the animal. There was no abſurdity in the caſe. But ſhou'd you ſhew me a brutiſh or a barbarous man thus taken up, and ſolac'd in his pleaſure; ſhou'd you ſhew me a ſot in his ſolitary debauch, or a tyrant in the exerciſe of his cruelty, with this *motto* over him, to forbid my appeal; I ſhou'd hardly be brought to think the better of his *enjoyment:* nor can I poſſibly ſuppoſe that a mere ſordid wretch, with a baſe abject ſoul, and the beſt fortune in the world, was ever capable of any *real enjoyment.* Sect. 1.

BY this zeal, reply'd THEOCLES, which you have ſhewn in the refuting *a wrong* hypotheſis, one wou'd imagine you had in reality ſome notion of *a right*; and began to think that there might poſſibly be ſuch a thing at laſt as *good.*

THAT there is ſomething nearer to *good*, and more like it than another, I am free, ſaid I, to

Part 2. *Pleaſure.*

own. But what *real* GOOD is, I am ſtill to ſeek, and muſt therefore wait till you can better inform me. This I only know; "That either all plea-"ſure is good, or only ſome." If *all*, then every kind of ſenſuality muſt be precious and deſirable. If *ſome* only, then we are to ſeek, *what kind*; and diſcover, if we can, *what* it is which diſtinguiſhes between one pleaſure and another: and makes *one* indifferent, ſorry, mean; *another* valuable, and worthy. And by this *ſtamp*, this *character*, if there be any ſuch, we muſt define GOOD; and not by *pleaſure* it-ſelf; which may be very great, and yet very contemptible. Nor can any-one truly judg the value of any immediate ſenſation, otherwiſe than by judging firſt of the ſituation of his own mind. For that which we eſteem a happineſs in *one* ſituation of mind, is otherwiſe thought of in *another*. Which ſituation therefore is the juſteſt, muſt be conſider'd; "How to gain that *point of ſight*, whence proba-"bly we may beſt diſcern; and how to place our-"ſelves in that unbiaſs'd ſtate, in which we are "fitteſt to pronounce."

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, if this be unfeign-edly your ſentiment; if it be poſſible you ſhou'd have the fortitude to with-hold your * aſſent in this affair, and go in ſearch of what the meaneſt of mankind think they already *know* ſo certainly; 'tis from a nobler turn of thought than what you have obſerv'd in any of the *modern ſcepticks* you have con-vers'd with. For if I miſtake not, there are hardly any-where at this day a ſort of people more peremp-tory, or who deliberate leſs on the choice of *good*. They who pretend to ſuch a ſcrutiny of other evi-dences, are the readieſt to take the evidence of the greateſt *deceivers* in the world, *their own paſſions*. Having gain'd, as they think, a liberty from ſome ſeeming conſtraints of religion, they ſuppoſe they employ this liberty to perfection, by following the

* VOL. I. *pag.* 55.

first motion of their will, and assenting to the first dictate or report of any prepossessing * *fancy*, any foremost *opinion* or *conceit* of GOOD. So that their privilege is only that of being perpetually amus'd; and their liberty that of being impos'd on in their most important choice. I think one may say with assurance, "That the greatest of fools is he who "imposes on himself, and in his greatest concern "thinks certainly he *knows* that which he has least "study'd, and of which he is most profoundly *igno-* "*rant*." He who is ignorant, but knows his ignorance, is far wiser. And to do justice to these fashionable men of wit; they are not all of 'em, indeed, so insensible as not to perceive something of their own blindness and absurdity. For often when they seriously reflect on their past pursuits and engagements, they freely own, "That for what re- "mains of *life*, they know not whether they shall "be of *a-piece with themselves*; or whether their "fancy, humour, or passion will not hereafter lead "'em to a quite *different choice* in PLEASURE, "and to a disapprobation of all they ever enjoy'd "before."——Comfortable reflection!

Sect. 1.

Pleasure.

To bring the satisfactions of *the mind*, continu'd he, and the enjoyments of *reason* and *judgment* under the denomination of PLEASURE, is only a collusion, and a plain receding from the common notion of the word. They deal not fairly with us, who in their philosophical hour, admit that for *pleasure*, which at an ordinary time, and in the common practice of life, is so little taken for such. The mathematician who labours at his problem, the bookish man who toils, the artist who endures voluntarily the greatest hardships and fatigues; none of these are said "*To follow pleasure*." Nor will the men of pleasure by any means admit 'em to be of their number. The satisfactions which are *purely mental*, and depend only on the motion of *a*

* VOL. I. *pag.* 216, &c.

Part 2. *thought;* muſt in all likelihood be too refin'd for the apprehenſions of our modern *Epicures*, who are ſo taken up with pleaſure of *a more ſubſtantial* kind. They who are full of the idea of ſuch a *ſenſible ſolid* good, can have but a ſlender fancy for the mere *ſpiritual* and *intellectual* ſort. But 'tis this latter they ſet up and magnify upon occaſion; to ſave the ignominy which may redound to 'em from the former. This done, the latter may take its chance: its uſe is preſently at an end. For 'tis obſervable, that when the men of this ſort have recommended the enjoyments of the mind under the title of *pleaſure*; when they have thus dignify'd the word, and included in it whatever is mentally good or excellent, they can afterwards ſuffer it contentedly to ſlide down again into its own genuine and vulgar ſenſe; whence they rais'd it only to ſerve a turn. When *pleaſure* is call'd in queſtion, and attack'd, then *reaſon* and *virtue* are call'd in to her aid, and made principal parts of her conſtitution. A complicated form appears, and comprehends ſtraight all which is generous, honeſt, and beautiful in human life. But when the attack is over, and the objection once ſolv'd, the ſpecter vaniſhes: *pleaſure* returns again to her former ſhape: ſhe may e'en be *pleaſure* ſtill, and have as little concern with *dry ſober reaſon*, as in the nature of the thing, and according to common underſtanding, ſhe really has. For if this rational ſort of enjoyment be admitted into the notion of *good*, how is it poſſible to admit withal that kind of ſenſation which in effect is rather oppoſite to this enjoyment? 'Tis certain that in reſpect of the mind and its enjoyments, the eagerneſs and irritation of *mere pleaſure*, is as diſturbing as the importunity and vexation of *pain*. If *either* throws the mind off its biaſs, and deprives it of the ſatisfaction it takes in its natural exerciſe and employment; the mind in this caſe muſt be ſufferer as well by one as by the other. If *neither* does this, there is no harm on either ſide.——

Pleaſure and pain.

BY the way, ſaid I, interrupting him; as ſincere as I am in queſtioning, "Whether PLEASURE be "really *good*;" I am not ſuch a ſceptick as to doubt "Whether PAIN be really *ill*." Sect. 1.

WHATEVER is *grievous*, reply'd he, can be no other than ILL. But that what is grievous to *one*, is not ſo much as troubleſome to *another*; let ſportſmen, ſoldiers, and others of the hardy kinds be witneſs. Nay, that what is *pain* to one, is *pleaſure* to another, and ſo alternately, we very well know: ſince men vary in their apprehenſion of theſe ſenſations, and on many occaſions confound one with the other. Has not even nature her-ſelf, in ſome reſpect, as it were blended 'em together, and (as a wiſe man ſaid once) "join'd the extremity of one "ſo nicely to the other, that it abſolutely runs in-"to it, and is undiſtinguiſhable?"

IN FINE then, ſaid I, if *pleaſure* and *pain* be thus convertible and mix'd; if, according to your account, "That which is now *pleaſure*, by being "ſtrain'd a little too far, runs into *pain*, and *pain*, "when carry'd far, creates again *the higheſt plea-"ſure*, by mere ceſſation, and a kind of natural "ſucceſſion; if ſome pleaſures to *ſome* are pains, "and ſome pains to *others* are pleaſures:" all this, if I miſtake not, makes ſtill for my opinion, and ſhows that there is nothing you can aſſign which can really ſtand as GOOD. For if *pleaſure* be not GOOD, nothing is. And if *pain* be ILL (as I muſt neceſſarily take for granted) we have a ſhreud chance on the *ill* ſide indeed, but none at all on the *better*. So that we may fairly doubt, "Whether LIFE *it-"ſelf* be not mere miſery;" ſince *gainers* by it we can never be: *loſers* we may ſufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our lives. Accordingly, what our *Engliſh* poeteſs ſays of good, ſhou'd be juſt and proper: "*'Tis good not to be born.*"—And thus for any thing of *good* which can be expect-ed in life, we may e'en "Beg pardon of nature; *Good.*

Part 2. " and return her preſent on her hands, without
" waiting for her call." For what ſhou'd hinder
Good. us? or what are we the better for living?

THE query, ſaid he, is pertinent. But why
ſuch diſpatch, if the caſe be doubtful? This, ſurely
(my good PHILOCLES!) is a plain tranſgreſſion of
your *ſceptical* bounds. We muſt be ſufficiently *dog-*
Futurity. *matical*, to come to this determination. 'Tis a de-
ciding as well concerning death, as life; " What
" poſſibly *may* be hereafter, and what *not*." Now
to be aſſur'd that we can never be concern'd in any
thing *hereafter*, we muſt underſtand perfectly what
it is which concerns or engages us in any thing *pre-*
Self. *ſent*. We muſt truly *know our-ſelves*, and in what
this SELF of ours conſiſts. We muſt determine a-
gainſt *pre-exiſtence*, and give a better reaſon for our
having never been concern'd in ought before our
birth, than merely, " Becauſe we *remember not*,
" nor are *conſcious*." For in many things we have
been concern'd to purpoſe, of which we have now
no memory or conſciouſneſs remaining. And thus
we may happen to be again and again, to perpetui-
ty, for any reaſon we can ſhow to the contrary. All
is *revolution* in us. We are no more the ſelf-ſame
matter, or ſyſtem of matter, from one day to ano-
ther. What ſucceſſion there may be *hereafter*, we
know not; ſince even *now*, we live by ſucceſſion,
and only periſh and are renew'd. 'Tis in vain we
flatter our-ſelves with the aſſurance of our intereſt
ending with a certain ſhape or form. What inte-
reſted us *at firſt* in it, we know not; any more
than how we have *ſince* held on, and continue *ſtill*
concern'd in ſuch an aſſemblage of fleeting parti-
cles. *Where* beſides, or in *what* elſe we may have
to do, perchance, in time to come, we know a
little; nor can tell how *chance* or *providence*, here-
after, may diſpoſe of us. And if *providence* be in
the caſe, we have ſtill more reaſon to conſider how
we undertake to be our own diſpoſers. It muſt

eeds become a SCEPTICK above all men to hesi- Sect. 1.
ate in matters of *exchange*. And tho he acknow-
ledges no preſent good or enjoyment in life, he
uſt be ſure, however, of bettering his condition,
efore he attempts to alter it. But as yet, PHILO-
LES, even this point remains undetermin'd be- *Good.*
ween us: " Whether in this preſent life there be
" not ſuch a thing as *real* GOOD."

BE you therefore (ſaid I) my inſtructor, ſaga-
ious THEOCLES! and inform me " *What* that
" GOOD is, or *where*, which can afford content-
" ment and ſatisfaction always alike, without va-
" riation or diminution." For tho on ſome occa-
ions, and in ſome ſubjects, the mind may poſſibly
e ſo bent, and the paſſion ſo wrought up, that for
he time no bodily ſufferance or pain can alter it;
et this is what can ſeldom happen, and is unlikely
o laſt long: ſince without any pain or inconveni-
nce, the paſſion in a little time does its own work,
he mind relaxes with its bent, and the temper
eary'd with repetition finds no more enjoyment,
t runs to ſomething new.

HEAR then! ſaid THEOCLES. For tho I pre-
nd not to tell you at once the nature of this which
call GOOD; yet I am content to ſhew you ſome-
ing of it, in *your-ſelf*, which you will acknowledg
be naturally more fix'd and conſtant, than any
ing you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my
iend! if ever you were weary of doing good to
oſe you lov'd? Say when you ever found it un-
eaſing to ſerve *a friend?* Or whether when you *Friendſhip.*
ſt prov'd this generous pleaſure, you did not feel
leſs than at *this preſent*; after ſo long experience?
elieve me, PHILOCLES, this pleaſure is more de-
uching than any other. Never did any ſoul do
ood, but it came readier to do the ſame again,
th more enjoyment. Never was love, or gra-
ude, or bounty practis'd but with increaſing
y, which made the practiſer ſtill more in love

Part 2. with the fair act. Answer me, PHILOCLES, you who are such a judg of *beauty*, and have so good a *taste* of pleasure; is there any thing you admire, so fair as *friendship?* or any thing so charming as a *generous action?* What wou'd it be therefore, if all life were in reality but one continu'd friendship, and cou'd be made one such intire act? Here surely wou'd be that *fix'd* and *constant* GOOD you sought. Or wou'd you look for any thing beyond?

Friendship private, publick.

PERHAPS not, said I. But I can never, surely, go beyond this, to seek for *a chimera*, if this GOOD of yours be not thorowly chimerical. For tho a poet may possibly work up such a single action, so as to hold *a play* out; I can conceive but very faintly how this high strain of friendship can be so manag'd, as to fill *a life*. Nor can I imagine where the object lies of such a sublime heroick passion.

CAN any friendship, said he, be so heroick, as that towards mankind? Do you think the love of friends in general, and of one's country, to be nothing? or that particular friendship can well subsist without such an enlarg'd affection, and sense of obligation to society? Say (if possible) you are a *friend*, but hate *your country*. Say, you are true to the interest of *a companion*, but false to that of *society*. Can you believe your-self? Or will you lay the name aside, and refuse to be call'd *the friend*, since you renounce the MAN?

THAT there is something, said I, due to *mankind*, is what I think will not be disputed by one who claims the name of *friend*. Hardly indeed cou'd I allow the name of *man* to one who never cou'd call or be call'd *friend*. But he who justly proves himself *a friend*, is MAN enough; nor is he wanting to *society*. A single friendship may acquit him. He has deserv'd a friend, and is *man friend;* tho not in strictness, or according to your high moral sense, *the friend of mankind*. For to say truth, as to this sort of friendship; it may by wise

heads be eſteem'd perhaps more than ordinarily manly, and even heroick, as you aſſert it: but for my part, I ſee ſo very little worth in *mankind*, and have ſo indifferent an opinion of *the publick*, that I can propoſe little ſatisfaction to my-ſelf in loving *either*. Sect. 1.

Do you, then, take *bounty* and *gratitude* to be among the acts of friendſhip and good-nature? *Gratitude.*

Undoubtedly: for they are the chief.

Suppoſe then, that the oblig'd perſon diſcovers in the obliger ſeveral failings; does this exclude *the gratitude* of the former? Not in the leaſt.

Or does it make *the exerciſe* of gratitude leſs pleaſing? I think rather the contrary. For when depriv'd of other means of making a return, I might rejoice ſtill in that ſure way of ſhewing my gratitude to my benefactor, by bearing his failings as a friend. And as to *bounty:* tell me, I beſeech you, is it to thoſe only who are *deſerving* that we ſhou'd do good? Is it only to *a good* neighbour, or relation, *a good* father, child, or brother? Or does nature, reaſon, and humanity better teach us, to do good ſtill to a father, becauſe *a father;* and to a child, becauſe *a child*; and ſo to every relation in human life? I think, ſaid I, this laſt is righteſt. *Bounty.*

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, conſider then what it was you ſaid, when you objected againſt the love of *mankind* becauſe of human frailty; and ſeem'd to ſcorn the *publick*, becauſe of its misfortunes. See if this ſentiment be conſiſtent with that humanity which elſewhere you own and practiſe. For where can generoſity exiſt, if not here? Where can we ever exert friendſhip, if not in this chief ſubject? To what ſhou'd we be true or grateful in the world, if not to mankind, and that ſociety to which we are ſo deeply indebted? What are the faults or blemiſhes which can excuſe ſuch an omiſſion, or how a grateful mind can ever leſſen the ſatisfaction of making a grateful kind return? Can you then *Love of mankind.*

Part 2. out of *good-breeding* merely, and from a temper natural to you, rejoice to ſhew civility, courteouſneſs, obligingneſs, ſeek objects of compaſſion, and be pleas'd with every occurrence where you have power to do ſome ſervice even to people unknown? Can you delight in ſuch adventures abroad in foreign countrys, or in the caſe of ſtrangers here at home; to help, aſſiſt, relieve all who require it, in the moſt hoſpitable, kind, and friendly manner? And can *your country*, or what is more, *your* KIND, require leſs kindneſs from you, or deſerve leſs to be conſider'd, than even one of theſe chance-creatures? —O PHILOCLES! how little do you know the extent and power of *good-nature*, and to what an heroick pitch a ſoul may riſe, which knows the thorow force of it; and diſtributing it rightly, frames in it-ſelf an equal, juſt, and univerſal friendſhip!

Good-breeding.

Good-nature.

JUST as he had ended theſe words, a ſervant came to us in the field, to give notice of ſome company, who were come to dine with us, and waited our coming in. So we walk'd home-wards. I told THEOCLES, going along, that I fear'd I ſhou'd never make a good *friend* or *lover* after his way. As for a plain natural love of *one ſingle* perſon in either ſex, I cou'd compaſs it, I thought well enough; but this *complex univerſal* ſort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the individual but not the ſpecies. This was too myſterious; too metaphyſical an object for me. In ſhort, I cou'd love nothing of which I had not ſome ſenſible material image.

Myſtical Love.

How! reply'd THEOCLES, can you never love except in this manner? when yet I know that you admir'd and lov'd a friend long e'er you knew his perſon. Or was PALEMON's character of no force when it engag'd you in that long correſpondence which preceded your *late* acquaintance?

The fact (ſaid I) I muſt, of neceſſity, own to you. And now, methinks, I underſtand your myſte-

and perceive how I muſt prepare for it: for in the ſame manner as when I firſt began to love PALEMON, I was forc'd to form a kind of material object, and had always ſuch a certain image of him, ready-drawn, in my mind, whenever I thought of him; ſo I muſt endeavour to order it in the caſe before us: if poſſibly by your help I can raiſe any ſuch image, or ſpecter, as may repreſent this odd being you wou'd have me love. Sect. 1.

METHINKS, ſaid he, you might have the ſame indulgence for NATURE or MANKIND, as for *the people of old* ROME; whom, notwithſtanding their blemiſhes, I have known you in love with, many ways; particularly under the repreſentation of a beautiful youth call'd *the* GENIUS *of the people*. For I remember, that viewing ſome pieces of antiquity, where the people were thus repreſented, you allow'd 'em to be no diſagreeable object. *Genius of a country.*

INDEED, reply'd I, were it poſſible for me to ſtamp upon my mind ſuch a figure as you ſpeak of, whether it ſtood for *mankind* or *nature*, it might probably have its effect; and I might become perhaps *a lover* after your way: but more eſpecially, if you cou'd ſo order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to fancy of this GENIUS, that it cou'd be "ſenſible of my love, and "capable of *a return*." For without this, I ſhou'd make but an ill lover, tho of the perfecteſt beauty in the world. *Nature.*

'TIS enough, ſaid THEOCLES, I accept the terms: and if you promiſe *to love*, I will endeavour to ſhew you *that* BEAUTY which I count *the perfecteſt*, and *moſt deſerving of* LOVE; and which will not fail of *a return*.——To-morrow, when the eaſtern ſun (as poets deſcribe) with his firſt beams adorns the front of yonder hill; there, if you are content to wander with me in the woods you ſee, we will purſue thoſe *loves* of ours, by favour of the ſilvan nymphs: and invoking firſt

Part 2. *the genius of the place*, we'll try to obtain at leaſt ſome faint and diſtant view of *the ſovereign* GENIUS and *firſt beauty*. This if you can come once to contemplate, I will anſwer for it, that all thoſe forbidding features and deformitys, whether of *nature* or *mankind*, will vaniſh in an inſtant, and leave you that *lover* I cou'd wiſh.—But now, enough!—Let us to our *company*; and change this converſation for ſome other more ſutable to our *friends* and *table*.

Genius of the world.

SECT. II.

YOU ſee here, PALEMON, what a foundation is laid for the *Enthuſiaſms* I told you of; and which, in my opinion (I told you too) were the more dangerous, becauſe ſo very odd, and out of the way. But curioſity had ſeiz'd you, I perceiv'd, as it had done me before. For after this firſt converſation, I muſt own, I long'd for nothing ſo much as the next day, and the appointed morning-walk in the *woods*.

WE had only a friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we diſcours'd of news and indifferent things, till I, who had my head ſtill running upon thoſe other ſubjects, gladly laid hold of ſomething dropt by chance concerning *friendſhip*; and ſaid, that for my own part, truly, tho I once thought I had known friendſhip, and really counted my-ſelf *a good friend* during my whole life; yet I was now perſuaded to believe my-ſelf no better than *a learner*: ſince THEOCLES had almoſt convinc'd me, "That to be a *friend* to any one *in par-*"*ticular*, 'twas neceſſary to be firſt *a friend to* "*mankind*." But how to qualify my-ſelf for ſuch a friendſhip, was, methought, no little difficulty.

Friendſhip.

INDEED, ſaid THEOCLES, you have given us a very indifferent character of your-ſelf, in ſaying ſo. If you had ſpoken thus of the friendſhip of any *great man* at court, or perhaps of *a court* it-ſelf, and

had complain'd "How hard it was for you to ſuc- Sect. 2.
"ceed, or make intereſt with ſuch as govern'd
"there;" we ſhou'd have concluded in your behalf, that there were ſuch terms to be comply'd with, as were unworthy of you. But "To de- *Virtue.*
"ſerve well of *the publick*," and "To be juſtly "ſtil'd *the friend of mankind*," requires no more than to be *good* and *virtuous*; terms which for one's own ſake one wou'd naturally covet.

How comes it then, ſaid I, that even theſe *good* *Motives.*
terms themſelves are ſo ill accepted, and hardly ever taken (if I may ſo expreſs it) except on *further terms?* For VIRTUE, *by it-ſelf*, is thought but an ill bargain: and I know few, even of the religious and devout, who take up with it any otherwiſe than as children do with phyſick; where the rod and ſweet-meat are the potent motives.

THEY are children indeed, reply'd THEOCLES, and ſhou'd be treated ſo, who need any force or perſuaſion to do what conduces to their health and good. But where, I beſeech you, are thoſe forbidding circumſtances which ſhou'd make *virtue* go down ſo hardly? Is it not, among other things, that you think your-ſelf by this means precluded the fine tables and coſtly eating of our modern *Epicures*; and that perhaps you fear the being reduc'd to eat always as ill as now, upon a plain diſh or two, and no more?

THIS, I proteſted, was injuriouſly ſuppos'd of me. For I wiſh'd never to eat otherwiſe than I now did, at his table; which, by the way, had more reſemblance (I thought) of EPICURUS's, than thoſe which now-a-days prepoſterouſly paſs'd under his name. For if his opinion might be taken, the higheſt pleaſures in the world were owing to *temperance*, and *moderate uſe*.

IF then the mereſt ſtudier of *pleaſure*, (anſwer'd THEOCLES) even EPICURUS himſelf, made that favourable report of *temperance*, ſo different from his *Temperance.*
modern diſciples; if he cou'd boldly ſay, "That

Part 2. *Temperance.*

" with ſuch fare as a mean garden afforded, he " cou'd vie even with the gods for happineſs;" how ſhall we ſay of this part of virtue, that it needs be *taken upon terms?* If the immediate practice of *temperance* be thus harmleſs; are its conſequences injurious? Does it take from the vigour of the mind, conſume the body, and render both the one and the other leſs apt to their proper exerciſes, " the enjoyments of reaſon or ſenſe, or the em- " ployments and offices of civil life?" Or is it that a man's circumſtances are the worſe for it, as he ſtands towards his friends, or mankind? Is a gentleman in this ſenſe to be pity'd, " As *one* burdenſom " to himſelf, and others; *one* whom all men will " naturally ſhun, as an ill friend, and a corrupter " of ſociety and good manners?"—Shall we conſider our gentleman in *a publick truſt*, and ſee whether he is like to ſucceed beſt with this reſtraining quality; or whether he may be more rely'd on, and thought more incorrupt, if his appetites are high, and his reliſh ſtrong towards that which we call pleaſure? Shall we conſider him as *a ſoldier*, in a campain, or ſiege; and adviſe with our-ſelves how we might be beſt defended, if we had occaſion for ſuch a one's ſervice? " Which officer wou'd " make the beſt for the ſoldiers; which ſoldier " for the officers; or which army for their coun- " try?"—What think you of our gentleman, for *a fellow-traveller?* Wou'd he, as a temperate man, be an ill choice? Wou'd it indeed be more eligible and delightful " To have a companion, " who, in any ſhift or neceſſity, wou'd prove the " moſt ravenous, and eager to provide in the firſt " place for himſelf, and his own exquiſite ſenſati- " ons?"——I know not what to ſay where *beauty* is concern'd. Perhaps the *amorous galants*, and exquiſite *refiners* on this ſort of pleaſure, may have ſo refin'd their minds and tempers, that, notwithſtanding their accuſtom'd indulgence, they can, upon occaſion, renounce their enjoyment, rather than

violate honour, faith, or juſtice.——And thus, at laſt, there will be little virtue or worth aſcrib'd to this patient ſober *character*. " The dull *tempe-* " *rate man* is no fitter to be truſted than the ele- " gant *luxurious one*. Innocence, youth, and for- " tune may be as well committed to the care of " this latter gentleman. He wou'd prove as good " *an executor*, as good *a truſtee*, as good *a guar-* " *dian*, as he wou'd a *friend*. The family which " entruſted him wou'd be ſecure; and no diſhon- " our, in any likelihood, wou'd happen from the " honeſt *man of pleaſure*." Sect. 2.

THE ſerioufneſs with which THEOCLES ſpoke this, made it the more pleaſant; and ſet our other company upon ſaying a great many good things on the ſame ſubject, in commendation of *a temperate life*. So that our dinner by this time being ended, and the wine, according to cuſtom, plac'd before us; I found ſtill we were in no likelihood of proceeding to a debauch. Every-one drank only as he fancy'd, in no order or proportion, and with no regard to circular healths or pledges: a manner which the ſociable men of another ſcheme of morals wou'd have cenſur'd no doubt, as a heinous irregularity, and corruption of *good fellowſhip*.

I OWN (ſaid I) I am far from thinking TEMPERANCE ſo diſagreeable a character. As for this part of virtue, I think there is no need of taking it on any other *terms* to recommend it, than the mere advantage of being ſav'd from intemperance, and from the deſire of things unneceſſary.

How! ſaid THEOCLES, are you thus far advanc'd? And can you carry this *temperance* ſo far as to eſtates and honours, by oppoſing it to *avarice* and *ambition?*—Nay, then truly, you may be ſaid to have fairly embark'd your-ſelf in this cauſe. You have paſs'd the channel, and are more than half-ſeas over. There remains no further ſcruple

Part 2. in the caſe of virtue, unleſs you will declare your-ſelf *a coward*, or conclude it a happineſs to be born one. For if you can be *temperate* withal towards LIFE, and think it not ſo great a buſineſs, whether *it* be of fewer or more years; but ſatisfy'd with what you have liv'd, can riſe a thankful gueſt from a full liberal entertainment; is not this the ſum of all? the finiſhing ſtroke and very accompliſhment of *virtue?* In this temper of mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for our-ſelves as heroick *a character* as we pleaſe? What is there either *good*, *generous*, or *great*, which does not naturally flow from ſuch a modeſt TEMPERANCE? Let us once gain this ſimple plain-look'd *virtue*, and ſee whether the more ſhining *virtues* will not follow. See what that *country of the mind* will produce, when by the wholeſom laws of this legiſlatreſs it has obtain'd its *liberty!* You, PHILOCLES, who are ſuch an admirer of *civil liberty*, and can repreſent it to your-ſelf with a thouſand ſeveral graces and advantages; can you imagine no grace or beauty in that original *native liberty*, which ſet us free from ſo many in-born tyrannys, gives us the privilege of our-ſelves, and makes us *our own*, and independent? A ſort of property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which ſecures us our lands, or revenues.

LIBERTY.
Civil.
Moral.

I SHOU'D think, ſaid he (carrying on his humour) that one might draw the picture of this *moral* dame to as much advantage as that of her *political* ſiſter; whom you admire, as deſcrib'd to us " in her AMAZON-*dreſs*, with a free manly air " becoming her; her guards the *laws*, with their " written tables, like bucklers, ſurrounding her; " riches, traffick, and plenty, with the *cornucopia*, " ſerving as her attendents; and in her train the " *arts* and *ſciences*, like children, playing."—— The reſt of the piece is eaſy to imagine: " her tri-" umph over tyranny, and lawleſs rule of luſt

" and paſſion."——But what a triumph wou'd her Sect. 2.
ſiſter's be! What monſters of ſavage paſſions wou'd
there appear ſubdu'd! " There fierce *ambition*,
" *luſt*, *uproar*, *miſrule*, with all the *fiends* which
" rage in human breaſts, wou'd be ſecurely chain'd.
" And when *fortune* her-ſelf, the queen of flat-
" terys, with that prince of terrors, *death*, were
" at the chariot-wheels, as captives; how natural
" wou'd it be to ſee *fortitude*, *magnanimity*, *juſ-*
" *tice*, *honour*, and all that generous band attend
" as the companions of our inmate lady LIBER-
" TY! She, like ſome new-born goddeſs, wou'd
" grace her mother's chariot, and own her birth
" from humble *temperance*, that nurſing mother of
" the virtues; who like the parent of the gods
" (old reverend CYBELE) wou'd properly appear
" drawn by rein'd lions, patient of the bit, and on
" her head a turret-like attire: the image of de-
" fenſive power, and ſtrength of mind."

BY THIS picture THEOCLES, I found, had given entertainment to the company; who from this rough draught of his, fell to deſigning upon the ſame ſubject, after the antient manner; till PRODICUS and CEBES, and all the antients were exhauſted.

GENTLEMEN, ſaid I, the deſcriptions you have *VIRTUE.*
been making, are, no doubt, the fineſt in the world: but after all, when you have made *virtue* as glorious and triumphant as you pleaſe, I will bring you an authentick picture of another kind, where we ſhall ſee this triumph *in reverſe*; " VIRTUE
" her-ſelf *a captive* in her turn; and by a proud
" conqueror triumph'd over, degraded, ſpoil'd of
" all her honours, and defac'd; ſo as to retain
" hardly one ſingle feature of real beauty."——

I OFFER'D to go on further, but cou'd not, being ſo violently decry'd by my two fellow-gueſts; who proteſted they wou'd never be brought

Part 2. to own ſo deteſtable a picture: and one of 'em (a formal ſort of gentleman, ſomewhat advanc'd in years) looking earneſtly upon me, ſaid, in an angry tone, "That he had hitherto, indeed, conceiv'd "ſome hopes of me; notwithſtanding he obſerv'd "my *freedom of thought*, and heard me quoted "for ſuch a paſſionate lover of *liberty*: But he "was ſorry to find that my principle of liberty "extended in fine to a liberty from all principles" (ſo he expreſs'd himſelf.) "And none, he thought, "beſide a libertine in principle wou'd approve of "ſuch a picture of virtue, as only *an Atheiſt* cou'd "have the impudence to make."

THEOCLES the while ſat ſilent; tho he ſaw I minded not my antagoniſt, but kept my eye fix'd ſteddily on himſelf, expecting to hear what he wou'd ſay. At laſt, fetching a deep ſigh, O PHILOCLES, ſaid he, how well you are maſter of that cauſe you have taken on you to defend! How well you know the way to gain advantage to the worſt of cauſes, from the imprudent management of thoſe who defend the beſt!——I dare not, for my own ſhare, affirm to you, as my worthy friends have done, "That 'tis *the Atheiſt* alone can lay this "load on *virtue*, and picture her thus diſgraceful-"ly."——No——There are other over-officious and leſs-ſuſpected hands, which do her perhaps more injury, tho with a better colour.

THAT *virtue* ſhou'd, with any ſhew of reaſon, be made *a victim* (continu'd he, turning himſelf to his gueſts) muſt have appear'd ſtrange to you, no doubt, to hear aſſerted with ſuch aſſurance as has been done by PHILOCLES. You cou'd conceive no tolerable ground for ſuch a ſpectacle. In this *revers'd triumph* you expected perhaps to ſee ſome foreign conqueror exalted; as either *vice* itſelf, or *pleaſure*, *wit*, *ſpurious philoſophy*, or ſome *falſe image* of *truth* or *nature*. Little were you aware that the cruel enemy oppos'd to vir-

tue ſhou'd be RELIGION it-ſelf! But you will call to mind, that even innocently, and without any treacherous deſign, *virtue* is often treated ſo, by thoſe who wou'd magnify to the utmoſt the corruption of man's heart; and in expoſing, as they pretend, the falſhood of *human virtue*, think to extol *religion*. How many religious authors, how many ſacred orators turn all their edge this way, and ſtrike at *moral virtue* as a kind of *ſtepdame*, or *rival* to RELIGION!—"**morality* muſt not be "nam'd; *nature* has no pretence; *reaſon* is an "enemy; *common juſtice*, folly; and *virtue*, mi"ſery. Who wou'd not be vitious, had he his "choice? Who wou'd not forbear, but becauſe "*he muſt?* Or who wou'd value virtue, but for "*hereafter?*"

Sect. 2. *Religion and virtue.*

TRULY, ſaid the old gentleman (interrupting him) if this be the *triumph* of religion, 'tis ſuch as her greateſt enemy, I believe, wou'd ſcarce deny her: and I muſt ſtill be of opinion (with PHILOCLES's leave) that it is no great ſign of tenderneſs for *religion*, to be ſo zealous in honouring her at the coſt of *virtue*.

PERHAPS ſo, ſaid I. Yet that there are many ſuch zealots in the world, you will acknowledg. And that there is a certain harmony between this *zeal* and what you call *Atheiſm*, THEOCLES, you hear, has allow'd.—But let us hear him out; if perhaps he will be ſo free as to diſcover to us what he thinks of the generality of our religious writers, and their method of encountring their common enemy, *the Atheiſt*. This is a ſubject which poſſibly may need a better clearing. For 'tis notorious that the chief oppoſers of Atheiſm write upon contrary principles to one another, ſo as in a manner to confute themſelves. Some of 'em hold zealouſly for virtue, and are *realiſts* in the point. O-

Zeal.

Atheiſm.

* VOL. III. *pag.* 209.

Part 2.

thers, one may ſay, are only *nominal moraliſts*, by making virtue nothing in it-ſelf, a creature of will only, or a mere name of faſhion. 'Tis the ſame in natural philoſophy: ſome take one hypotheſis, and ſome another. I ſhou d be glad to diſcover once the true foundation; and diſtinguiſh thoſe who effectually refute their other antagoniſts as well as the *Atheiſts*, and rightly aſſert the joint-cauſe of virtue and religion.

MORALISTS, Nominal, Real. Naturaliſts.

HERE, PALEMON, I had my wiſh. For by degrees I ingag'd THEOCLES to diſcover himſelf fully upon theſe ſubjects; which ſerv'd as a prelude to thoſe we were to ingage in, the next morning; for the approach of which, I ſo impatiently long'd. If his ſpeculations prov'd *of a rational kind*, this previous diſcourſe (I knew) wou'd help me to comprehend 'em; if only *pleaſing fancys*, this wou'd help me however, to pleaſe my-ſelf the better with 'em.

HERE then began his criticiſm of authors; which grew by degrees into a continu'd diſcourſe. So that had this been at a univerſity, THEOCLES might very well have paſs'd for ſome grave divinity-profeſſor, or teacher of *Ethicks*, reading an afternoon lecture to his pupils.

SECT. III.

Divinity.

IT WOU'D be undoubtedly, ſaid he, a happy *cauſe* which cou'd have the benefit of ſuch managers as ſhou'd never give their adverſarys any handle of advantage againſt it. I cou'd wiſh that in the *cauſe* of RELIGION we had reaſon to boaſt as much. But ſince 'tis not impoſſible to write ill even in the beſt of cauſes, I am inclin'd to think this great one of *religion* may have run at leaſt an equal hazard with any other; ſince they who write in defence of it, are apt generally to uſe ſo much the leſs caution, as they are more exempt from the fear of cenſure or criticiſm in their own perſon.

Divines.

Their adverſary is well ſecur'd and ſilenc'd to their hand. They may ſafely provoke him to a field where he cannot appear openly, or as a profeſs'd antagoniſt. His weapons are private, and can often reach the *cauſe* without offence to its *maintainers;* whilſt no direct attack robs them of their imaginary victory. They conquer *for themſelves*, and expect to be approv'd ſtill for their *zeal*, however *the cauſe* it-ſelf may have ſuffer'd in their hands. —— Sect. 3.

PERHAPS then, ſaid I, (interrupting him) it may be true enough, what was ſaid once by a perſon who ſeem'd zealous for religion, "That none "*writ well* againſt the atheiſts beſide the *clerk* who "drew the warrant for their execution." *Atheiſt.*

IF this were the *true writing*, reply'd he, there wou'd be an end of all diſpute or reaſoning in the caſe. For where force is neceſſary, reaſon has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if reaſon be needful, force in the mean while muſt be laid aſide: for there is no enforcement of reaſon, but by reaſon. And therefore if *Atheiſts* are to be reaſon'd with, at all; they are to be reaſon'd with, like other men; ſince there's no other way in nature to convince 'em.

THIS I own, ſaid I, ſeems rational and juſt: but I'm afraid that moſt of the devout people will be found ready to abandon the *patient*, for the more *conciſe* method. And tho force without reaſon may be thought ſomewhat hard, yet your other way of reaſon without force, I am apt to think, wou'd meet with fewer admirers.

BUT perhaps, reply'd THEOCLES, 'tis a mere ſound which troubles us. The word or name of *Atheiſt* may poſſibly occaſion ſome diſturbance, by being made to deſcribe two characters ſo very different as his who *abſolutely denies*, and his who *only doubts*. Now he who *doubts*, may poſſibly lament his own unhappineſs, and wiſh to be convinc'd. He who *denies*, is daringly preſumptuous, and ſets up an opinion againſt the intereſt of mankind, and

Part 2. being of ſociety. 'Tis eaſily ſeen that *one* of theſe perſons may bear a due reſpect to the magiſtrate and laws, tho not *the other;* who being obnoxious to them, is therefore puniſhable. But how the former is puniſhable *by man*, will be hard to ſay; unleſs the magiſtrate had dominion over minds, as well as over actions and behaviour; and had power to exerciſe an inquiſition within the inmoſt boſoms and ſecret thoughts of men.

Puniſhment.

I APPREHEND you, ſaid I. And by your account, as there are *two* ſorts of people who are call'd Atheiſts, ſo there are *two* ways of writing againſt them, which may be fitly us'd apart, but not ſo well jointly. You wou'd ſet aſide mere menaces, and ſeparate the *philoſopher's* work from the *magiſtrate's;* taking it for granted, that the more diſcreet and ſober part of unbelievers, who come not under the diſpatching pen of the magiſtrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one of philoſophy. Now the language of the magiſtrate, I muſt confeſs, has little in common with that of philoſophy. Nothing can be more unbecoming the magiſterial authority than a philoſophical ſtyle: and nothing can be more unphiloſophical than a magiſterial one. A mixture of theſe muſt needs ſpoil both. And therefore, in the cauſe before us, "If "any one beſides the magiſtrate, can be ſaid to "*write well*; 'tis HE (according to your account) "who writes as becomes philoſophy, with freedom "of debate, and fairneſs towards his adverſary."

Magiſtrate.

ALLOW it, reply'd he. For what can be more equitable? Nothing. But will *the world* be of the ſame opinion? And may this method of writing be juſtly practis'd in it? Undoubtedly it may. And for a proof, we have many inſtances in antiquity to produce. The freedom taken in this philoſophical way was never eſteem'd injurious to religion, or prejudicial to the vulgar: ſince we find it to have been a practice both in writing and converſe among the great men of a virtuous and

Philoſophy.

religious people; and that even thoſe magiſtrates who officiated at the altars, and were the guardians of the publick worſhip, were ſharers in theſe free debates. Sect. 3.

FORGIVE me, THEOCLES, (ſaid I) if I preſume to ſay, that ſtill this reaches not the caſe before us. We are to conſider *chriſtian* times, ſuch as are now preſent. You know the common fate of thoſe who dare to appear *fair authors*. What was that pious and learned man's caſe, who wrote *the intellectual ſyſtem of the univerſe?* I confeſs it was pleaſant enough to conſider, that tho the whole world were no leſs ſatisfy'd with his capacity and learning, than with his ſincerity in the cauſe of *Deity*; yet was he accus'd of giving the upper hand to the Atheiſts, for having only ſtated their reaſons, and thoſe of their adverſarys, fairly together. And among other writings of this kind, you may remember how a certain *fair* INQUIRY (as you call'd it) was receiv'd, and what offence was taken at it. *Jealouſy of authors.*

I AM ſorry, ſaid THEOCLES, it prov'd ſo. But now indeed you have found a way which may, perhaps, force me to diſcourſe at large with you on this head; by entering the liſts in defence of a friend unjuſtly cenſur'd for this philoſophical liberty.

I CONFESS'D to THEOCLES and the company, that this had really been my aim: and that for this reaſon alone I made my-ſelf the accuſer of this author: "Whom I here actually charg'd, as I did all "thoſe other *moderate calm* writers, with no leſs "than profaneneſs, for reaſoning ſo unconcerned-"ly and patiently, without the leaſt ſhew of zeal "or paſſion, upon the ſubject of a Deity, and a "future ſtate."

AND I, on the other ſide, reply'd THEOCLES, am rather for this patient way of reaſoning; and will endeavour to clear my friend of this imputation, if you can have patience enough to hear me out, in an affair of ſuch a compaſs.

WE all anſwer'd for our-ſelves, and he began thus.

Part 2. OF THE many writers ingag'd in the defence of religion, it ſeems to me that the greateſt part are imploy'd, either in ſupporting the truth of the Chriſtian faith in general, or in refuting ſuch particular doctrines as are eſteem'd innovations in the Chriſtian church. There are not, 'tis thought, many perſons in the world who are looſe in the very grounds and principles of all religion: and to ſuch as theſe we find, indeed, there are not many writers who purpoſely apply themſelves. They may think it a mean labour, and ſcarce becoming them, to argue ſedately with ſuch as are almoſt univerſally treated with deteſtation and horror. But as we are requir'd by our religion to have charity for all men, ſo we cannot ſurely avoid having a real concern for thoſe whom we apprehend to be under the worſt of errors, and whom we find by experience to be with the greateſt difficulty reclaim'd. Neither ought they perhaps in prudence to be treated with ſo little regard, whoſe number, however ſmall, is thought to be rather increaſing; and this too among the people of no deſpicable rank. So that it may well deſerve ſome conſideration, "Whether in our "age and country the ſame remedys may ſerve, "which have hitherto been try'd; or whether ſome "other may not be prefer'd, as being ſutable to "times of leſs ſtrictneſs in matters of religion, and "places leſs ſubject to authority."

Authors.

THIS might be enough to put an author upon thinking of ſuch a way of reaſoning with theſe deluded perſons, as in his opinion might be more effectual for their benefit, than the repeated *exclamations* and *invectives* with which moſt of the arguments us'd againſt them are commonly accompany'd. Nor was it ſo abſurd to imagine that a quite different method might be attempted; by which a writer might offer reaſon to theſe men with ſo much more favour and advantage, as he appear'd unprepoſſeſs'd, and willing to examine every thing with the greateſt unconcern and indifference. For

to ſuch perſons as theſe, 'tis to be fear'd, 'twill always appear, "That what was never *queſtion'd*, "was never *prov'd*: and that whatever ſubject "had not, at ſome time or other, been examin'd "with perfect indifference, was never *rightly ex-* "*amin'd*, nor cou'd *rightly be believ'd*." And in a treatiſe of this kind, offer'd as an *eſſay* or *inquiry* only, they wou'd be far from finding that impartiality and indifference which is requiſite: if inſtead of a readineſs to comply with whatever conſequences ſuch an examination as this, and the courſe of reaſoning brought forth, the author ſhou'd ſhew a previous inclination to the conſequences only on one ſide, and an abhorrence of any concluſion on the other. Sect. 3.

OTHERS therefore, in different circumſtances, may perhaps have found it neceſſary, and becoming their *character*, to ſhew all manner of deteſtation both of the perſons and principles of theſe men. Our author, on the contrary, whoſe character exceeds not that of a *lay-man*, endeavours to ſhew civility and favour, by keeping the faireſt meaſures he poſſibly can with the men of this ſort; allowing 'em all he is able, and arguing with a perfect indifference, even on the ſubject of a *Deity*. He offers to conclude nothing poſitive himſelf, but leaves it to others to draw concluſions from his principles: having this one chief aim and intention; "How, in the firſt place, to reconcile theſe "perſons to *the principles of virtue*; That, by "this means, a way might be laid open to *religi-* "*on*; by removing thoſe greateſt, if not only ob- "ſtacles to it, which ariſe from the vices and paſ- "ſions of men."

Fundamental principles.

'TIS upon this account he endeavours chiefly to eſtabliſh *virtue* on principles, by which he is able to argue with thoſe who are not as yet induc'd to own a GOD, or *future ſtate*. If he cannot do thus much, he reckons he does nothing. For how can *ſupreme goodneſs* be intelligible to thoſe who know

Part 2. not what *goodneſs it-ſelf* is? Or how can virtue be underſtood to deſerve reward, when as yet its merit and excellence is unknown? We begin ſurely at the wrong end, when we wou'd prove MERIT *by favour*, and ORDER *by a Deity*.——This our friend ſeeks to redreſs. For being, in reſpect of VIRTUE, what you lately call'd *a realiſt*; he endeavours to ſhew, "That it is really ſomething *in* "*it-ſelf*, and in the nature of things: not arbi- "trary or *factitious* (if I may ſo ſpeak) not conſti- "tuted from without, or dependent on *cuſtom*, "*fancy*, or *will*; not even on the *ſupreme will* "it-ſelf, which can no-way govern it: but being "*neceſſarily good*, is govern'd by it, and ever uni- "form with it." And notwithſtanding he has thus made VIRTUE his chief ſubject, and in ſome meaſure independent on religion, yet I fancy he may poſſibly appear at laſt as high a *divine* as he is a *moraliſt*.

Theiſts, *Nominal, real.*

I WOU'D not willingly advance it as a rule, "That thoſe who make only *a name* of VIRTUE, "make no more of DEITY, and cannot without "affectation defend the principles of *religion*:" But this I will venture to aſſert; "That whoever "ſincerely defends VIRTUE, and is a *realiſt* in "MORALITY, muſt of neceſſity, in a manner, by "the ſame ſcheme of reaſoning, prove as very *a* "*realiſt* in DIVINITY."

ALL *affectation*, but chiefly in philoſophy, I muſt own, I think unpardonable. And you, PHILOCLES, who can give no quarter to ill reaſoning, nor endure any unſound or inconſiſtent hypotheſis; you will be ſo ingenuous, I dare ſay, as to reject our modern DEISM, and challenge thoſe who aſſume a name to which their *philoſophy* can never in the leaſt intitle 'em.

COMMEND me to honeſt EPICURUS, who raiſes his DEITYS aloft in the imaginary ſpaces; and ſetting 'em apart out of the univerſe and nature of things, makes nothing of 'em beyond *a word*.

This is ingenuous, and plain dealing: for this every one who philoſophizes may eaſily underſtand. Sect. 3.

THE ſame ingenuity belongs to thoſe philoſophers whom you, PHILOCLES, ſeem inclin'd to favour. When A SCEPTICK queſtions, "Whether "*a real Theology* can be rais'd out of *philoſophy* "*alone*, without the help of *revelation*;" he does no more than pay a handſom compliment to authority and the receiv'd religion. He can impoſe on no-one who reaſons deeply: ſince whoever does ſo, will eaſily conceive, that at this rate theology muſt have no foundation at all. For revelation it-ſelf, we know, is founded on the acknowledgment of a divine exiſtence: and 'tis the province of philoſophy alone to *prove* what revelation only *ſuppoſes*.

I LOOK on it, therefore, as a moſt unfair way, for thoſe who wou'd be *builders*, and undertake this *proving* part, to lay ſuch a foundation as is inſufficient to bear the ſtructure. Supplanting and undermining may, in other caſes, be *fair war*: but in philoſophical diſputes, 'tis not allowable to work under-ground, or as in ſieges *by the ſap*. Nothing can be more unbecoming than to talk magiſterially and in venerable terms of "A *ſupreme* "NATURE, an *infinite being*, and A DEITY;" when all the while *a providence* is never meant, nor any thing like *order* or *the government of a Mind* admitted. For when *theſe* are underſtood, and *real Divinity* acknowledg'd; the notion is not dry, and barren; but ſuch conſequences are neceſſarily drawn from it, as muſt ſet us in action, and find employment for our ſtrongeſt affections. All the *duty's* of RELIGION evidently follow hence; and no exception remains againſt any of thoſe great maxims which *revelation* has eſtabliſh'd. Theiſts, *Nominal*, *real*.

NOW whether our friend be unfeignedly and ſincerely of this latter ſort of *real Theologiſts*, you will learn beſt from the conſequences of his *hypotheſis*. You will obſerve, whether inſtead of ending in *mere*

Part 2. *ſpeculation*, it leads to *practice:* and you will then ſurely be ſatisfy'd, when you ſee ſuch a ſtructure rais'd, as with the generality of the world muſt paſs at leaſt for *high religion*, and with ſome, in all likelihood, for no leſs than ENTHUSIASM.

FOR I appeal to you, PHILOCLES, whether there be any thing in *divinity* which you think has more the air of *Enthuſiaſm* than that notion of *divine* LOVE, ſuch as ſeparates from every thing worldly, ſenſual, or meanly-intereſted? A LOVE which is *ſimple*, *pure*, and *unmix'd;* which has no other object than merely *the excellency of that Being it-ſelf*, nor admits of any other thought of happineſs, than in *its ſingle fruition*. Now I dare preſume you will take it as a ſubſtantial proof of my friend's being far enough from irreligion, if it be ſhewn that he has eſpous'd this *notion*, and thinks of making out this *high point of divinity*, from arguments familiar even to thoſe who oppoſe *religion*.

Divine love.

ACCORDING, therefore, to his hypotheſis, he wou'd in the firſt place, by way of prevention, declare to you, That tho the *diſintereſted love of* GOD were the moſt excellent principle; yet he knew very well, that by the indiſcreet zeal of ſome devout well-meaning people it had been ſtretch'd too far, perhaps even to extravagance and Enthuſiaſm; as formerly among the *myſticks* of the antient church, whom theſe of latter days have follow'd. On the other hand, that there were thoſe who in oppoſition to this devout myſtick way, and as profeſs'd enemys to what they call *Enthuſiaſm*, had ſo far exploded every thing of this ecſtatick kind, as in a manner to have given up devotion; and in reality had left ſo little of zeal, affection, or warmth, in what they call their *rational religion*, as to make them much ſuſpected of their ſincerity in *any*. For tho it be natural enough (he wou'd tell you) for a mere political writer to ground his great argument for religion on the neceſſity of ſuch a belief as that *of a future reward and puniſhment;* yet, if you

Myſticks.

will take his opinion, 'tis a very ill token of ſince- Sect. 3.
rity in religion, and in the Chriſtian Religion more eſpecially, to reduce it to ſuch a philoſophy as will allow no room to that other principle of *love;* but treats all of that kind as *Enthuſiaſm*, for ſo much as aiming at what is call'd *diſintereſtedneſs*, or teaching the *love of God or virtue* for GOD or VIRTUE's ſake.

HERE, then, we have two ſorts of people (according to my friend's account) who in theſe oppoſite extremes expoſe *religion* to the inſults of its adverſarys. For as, on one hand, 'twill be found difficult to defend the notion of that high-rais'd love, eſpous'd with ſo much warmth by thoſe devout *myſticks*; ſo, on the other hand, 'twill be found as hard a taſk, upon the principles of theſe cooler men, to guard religion from the imputation of mercenarineſs, and a ſlaviſh ſpirit. For how ſhall one deny, that to ſerve God by compulſion, or for intereſt merely, is *ſervile* and *mercenary?* Is it not evident, that the only *true* and *liberal* ſervice paid either to that ſupreme Being, or to any other ſuperior, is *that*, "which proceeds from an *eſteem* or "*love* of the perſon ſerv'd, *a ſenſe* of duty or gra- "titude, and a love of the dutiful and grateful "part, as *good* and *amiable, in it-ſelf?*" And where is the injury to *religion*, from ſuch a conceſſion as this? Or what detraction is it from the belief of an after-reward or puniſhment, to own "That the ſervice caus'd by it, is not equal to "that which is *voluntary* and *with inclination*, but "is rather diſingenuous and of the ſlaviſh kind?" Is it not ſtill for the good of mankind and of the world, that obedience to the rule of right ſhou'd ſome way or other be paid; if not *in the better way*, yet at leaſt *in this imperfect one?* And is it not to be ſhewn, "That altho this ſervice of *fear* be al- "low'd ever ſo low or baſe: yet RELIGION ſtill "being *a diſcipline*, and *progreſs* of the ſoul to-

RELIGION, liberal, illiberal.

Part 2.

Rewards and punishments.

" wards perfection, the motive of reward and pu-
" niſhment is primary and of the higheſt moment
" with us; till being capable of more ſublime in-
" ſtruction, we are led from this *ſervile* ſtate to
" the generous ſervice of *affection* and *love?*"

To this it is that in our friend's opinion we ought all of us to aſpire, ſo as to endeavour " That the " *excellence of the object*, not the *reward* or *pu-* " *niſhment*, ſhou'd be our motive: but that where " thro the corruption of our nature, the *former* of " theſe motives is found inſufficient to excite to vir- " tue, there the *latter* ſhou'd be brought in aid, and " on no account be undervalu'd or neglected."

Supplemental motives.

Now this being once eſtabliſh'd, how can RELIGION be any longer ſubject to the imputation of *mercenarineſs?* But thus we know religion is often charg'd. " *Godlineſs*, ſay they, *is great gain:* nor " is GOD devoutly ſerv'd *for nought.*"——Is this therefore a reproach? Is it confeſs'd there may be *a better* ſervice, *a more generous love?*——Enough, there needs no more. On this foundation our friend preſumes it eaſy to defend RELIGION, and even that *devouteſt part*, which is eſteem'd ſo great a paradox of faith. For if there be in nature ſuch a ſervice as that of affection and love, there remains then only to conſider of *the object*, whether there be really that *ſupreme-one* we ſuppoſe. For if there be *divine excellence* in things; if there be in nature a *ſupreme mind* or DEITY; we have then an object conſummate, and comprehenſive of all which is *good* or *excellent*. And this object, of all others, muſt of neceſſity be the moſt amiable, the moſt ingaging, and of higheſt ſatisfaction and enjoyment. Now that there is ſuch a principal object as this in the world, the world alone (if I may ſay ſo) by its wiſe and perfect order muſt evince. This order, if indeed perfect, excludes all *real* ILL. And that it really does ſo, is what our author ſo earneſtly maintains, by ſolving the beſt he can thoſe untoward *Phænomena*

Object of love.

and ill ſigns, taken from the courſe of providence, in the ſeemingly unequal lot of *virtue* in this world. Sect. 3.

'TIS true; tho the appearances hold ever ſo ſtrongly againſt *virtue*, and in favour of *vice*, the objection which ariſes hence againſt a DEITY may be eaſily remov'd, and all ſet aright again on the ſuppoſal of a *future ſtate*. This to a chriſtian, or one already convinc'd of ſo great a point, is ſufficient to clear every dark cloud of providence. For he needs not be over-and above ſollicitous as to the fate of VIRTUE *in this world*, who is ſecure of *hereafter*. But the caſe is otherwiſe as to the people we are here to encounter. They are at a loſs for providence, and ſeek to find it in the world. The aggravation of the appearing diſorders in worldly affairs, and the blackeſt repreſentation of ſociety and human nature, will hardly help 'em to this view. 'Twill be difficult for 'em to read providence in ſuch characters. From ſo uncomely a face of things *below*, they will preſume to think unfavourably of all *above*. By *the effects* they ſee, they will be inclin'd to judg *the cauſe*, and by the fate of *virtue* to determine of *a providence*. But being once convinc'd of order and a providence as to things *preſent*, they may ſoon, perhaps, be ſatisfy'd even of *a future ſtate*. For if virtue be to it ſelf no ſmall reward, and vice in a great meaſure its own puniſhment; we have a ſolid ground to go upon. The plain foundations of a diſtributive juſtice, and due order in this world, may lead us to conceive a further building. We apprehend a larger ſcheme, and eaſily reſolve our-ſelves why things were not compleated in this ſtate; but their accompliſhment reſerv'd rather to ſome further period. For had the good and virtuous of mankind been wholly proſperous in this life; had goodneſs never met with oppoſition, nor merit ever lain under a cloud; where had been the trial, victory, or crown of *virtue?* Where had the virtues had their theater, or whence their names? Where had been

Future State.

Previous proof.

A providence. ORDER.

Part 2. *temperance* or *self-denial?* Where *patience, meekness, magnanimity?* Whence have these their being? What *merit*, except from hardship? What *virtue* without a conflict, and the encounter of such enemys as arise both within, and from abroad?

But as many as are the difficultys which *virtue* has to encounter in this world, her force is yet superior. Expos'd as she is here, she is not however abandon'd or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above pity, tho not above our wishes: and as happy as we see her here, we have room for further hopes in her behalf. Her present portion is sufficient to shew providence already ingag'd on her side. And since there is such provision for her *here*, such happiness and such advantages even in this life; how probable must it appear, that this providential care is extended yet further to *a succeeding life*, and perfected *hereafter?*

Recapitulation.

This is what, in our friend's opinion, may be said in behalf of a future state, to those who question revelation. 'Tis this must render revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the belief of a Deity and providence. A providence must be prov'd from what we see of order in things present. We must contend for order; and in this part chiefly, where virtue is concern'd. All must not be refer'd to *a hereafter*. For a disorder'd state, in which all present care of things is given up, vice uncontroul'd, and virtue neglected, represents a very *chaos*, and reduces us to the belov'd atoms, chance, and confusion of the Atheists.

Future State.

What therefore can be worse done in the cause of a *Deity*, than to magnify disorder, and exaggerate (as some zealous people do) the misfortunes of virtue, so far as to render it an unhappy choice with respect to this world? They err widely, who propose to turn men to the thoughts of a *better* world, by making 'em think so ill of *this*. For to declaim in this manner against *virtue* to those of a looser faith, will make 'em the less believe a

Deity, but not the more *a future ſtate*. Nor can it be thought ſincerely that any man, by having the moſt elevated opinion of virtue, and of the happineſs it creates, was ever the leſs inclin'd to the belief of a future ſtate. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are favourers of vice are always the leaſt willing to hear of a future exiſtence; ſo they who are in love with virtue, are the readieſt to embrace that opinion which renders it ſo illuſtrious, and makes its cauſe triumphant. Sect. 3. *Favourers of the opinion.*

THUS it was, that among the antients the great motive which inclin'd ſo many of the wiſeſt to the belief of this doctrine unreveal'd to 'em, was purely *the love of virtue* in the perſons of thoſe great men, the *founders* and *preſervers* of ſocietys, the *legislators*, *patriots*, *deliverers*, *heroes*, whoſe virtues they were deſirous ſhou'd live and be immortaliz'd. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making this belief more engaging among the good and virtuous than *the love of friendſhip*, which creates in 'em a deſire not to be wholly ſeparated by death, but that they may enjoy the ſame bleſs'd ſociety hereafter. How is it poſſible, then, that *an author* ſhou'd, for exalting *virtue* merely, be deem'd an enemy to *a future ſtate*? How can our friend be judg'd falſe to *religion*, for defending a principle on which the very notion of GOD and *goodneſs* depends? For this he ſays only, and this is the ſum of all: "That by building a future ſtate "on the ruins of *virtue*, RELIGION in general, "and the cauſe of *a Deity* is betray'd; and by "making rewards and puniſhments the principal "motives to duty, the Chriſtian Religion in parti-"cular is overthrown, and its greateſt principle, "that of *love*, rejected and expos'd." *Antients.* *Friendſhip.* *Concluſion.*

UPON the whole then, we may juſtly as well as charitably conclude, that it is truly *our author's* deſign, in applying himſelf with ſo much fairneſs to the men of looſer principles, to lead 'em into

Part 2. *Concluſion.* ſuch an apprehenſion of the conſtitution of mankind and of human affairs, as might form in 'em a notion of *order in things*, and draw hence an acknowledgment of that wiſdom, goodneſs, and beauty, which is ſupreme; that being thus far become proſelytes, they might be prepar'd for that *divine love* which our religion wou'd teach 'em, when once they ſhou'd embrace its precepts, and form themſelves to its ſacred character.

THUS, continu'd he, I have made my friend's apology; which may have ſhewn him to you perhaps a good *moraliſt*; and, I hope, no enemy to religion. But if you find ſtill that *the divine* has not appear'd ſo much in his character as I promis'd, I can never think of ſatisfying you in any ordinary way of converſation. Shou'd I offer to go further, I might be ingag'd deeply in ſpiritual affairs, and be forc'd to make ſome new model of *a ſermon* upon his ſyſtem of divinity. However, I am in hopes, now that in good earneſt matters are come wellnigh to *preaching*, you will acquit me for what I have already perform'd.

SECT. IV.

JUST as he had made an end of ſpeaking, came in ſome viſitants, who took us up the remaining part of the afternoon in other diſcourſes. But theſe being over, and our ſtrangers gone (all except *the old gentleman*, and *his friend*, who had din'd with us) we began a-new with THEOCLES, by laying claim to his ſermon, and intreating him, again and again, to let us hear him, at large, in his *theological* way.

THIS he complain'd was perſecuting him: as you have ſeen company, ſaid he, often perſecute a reputed ſinger, not out of any fancy for the muſick, but to ſatisfy a malicious ſort of curioſity, which ends commonly in cenſure and diſlike.

HOWEVER it might be, we told him we were resolv'd to perſiſt. And I aſſur'd our companions, that if they would ſecond me heartily in the manner I intended to preſs him; we ſhou'd eaſily get the better. Sect. 4.

IN revenge then, ſaid he, I will comply on this condition; that ſince I am to ſuſtain the part of *the divine* and *preacher*, it ſhall be at PHILOCLES's coſt; who ſhall bear the part of *the infidel*, and ſtand for the perſon *preach'd to*.

TRULY, ſaid the old gentleman, the *part* you have propos'd for him is ſo natural and ſutable, that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the leaſt pain. I cou'd wiſh rather, that you had ſpar'd your-ſelf the trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper *character*. He wou'd have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your diſcourſe by his perpetual cavils. Therefore ſince we have now had entertainment enough by way of *dialogue*, I deſire the *law* of SERMON may be ſtrictly obſerv'd; and "That there be no *anſwering* to "whatever is *argu'd* or *advanc'd*."

I CONSENTED to all the terms, and told THEOCLES I wou'd ſtand his mark willingly: and beſides, if I really were that *infidel* he was to ſuppoſe me, I ſhou'd count it no unhappineſs; ſince I was ſure of being ſo thorowly convinc'd by him, if he wou'd vouchſafe to undertake me.

THEOCLES then propos'd we ſhou'd walk out; the *evening* being fine, and the free air ſuting better (as he thought) with ſuch diſcourſes, than a chamber.

ACCORDINGLY we took our evening-walk in the fields, from whence the laborious hinds were now retiring. We fell naturally into the praiſes of *a country-life*; and diſcours'd a-while of *huſbandry*, and the nature of the *ſoil*. Our friends began to admire ſome of the *plants* which grew here to great perfection. And it being my fortune (as

Part 2. having acquir'd a little inſight into the nature of *ſimples*) to ſay ſomething they mightily approv'd, upon this ſubject, THEOCLES immediately turning about to me; "O my ingenious friend!" ſaid he, "whoſe reaſon, in other reſpects, muſt be allow'd "ſo clear and happy; how is it poſſible that with "ſuch inſight, and accurate judgment in *the parti-* "*culars* of natural beings and operations, you ſhou'd "no better judg of the ſtructure of things *in gene-* "*ral*, and of the order and frame of NATURE? "Who better than your-ſelf can ſhew the ſtructure "of each plant and animal-body, declare the of-
Organization. "fice of every *part* and *organ*, and tell the uſes, "ends, and advantages to which they ſerve? How "therefore, ſhou'd you prove ſo ill *a naturaliſt* in "*this* WHOLE, and underſtand ſo little the ana- "tomy of *the world* and *nature*, as not to diſcern "the ſame relation of parts, the ſame conſiſtency "and uniformity in *the univerſe!*

"SOME men perhaps there are of ſo confus'd a "thought, and ſo irregularly form'd *within them-* "*ſelves*, that 'tis no more than natural for them to "find fault, and imagine a thouſand inconſiſtences "and defects in this *wider conſtitution*. 'Twas not, "we may preſume, the abſolute aim or intereſt of "the univerſal nature, to render every private-one "infallible, and without defect. 'Twas not its in- "tention to leave us without ſome pattern of im- "perfection; ſuch as we perceive in minds, like "theſe, perplex'd with froward thought. But "you, my friend, are maſter of a nobler mind. "You are conſcious of better order *within*, and "can ſee workmanſhip and exactneſs in your-ſelf, "and other *innumerable parts* of the creation. Can "you anſwer it to your-ſelf, allowing thus much, "not to allow all? Can you induce your-ſelf ever "to believe or think, that where there are parts "ſo variouſly united, and conſpiring fitly within
WHOLE and parts. "themſelves, *the whole* it-ſelf ſhou'd have neither "union nor coherence; and where inferior and

" private natures are often found ſo perfect, *the* Sect. 4.
" *univerſal-one* ſhou'd want perfection, and be
" eſteem'd like whatſoever can be thought of, moſt
" monſtrous, rude, and imperfect?

" STRANGE! That there ſhou'd be *in nature*
" the idea of an order and perfection, which NA-
" TURE her-ſelf wants! That beings which ariſe
" from *nature* ſhou'd be ſo perfect, as to diſcover
" imperfection in her conſtitution; and be wiſe to
" correct that wiſdom by which they were made!

" NOTHING ſurely is more ſtrongly imprinted
" on our minds, or more cloſely interwoven with
" our ſouls, than the idea or ſenſe of *order* and
" *proportion*. Hence all the force of *numbers*, and *Proportion.*
" thoſe powerful *arts* founded on their management
" and uſe. What a difference there is between
" *harmony* and *diſcord! cadency* and *convulſion!*
" What a difference between compos d and orderly
" motion, and that which is ungovern d and acci-
" dental! between the regular and uniform pile of
" ſome noble architect, and a heap of ſand or
" ſtones! between an organiz'd body, and a miſt
" or cloud driven by the wind!

" NOW as this difference is immediately per-
" ceiv'd by a plain internal ſenſation, ſo there is
" withal in reaſon this account of it; That what-
" ever things have *order*, the ſame have *unity of* *Union.*
" *deſign*, and concur *in one*, are parts conſtituent
" of *one* WHOLE, or are, in themſelves, *intire*
" *ſyſtems*. Such is a *tree*, with all its branches;
" an *animal*, with all its members; an *edifice*,
" with all its exterior and interior ornaments.
" What elſe is even a *tune* or *ſymphony*, or any
" excellent piece of muſick, than a certain *ſyſtem*
" of proportion'd ſounds?

" NOW in this which we call the UNIVERSE, *Syſtem.*
" whatever the perfection may be of any *particu-*
" *lar ſyſtems*; or whatever *ſingle parts* may have
" proportion, unity, or form within themſelves;

Part 2. " yet if they are not united all in general, *in* * ONE
" *ſyſtem*, but are, in reſpect of one another, as the
Syſtem. " driven ſands, or clouds, or breaking waves; then
" there being no coherence in *the whole*, there can
" be infer'd no order, no proportion, and conſe-
" quently no project or *deſign*. But if none of theſe
" parts are independent, but all apparently united,
" then is the WHOLE *a ſyſtem* compleat, according
" to one *ſimple*, *conſiſtent*, and *uniform* DESIGN.
" HERE then is our main ſubject, inſiſted on:
" that neither *man*, nor any other animal, tho ever
" ſo compleat a *ſyſtem* of parts, as to all *within*,
" can be allow'd in the ſame manner compleat, as
" to all *without*; but muſt be conſider'd as having
" a further relation abroad to *the ſyſtem of his kind*.
Animal- " So even this ſyſtem of his kind to *the animal-*
Syſtem. " *ſyſtem*; this to the world (our *earth*;) and this
" again to *the bigger world*, and to *the univerſe*.

* *Vid.* LOCKE of human underſtanding, *Book IV. Chap. 6. Sect.* 11.

" Ac mihi quidem veteres illi majus quiddam animo
" complexi, multo plus etiam vidiſſe videntur, quam
" quantum noſtrorum ingeniorum acies intueri poteſt: qui
" omnia haec, quae ſupra et ſubter, unum eſſe, et una
" vi, atque una conſenſione naturae conſtricta eſſe dix-
" erunt. Nullum eſt enim genus rerum, quod aut avul-
" ſum a caeteris per ſeipſum conſtare, aut quo caetera ſi
" careant, vim ſuam, atque aeternitatem conſervare
" poſſint." Cicero de oratore, lib. 3.

" Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana
" concluſa ſunt, unum eſt: membra ſumus corporis
" magni." Seneca, Epiſt. 95.

" Societas noſtra lapidum fornicationi ſimillima eſt:
" quae caſura, niſi invicem obſtarent, hoc ipſo ſuſtine-
" tur." Ibidem.

" Eſtne Dei ſedes, niſi terra, et pontus, et aether,
" Et coelum, et virtus? Superos quid quaerimus ultra?
" Jupiter eſt quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris."
Lucan. lib. 9.

" ALL things in this world are *united*. For as Sect. 4.
" the *branch* is united with the *tree*, ſo is the tree
" as immediately with the *earth*, *air*, and *water*, *Syſtem of*
" which feed it. As much as the fertile *mould* is *the world.*
" fitted to the tree, as much as the ſtrong and up-
" right trunk of the *oak* or *elm* is fitted to the
" twining branches of the *vine* or *ivy*; ſo much are
" the very *leaves*, the *ſeeds*, and *fruits* of theſe
" trees fitted to the various *animals:* theſe again
" to one another, and to the *elements* where they
" live, and to which they are, as appendices, in a
" manner fitted and join'd; as either by *wings* for
" the air, *fins* for the water, *feet* for the earth,
" and by other correſpondent inward parts of a
" more curious frame and texture. Thus in con-
" templating all on earth, we muſt of neceſſity
" view *all in one*, as holding to one common ſtock.
" Thus too in the ſyſtem of the bigger world.
" See there the mutual dependency of things! the
" relation of one to another; of the ſun to this in-
" habited earth, and of the earth and other planets
" to the ſun! the order, union, and coherence of
" *the whole!* And know (my ingenious friend) that
" by this ſurvey you will be oblig'd to own the U-
" NIVERSAL SYSTEM, and coherent ſcheme of *Univerſal*
" things, to be eſtabliſh'd on abundant proof, ca- *ſyſtem.*
" pable of convincing any fair and juſt contempla-
" tor of the works of nature. For ſcarce wou'd
" any-one, till he had well ſurvey'd this univerſal
" ſcene, believe *a union* thus evidently demonſtra-
" ble, by ſuch numerous and powerful inſtances
" of mutual correſpondency and relation, from the
" minuteſt ranks and orders of beings to the re-
" moteſt ſpheres.

" Now, in this mighty UNION, if there be *Appear-*
" ſuch relations of parts one to another as are not *ance of* ill
" eaſily diſcover'd; if on this account the end and *neceſſary.*
" uſe of things does not every-where appear, there
" is no wonder; ſince 'tis no more indeed than what
" muſt happen of neceſſity: nor cou'd ſupreme

Part 2. " wiſdom have otherwiſe order'd it. For in an in-
" finity of things thus relative, a mind which ſees
" not *infinitely*, can ſee nothing *fully*: and ſince
" each particular has relation to all in general, it can
" know no perfect or true relation of any thing, in
" a world not perfectly and fully known.

Solution. " The ſame may be conſider d in any diſſected
" animal, plant, or flower; where he who is no
" anatomiſt, nor vers d in natural hiſtory, ſees that
" the many *parts* have a relation to *the whole*;
" for thus much even a ſlight view affords: but
" he who like you, my friend, is curious in the
" works of nature, and has been let into a know-
" ledg of the animal and vegetable worlds, he a-
" lone can readily declare the juſt relation of all
" theſe parts to one another, and the ſeveral uſes
" to which they ſerve.

Example. " But if you wou'd willingly enter further into
" this thought, and conſider how much we ought
" not only to be ſatisfy d with this our view of
" things, but even to admire its clearneſs; ima-
" gine only ſome perſon intirely a ſtranger to na-
" vigation, and ignorant of the nature of the ſea
" or waters, how great his aſtoniſhment wou'd be,
" when finding himſelf on board ſome veſſel, an-
" choring at ſea, remote from all land-proſpect,
" whilſt it was yet a calm, he view'd the ponder-
" ous machine firm and motionleſs in the midſt of
" the ſmooth-ocean, and conſider'd its foundations
" beneath, together with its cordage, maſts, and
" ſails above. How eaſily wou'd he ſee *the whole*
" one regular ſtructure, all things depending on one
" another; the uſes of the rooms *below*, the lodg-
" ments, and conveniences of men and ſtores? But
" being ignorant of the intent or deſign of all *a-*
" *bove*, wou'd he pronounce the maſts and cordage
" to be uſeleſs and cumberſom, and for this reaſon
" condemn the frame, and deſpiſe *the architect?*
" O my friend! let us not thus betray our igno-
" rance; but conſider where we are, and in what

" a univerſe. Think of the many parts of the vaſt Sect. 4.
" machine, in which we have ſo little inſight, and
" of which it is impoſſible we ſhou'd know the ends
" and uſes; when inſtead of ſeeing to the higheſt
" *pendants*, we ſee only ſome *lower deck*, and
" are in this dark caſe of fleſh, confin'd even to
" *the hold*, and meaneſt ſtation of the veſſel.

" Now having recogniz d this uniform conſiſtent
" fabrick, and own'd the *univerſal ſyſtem*, we muſt
" of conſequence acknowledg a *univerſal* MIND; *Univerſal*
" which no ingenuous man can be tempted to diſ- *mind.*
" own, except thro the imagination of diſorder in
" the univerſe, its ſeat. For can it be ſuppos'd
" of any-one in the world, that being in ſome de-
" ſart far from men, and hearing there a perfect
" ſymphony of muſick, or ſeeing an exact pile of
" regular architecture ariſing gradually from the
" earth in all its orders and proportions, he ſhou'd
" be perſuaded that at the bottom there was no
" *deſign* accompanying this, no ſecret ſpring of
" *thought*, no active *mind?* Wou'd he, becauſe he
" ſaw no hand, deny the handy-work, and ſuppoſe
" that each of theſe compleat and perfect ſyſtems
" were fram'd, and thus united in juſt ſymmetry,
" and conſpiring order, either by the accidental
" blowing of the winds, or rolling of the ſands?

" WHAT is it then ſhou'd ſo diſturb our views *Diſtur-*
" of *nature*, as to deſtroy that unity of deſign and *bance,*
" order of *a mind*, which otherwiſe wou'd be ſo *whence.*
" apparent? All we can ſee either of the heavens
" or earth, demonſtrates order and perfection; ſo
" as to afford the nobleſt ſubjects of contemplati-
" on to minds, like yours, enrich'd with ſciences
" and learning. All is delightful, amiable, rejoic-
" ing, except with relation to *man* only, and his *Human*
" circumſtances, which ſeem unequal. Here the *affairs.*
" calamity and ill ariſes; and hence the ruin of this
" goodly frame. All periſhes on this account; and
" the whole order of the univerſe, elſewhere ſo firm,
" intire, and immoveable, is here o'erthrown, and

Part 2. " loſt by this one view; in which we refer all things
" to our-ſelves: ſubmitting the intereſt of *the whole*
Selfiſhneſs. " to the good and intereſt of ſo ſmall *a part*.

" BUT how is it you complain of the unequal
" ſtate of man, and of the few advantages allow'd
" him above the beaſts? What can a creature
" claim, ſo little differing from 'em, or whoſe me-
" rit appears ſo little above 'em, except in *wiſdom*
Virtue and vice. " and *virtue*, to which ſo few conform? Man may
" be virtuous; and being ſo, is happy. His merit
" is reward. By virtue he deſerves; and in virtue
" only can meet his happineſs deſerv'd. But if e-
" ven *virtue* it-ſelf be unprovided for, and *vice*
" more proſperous, be the better choice; if this
" (as you ſuppoſe) be in the nature of things, ther
" is all order in reality inverted, and ſupreme wiſ-
" dom loſt: imperfection and irregularity being
" after this manner, undoubtedly too apparent in
" the moral world.

" HAVE you then, e'er you pronounc'd this
Their power, effect. " ſentence, conſider'd of the ſtate of *virtue* and
" *vice* with reſpect to *this life merely*; ſo as to
" ſay, with aſſurance, when, and how far, in what
" particulars, and how circumſtantiated, the one or
" the other is *good* or *ill?* You who are ſkill'd in
" other fabricks and compoſitions, both of art and
" nature, have you conſider'd of the fabrick of *the*
" *mind*, the conſtitution of the ſoul, the connexi-
A mind. " on and frame of all its paſſions and affections
" to know accordingly the order and ſymmetry of
" the part, and how it either improves or ſuffers
" what its force is, when naturally preſerv'd in its
Improve-ment. " ſound ſtate; and what becomes of it, when cor-
" rupted and abus'd? Till this (my friend!) be
" well examin'd and underſtood, how ſhall we
" judg either of the force of *virtue*, or power of
" *vice?* Or in what manner either of theſe may
" work to our happineſs or undoing?

" HERE therefore is that INQUIRY we ſhou'
" firſt make. But who is there can afford to mak

" it as he ought? If happily we are born of a good Sect. 4.
" nature; if a liberal education has form'd in us a
" generous temper and diſpoſition, well-regulated *Temper.*
" appetites, and worthy inclinations, 'tis well for
" us; and ſo indeed we eſteem it. But who is
" there endeavours to give theſe to himſelf, or to
" advance his portion of happineſs in this kind?
" Who thinks of improving, or ſo much as of pre-
" ſerving his ſhare, in a world where it muſt of
" neceſſity run ſo great a hazard, and where we
" know an honeſt nature is ſo eaſily corrupted?
" All other things relating to us are preſerv'd with
" care, and have ſome art or œconomy belonging
" to 'em; this which is neareſt related to us, and
" on which our happineſs depends, is alone com-
" mitted to chance: and *temper* is the only thing
" ungovern d, whilſt it governs all the reſt.

" THUS we inquire concerning what is good and *Appetites.*
" ſutable to our appetites; but what appetites are
" good and ſutable to us, is no part of our examina-
" tion. We inquire what is according to *intereſt*,
" *policy*, *faſhion*, *vogue*; but it ſeems wholly ſtrange,
" and out of the way, to inquire what is *according*
" *to* NATURE. The ballance of EUROPE, of trade,
" of power, is ſtrictly ſought after; while few have
" heard of *the ballance of their paſſions*, or thought *Ballance.*
" of holding theſe ſcales even. Few are acquaint-
" ed with this province, or knowing in theſe af-
" fairs. But were we more ſo (as this *inquiry*
" wou'd make us) we ſhou'd then ſee beauty and
" decorum here, as well as elſewhere in nature;
" and the order of the moral world wou'd equal
" that of the natural. By this the *beauty of* VIR- *Virtue.*
" TUE wou'd appear; and hence (as has been ſhewn) *Deity.*
" *the ſupreme* and *ſovereign* BEAUTY, the original
" of all which is good or amiable.

" BUT leſt I ſhou'd appear at laſt too like an
" *enthuſiaſt*, I chuſe to expreſs my ſenſe, and con-
" clude this *philoſophical ſermon* in the words of
" one of thoſe antient *philologiſts*, whom you are

Part 2. " us'd to eſteem. *For divinity it-ſelf,* ſays he, *is*
" *ſurely beauteous, and of all beautys the brighteſt;*
" *tho not a beauteous body, but that from whence*
" *the beauty of body is deriv'd: not a beauteous*
" *plain, but that from whence the plain looks beau-*
" *tiful. The river's beauty, the ſea's, the heaven's,*
" *and heavenly conſtellations, all flow from hence*
" *as from a ſource eternal and incorruptible. As*
" *beings partake of this, they are fair, and flouriſh-*
" *ing, and happy: as they are loſt to this, they are*
" *deform'd, periſh'd and loſt.*"

WHEN THEOCLES had thus ſpoken, he was formally complimented by our *two companions.* I was going to add ſomething in the ſame way: but he preſently ſtop'd me, by ſaying, he ſhou'd be ſcandaliz'd, if inſtead of commending him, I did not according to my *character*, chuſe rather to criticize ſome part or other of his long diſcourſe.

IF it muſt be ſo then, reply'd I; in the firſt place, give me leave to wonder that, inſtead of the many arguments commonly brought for proof of a *Deity*, you make uſe only of one ſingle one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in cuſtomary form, of a *firſt cauſe*, a *firſt being*, and a *beginning of motion:* how clear the *idea* was of an *immaterial ſubſtance:* and how plainly it appear'd, that at ſome time or other *matter muſt have been created.* But as to all this, you are ſilent.

Matter and thought.

As for what is ſaid, of " A material unthinking " ſubſtance being never able to have produc'd an " immaterial thinking one;" I readily grant it: but on the condition, that this great maxim of *nothing being ever made from nothing*, may hold as well on my ſide as my adverſary's: and then, I ſuppoſe, that whilſt the world endures, he will be at a loſs how to aſſign a beginning to *matter*; or how to ſuggeſt a poſſibility of annihilating it. The ſpiritual men may, as long as they pleaſe, repreſent to us, in the moſt eloquent manner,

"That *matter* conſider'd in a thouſand different "ſhapes, join'd and disjoin'd, vary'd and modi- "fy'd to eternity, can never, of it-ſelf, afford one "ſingle thought, never occaſion or give riſe to "any thing like ſenſe or knowledge." Their argument will hold good againſt a DEMOCRITUS, an EPICURUS, or any of the elder or latter *Atomiſts*. But it will be turn'd on them by an examining *Academiſt:* and when the two ſubſtances are fairly ſet aſunder, and conſider'd apart, as different kinds; 'twill be as ſtrong ſenſe, and as good argument, to ſay as well of the *immaterial kind*; "That do with it as you pleaſe, modify it a thou- "ſand ways, purify it, exalt it, ſublime it, torture "it ever ſo much, or rack it, as they ſay, with "thinking; you will never be able to produce or "force the contrary ſubſtance out of it." The poor dregs of ſorry *matter* can no more be made out of the ſimple pure ſubſtance of immaterial *thought*, than the high ſpirits of *thought* or *reaſon* can be extracted from the groſs ſubſtance of heavy *matter*. So let the *dogmatiſts* make of this argument what they can. Sect. 4.

BUT for your part, continu'd I, as you have ſtated the queſtion, 'tis not about what was *firſt*, or *foremoſt*; but what is *inſtant*, and *now* in being. "For if DEITY be *now* really extant; if by any "good token it appears that there is *at this preſent* "a univerſal mind; 'twill eaſily be yielded there "*ever* was one."—— This is your argument.—— You go (if I may ſay ſo) upon *fact*, and would prove that things *actually are* in ſuch a ſtate and condition, which if they really *were*, there wou'd indeed be no diſpute left. Your UNION is your main ſupport. Yet how is it you prove this? What demonſtration have you given? What have you ſo much as offer'd at, beyond *bare probability?* So far are you from *demonſtrating* any thing, that if this uniting ſcheme be the chief argument for

Part 2. Deity (as you tacitly allow) you ſeem rather to have demonſtrated, "That the caſe it-ſelf is inca-"pable of demonſtration." For, "How, ſay you, "can a narrow mind ſee *all things?*"——And yet if, in reality, it ſees not *all*, it had as good ſee *nothing*. The demonſtrable part is ſtill as far behind. For grant that this *all*, which lies within our view or knowledg, is orderly and united, as you ſuppoſe: this mighty *all* is a mere point ſtill, a very nothing compar'd to what remains. "'Tis "only a ſeparate *by*-world (we'll ſay) of which "perhaps there are, in the wide waſte, millions be-"ſides, as horrid and deform'd, as this of ours is "regular and proportion'd. In length of time, "amidſt the infinite hurry and ſhock of beings, this "*ſingle odd world*, by accident, might have been "ſtruck out, and caſt into ſome form (as among "infinite *chances*, what is there which may not "happen?) But for the reſt of *matter*, 'tis of a "different hue. Old *father* CHAOS (as the poets "call him) in theſe wild ſpaces, reigns abſolute, "and upholds his realms of darkneſs. He preſſes "hard upon our frontier: and one day, belike, "ſhall by a furious inroad recover his loſt right, "conquer his rebel-ſtate, and re-unite us to primi-"tive *diſcord* and *confuſion*."

Atheiſtical hypotheſis.

THIS, ſaid I, THEOCLES! (concluding my diſcourſe) is all I dare offer in oppoſition to your *philoſophy*. I imagin'd, indeed, you might have given me more ſcope: but you have retrench'd your-ſelf in narrower bounds. So that to tell you truth, I look upon your *theology* to be hardly ſo fair or open as that of our divines in general. They are ſtrict, it's true, as to *names*; but allow a greater latitude in *things*. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-charge, a downright queſtioning of *Deity:* but in return, they give always fair play againſt NATURE, and allow her to be challeng'd for her failings. She may freely err, and we as freely cen-

NATURE arraign'd.

ſure. *Deity*, they think, is not accountable for her: only ſhe for her-ſelf. But you are ſtraiter, and more preciſe in this point. You have unneceſſarily brought *nature* into the controverſy, and taken upon you to defend her honour ſo highly, that I know not whether it may be ſafe for me to queſtion her. Sect. 4.

LET not this trouble you, reply'd THEOCLES: but be free to cenſure *nature*; whatever may be the conſequence. 'Tis only *my hypotheſis* can ſuffer. If I defend *it* ill, my friends need not be ſcandaliz'd. They are fortify'd, no doubt, with ſtronger arguments for a Deity, and can well employ thoſe *metaphyſical* weapons, of whoſe edge you ſeem ſo little apprehenſive. I leave them to diſpute this ground with you, whenever they think fit. For my own arguments, if they can be ſuppos'd to make any part of this defence, they may be look'd upon only as diſtant lines, or outworks, which may eaſily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the body of the place.

NOTWITHSTANDING, then, ſaid I, that you are willing I ſhou'd attack NATURE *in form*, I chuſe to ſpare her in all other ſubjects, except MAN only. How comes it, I intreat you, that in this nobleſt of creatures, and worthieſt her care, ſhe ſhou'd appear ſo very weak and impotent; whilſt in mere *brutes*, and the irrational ſpecies, ſhe acts with ſo much ſtrength, and exerts ſuch hardy vigour? Why is ſhe ſpent ſo ſoon in feeble *man*, who is found more ſubject to diſeaſes, and of fewer years than many of the *wild creatures?* They range ſecure; and proof againſt all the injurys of ſeaſons and weather, want no help from *art*, but live in careleſs eaſe, diſcharg'd of labour, and freed from the cumberſom baggage of a neceſſitous human life. In infancy more helpful, vigorous in age, with ſenſes quicker, and more natural ſaga- *NATURE in man. In brutes.*

Part 2. city, they purſue their intereſts, joys, recreations, and cheaply purchaſe both their food and maintenance; cloth'd and arm'd by nature her-ſelf; who provides them both a couch and manſion. So has nature order'd for the reſt of creatures. Such is their hardineſs, robuſtneſs, vigour. Why not the ſame for *man?*

AND do you ſtop thus ſhort, ſaid THEOCLES, in your expoſtulation? Methinks 'twere as eaſy to proceed, now you are in the way; and inſtead of laying claim to ſome *few* advantages of other creatures, you might as well ſtand for *all*, and complain "That *man*, for his part, ſhou'd be any "thing leſs than a conſummation of all advantages "and privileges which nature can afford." Aſk not merely, why *man* is naked, why unhoof'd, why ſlower-footed than the beaſts? Aſk, "Why "he has not *wings* alſo for the air, *fins* for the "water, and ſo on; that he might take poſſeſſion "of *each* element, and reign in *all?*"

Nature in man.

NOT ſo, ſaid I, neither. This wou'd be to rate him high indeed! As if he were, by nature, LORD *of all:* which is more than I cou'd willingly allow.

'TIS enough, reply'd he, that this is yielded. For if we allow once a *ſubordination* in his caſe; if *nature* her-ſelf be not for MAN, but *man* for NATURE; then muſt *man*, by his good leave, ſubmit to *the elements of* NATURE, and not *the elements* to him. Few of theſe are at all fitted to him; and none perfectly. If he be left in *air*, he falls headlong; for wings were not aſſign'd him. In *water* he ſoon ſinks. In *fire* he conſumes. Within *earth* he ſuffocates.——

AS for what dominion he may naturally have in other elements, ſaid I, my concern truly is not very great in his behalf; ſince by art he can even exceed the advantages nature has given to other creatures: but for *the air*, methinks it had been wonderfully obliging in nature to have allow'd him wings.

AND what wou'd he have gain'd by it, reply'd THEOCLES? For conſider what an alteration of *form* muſt have enſu'd. Obſerve in one of thoſe wing'd creatures, whether the whole ſtructure be not made ſubſervient to this purpoſe, and all other advantages ſacrific'd to this ſingle operation. The anatomy of the creature ſhews it, in a manner, to be *all wing:* its chief bulk being compos'd of two exorbitant muſcles, which exhauſt the ſtrength of all the other, and engroſs (if I may ſay ſo) the whole œconomy of the frame. 'Tis thus the ærial racers are able to perform ſo rapid and ſtrong a motion, beyond compariſon with any other kind, and far exceeding their little ſhare of ſtrength elſewhere: theſe parts of theirs being made in ſuch ſuperior proportion, as in a manner *to ſtarve* their companions. And in man's architecture, of ſo different an order, were the flying engines to be affix'd; muſt not the other members ſuffer, and the multiply'd parts ſtarve one another? What think you of the brain in this partition? Is it not like to prove *a ſtarveling?* Or wou'd you have it be maintain'd at the ſame high rate, and draw the chief nouriſhment to it-ſelf, from all the reſt? ——

Sect. 4.

Volatiles.

Anatomy.

The brain.

I UNDERSTAND you, ſaid I, THEOCLES (interrupting him:) the brain certainly is a great *ſtarver*, where it abounds; and the thinking people of the world, the *philoſophers* and *virtuoſo's* eſpecially, muſt be contented (I find) with a moderate ſhare of bodily advantages, for the ſake of what they call *parts* and *capacity* in another ſenſe. The parts, it ſeems, of one kind agree ill in their œconomy with the parts of the other. But to make this even on both ſides, let us turn the tables; and the caſe, I ſuppoſe, will ſtand the ſame with the MILO's of the age, the men of bodily proweſs and dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar ſort, ſuch as *wreſtlers*, *vaulters*, *racers*,

Parts.

Part 2. *hunters;* what ſhall we ſay of our fine-bred gentlemen, our *riders*, *fencers*, *dancers*, *tennis-players*, and ſuch like? 'Tis the body ſurely is the *ſtarver* here: and if the brain were ſuch a terrible devourer in the other way; the body and bodily parts ſeem to have their repriſals in this rank of men.

Ballance. IF then, ſaid he, the caſe ſtands thus between *man* and *man*, how muſt it ſtand between *man* and a *quite different creature?* If the BALLANCE be ſo nice, that the leaſt thing breaks it, even in creatures of the ſame frame and order; of what fatal effect muſt it be to change *the order* it-ſelf, and make ſome eſſential alteration in the frame? Conſider therefore how it is we cenſure *nature* in theſe and ſuch-like caſes. "Why, ſays one, was I not made "by nature ſtrong as *a horſe?* Why not hardy "and robuſt as this *brute*-creature? or nimble and "active as that other?" —— And yet when uncommon ſtrength, agility, and feats of body are ſubjoin'd, even in our own ſpecies, ſee what befals! So that for a perſon thus in love with an *athletick* MILONEAN conſtitution, it were better, methinks, and more modeſt in him, to change the expoſtulation, and aſk, "Why was I not made in "good earneſt *a very* BRUTE?" For that wou'd be more ſutable.

I AM apt indeed, ſaid I, to think that the excellence of MAN lies ſomewhat different from that of *a brute:* and that ſuch amongſt us as are more truly *men*, ſhou'd naturally aſpire to manly qualitys, and leave the brute his own. But nature, I ſee, has done well to mortify us in this particular, by furniſhing us with ſuch ſlight ſtuff, and in ſuch a tender frame, as is indeed wonderfully commodious to ſupport that man-excellence of *thought* and *reaſon*; but wretchedly ſcanty and ineffectual for other purpoſes. As if it were her very deſign, "To hinder us from aſpiring ridiculouſly to what "was miſbecoming our character."

I SEE, ſaid THEOCLES, you are not one of thoſe timorous arguers who tremble at every objection rais'd againſt their opinion or belief, and are ſo intent in upholding their *own* ſide of the argument, that they are unable to make the leaſt conceſſion on *the other*. Your wit allows you to divert yourſelf with whatever occurs in the debate: and you can pleaſantly improve even what your antagoniſt brings as a ſupport to his own hypotheſis. This indeed is a fairer ſort of practice than what is common now-a-days. But 'tis no more than ſutable to your *character*. And were I not afraid of ſpeaking with an air of compliment, in the midſt of a philoſophical debate; I ſhou'd tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of *your* SCEPTICISM, in oppoſition to a kind of bigot-*ſcepticks;* who forfeit their right to *the philoſophick character*, and retain hardly ſo much as that of *the gentleman* or *good-companion*.——But to our argument.—— Sect. 4.

SUCH then, continu'd he, is the admirable diſtribution of NATURE, her adapting and adjuſting not only the *ſtuff* or *matter* to the *ſhape* and *form*, and even the ſhape it-ſelf and form to the *circumſtance*, *place*, *element* or *region;* but alſo the *affections*, *appetites*, *ſenſations*, mutually to *each other*, as well as to the *matter*, *form*, *action*, and all beſides: "All manag'd *for the beſt*, with perfect fru- "gality and juſt *reſerve:* profuſe to none, but "bountiful to all: never employing in one thing "more than enough; but with exact œconomy "retrenching the ſuperfluous, and adding force to "what is *principal* in every thing." And is not THOUGHT and REASON *principal* in man? Wou'd he have no *reſerve* for theſe? no ſaving for this part of his engine? Or wou'd he have the ſame ſtuff or matter, the ſame inſtruments or organs ſerve alike for different purpoſes, and an ounce be equivalent to a pound?——It cannot be. What wonders, then, can he expect from a few ounces *Diſtribution.* *Principal part.*

Part 2. of blood in ſuch a narrow veſſel, fitted for ſo ſmall a diſtrict of nature? Will he not rather think highly of that NATURE, which has thus manag'd his portion for him, to beſt advantage, with this happy *reſerve* (happy indeed for him, if he knows and uſes it!) by which he has ſo much a better uſe of organs than any other creature? *Reaſon.* by which he holds his reaſon, is *a man*, and not *a beaſt?*

Inſtinct. BUT * beaſts, ſaid I, have *inſtincts*, which man has not.

TRUE, ſaid he, they have indeed perceptions, ſenſations, and † *pre-ſenſations* (if I may uſe the *Animals.* expreſſion) which man, for his part, has not in any proportionable degree. Their females, newly pregnant, and before they have bore young, have a clear proſpect or *pre-ſenſation* of their ſtate which is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they pre-ponderate? How many at once comprehend? The ſeaſons of the year, the country, climate, place, aſpect, ſituation, the baſis of their building, the materials, architecture; the diet and treatment of their offſpring; in ſhort, the whole œconomy of their nurſery: and all this as perfectly at firſt, and when unexperienc'd, as at any time of their life afterwards. And "*Why* *Human kind.* "*not this*, ſay you, in human kind?" Nay, rather on the contrary, I aſk "*Why this?* Where "was the occaſion or uſe? Where the neceſſity? "Why this ſagacity for *men?* Have they not what "is better, in another kind? Have they not rea- "ſon and diſcourſe? Does not this inſtruct them? "What need then of the other? Where wou'd be "the prudent management at this rate? Where "the *reſerve?*"

* *Supra*, p. 61, &c. and 86. And VOL. III. *p.* 148, 149, &c. † *Infra*, p. 267.

THE *young* of moſt other *kinds*, continu'd he, are inſtantly helpful to themſelves, ſenſible, vigorous, know to ſhun danger, and ſeek their good: a *human infant* is of all the moſt helpleſs, weak, infirm. And wherefore ſhou'd it not have been thus order'd? Where is the loſs in ſuch a ſpecies? Or what is *man* the worſe for this defect, amidſt ſuch large ſupplys? Does not this *defect* engage him the more ſtrongly to ſociety, and force him to own that he is purpoſely, and not by accident, made rational and *ſociable;* and can no otherwiſe increaſe or ſubſiſt, than in that *ſocial* intercourſe and community which is his *natural ſtate?* Is not both conjugal affection, and natural affection to parents, duty to magiſtrates, love of a common city, community, or country, with the other dutys and ſocial parts of life, deduc'd from hence, and founded in theſe very *wants?* What can be happier than ſuch a deficiency, as is the occaſion of ſo much good? What better than a want ſo abundantly made up, and anſwer'd by ſo many enjoyments? Now if there are ſtill to be found among mankind ſuch as even in the midſt of theſe wants ſeem not aſham'd to affect a right of independency, and deny themſelves to be by nature *ſociable;* where wou'd their ſhame have been, had nature otherwiſe ſupply'd theſe wants? What duty or obligation had been ever thought of? What reſpect or reverence of parents, magiſtrates, their country, or their kind? Wou'd not their full and ſelf-ſufficient ſtate more ſtrongly have determin'd them to throw off *nature*, and deny the *ends* and *author* of their creation? Sect. 4. *Society.*

WHILST THEOCLES argu'd thus concerning NATURE, the old gentleman, my adverſary, expreſs'd great ſatisfaction in hearing me, as he thought, refuted, and my opinions expos'd. For he wou'd needs believe theſe to be ſtrongly my opinions, which I had only ſtarted as objections in

Part 2. the diſcourſe. He endeavour'd to reinforce the argument by many particulars from the common topicks of the *ſchool-men* and *civilians*. He added withal, " That it was better for me to declare my " ſentiments openly: for he was ſure I had ſtrongly " imbib'd that principle, that * *the ſtate of nature* " was *a ſtate of war*."

State of nature.

THAT it was no *ſtate of government*, or *publick rule*, reply'd I, you your-ſelf allow. I do ſo. Was it then *a ſtate of fellowſhip*, or *ſociety?* No: " For when men enter'd firſt into " ſociety, they paſs'd from *the ſtate of nature* into " that new one which is founded upon *compact*."

And was that former ſtate *a tolerable one?* Had it been abſolutely intolerable, there had never been any ſuch. Nor cou'd we properly call that *a ſtate*, which cou'd not ſtand or endure for the leaſt time. If man therefore cou'd *endure* to live without ſociety; and if it be true that he *actually* liv'd ſo, when in *the ſtate of nature*; how can it be ſaid, " That he is *by nature ſociable?*"

THE old gentleman ſeem'd a little diſturb'd at my queſtion. But having recover'd himſelf, he ſaid in anſwer, " That MAN indeed, from his own *na-* " *tural inclination*, might not, perhaps have been " mov'd to aſſociate; but rather from ſome parti- " cular *circumſtances*."

HIS *nature* then, ſaid I, was not ſo very good, it ſeems; ſince having no *natural affection*, or *friendly inclination* belonging to him, he was forc'd into a ſocial ſtate, *againſt his will:* and this, not from any neceſſity in reſpect of outward things (for you have allow'd him a tolerable ſubſiſtence) but in probability from ſuch inconveniences as aroſe chiefly from himſelf, and his own malignant temper and principles. And indeed 'twas no wonder if creatures who were *naturally* thus unſociable,

* VOL. I. *p.* 74, &c.

ſhou'd be as naturally miſchievous and troubleſom. If, *according to their nature*, they cou'd live out of ſociety, with ſo little affection for one another's company, 'tis not likely that upon occaſion they wou'd ſpare one another's perſons. If they were ſo ſullen as not to meet *for love*, 'tis more than probable they wou'd fight *for intereſt*. And thus from your own reaſoning it appears, "That the "*ſtate of nature* muſt in all likelihood have been "little different from *a ſtate of* WAR." Sect. 4. *State of nature.*

HE was going to anſwer me with ſome ſharpneſs, as by his looks appear'd; when THEOCLES interpoſing, deſir'd, that as he had occaſion'd this diſpute, he might be allow'd to try if he cou'd end it, by ſetting the queſtion in a fairer light. You ſee, ſaid he to the old gentleman, what artifice PHILOCLES made uſe of, when he engag'd you to allow, that the ſtate of nature and that of ſociety were perfectly diſtinct. But let us queſtion him now in his turn, and ſee whether he can demonſtrate to us, "That there can be naturally any *human ſtate* "which is not *ſocial*."

WHAT is it then, ſaid the old gentleman, which we call the *ſtate of nature?*

NOT that imperfect rude condition of mankind, ſaid THEOCLES, which ſome imagine; but which, if it ever were in nature, cou'd never have been of the leaſt continuance, or any way *tolerable*, or ſufficient for the ſupport of human race. Such a condition cannot indeed ſo properly be call'd *a ſtate*. For what if ſpeaking of an infant juſt coming into the world, and in the moment of the birth, I ſhou'd fancy to call this *a ſtate*; wou'd it be proper?

HARDLY ſo, I confeſs.

JUST ſuch *a ſtate*, therefore, was that which we ſuppoſe of MAN, e'er yet he enter'd into *ſociety*, and became in truth *a human creature*. 'Twas the *rough draught* of man, the *eſſay* or *firſt effort* of nature, a ſpecies *in the birth*, a kind as yet *un-*

Part 2. *form'd*; not in its *natural* ſtate, but under *violence*, and ſtill reſtleſs, 'till it attain'd its natural perfection.

AND thus, ſaid THEOCLES (addreſſing ſtill more particularly to the old gentleman) the caſe muſt neceſſarily ſtand, even on the ſuppoſal "That there "was ever ſuch a condition or *ſtate* of men, when "as yet they were unaſſociated, unacquainted, and "conſequently without any language or form of "art." But "That it was their *natural ſtate*, to "live thus ſeparately," can never without abſurdity be allow'd. For ſooner may you diveſt the creature of all other feeling or affection, than that towards *ſociety* and his *likeneſs*. Allowing you, however, the power of diveſting him at pleaſure; allowing you to reduce even whole parts and members of his preſent frame; wou'd you transform him thus, and call him ſtill *a man*? Yet better might you do this indeed, than you cou'd ſtrip him of his *natural affections*, ſeparate him from all his *kind*, and incloſing him like ſome ſolitary *inſect* in a ſhell, decare him ſtill *a* MAN. So might you call the human egg, or embrio, *the man*. The bug which breeds the butterfly is more properly *a fly*, tho without wings, than this imaginary creature is *a man*. For tho his outward ſhape were *human*, his paſſions, appetites, and organs muſt be wholly different. His whole inward make muſt be revers'd, to fit him for ſuch a recluſe œconomy, and ſeparate ſubſiſtence.

State of nature.

TO explain this a little further, continu'd he: Let us examine this pretended *ſtate of nature*; how and on what foundation it muſt ſtand. "For either "*man* muſt have been from eternity, or not. If "from eternity, there cou'd be no *primitive* or "*original ſtate*, no *ſtate of nature*, other than we "ſee at preſent before our eyes. If not from e- "ternity, he aroſe either *all at once* (and conſe- "quently he was at the very *firſt* as he is *now*) "or *by degrees*, thro ſeveral ſtages and conditions,

" to that, in which he is at length ſettled, and has Sect. 4.
" continu'd for ſo many generations."

FOR inſtance, let us ſuppoſe he ſprang, as the old poets feign'd, from *a big-belly'd oak:* and then belike he might reſemble more a *man-drake* than a MAN. Let us ſuppoſe him at firſt with little more of life than is diſcover'd in that plant which they call *the ſenſitive*. But when *the mother-oak* had been ſome time deliver'd, and the falſe birth by ſome odd accident or device was wrought into form; the members were then fully diſplay'd, and the organs of ſenſe began to unfold themſelves. " Here ſprang an *ear:* there peep'd an *eye*. Per-
" haps a *tail* too came in company. For what
" *ſuperfluitys* nature may have been charg'd with
" at firſt, is difficult to determine. They dropt off,
" it ſeems, in time; and happily have left things,
" at laſt, in a good poſture, and (to a wonder!)
" juſt *as they ſhou'd* be."

THIS ſurely is the loweſt view of *the original affairs* of human kind. For if A PROVIDENCE, and not CHANCE, gave *man* his being, our argument for his *ſocial nature* muſt ſurely be the ſtronger. But admitting his riſe to be, as we have deſcrib'd, and as a certain ſort of philoſophers wou'd needs have it; nature has then had no intention at all, no meaning or deſign in this whole matter. So how any thing can be call'd *natural* in the caſe; how any *ſtate* can be call'd *a ſtate of nature*, or *according to nature*, one more than another, I know not. *State of nature.*

LET us go on however, and on their hypotheſis conſider, which *ſtate* we may beſt call *nature's own*. " She has by accident, thro many changes
" and chances, rais'd a creature, which ſpringing
" at firſt from rude ſeeds of *matter*, proceeded till
" it became what now it is; and arriv'd where for
" many generations it has been at a ſtay." In this long proceſſion (for I allow it any length whatever) I aſk, " Where was it that this *ſtate of nature*

Part 2. " cou'd begin ?" The creature muſt have endur'd many changes: and each change, whilſt he was thus growing up, was as *natural*, one as another. So that either there muſt be reckon'd a hundred different ſtates of natures; or if one, it can be only *that* in which nature was *perfect*, and her growth *compleat*. Here where ſhe *reſted*, and attain'd her end, here muſt be her ſtate, or no-where.

State of nature.

Cou'd ſhe then *reſt*, think you, in that deſolate ſtate before ſociety? Cou'd ſhe maintain and propagate the ſpecies, ſuch as it now is, without fellowſhip or community? Shew it us in fact anywhere, amongſt any of our own kind. For as for creatures which may much reſemble us in outward form, if they differ yet in the leaſt part of their conſtitution, if their inwards are of a different texture, if their ſkin and pores are otherwiſe form'd or harden'd; if they have other excreſcences of body, another temper, other natural inſeparable habits or affections, they are not truly *of our kind*. If, on the other hand, their conſtitution be as ours; their natural parts or inward facultys as ſtrong, and their bodily frame as weak as ours; if they have *memory*, and *ſenſes*, and *affections*, and *a uſe of organs* as ours: 'tis evident they can no more by their good-will abſtain from *ſociety*, than they can poſſibly preſerve themſelves without it.

And here (my friends !) we ought to remember what we diſcours'd a-while ſince, and was advanc'd by Philocles himſelf, concerning the * weakneſs of human bodys, and the neceſſitous ſtate of *man*, in reſpect of all other creatures; " His " long and helpleſs infancy, his feeble and defence" leſs make, by which he is more fitted to be a " prey himſelf, than live by prey on others." Yet 'tis impoſſible for him to ſubſiſt like any of thoſe grazing kinds. He muſt have better proviſion and

* *Pag.* 195.

choicer food than the raw herbage; a better couch and covering than the bare earth or open ſky. How many conveniences of other kinds does he ſtand in need of? What union and ſtrict ſociety is requir'd between the *ſexes*, to preſerve and nurſe their growing *offſpring?* This kind of *ſociety* will not, ſurely, be deny'd to MAN, which to every beaſt of prey is known proper, and *natural*. And can we allow *this* ſocial part to man, and go no further? Is it poſſible he ſhou'd *pair*, and live in love and fellowſhip with his *partner* and *offſpring*, and remain ſtill wholly wild, and ſpeechleſs, and without thoſe arts of ſtoring, building, and other œconomy, as natural to him ſurely as to the *beaver*, or to the *ant*, or *bee?* Where, therefore, ſhou'd he break off from this *ſociety*, if once begun? For that it began thus, as early as generation, and grew into a houſhold and œconomy, is plain. Muſt not this have grown ſoon into a *tribe?* and this tribe into *a nation?* Or tho it remain'd *a tribe* only; was not this ſtill *a ſociety* for mutual defence and common intereſt? In ſhort, if generation be *natural*, if natural affection and the care and nurture of the offſpring be *natural*, things ſtanding as they do with man, and the creature being of that form and conſtitution he now is; it follows, "That *ſociety* muſt "be alſo *natural to him*;" and "That out of ſo-"ciety and community he never *did*, nor ever *can* "ſubſiſt."

Sect. 4. *State of nature.*

To conclude, ſaid he (addreſſing ſtill to the two companions) I will venture to add a word in behalf of PHILOCLES: that ſince the learned have ſuch a fancy for this notion, and love to talk of this imaginary *ſtate of nature*, I think 'tis even charity to ſpeak as *ill* of it as we poſſibly can. Let it be *a ſtate of* WAR, *rapine*, and *injuſtice*. Since 'tis unſocial, let it e'en be as uncomfortable and as frightful as 'tis poſſible. To ſpeak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tempt men to turn

Part 2. *State of nature.*

hermites. Let it, at leaſt, be look'd on as many degrees worſe than the worſt government in being. The greater dread we have of *anarchy*, the better *country-men* we ſhall prove, and value more the *laws* and *conſtitution* under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous violences of ſuch an unnatural ſtate. In this I agree heartily with thoſe transformers of human nature, who conſidering it abſtractedly and apart from government or ſociety, repreſent it under monſtrous viſages of *dragons*, *Leviathans*, and I know not what devouring creatures. They wou'd have done well however, to have expreſs'd themſelves more properly in their great maxim. For to ſay in diſparagement of *man*, "That he is *to* "*man a wolf*," appears ſomewhat abſurd, when one conſiders that *wolves* are *to wolves* very kind and loving creatures. The ſexes ſtrictly *join* in the care and nurture of the young: and this *union* is continu'd ſtill between 'em. They houl to one another, to bring company; whether to hunt, or invade their prey, or aſſemble on the diſcovery of a good carcaſe. Even the ſwiniſh kinds want not *common affection*, and run in herds to the aſſiſtance of their diſtreſs'd fellows. The meaning therefore of this famous ſentence (if it has any meaning at all) muſt be, "That *man is naturally to man, as* "*a wolf is to a tamer creature:*" as, for inſtance, to *a ſheep*. But this will be as little to the purpoſe as to tell us, "That there are *different* ſpecies or "characters of men; that *all* have not this * wol-"ſiſh nature, but that *one half* at leaſt are *natu-*"*rally* innocent and mild." And thus the ſentence comes to nothing. For without belying *nature*, and contradicting what is evident from *natural hiſtory*, *fact*, and the plain *courſe of things*, 'tis impoſſible to aſſent to this ill-natur'd propoſition,

* VOL. I. *pag.* 60, and 80.

when we have even done our beſt to make tolerable ſenſe of it. —— But ſuch is mankind! And even *here* HUMAN NATURE ſhews it-ſelf, ſuch as it is; not perfect, or abſolutely ſucceſsful, tho rightly tending, and mov'd by proper and juſt principles. 'Tis *here*, therefore, *in philoſophy*, as in the common *converſations* of the world. As fond as men are of *company*, and as little able to enjoy any happineſs out of it, they are yet ſtrangely addicted to the way of *ſatir*. And in the ſame manner as a *malicious cenſure* craftily worded, and pronounc'd with aſſurance, is apt to paſs with mankind for ſhreud WIT; ſo *a virulent maxim* in bold expreſſions, tho without any juſtneſs of thought, is readily receiv'd for *true* PHILOSOPHY. Sect. 5.

SECT. V.

IN theſe diſcourſes the evening ended; and night advancing, we return'd home from our walk. At ſupper, and afterwards for the reſt of that night, THEOCLES ſaid little. The diſcourſe was now manag'd chiefly by the *two* companions, who turn'd it upon a new ſort of philoſophy; ſuch as you will excuſe me (good PALEMON!) if I paſs over with more haſte.

THERE was much ſaid, and with great learning, on the nature of *ſpirits* and *apparitions*; of which, the moſt aſtoniſhing accounts were the moſt raviſhing with our friends: who endeavour'd to exceed one another in this admirable way; and perform'd to a miracle in raiſing one another's amazement. Nothing was ſo charming with them, as that which was diſagreeing and odd: nothing ſo ſoothing, as that which mov'd horror. In ſhort, whatever was rational, plain, and eaſy, bore no reliſh; and nothing came amiſs which was croſs to nature, out of ſort and order, and in no proportion or harmony with the reſt of things. *Monſtrous births, prodigys, enchantments, elementary wars*, and *Miracles. Prodigys.*

Part 2. *convulſions* were our chief entertainment. One wou'd have thought that in a kind of rivalſhip between PROVIDENCE and NATURE, the *latter lady* was made to appear as homely as poſſible; that her deformitys might recommend and ſet off the beautys of *the former*. For to do our friends juſtice, I muſt own I thought their intention to be ſincerely *religious*. But this was not a face of *religion* I was like to be enamour'd with. It was not from hence I fear'd being made *enthuſiaſtick*, or *ſuperſtitious*. If ever I became ſo, I found it wou'd rather be after THEOCLES's manner. The *monuments* and *church-yards* were not ſuch powerful ſcenes with me, as the *mountains*, the *plains*, the ſolemn *woods* and *groves;* of whoſe inhabitants I chuſe much rather to hear, than of the other. And I was readier to fancy truth in thoſe poetical fictions which THEOCLES made uſe of, than in any of his friends ghaſtly ſtorys, ſo pompouſly ſet off, after the uſual way, in a lofty tone of authority, and with an aſſuming air of truth.

Scepticiſm. YOU may imagine, PALEMON, that my * *Scepticiſm*, with which you ſo often reproach me, cou'd not well forſake me here: nor cou'd it fail to give diſturbance to our companions, eſpecially to the grave gentleman who had claſh'd with me ſome time before. He bore with me a-while; till having loſt all patience, one muſt certainly, ſaid he, be maſter of no ſmall ſhare of aſſurance, to hold out againſt the common opinion of the world, and deny things which are known by the report of the moſt conſiderable part of mankind.

THIS, ſaid I, is far from being my caſe. You have never yet heard me deny any thing; tho I have queſtion'd many. If I ſuſpend my judgment, 'tis becauſe I have leſs ſufficiency than others. There are people, I know, who have ſo great a regard to

* VOL. III. *pag.* 51, 2, 3, &c. And 165, 6, 7. And 215, 216, &c.

every fancy of *their own*, that they can believe their very *dreams*. But I who cou'd never pay any ſuch deference to my *ſleeping* fancys, am apt ſometimes to queſtion even my *waking* thoughts, and examine, "Whether theſe are not *dreams* too;" ſince men have a faculty of dreaming ſometimes with their eyes open. You will own 'tis no ſmall pleaſure with mankind to make their *dreams* paſs for *realitys*; and that *the love of truth* is, in earneſt, not half ſo prevalent as this *paſſion* for *novelty* and *ſurprize*, join'd with *a deſire of making impreſſion*, and *being admir'd*. However, I am ſo charitable ſtill, as to think, there is more of innocent *deluſion* than voluntary *impoſture* in the world: and that they who have moſt impos'd on mankind, have been happy in a certain faculty of impoſing firſt upon themſelves; by which they have a kind of ſalvo for their conſciences, and are ſo much the more ſucceſsful, as they can act their part more naturally, and *to the life*. Nor is it to be eſteem'd a riddle, that mens dreams ſhou'd ſometimes have the good fortune of paſſing with 'em for truth; when we conſider, that in ſome caſes, that which was never ſo much as *dreamt* of, or related as *truth*, comes afterwards to be believ'd by one who has often told it. Sect. 5. *Impoſture.*

So that the greateſt *impoſtor* in the world, reply'd he, at this rate may be allow'd *ſincere*.

As to the *main* of his impoſture, ſaid I, perhaps he may; notwithſtanding ſome pious frauds made uſe of between whiles, in behalf of a belief thought good and wholſom. And ſo very natural do I take this to be, that in all religions, except the true, I look upon the greateſt zeal to be accompany'd with the ſtrongeſt inclination to deceive. For the deſign and end being *the truth*, 'tis not cuſtomary to heſitate or be ſcrupulous about the choice of means. Whether this be true or no, I appeal to the experience of the laſt age: in which 'twill not be difficult to find very remarkable ex-

Part 2. amples where *impoſture* and *zeal*, *bigotry* and *hypocriſy* have liv'd together, in one and the ſame *character*.

LET this be as it will, reply'd he, I am ſorry, upon the whole, to find you of ſuch an *incredulous* temper.

'TIS juſt, ſaid I, that you ſhou'd pity me as a ſufferer, for loſing that pleaſure which I ſee others enjoy. For what ſtronger pleaſure is there with mankind, or what do they earlier learn, or longer retain, than *the love of hearing and relating things ſtrange and incredible?* How wonderful a thing is *the love of wondering*, and of raiſing *wonder!* 'Tis the delight of children to hear tales they ſhiver at, and the vice of old age to abound in ſtrange ſtorys of times paſt. We come into the world wondering at every thing: and when our wonder about common things is over, we ſeek ſomething new to wonder at. Our laſt ſcene is to tell wonders of *our own*, to all who will believe 'em. And amidſt all this, 'tis well if TRUTH comes off, but moderately tainted.

Wonderment.

'TIS well, reply'd he, if with this *moderate* FAITH of yours, you can believe any *miracles* whatever.

No matter, ſaid I, how incredulous I am of *modern miracles*, if I have a right faith in thoſe of *former times*, by paying the deference due to ſacred writ. 'Tis here I am ſo much warn'd againſt *credulity*, and enjoin'd never to believe even the greateſt miracles which may be wrought, in oppoſition to what has been already taught me. And this injunction I am ſo well fitted to comply with, that I can ſafely engage to keep ſtill in the ſame *faith*, and promiſe *never to believe amiſs*.

Credulity.

BUT is this *a promiſe* which can well be made? IF not, and that my belief indeed does not abſolutely depend upon myſelf, how am I accountable for it? I may be juſtly puniſh'd for actions, in which my will is free; but with what juſtice can I be challeng'd for my belief, if in this I am not at my liberty? If credulity and incredulity are defects only in the judgment; and the beſt-meaning perſon in

the world may err on either ſide, whilſt a much worſe man, by having better parts, may judg far better of the evidence of things: how can you puniſh him who errs, unleſs you wou'd puniſh *weakneſs*, and ſay, 'tis juſt for men to ſuffer for their unhappineſs, and not their fault? Sect. 5.

I AM apt to think, ſaid he, that very few of thoſe who are puniſh'd for their *incredulity*, can be ſaid to be ſufferers for their *weakneſs*.

TAKING it for granted then, reply'd I, that *ſimplicity* and *weakneſs* is more the character of *the credulous* than of *the unbelieving*; yet I ſee not, but that even this way ſtill we are as liable to ſuffer by our *weakneſs*, as in the contrary caſe by an over-refin'd *wit*. For if we cannot command our own belief, how are we ſecure againſt thoſe falſe prophets, and their deluding miracles, of which we have ſuch warning given us? How are we ſafe from hereſy and falſe religion? *Credulity* being that which delivers us up to all impoſtures of this ſort, and which actually at this day hold the *Pagan* and *Mahometan* world in error and blind ſuperſtition. Either therefore there is no puniſhment due to wrong belief, becauſe we *cannot* believe as we will our-ſelves; or if we *can*, why ſhou'd we not promiſe *never to believe amiſs?* Now in reſpect of miracles to come, the ſureſt way never to believe *amiſs*, is never to believe *at all*. For being ſatisfy'd of the truth of our religion by paſt miracles, ſo as to need no other to confirm us; the belief of new may often do us harm, but can never do us good. Therefore as the trueſt mark of a believing Chriſtian is to ſeek after no ſign or miracle to come; ſo the ſafeſt ſtation in chriſtianity is his who can be mov'd by nothing of this kind, and is thus miracle-proof. For if the *miracle* be on the ſide of his faith, 'tis ſuperfluous, and he needs it not; if againſt his faith, let it be as great as poſſible, he will never regard it in the leaſt, or believe it any other than impoſture, tho coming from an angel. *Credulity.*

Part 2. So that with all that *incredulity* for which you reproach me ſo ſeverely, I take my-ſelf to be ſtill the better and more orthodox Chriſtian. At leaſt I am more ſure of continuing ſo than you, who with your credulity may be impos'd upon by ſuch as are far ſhort of *angels*. For having this preparatory diſpoſition, 'tis odds you may come in time to believe miracles in any of the different *ſects*, who, we know, all pretend to them. I am perſuaded therefore, that the beſt maxim to go by, is that common one, "That *miracles are ceas'd*." And I am ready to defend this opinion of mine to be the moſt probable in it-ſelf, as well as moſt ſuitable to Chriſtianity.

THIS queſtion, upon further debate, happen'd to divide our *two* companions. For the elderly gentleman, my antagoniſt, maintain'd, "That the "giving up of miracles for the time preſent, would "be of great advantage to the atheiſts." The younger gentleman, his companion, queſtion'd "Whether the allowing 'em might not be of a "great advantage to the enthuſiaſts and ſectarys "againſt the national church: this of the two being the greateſt danger (he thought) both to religion and the ſtate." He was reſolv'd, therefore, for the future to be as cautious in examining theſe modern *miracles*, as he had before been eager in ſeeking 'em. He told us very pleaſantly what an adventurer he had been of that kind; and on how many partys he had been ingag'd, with a ſort of people who were always on the hot ſcent of ſome new *prodigy* or *apparition*, ſome upſtart *revelation* or *prophecy*. This, he thought, was true *fanaticiſm errant*. He had enough of this viſionary chace, and wou'd ramble no more in blind corners of the world, as he had been formerly accuſtom'd, in ghoſtly company of ſpirit-hunters, witch-finders, and layers-out for helliſh ſtorys and diabolical tranſactions. There was no need, he thought, of ſuch in-

Fanaticiſm.

telligences from *hell*, to prove the power of *heaven*, and being of *a God*. And now at laſt he begun to ſee the ridicule of laying ſuch a ſtreſs on theſe matters: as if *a providence* depended on them, and *religion* were at ſtake, when any of theſe wild feats were queſtion'd. He was ſenſible there were many good Chriſtians who made themſelves ſtrong partiſans in this cauſe; tho he cou'd not avoid wondring at it, now he began to conſider, and look back. Sect. 5.

THE HEATHENS, he ſaid, who wanted ſcripture, might have recourſe to *miracles*: and providence perhaps had allow'd them their *oracles* and *prodigys*, as an imperfect kind of *revelation*. The JEWS too, for their hard heart, and harder underſtanding, had this allowance; when ſtubbornly they aſk'd for *ſigns* and *wonders*. But CHRISTIANS, for their parts, had a far better and truer *revelation*; they had their plainer oracles, a more rational law, and clearer ſcripture, carrying its own force, and withal ſo well atteſted, as to admit of no diſpute. And were I, continu'd he, to aſſign the exact time when miracles probably might firſt have ceas'd, I ſhou'd be tempted to fancy it was when *ſacred writ* took place, and was compleated.

THIS is fancy indeed (reply'd the grave gentleman) and a very dangerous one to that ſcripture you pretend is of it-ſelf ſo well atteſted. The atteſtation of men dead and gone, in behalf of miracles paſt and at an end, can never ſurely be of equal force with miracles preſent: and of theſe, I maintain, there are never wanting a number ſufficient in the world to warrant a *divine exiſtence*. If there were no miracles now-a-days, the world wou'd be apt to think there never were any. The preſent muſt anſwer for the credibility of the paſt. This is "*GOD witneſſing for himſelf;*" not "*Men for* "*GOD.*" For who ſhall witneſs for *men*, if in the caſe of religion they have no teſtimony from heaven in their behalf?

Miracles paſt, preſent.

Human teſtimony.

Part 2. WHAT it is may make the report of *men* credible (ſaid the younger gentleman) is another queſtion. But for mere *miracles*, it ſeems to me, they cannot be properly ſaid "To witneſs either for "*GOD* or *men*." For who ſhall witneſs for the *miracles* themſelves? And what tho' they are ever ſo certain? What ſecurity have we, that they are not acted by DÆMONS? What proof that they are not wrought by *magick?* In ſhort, "What truſt "is there to any thing above, or below, if the ſigns "are only of *power*, and not of *goodneſs?*

AND are you ſo far improv'd then, reply'd the ſevere companion, under your new *ſceptical* maſter (pointing to me) that you can thus readily diſcard all miracles, as uſeleſs? ——

THE young gentleman, I ſaw, was ſomewhat daunted with this rough uſage of his friend; who was going on ſtill with his invective. Nay then (ſaid I, interpoſing) 'tis I who am to anſwer for this young gentleman, whom you make to be my diſciple. And ſince his modeſty, I ſee, will not allow him to purſue what he has ſo handſomly begun, I will endeavour it my-ſelf, if he will give me leave.

THE young gentleman aſſented; and I went on, repreſenting his fair intention of eſtabliſhing in the firſt place a rational and juſt foundation for *our faith;* ſo as to vindicate it from the reproach of having no immediate miracles to ſupport it. He wou'd have done this (I ſaid) undoubtedly, by ſhewing how good proof we had already for our *ſacred oracles*, from the teſtimony of *the dead;* whoſe characters and lives might anſwer for them, as to the truth of what they reported to us from God. This, however, was by no means "*Witneſ-*"*ſing for GOD*," as the zealous gentleman had haſtily expreſs'd himſelf. For this was above the reach either of men, or miracles. Nor cou'd God witneſs *for himſelf*, or aſſert his being any other way

Divine teſtimony.

to men, than " By revealing himſelf to their *rea-* Sect. 5.
" *ſon*, appealing to their *judgment*, and ſubmitting
" his ways to their *cenſure*, and *cool deliberation*."
The contemplation of the univerſe, its laws and government, was (I aver'd) the only means which cou'd eſtabliſh the *ſound belief* of a DEITY. For what tho innumerable *miracles* from every part aſſail'd the ſenſe, and gave the trembling ſoul no reſpite? What tho the ſky ſhou'd ſuddenly open, *Miracles no proof of Divinity.* and all kinds of prodigys appear, voices be heard, or characters read? What wou'd this evince more than " That there were *certain* POWERS cou'd do
" all this?" But " *What* POWERS; whether *one*,
" or *more*; whether *ſuperior*, or *ſubaltern*; *mor-*
" *tal*, or *immortal*; *wiſe*, or *fooliſh*; *juſt*, or *un-*
" *juſt*; *good* or *bad*:" this wou'd ſtill remain a myſtery; as wou'd the true intention, the infallibility or certainty of whatever *theſe* POWERS aſſerted. Their word cou'd not be taken in their own caſe. They might ſilence men indeed, but not convince them: ſince " POWER can never ſerve as
" proof for * *goodneſs*; and GOODNESS is the on-
" ly pledg of *truth*." By GOODNESS alone, *truſt* is created. By GOODNESS *ſuperior* POWERS may win belief. They muſt allow their works to be examin'd, their actions criticiz'd: and thus, *thus* only, they may be confided in; " When by re-
" peated marks their *benevolence* is prov'd, and
" their *character* of *ſincerity* and *truth* eſtabliſh'd."
To whom therefore the laws of this univerſe and its government appear juſt and uniform; to him they ſpeak the government of one JUST-ONE; to him they *reveal* and witneſs a GOD: and laying in him the foundation of this *firſt* faith, they fit him for *a* † *ſubſequent one*. He can then hearken to *hiſtori-* *Revelation.*
cal revelation: and is then fitted (and not till then)

* VOL. I. *p.* 64. And VOL. III. *p.* 80.
† VOL. I. *p.* 201. And in this volume, *p.* 175.

Part 2. for the reception of any *meſſage* or miraculous *notice* from above; where he knows beforehand all is juſt and true. But this, no power of miracles, nor any power beſides his REASON, can make him know, or apprehend.

BUT now, continu'd I, ſince I have been thus long the *defendent* only; I am reſolv'd to take up *offenſive* arms, and be aggreſſor in my turn; provided THEOCLES be not angry with me for borrowing ground from his hypotheſis.

WHATEVER you borrow of his, reply'd my antagoniſt, you are pretty ſure of ſpoiling it: and as it paſſes thro your hands, you had beſt beware leſt you ſeem rather to reflect on *him* than *me*.

I'LL venture it, ſaid I; whilſt I maintain that moſt of thoſe maxims you build upon, are fit only to betray your own cauſe. For whilſt you are labouring to unhinge nature; whilſt you are ſearching heaven and earth for prodigys, and ſtudying how to *miraculize* every thing; you bring confuſion on the world, you break its uniformity, and deſtroy that admirable ſimplicity of order from whence the ONE infinite and perfect principle is known. Perpetual ſtrifes, convulſions, violences, breach of laws, variation and unſteddineſs of order, ſhew either no controul, or ſeveral uncontroul'd and unſubordinate powers in nature. We have before our eyes either the *chaos* and *atoms* of the ATHEISTS, or the *magick* and *Dæmons* of the POLYTHEISTS. Yet is this tumultuous ſyſtem of the univerſe aſſerted with the higheſt zeal by ſome who wou'd maintain a DEITY. This is that face of things, and theſe the features by which they repreſent *divinity*. Hither the eyes of our more inquiſitive and ingenuous youth are turn'd with care, leſt they ſee any thing otherwiſe than in this perplex'd and amazing view. As if *Atheiſm* were the moſt natural inference which cou'd be drawn from a re-

Atheiſm from ſuperſtition.

gular and orderly ſtate of things! But after all this mangling and diſfigurement of *nature;* if it happens (as oft it does) that the amaz'd diſciple coming to himſelf, and ſearching leiſurely into *nature*'s ways, finds more of *order*, *uniformity*, and *conſtancy* in things than he ſuſpected; he is of courſe driven into *Atheiſm:* and this merely by the impreſſions he receiv'd from that prepoſterous ſyſtem, which taught him to ſeek for DEITY in *confuſion*, and to diſcover PROVIDENCE in *an irregular diſjointed world.* Sect. 5.

AND when you, reply'd he, with your newly-eſpous'd ſyſtem, have brought all things to be as *uniform*, *plain*, *irregular*, and *ſimple*, as you cou'd wiſh; I ſuppoſe you will ſend your diſciple to ſeek for DEITY in *mechaniſm*; that is to ſay, in ſome exquiſite ſyſtem of *ſelf-govern'd* matter. For what elſe is it you naturaliſts make of the world, than a mere *machine?*

NOTHING elſe, reply'd I, if to the machine you allow a *mind.* For in this caſe 'tis not a *ſelf-govern'd*, but a *God-govern'd* machine.

AND what are the tokens, ſaid he, which ſhou'd convince us? What ſigns ſhou'd this dumb *machine* give of its being thus govern'd?

THE preſent, reply'd I, are ſufficient. It cannot poſſibly give ſtronger ſigns of life and ſteddy thought. Compare *our own machines* with this *great* ONE; and ſee, whether by their order, management and motions, they betoken either ſo perfect a life, or ſo conſummate an intelligence. The one is regular, ſteddy, permanent; the *other* are irregular, variable, inconſtant. In *one* there are the marks of wiſdom and determination; in the other, of whimſy and conceit: in one there appears judgment; in the other, fancy only: in one, will; in the other, caprice: in one truth, certainty, knowledg; in the other, error, folly, and madneſs.—— But to be convinc'd there is ſomething above, which thinks and acts, we want, it ſeems, the *latter* of theſe ſigns; as ſuppoſing there can be no thought

Part 2. or intelligence beſide what is like *our own*. We ſicken and grow weary with the orderly and regular courſe of things. Periods, and ſtated laws, and revolutions juſt and proportionable, work not upon us, nor win our admiration. We muſt have riddles, prodigys, matters for ſurprize and horror! By harmony, order and concord, we are made *Atheiſts:* by irregularity and diſcord, *we are convinc'd of* DEITY! "The world is mere accident, "if it proceed in courſe; but an effect of wiſdom, "if it runs mad!"

Atheiſm from ſuperſtition.

THUS I took upon me the part of a ſound THEIST, whilſt I endeavour'd to refute my antagoniſt, and ſhew that his principles favour'd *Atheiſm*. The zealous gentleman took high offence: and we continu'd debating warmly, till late at night. But THEOCLES was moderator: and we retir'd at laſt to our repoſe, all calm and friendly. However, I was not a little rejoic'd to hear that our companions were to go away early the next morning, and leave THEOCLES to me alone.

FOR now (PALEMON!) that morning was approaching, for which I ſo much long'd. What your longing may prove, I may have reaſon to fear. You have had enough, one wou'd think, to turn the edge of your curioſity in this kind. Can it be imagin'd, that after the recital of *two* ſuch days already paſt, you can with patience hear of *another* yet to come, more philoſophical than either?—— But you have made me promiſe; and now, whate'er it coſt, take it you muſt, as follows.

PART III.

PHILOCLES *to* PALEMON.

IT WAS yet deep night (as I imagin'd) when I wak'd with the noiſe of people up in the houſe. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that THEOCLES had a little before parted with his friends; after which he went out to take his morning-walk, but wou'd return (they thought) pretty ſoon: for ſo he had left word; and that nobody in the mean time ſhou'd diſturb my reſt.

THIS was diſturbance ſufficient, when I heard it. I preſently got up; and finding it light enough to ſee the hill, which was at a little diſtance from the houſe, I ſoon got thither; and, at the foot of it, overtook THEOCLES; to whom I complain'd of his unkindneſs. For I was not certainly (I told him) ſo effeminate and weak *a friend*, as to deſerve that he ſhou'd treat me like a *woman:* nor had I ſhown ſuch an averſion to his manners or converſation, as to be thought fitter for the dull luxury of a ſoft bed and eaſe, than for buſineſs, recreation, or ſtudy, with an early friend. He had no other way therefore of making me amends, than by allowing me henceforward to be a party with him in his *ſerious thoughts*, as he ſaw I was reſolv'd to be in his *hours* and *exerciſes* of this ſort.

YOU have forgot then, ſaid THEOCLES, the aſſignation you had yeſterday with the *Silvan* NYMPHS at this place and hour? No, truly, ſaid I: for, as you ſee, I come punctually to the place appointed. But I never expected you ſhou'd have come hither without me. Nay then, ſaid THEOCLES, there's hope you may in time become a

Part 3. lover with me: for you already begin to ſhew *jealouſy*. How little did I think theſe NYMPHS cou'd raiſe that paſſion in you? Truly, ſaid I, for the *nymphs* you mention, I know little of 'em as yet. My jealouſy and love regard *you* only. I was afraid you had a mind to eſcape me. But now that I am again in poſſeſſion of you, I want no *nymph* to make me happy here; unleſs it were perhaps to join forces againſt you, in the manner your belov'd poet makes the *nymph* ÆGLE join with his two youths, in forcing the God SILENUS to ſing to 'em.

I DARE truſt your gallantry, reply'd THEOCLES, that if you had ſuch fair company as you ſpeak of, you wou'd otherwiſe beſtow your time than in an adventure of *philoſophy*.——But do you expect I ſhou'd imitate the poet's God you mention'd, and ſing "The riſe of things from atoms; the "birth of order from confuſion; and the origin "of *union*, *harmony*, and *concord*, from the ſole "powers of CHAOS, and blind *chance?*" The ſong indeed was fitted to the *God*. For what cou'd better ſute his jolly character, than ſuch a drunken creation; which he lov'd often to celebrate, by acting it to the life? But even this ſong was too harmonious for the night's debauch. Well has our poet made it of the morning, when the God was freſh: for hardly ſhou'd we be brought ever to believe that ſuch harmonious numbers cou'd ariſe from a mere *chaos* of the mind. But we muſt hear our poet ſpeaking in the mouth of ſome ſoberer *demi-God* or *hero*. He then preſents us with a different principle of things, and in a more proper order of precedency, gives *thought* the upper hand. He makes MIND originally to have govern'd *body*; not BODY *mind:* For this had been a CHAOS everlaſting, and muſt have kept all things in a *chaos*-ſtate to this day, and for ever, had it ever been. But,

Sect. 1.

The active MIND, *infus'd thro all the ſpace,*
Unites and mingles with the mighty maſs:
Hence men and beaſts.——

HERE, PHILOCLES, we ſhall find our *ſovereign genius*; if we can charm the *genius* of the place (more chaſte and ſober than your SILENUS) to inſpire us with a truer ſong of nature, teach us ſome celeſtial hymn, and make us feel *divinity* preſent in theſe ſolemn places of retreat.

HASTE then, I conjure you, ſaid I, good THEOCLES, and ſtop not one moment for any ceremony or rite. For well I ſee, methinks, that without any ſuch preparation, ſome *divinity* has approach'd us, and already moves in you. We are come to the ſacred groves of the *hamadryads*, which formerly were ſaid to render oracles. We are on the moſt beautiful part of the hill; and the ſun, now ready to riſe, draws off the curtain of night, and ſhews us the open ſcene of nature in the plains below. Begin: for now I know you are full of thoſe divine thoughts which meet you ever in this *ſolitude*. Give 'em but voice and accents: you may be ſtill as much *alone* as you are us'd, and take no more notice of me than if I were abſent.

JUST as I had ſaid this, he turn'd away his eyes from me, muſing a-while by himſelf; and ſoon afterwards, ſtretching out his hand, as pointing to the objects round him, he began.

Meditation.

" YE fields and woods, my refuge from the " toilſome world of buſineſs, receive me in your " quiet ſanctuarys, and favour my retreat and " thoughtful ſolitude.——Ye verdant plains, how " gladly I ſalute ye!——Hail all ye bliſsful " manſions! known ſeats! delightful proſpects! " majeſtick beautys of this earth, and all ye rural " powers and graces!——Bleſs'd be ye chaſte a- " bodes of happieſt mortals, who here in peace-

Part 3. " ful innocence enjoy a life unenvy'd, tho di-
" vine; whilſt with its bleſs'd tranquillity it affords
" a happy leiſure and retreat for man; who,
" made for contemplation, and to ſearch his own
" and other natures, may here beſt meditate the
" cauſe of things; and plac'd amidſt the vari-
" ous ſcenes of nature, may nearer view her
" works.

" O GLORIOUS *nature!* ſupremely fair, and
" ſovereignly good! All-loving and all lovely,
" all-divine! Whoſe looks are ſo becoming, and
" of ſuch infinite grace; whoſe ſtudy brings ſuch
" wiſdom, and whoſe contemplation ſuch delight;
" whoſe every ſingle work affords an ampler ſcene,
" and is a nobler ſpectacle than all which ever art
" preſented!——O mighty *nature!* Wiſe ſubſti-
" tute of *providence!* impower'd *creatreſs!* Or
" thou impowering DEITY, ſupreme Creator!
" Thee I invoke, and thee alone adore. To thee
" this ſolitude, this place, theſe rural meditations
" are ſacred; whilſt thus inſpir'd with harmony of
" thought, tho unconfin'd by words, and in looſe
" numbers, I ſing of nature's order in created Be-
" ings, and celebrate the beautys which reſolve in
" thee, the ſource and principle of all beauty and
" perfection.

" THY being is boundleſs, unſearchable, impe-
" netrable. In thy immenſity all thought is loſt;
" fancy gives o'er its flight; and weary'd imagina-
" tion ſpends it-ſelf in vain; finding no coaſt nor
" limit of this ocean, nor, in the wideſt tract thro
" which it ſoars, one point yet nearer the circum-
" ference than the firſt center whence it parted.—
" Thus having oft eſſay'd, thus ſally'd forth into
" the wide *expanſe*, when I return again within
" *my-ſelf*, ſtruck with the ſenſe of this ſo narrow
" being, and of the fulneſs of that immenſe-one;
" I dare no more behold the amazing depths, nor
" ſound the abyſs of DEITY.——

" YET ſince by thee (O *ſovereign* MIND!) I Sect. 1.
" have been form'd ſuch as I am, intelligent and
" rational; ſince the peculiar dignity of my nature *Meditation.*
" is to know and contemplate thee; permit that
" with due freedom I exert thoſe facultys with
" which thou haſt adorn'd me. Bear with my ven-
" trous and bold approach. And ſince nor vain
" curioſity, nor fond conceit, nor love of ought
" ſave thee alone, inſpires me with ſuch thoughts
" as theſe, be thou my aſſiſtant, and guide me in
" this purſuit; whilſt I venture thus to tread the
" labyrinth of wide nature, and endeavour to trace
" thee in thy works."——

HERE he ſtop'd ſhort, and ſtarting, as out of a dream; now, PHILOCLES, ſaid he, inform me, how have I appear'd to you in my fit? Seem'd it a ſenſible kind of madneſs, like thoſe tranſports which are permitted to our *poets?* or was it down-right raving?

I ONLY wiſh, ſaid I, that you had been a little ſtronger in your tranſport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to ſee wonders in that *nature* you taught me, and was coming to know the hand of your *divine artificer*. But if you ſtop here, I ſhall loſe the enjoyment of the pleaſing viſion. And already I begin to find a thouſand difficultys in fancying ſuch a *univerſal genius* as you deſcribe.

WHY, ſaid he, is there any difficulty in fancy- *Unity.*
ing the univerſe to be *one intire thing?* Can one otherwiſe think of it, by what is viſible, than that all hangs together, as *of a piece?* Grant it: and what follows? Only this; that if it may indeed be ſaid of the world, " That it is ſimply " *one*," there ſhou'd be ſomething belonging to it which makes it *one*. As how? No otherwiſe than as you may obſerve in every thing. For to inſtance in what we ſee before us; I know you look upon the *trees* of this vaſt wood to be different

Part 3. *Unity.*

from one another: and this tall *oak*, the nobleſt of the company, as it is by it-ſelf a different thing from all its fellows of the wood, ſo with its own wood of numerous ſpreading branches (which ſeem *ſo many different* TREES) 'tis ſtill, I ſuppoſe, *one* and *the ſelf-ſame* TREE. Now ſhou'd you, as a mere caviller, and not as a fair *ſceptick*, tell me that if a figure of wax, or any other matter, were caſt in the exact ſhape and colours of this tree, and temper'd, if poſſible, to the ſame kind of ſubſtance, it might therefore poſſibly be *a real tree* of the ſame kind or ſpecies; I wou'd have done with you, and reaſon no longer. But if you queſtion'd me fairly, and deſir'd I ſhou'd ſatisfy you what I thought it was which made this *oneneſs* or *ſameneſs* in the tree or any other plant; or by what it differ'd from the waxen figure, or from any ſuch figure accidentally made, either in the clouds, or on the ſand by the ſea-ſhore; I ſhou'd tell you, that neither the *wax*, nor *ſand*, nor *cloud* thus piec'd together by our hand or fancy, had any real relation within themſelves, or had any nature by which they correſponded any more in that near ſituation of parts, than if ſcatter'd ever ſo far aſunder. But this I ſhou'd affirm, "That wherever there was ſuch a *ſympathiz-* "*ing of parts*, as we ſaw here, in our *real* TREE; "wherever there was ſuch a plain concurrence *in* "*one common end*, and to the ſupport, nouriſh- "ment, and propagation of ſo fair *a form;* we "cou'd not be miſtaken in ſaying there was a pe- "culiar *nature* belonging to this *form*, and com- "mon to it with others of the ſame kind." By virtue of this, our tree is a real *tree;* lives, flouriſhes, and is ſtill *one and the ſame*; even when by vegetation and change of ſubſtance, not one particle in it remains *the ſame*.

AT this rate indeed, ſaid I, you have found a way to make very adorable places of theſe *ſilvan* habitations. For beſides the living *genius* of each

place, the woods too, which, by your account, are animated, have their *hamadryads*, no doubt, and the ſprings and rivulets their *nymphs* in ſtore belonging to 'em: and theſe too, by what I can apprehend, of immaterial and immortal ſubſtances. Sect. 1.

WE injure 'em then, reply'd THEOCLES, to ſay "*they belong to theſe trees;*" and not rather "*theſe* "trees *to them.*" But as for their *immortality*, let them look to it themſelves. I only know that both *theirs* and all other *natures* muſt for their duration depend alone on *that nature* on which the world depends: and that every *genius* elſe muſt be ſubordinate to that *one good* GENIUS, whom I wou'd willingly perſuade you to think *belonging to this world*, according to our preſent way of ſpeaking.

LEAVING, therefore, theſe trees, continu'd he, to perſonate themſelves the beſt they can, let us examine this thing of *perſonality* between you and me; and conſider how you, PHILOCLES, are *you*, and I'm *my-ſelf*. For that there is a ſympathy of parts in theſe figures of ours, other than in thoſe of *marble* form'd by a PHIDIAS or PRAXITELES; ſenſe, I believe, will teach us. And yet that our own *marble*, or *ſtuff* (whate'er it be, of which we are compos'd) wears out in ſeven, or, at the longeſt, in twice ſeven years, the meaneſt anatomiſt can tell us. Now where, I beſeech you, will that ſame *one* be found at laſt, ſuppoſing it to lie in the *ſtuff* it-ſelf, or any part of it? For when that is wholly ſpent, and not one particle of it left, we are *ourſelves* ſtill as much as before. *Perſonality.* *Self.*

WHAT you philoſophers are, reply'd I, may be hard perhaps to determine: but for the reſt of mankind, I dare affirm, that few are ſo long themſelves as *half* ſeven years. 'Tis good fortune if a man be *one and the ſame* only for a day or two. A year makes more revolutions than can be number'd.

TRUE, ſaid he: but tho this may happen to a man, and chiefly to one whoſe contrary vices ſet

Part 3. him at odds ſo often with himſelf; yet when he comes to ſuffer, or be puniſh'd for thoſe vices, he finds himſelf, if I miſtake not, ſtill *one and the ſame*. And you (PHILOCLES!) who, tho you diſown philoſophy, are yet ſo true a proſelyte to *pyrrhoniſm*; ſhou'd you at laſt, feeling the power of the GENIUS I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine hypotheſis, and from this new turn of thought admit a total change in all your principles and opinions; yet wou'd you be ſtill the ſelf-ſame PHILOCLES: tho better yet, if you will take my judgment, than the preſent-one, as much as I love and value him. You ſee therefore, there is a ſtrange ſimplicity in this YOU and ME, that in reality they ſhou'd be ſtill *one and the ſame*, when neither *one* atom of body, *one* paſſion, nor *one* thought remains the ſame. And for that poor endeavour of making out this *ſameneſs* or *identity* of being, from ſome ſelf-ſame matter, or particle of matter, ſuppos'd to remain with us when all beſides is chang'd; this is by ſo much the more contemptible, as that *matter* it-ſelf is not really capable of ſuch ſimplicity. For I dare anſwer, you will allow this *you* and *me* to be each of us ſimply and individually *one*, better than you can allow the ſame to any thing of mere matter; unleſs quitting your inclination for *ſcepticiſm*, you fall ſo in love with the notion of an ATOM, as to find it full as intelligible and certain to you, as that *you* are YOURSELF.

Identity.

Matter.

BUT whatever, continu'd THEOCLES, be ſuppos'd of *uncompounded matter* (a thing, at beſt, pretty difficult to conceive) yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of ſuch parts as unite and conſpire in theſe frames of ours, and others like them; if it can preſent us with ſo many innumerable inſtances of particular forms, who ſhare this ſimple principle, by which they are really *one*, live, act, and have *a nature* or *genius* peculiar to themſelves, and provident for their own welfare;

Form.

A genius.

how ſhall we at the ſame time overlook this in *the whole*, and deny the great and general-ONE of the world? How can we be ſo unnatural as to diſown divine nature, our common parent, and refuſe to recognize *the univerſal* and *ſovereign* GENIUS?

Sect. I. *The ſupreme one.*

SOVEREIGNS, ſaid I, require no *notice* to be taken of 'em, when they paſs *incognito*, nor no *homage* where they appear not *in due form*. We may even have reaſon to preſume they ſhou'd be diſpleas'd with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to diſcover them, when they keep themſelves either wholly inviſible, or in very dark diſguiſe. As for the *notice* we take of theſe *inviſible powers* in the common way of our religion, we have our *viſible* ſovereigns to anſwer for us. Our lawful ſuperiors teach us what we are to *own*, and to *perform*, in worſhip. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their example. But in a philoſophical way, I find no warrant for our being ſuch earneſt recognizers of a controverted title. However it be, you muſt allow one at leaſt to underſtand the controverſy, and know the nature of theſe *powers* deſcrib'd. May one not inquire, "What *ſubſtances* they are of? whether "*material* or *immaterial?*"

MAY one not, on the other hand, reply'd THEOCLES, inquire as well, "What *ſubſtance*, or "which of theſe two *ſubſtances* you count your "real and proper SELF." Or wou'd you rather be *no ſubſtance*, but chuſe to call your-ſelf a *mode* or *accident?*

Subſtance, *material*, *immaterial.*

TRULY, ſaid I, as accidental as my life may be, or as that random humour is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, ſo *real* or *ſubſtantial* as MY-SELF. Therefore if there be that thing you call *a ſubſtance*, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing further relating to this queſtion, you know my *ſceptick* principles: I determine neither way.

Part 3. ALLOW me then, reply'd he (good PHILOCLES!) the ſame privilege of *ſcepticiſm* in this reſpect; ſince it concerns not the affair before us, which way we determine, or whether we come to any determination at all in this point. For be the difficulty ever ſo great; it ſtands the ſame, you may perceive, againſt *your own being*, as againſt *that* which I am pretending to convince you of. You may raiſe what objections you pleaſe on either hand; and your dilemma may be of notable force againſt the manner of ſuch a ſupreme Being's exiſtence. But after you have done all, you will bring the ſame dilemma home to you, and be at a loſs ſtill about YOUR-SELF. When you have argu'd ever ſo long upon theſe metaphyſical points of *mode* and *ſubſtance*, and have philoſophically concluded from the difficultys of each hypotheſis, "That "there cannot be in nature ſuch a *univerſal-one* as "this;" you muſt conclude, from the ſame reaſons, "That there cannot be any ſuch *particular* "*one* as your-ſelf." But that there is actually ſuch a one as *this latter*, your own mind, 'tis hop'd, may ſatisfy you. And of this *mind* 'tis enough to ſay, "That it is ſomething which *acts* upon a body, "and has ſomething *paſſive* under it, and ſubject "to it: that it has not only *body* or *mere mat*"*ter* for its ſubject, but in ſome reſpect even *it*"*ſelf* too, and what proceeds from it: that it ſu"perintends and manages its own *imaginations*, "*appearances*, *fancys*; correcting, working, and "modelling theſe, as it finds good; and adorning "and accompliſhing, the beſt it can, this compo"ſite order of body and underſtanding." Such a MIND and governing part, I know there is ſomewhere in the world. Let PYRRHO, by the help of ſuch another, contradict me, if he pleaſes. We have our ſeveral underſtandings and thoughts, however we came by 'em. Each underſtands and thinks the beſt he can for his own purpoſe: he

Metaphyſicks.

A mind.

Particular minds.

for himſelf; I for another *ſelf*. And who, I beſeech you, for *the* WHOLE? —— No-one? Nothing at all? —— The world, perhaps, you ſuppoſe to be mere *body*: a maſs of *modify'd matter*. The bodys of *men* are part therefore of this *body*. The imaginations, ſenſations, apprehenſions of men are included in this *body*, and inherent in it, produc'd out of it, and reſum'd again into it; tho *the body*, it ſeems, never dreams of it! The WORLD *itſelf* is never the wiſer for all the wit and wiſdom it breeds! It has no apprehenſion at all of what is doing; no thought kept to *it-ſelf*, for *its own* proper uſe, or purpoſe; not a ſingle imagination or reflection, by which to diſcover or be conſcious of the manifold imaginations and inventions which it ſets afoot, and deals abroad with ſuch an open hand! The goodly bulk ſo prolifick, kind, and yielding for every-one elſe, has nothing left at laſt for its own ſhare; having unhappily laviſh'd all away!——By what chance I wou'd fain underſtand. "How? or by what neceſſity?——Who "gives the law?——Who orders and diſtributes "thus?" NATURE, ſay you. And what is nature? Is *it* ſenſe? Is *it* a perſon? Has *ſhe* reaſon or underſtanding? No. Who then underſtands for her, or is intereſted or concern'd in her behalf? No-one; not a ſoul: but *every one for himſelf*.

Sect. 1. *Mind of the whole.* *Nature.*

COME on then. Let us hear further, is not this *nature* ſtill a SELF? Or, tell me, I beſeech you, how are YOU *one?* By what *token?* or by virtue of *what?* "By a principle which joins cer-"tain parts, and which thinks and acts conſo-"nantly for the uſe and purpoſe of thoſe parts."

Say, therefore, what is your whole ſyſtem a part of? Or is it, indeed, no *part*, but *a whole, by it-ſelf*, abſolute, independent, and unrelated to any thing beſides? If it be indeed *a part*, and really *related*; to what elſe, I beſeech you, than

Part 3.

Nature, ſubject to a mind.

to *the whole of* NATURE? Is there then ſuch *a uniting principle* in NATURE? If ſo, how are you then a *ſelf*, and *nature* not ſo? How have you ſomething to underſtand and act for you, and NATURE, who gave this underſtanding, nothing at all to underſtand for her, adviſe her, or help her out (poor being!) on any occaſion, whatever neceſſity ſhe may be in? Has the WORLD ſuch ill fortune *in the main?* Are there ſo many *particular* underſtanding active principles every-where? And is there nothing, at laſt, which thinks, acts, or underſtands for *all?* Nothing which adminiſters or looks after *all?*

Contrary belief.

Two ſorts.

Faith of Atheiſm.

No (ſays one of a modern hypotheſis) for the WORLD was from eternity, as you ſee it; and is no more than barely what you ſee: "*matter mo-*"*dify'd; a lump in motion, with here and there a* "*thought, or ſcatter'd portion of diſſoluble intelli-*"*gence.*"——No (ſays one of an antienter hypotheſis) for the world was once without any intelligence or thought at all; "*mere matter, chaos,* "*and a play of atoms*; till *thought*, by chance, "came into play, and made up a harmony which "was never deſign'd, or thought of."——Admirable conceit!—Believe it who can. For my own ſhare (thank providence) I have a MIND in my poſſeſſion, which ſerves, ſuch as it is, to keep my body and its affections, my paſſions, appetites, imaginations, fancys, and the reſt, in tolerable *harmony* and *order*. But *the order of the* UNIVERSE, I am perſuaded ſtill, is much the better of the *two*. Let EPICURUS, if he pleaſe, think his *the better*; and believing no *genius* or *wiſdom* above his own, inform us by what chance 'twas dealt him, and how *atoms* came to be ſo wiſe.

Faith of Theiſm.

IN fine, continu'd THEOCLES (raiſing his voice and action) being thus, even by *Scepticiſm* it-ſelf, convinc'd the more ſtill of my own being, and of this *ſelf* of mine, "That 'tis a *real ſelf*, drawn "out, and copy'd from another principal and *cri-*

" *ginal* SELF (the *great one* of the world)" I endeavour to be really *one* with it, and conformable to it, as far as I am able. I conſider, that as there is *one* general maſs, *one* body of the whole; ſo to this body there is *an order*, to this *order* a MIND: that to this *general* MIND each *particular-one* muſt have relation; as being of like ſubſtance (as much as we can underſtand of *ſubſtance*) alike active upon body, original to motion and order; alike ſimple, uncompounded, individual; of like energy, effect, and operation; and more like ſtill, if it co-operates with it to general good, and ſtrives *to will* according to the beſt of *wills*. So that it cannot ſurely but ſeem natural, " That the *particular* MIND " ſhou'd ſeek its happineſs in conformity with the " *general-one*, and endeavour to reſemble it in its " higheſt ſimplicity and excellence." Sect. 1.

THEREFORE, now, ſaid I, good THEOCLES, be once againſt the *Enthuſiaſt;* and let me hear a-new that divine ſong with which I was lately charm'd. I am already got over my qualm, and begin better than ever to fancy ſuch *a nature* as you ſpeak of; inſomuch that I find my-ſelf mightily in its intereſt, and concern'd that all ſhou'd go happily and well with it. Tho at the rate it often runs, I can ſcarce help being in ſome pain on its account.

FEAR not, my friend, reply'd he. For know that every *particular* NATURE certainly and conſtantly produces what is good to it-ſelf; unleſs ſomething *foreign* diſturbs or hinders it, either by overpowering and corrupting it *within*, or by violence *from without*. Thus *nature* in the patient ſtruggles to the laſt, and ſtrives to throw off the diſtemper. Thus even in theſe plants we ſee round us, every *particular* NATURE thrives, and attains its perfection, if nothing from *without* obſtructs it, nor any thing *foreign* has already impair'd or wound- *Energy of nature.*

Part 3. ed it; and even in this caſe, it does its utmoſt ſtill to redeem it-ſelf. What are all weakneſſes, diſtortions, ſickneſſes, imperfect births, and the ſeeming contradictions and perverſitys of nature, other than of this ſort? And how ignorant muſt one be of all natural cauſes and operations, to think that any of theſe diſorders happen by a miſcarriage of the *particular nature*, and not by the force of ſome *foreign nature* which over-powers it? If therefore every *particular nature* be thus conſtantly and unerringly *true* to it-ſelf, and certain to produce only what is good for it-ſelf, and conducing to its own right ſtate; ſhall not the *general-one*, *the* NATURE *of the whole*, do full as much? Shall *that* alone miſcarry or fail? Or is there any thing *foreign* which ſhou'd at any time do violence upon it, or force it out of its natural way? If not, then all it produces is to its own advantage and good; the *good* of *all* in general: and what is for the good of all, in general, is *juſt* and *good*. 'Tis ſo, ſaid I, I confeſs.

Diſtempers.

General good.

THEN you ought to reſt ſatisfy'd, reply'd he; and not only ſo, but be pleas'd and rejoice at what happens, knowing *whence* it comes, and to *what perfection* it contributes.

Reſignation.

BLESS me! ſaid I, THEOCLES, into what a ſuperſtition are you like to lead me! I thought it heretofore the mark of a ſuperſtitious mind, to ſearch for providence in the common accidents of life, and aſcribe to the divine power thoſe common diſaſters and calamitys which nature has entail'd on mankind. But now, I find, I muſt place all in general to one account; and viewing things thro a kind of magical glaſs, I am to ſee the worſt of *ills* transform'd to *good*, and admire equally whatever comes from one and the ſame perfect hand — But no matter; I can ſurmount all. Go on, THEOCLES, and let me adviſe you in my own behalf, that ſince you have

rekindled me, you do not by delaying give me time to cool again. Sect. 1.

I WOU'D have you know, reply'd he, I ſcorn to take the advantage of a warm fit, and be beholden to temper or imagination for gaining me your aſſent. Therefore e'er I go yet a ſtep farther, I am reſolv'd to enter again into cool reaſon with you, and aſk, if you admit for proof what I advanc'd yeſterday upon that head, "Of a *univerſal UNI-* "*ON, coherence*, or *ſympathizing* of things?"

BY force of probability, ſaid I, you overcame me. Being convinc'd of a conſent and correſpondence in *all* we ſaw of things, I conſider'd it as *unreaſonable* not to allow the ſame *throughout*! *Principle of order.*

UNREASONABLE indeed! reply'd he. For in the infinite *reſidue*, were there no principle of union; it wou'd ſeem next to impoſſible, that things within our ſphere ſhou'd be conſiſtent, and keep their order. "For what was infinite, wou'd be "predominant." *Why univerſal.*

It ſeems ſo.

TELL me then, ſaid he, after this *union* own'd, how you can refuſe to allow the name of demonſtration to the remaining arguments, which eſtabliſh the government of a perfect mind.

YOUR ſolutions, ſaid I, of the *ill appearances* are not perfect enough to paſs for demonſtration. And whatever ſeems vitious or imperfect in the creation, puts a ſtop to further concluſions, till the thing be ſolv'd. *Phaenomena of* ill.

DID you not then, ſaid he, agree with me, when I aver'd that the *appearances* muſt of neceſſity ſtand as they are, and things ſeem altogether as imperfect, even on the conceſſion of a perfect ſupreme Mind exiſtent?

I did ſo.

AND is not the ſame reaſon good ſtill, viz. "*That in an infinity of things, mutually relative,* "*a mind which ſees not infinitely, can ſee nothing* *Whence.*

Part 3. "*fully; and muſt therefore frequently ſee that as* "*imperfect, which in it-ſelf is really perfect.*"

The reaſon is ſtill good.

ARE the *appearances*, then, any objection to our hypotheſis?

None, whilſt they remain *appearances* only.

CAN you then prove them to be any more? For if you cannot, you prove nothing. And that it lies on you *to prove*, you plainly ſee: ſince the *appearances* do not only agree with the hypotheſis, but are a neceſſary conſequence from it. To bid me *prove*, therefore, in this caſe, is, in a manner, the ſame as to bid me *be infinite*. For nothing beſide what is *infinite* can ſee *infinite connexions*.

THE preſumption, I muſt confeſs, ſaid I, by this reckoning, is wholly on your ſide. Yet ſtill this is only *preſumption*.

Demonſtration. TAKE *demonſtration* then, ſaid he, if you can endure I ſhou'd reaſon thus abſtractedly and drily. The *appearances* of ILL, you ſay, are not neceſſarily that ILL they repreſent to us.

I own it.

THEREFORE what they repreſent may poſſibly be GOOD.

It may.

AND therefore there may poſſibly be no *real* ILL in things: but all may be perfectly concurrent to one intereſt; the intereſt of that univerſal ONE.

It may be ſo.

WHY, then, if it may be ſo (be not ſurpriz'd) "It follows that it muſt be ſo;" on the account of that great *unit*, and ſimple *ſelf-principle* which you have granted in *the* WHOLE. For whatever is poſſible *in the whole*, the nature or mind of the *whole* will put in execution for *the whole's good*: and if it be poſſible to exclude ILL, it will exclude it. Therefore ſince notwithſtanding the *appearances*, 'tis poſſible that ILL may actually be excluded; count upon it, "That actually it is excluded." For nothing merely *paſſive* can oppoſe this univer-

ſally *active* principle. If any thing active oppoſe it, 'tis *another principle*. Sect. 1.

Allow it. *Mani-*

'TIS impoſſible. For were there in nature *two* or more principles, either they muſt agree, or not. If they agree not, all muſt be confuſion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there muſt be ſome natural reaſon for their agreement; and this natural reaſon cannot be from *chance*, but from ſome particular *deſign*, *contrivance*, or *thought*: which brings us up again to ONE principle, and makes the other *two* to be ſubordinate. And thus when we have compar'd each of the *three* opinions, *viz.* "That *there is no deſigning active principle*; That "*there is more than one*;" or, "That finally *there* "*is but* ONE;" we ſhall perceive, that the only conſiſtent opinion is *the laſt*. And ſince *one* or *other* of theſe opinions muſt of neceſſity be true; what can we determine, other than that the *laſt* is, and muſt be ſo, demonſtrably? If it be demonſtration, "That in *three* opinions, *one* of which muſt ne- "ceſſarily be true, *two* being plainly abſurd, the "*third* muſt be the truth." *chaciſm.* *Concluſion.*

ENOUGH, ſaid I, THEOCLES. My doubts are vaniſh'd. MALICE and CHANCE (vain *phantoms!*) have yielded to that *all-prevalent* WISDOM which you have eſtabliſh'd. You are conqueror in the cool way of *reaſon*, and may with honour now grow warm again, in your *poetick* vein. Return therefore, I intreat you, once more, to that *perfection of being*; and addreſs your-ſelf to it as before, on our approaches to theſe ſilvan ſcenes, where firſt it ſeem'd to inſpire you. I ſhall now no longer be in danger of imagining either *magick* or *ſuperſtition* in the caſe; ſince you invoke no other POWER than that ſingle ONE, which ſeems ſo natural.

THUS I continue then, ſaid THEOCLES, addreſſing my-ſelf, as you wou'd have me, to that *guardian*-DEITY and *inſpirer*, whom we are to

Part 3. *Meditation.*

imagine preſent here; but not *here* only. For, "O
" mighty GENIUS! Sole-animating and inſpiring
" power! Author and ſubject of theſe thoughts!
" Thy influence is univerſal, and in all things,
" thou art inmoſt. From thee depend their ſecret
" ſprings of action. Thou mov'ſt them with an
" irreſiſtible unweary'd force, by ſacred and invio-
" lable *laws*, fram'd for the good of each particular
" being; as beſt may ſute with the perfection, life,
" and vigour of *the whole*. The vital principle is
" widely ſhar'd, and infinitely vary'd; diſpers'd
" throughout; no-where extinct. All lives; and
" by ſucceſſion ſtill revives. The temporary beings
" quit their borrow'd forms, and yield their ele-
" mentary ſubſtance to new-comers. Call'd, in
" their ſeveral turns, to life, they view the light,
" and viewing paſs; that others too may be ſpec-
" tators of the goodly ſcene, and greater numbers
" ſtill enjoy the privilege of NATURE. Munificent
" and great, ſhe imparts her-ſelf to moſt; and
" makes the ſubjects of her bounty infinite. Nought
" ſtays her haſtning hand. No time nor ſubſtance
" is loſt or un-improv'd. New forms ariſe: and
" when the old diſſolve, the matter whence they
" were compos'd is not left uſeleſs, but wrought
" with equal management and art, even in *cor-*
" *ruption*, nature's ſeeming waſte, and vile abhor-
" rence. The abject ſtate appears merely as *the*
" *way* or *paſſage* to ſome better. But cou'd we
" nearly view it, and with indifference, remote
" from the antipathy of ſenſe; we then perhaps
" ſhou'd higheſt raiſe our admiration: convinc'd
" that even *the way it-ſelf* was equal to *the end*.
" Nor can we judg leſs favorably of that conſum-
" mate art exhibited thro all the works of nature;
" ſince our weak eyes, help'd by mechanick art,
" diſcover in theſe works a hidden ſcene of won-
" ders; worlds within worlds, of infinite minute-
" neſs, tho as to art ſtill equal to the greateſt, and
" pregnant with more wonders than the moſt diſ-

" cerning ſenſe, join'd with the greateſt art, or the Sect. 1.
" acuteſt reaſon, can penetrate or unfold.

" BUT 'tis in vain for us to ſearch the bulky " maſs of MATTER; ſeeking to know its nature; " how great *the whole* it-ſelf, or even how ſmall " its *parts*.

" IF knowing only ſome of the rules of MOTI- " ON, we ſeek to trace it further, 'tis in vain we " follow it into the bodys it has reach'd. Our " tardy apprehenſions fail us, and can reach nothing " beyond the body it-ſelf, thro which it is diffus'd. " Wonderful *being*, (if we may call it ſo) which " bodys never receive, except from others which " loſe it; nor ever loſe, unleſs by imparting it to " others. Even without change of place it has its " force: and bodys big with motion labour to " move, yet ſtir not; whilſt they expreſs an energy " beyond our comprehenſion.

" IN vain too we purſue that *phantom* TIME, " too ſmall, and yet too mighty for our graſp: " when ſhrinking to a narrow point, it ſcapes our " hold, or mocks our ſcanty thought by ſwelling " to eternity; an object unproportion'd to our capa- " city, as is thy being, O thou antient *Cauſe!* old- " er than *time*, yet young with freſh eternity.

" IN vain we try to fathom the abyſs of SPACE, " the ſeat of thy extenſive being; of which no " place is empty, no void which is not full.

" IN vain we labour to underſtand that principle " of SENSE and THOUGHT, which ſeeming in us to " depend ſo much on *motion*, yet differs ſo much " from it, and from *matter* it-ſelf, as not to ſuf- " fer us to conceive how thought can more reſult " from this, than this ariſe from thought. But " *thought* we own pre-eminent, and confeſs the " realleſt of beings; the only exiſtence of which " we are made ſure of, by being conſcious. All " elſe may be only dream and ſhadow. All which " even *ſenſe* ſuggeſts may be deceitful. The

Part 3. Meditation.

" SENSE *it-ſelf* remains ſtill; REASON ſubſiſts; and " THOUGHT maintains its *elderſhip* of being. Thus " are we in a manner conſcious of that *original* " and *eternally exiſtent* THOUGHT, whence we de- " rive *our own*. And thus the aſſurance we have " of the exiſtence of beings above our ſenſe, and of " THEE (the great exemplar of thy works) comes " from thee, the ALL-TRUE, and perfect, who " haſt thus communicated thy-ſelf more immedi- " ately to us, ſo as in ſome manner *to inhabit* with- " in our *ſouls*; thou who art *original* SOUL, dif- " fuſive, vital in all, inſpiriting *the whole!*

" ALL nature's wonders ſerve to excite and per- " fect this idea of their *author*. 'Tis here he ſuf- " fers us to ſee, and even converſe with him, in a " manner ſutable to our frailty. How glorious is " it to contemplate him, in this nobleſt of his " works apparent to us, the *ſyſtem* of *the bigger* " *world!*"

HERE I muſt own, 'twas no ſmall comfort to me, to find that, as our meditation turn'd, we were likely to get clear of an entangling abſtruſe *philoſophy*. I was in hopes THEOCLES, as he proceeded, might ſtick cloſer to *nature*, ſince he was now come upon the borders of our world. And here I wou'd willingly have welcom'd him, had I thought it ſafe at preſent to venture the leaſt interruption.

" BESIDES the neighbouring planets (continu'd he, in his rapturous ſtrain) " what multitudes of " *fix'd* STARS did we ſee ſparkle, not an hour ago, " in the clear night, which yet had hardly yielded " to the day? How many others are diſcover'd by " the help of art? Yet how many remain ſtill, " beyond the reach of our diſcovery! Crouded as " they ſeem, their diſtance from each other is as " unmeaſurable by art, as is the diſtance between " them and us. Whence we are naturally taught " the immenſity of that BEING, who thro theſe

" immenſe ſpaces has diſpos'd ſuch an infinite of Sect. I.
" bodys, belonging each (as we may well pre-
" ſume) to ſyſtems as compleat as our own world:
" ſince even the ſmalleſt ſpark of this bright *gal-*
" *laxy* may vie with this our SUN; which ſhin-
" ing now full out, gives us new life, exalts our
" ſpirits, and makes us feel DIVINITY more pre-
" ſent.

" PRODIGIOUS ORB! Bright ſource of vital
" heat, and ſpring of day!——Soft flame, yet
" how intenſe, how active! How diffuſive, and how
" vaſt a ſubſtance; yet how collected thus within
" it-ſelf, and in a glowing maſs confin'd to the cen-
" ter of this *planetary* world!——*Mighty* being!
" Brighteſt image, and repreſentative of *the Al-*
" *mighty!* ſupreme of the corporeal world! Un-
" periſhing in grace, and of undecaying youth!
" fair, beautiful, and hardly mortal creature! By
" what ſecret ways doſt thou receive the ſupplys
" which maintain thee ſtill in ſuch unweary'd vi-
" gour, and un-exhauſted glory; notwithſtanding
" thoſe eternally emitted ſtreams, and that conti-
" nual expence of vital treaſures, which inlighten
" and invigorate the ſurrounding worlds?——

" AROUND him all the PLANETS, with this
" *our earth*, ſingle, or with attendants, continually
" move; ſeeking to receive the bleſſing of his light,
" and lively warmth! Towards him they ſeem to
" tend with prone deſcent, as to their center; but
" happily controul'd ſtill by another impulſe,
" they keep their heavenly order; and in juſt
" numbers, and exacteſt meaſure, go the eternal
" rounds.

" BUT, O thou who art the *author* and *modi-*
" *fier* of theſe various motions! O *ſovereign* and
" *ſole mover*, by whoſe high art the rolling ſpheres
" are govern'd, and theſe ſtupendous bodys of our
" world hold their unrelenting courſes! O wiſe
" œconomiſt, and powerful chief, whom all the

Part 3. *Meditation.*

" elements and powers of nature ſerve! How haſt
" thou animated theſe moving worlds? What ſpi-
" rit or ſoul infus'd? What bias fix'd? Or how
" encompaſs'd them in liquid *Æther*, driving them
" as with the breath of living winds, thy active and
" unweary'd miniſters in this intricate and mighty
" work?

" THUS powerfully are the *ſyſtems* held intire,
" and kept from fatal interfering. Thus is our
" *ponderous* GLOBE directed in its annual courſe;
" daily revolving on its own center: whilſt the ob-
" ſequious MOON with double labour, monthly
" ſurrounding this our bigger orb, attends the mo-
" tion of her ſiſter-planet, and pays in common
" her circular homage to the *ſun*.

" YET is this *manſion*-GLOBE, this *man*-con-
" tainer, of a much narrower compaſs even than
" other its fellow-wanderers of our ſyſtem. How
" narrow then muſt it appear, compar'd with the
" capacious *ſyſtem* of its own *ſun!* And how nar-
" row, or as nothing, in reſpect of thoſe *innume-*
" *rable ſyſtems* of other apparent *ſuns!* Yet how
" immenſe a body it ſeems, compar'd with ours of
" human form, a borrow'd remnant of its variable
" and oft-converted ſurface! tho animated with a
" ſublime celeſtial ſpirit, by which we have rela-
" tion and tendency to *thee* our heavenly *Sire*,
" center of ſouls; to whom theſe ſpirits of ours
" by nature tend, as earthly bodys to their proper
" center. —— O did they tend as unerringly and
" conſtantly! — But *thou* alone compoſeſt the diſ-
" orders of the corporeal world, and from the reſt-
" leſs and fighting *elements* raiſed that peaceful con-
" cord, and conſpiring beauty of the ever-flouriſh-
" ing creation. Even ſo canſt thou convert theſe
" jarring motions of intelligent beings, and in due
" time and manner cauſe them to find their reſt;
" making them contribute to the good and per-
" fection of *the* UNIVERSE, thy *all-good* and *perfect*
" *work*." ——

HERE again he broke off, looking on me as if he expected I ſhou'd ſpeak; which when he found plainly I wou'd not, but continu'd ſtill in a poſture of muſing thought: why PHILOCLES! (ſaid he, with an air of wonder) what can this mean, that you ſhou'd ſuffer me thus to run on, without the leaſt interruption? Have you at once given over your ſcrupulous philoſophy, to let me range thus at pleaſure thro theſe ærial ſpaces and imaginary regions, where my capricious fancy or eaſy faith has led me? I wou'd have you to conſider better, and know, my PHILOCLES, that I had never truſted myſelf with you in this *vein* of *Enthuſiaſm*, had I not rely'd on you to govern it a little better. Sect. 1.

I FIND then, ſaid I (rouzing my-ſelf from my muſing poſture) you expect I ſhou'd ſerve you in the ſame capacity as that muſician, whom an antient orator made uſe of at his elbow, to ſtrike ſuch moving notes as rais'd him when he was perceiv'd to ſink; and calm'd him again, when his impetuous ſpirit was tranſported in too high a ſtrain.

YOU imagine right, reply'd THEOCLES; and therefore I am reſolv'd not to go on, till you have promis'd to pull me by the ſleeve when I grow extravagant. Be it ſo, ſaid I; you have my promiſe. But how if inſtead of riſing in my tranſports, I ſhou'd grow flat and tireſom: what lyre or inſtrument wou'd you imploy to raiſe me?

THE danger, I told him, cou'd hardly be ſuppos'd to lie on this hand. His *vein* was a plentiful one; and his *Enthuſiaſm* in no likelihood of failing him. His ſubject too, as well as his numbers, wou'd bear him out. And with the advantage of the rural ſcene around us, his number'd proſe, I thought, ſupply'd the room of the beſt paſtoral ſong. For in the manner I was now wrought up, 'twas as agreeable to me to hear him, in this kind of *paſſion*, invoke his *ſtars* and *elements*, as

Part 3. to hear one of thoſe amorous *ſhepherds* complaining to his *flock*, and making the woods and rocks reſound the name of *her* whom he ador'd.——Begin therefore (continu'd I, ſtill preſſing him) begin anew, and lead me boldly thro your *elements*. Wherever there is danger, be it on either hand, I promiſe to give you warning, when I perceive it.

Meditation.

LET us begin then, ſaid he, with this our *element* of EARTH, which yonder we ſee cultivated with ſuch care by the early ſwains now working in the plain below.——"Unhappy reſtleſs *men*, who "firſt diſdain'd theſe peaceful labours, gentle rural "taſks, perform'd with ſuch delight! What *pride* "or what *ambition* bred this ſcorn? Hence all "thoſe fatal evils of your race, enormous *luxury*, "deſpiſing homely fare, ranges thro ſeas and lands, "riffles the globe; and men ingenious to their miſery, work out for themſelves the means of heavier labour, anxious cares, and ſorrow: not ſatisfy'd to turn and manure for their uſe the wholeſom and beneficial mould of this their EARTH, "they dig yet deeper, and ſeeking out imaginary "wealth, they ſearch its very entrails.

"HERE, led by curioſity, we find *minerals* of "different natures, which by their ſimplicity diſcover no leſs of the divine art, than the moſt compounded of nature's works. Some are found "capable of ſurpriſing changes; others as durable, "and hard to be deſtroy'd or chang'd by fire, or "utmoſt art. So various are the ſubjects of our "contemplation, that even the ſtudy of theſe inglorious parts of nature, in the nether world, is "able it-ſelf alone to yield large matter and employment for the buſieſt ſpirits of men, who in "the labour of theſe experiments can willingly "conſume their lives.——But the noiſom poiſonous ſteams which the *earth* breathes from theſe "dark caverns, where ſhe conceals her treaſures,

" ſuffer not prying mortals to live long in this " ſearch. Sect. 1.

" How comfortable is it to thoſe who come out " hence alive, to breathe a purer AIR! to ſee the " rejoicing light of *day!* and tread the fertile " ground! How gladly they contemplate the ſur- " face of the earth, their habitation, heated and " enliven'd by the *ſun*, and temper'd by the freſh " AIR of fanning *breezes!* Theſe exerciſe the reſty " plants, and ſcour the unactive globe. And when " the *ſun* draws hence thick clouded ſteams and " vapours, 'tis only to digeſt and exalt the unwhole- " ſome particles, and commit 'em to the ſprightly " AIR; which ſoon imparting its quick and vital " ſpirit, renders 'em again with improvement to " the earth, in gentle breathings, or in rich dews, " and fruitful ſhowers. The ſame AIR, moving " about the mighty maſs, enters its pores, im- " pregnating the whole: and both the *ſun* and " AIR conſpiring, ſo animate this *mother-earth*, " that tho ever breeding, her vigour is as great, " her beauty as freſh, and her looks as charming, " as if ſhe newly came out of the forming hands of " her Creator.

" How beautiful is the WATER among the in- " ferior earthly works! Heavy, liquid, and tranſ- " parent: without the ſpringing vigour and expan- " ſive force of *air*; but not without activity. " Stubborn and un-yielding, when compreſs'd; " but placidly avoiding force, and bending every " way with ready fluency! Inſinuating, it diſſolves " the lumpiſh earth, frees the intangled bodys, " procures their intercourſe, and ſummons to the " field the keen terreſtrial particles; whoſe happy " ſtrifes ſoon ending in ſtrict union, produce the " various forms which we behold. How vaſt are " the abyſſes of the *ſea*, where this ſoft element " is ſtor'd; and whence the ſun and winds ex- " tracting, raiſe it into clouds! Theſe ſoon con-

Part 3. *Meditation.*

" verted into rain, water the thirſty ground, and " ſupply a-freſh the ſprings and rivers; the com- " fort of the neighbouring plains, and ſweet re- " freſhment of all animals.

" BUT whither ſhall we trace the ſources of *the* " LIGHT? or in what ocean comprehend the lu- " minous matter ſo wide diffus'd thro the immenſe " ſpaces which it fills? What ſeats ſhall we aſſign " to that fierce element of FIRE, too active to be " confin'd within the compaſs of the *ſun*, and not " excluded even the bowels of the heavy *earth*? " The *air* it-ſelf ſubmits to it, and ſerves as its " inferior inſtrument. Even this our *ſun*, with " all thoſe *numerous ſuns*, the glittering hoſt of " heaven, ſeem to receive from hence the vaſt ſup- " plys which keep them ever in their ſplendid " ſtate. The *inviſible aetherial ſubſtance*, pene- " trating both liquid and ſolid bodys, is diffus'd " throughout the univerſe. It cheriſhes the cold " dull maſſy *globe*, and warms it to its center. It " forms the minerals; gives life and growth to ve- " getables; kindles a ſoft, inviſible, and vital *flame* " in the breaſts of living creatures; frames, ani- " mates, and nurſes all the various forms; ſparing, " as well as imploying for their uſe, thoſe *ſulphu-* " *rous* and *combuſtible* matters of which they are " compos'd. Benign and gentle amidſt all, it ſtill " maintains this happy peace and concord, accord- " ing to its ſtated and peculiar laws. But theſe " once broken, the acquitted *being* takes its courſe " unrul'd. It runs impetuous thro the fatal " breach, and breaking into viſible and fierce *flames*, " paſſes triumphant o'er the yielding forms, con- " verting all into it-ſelf, and diſſolving now thoſe " ſyſtems, which it-ſelf before had form'd. 'Tis " thus"——

HERE THEOCLES ſtopt on a ſudden, when (as he imagin'd) I was putting my hand out, to lay hold on his ſleeve.

O PHILOCLES, ſaid he, 'tis well remember'd. I was growing too warm, I find; as well I might indeed, in this *hot* element. And here perhaps I might have talk'd yet more myſteriouſly, had you been one who cou'd think otherwiſe than in the common way of the ſoft flames of *love*. You might, perhaps, have heard wonders in this kind: "How all things had their being *hence*, and how "their nobleſt end was to be *here* wrapt up, con-"ſum'd and loſt."—But in theſe high flights, I might poſſibly have gone near to burn my wings. Sect. 1.

INDEED, ſaid I, you might well expect the fate of ICARUS, for your high-ſoaring. But this, indeed, was not what I fear'd. For you were got above danger; and, with that devouring element on your ſide, had maſter'd not only the *ſun* himſelf, but every thing which ſtood in your way. I was afraid it might, in the iſſue, run to what they tell us of a *univerſal conflagration;* in which I knew not how it might go, poſſibly, with our GENIUS.

I AM glad, ſaid he, PHILOCLES! to find this grown ſuch a concern with you. But you may reſt ſecure here, if the caſe you meant were that *periodical conflagration* talk'd of by ſome *philoſophers*. For there the GENIUS wou'd of neceſſity be *all in all:* and in thoſe intervals of creation, when no form, nor ſpecies exiſted any-where out of *the divine mind*, all then was DEITY: all was that ONE, collected thus within it ſelf, and ſubſiſting (as they imagin'd) rather in a more ſimple and perfect manner, than when multiply'd in more ways; and becoming productive, it unfolded it ſelf in the various map of *nature*, and this *fair viſible world*.

BUT for my part, ſaid I (interrupting him) who can much better ſee DIVINITY unfolded, than in that *involv'd* and *ſolitary* ſtage before creation; I cou'd wiſh you wou'd go a little further with me in the map of *nature;* eſpecially if deſcending from your lofty flights, you wou'd be content to

Part 3. pitch upon this humble ſpot of EARTH; where I cou'd better accompany you, where-e'er you led me.

BUT you, reply'd he, who wou'd confine me to this heavy *earth*, muſt yet allow me the ſame wings of fancy. How elſe ſhall I fly with you, thro different climates, from pole to pole, and from the frigid to the torrid zone?

O, SAID I, for this purpoſe I will allow you the PEGASUS of the poets, or that wing'd *griffin* which an *Italian* poet of the moderns gave to one of his heroes: yet on this condition, that you take no ſuch extravagant flight, as his was, to the *moon*; but keep cloſely to this orb of *earth*.

SINCE you will have it ſo, reply'd THEOCLES, let us try firſt on the darkeſt and moſt imperfect parts of our map, and ſee how you can indure the proſpect. "How oblique and faintly looks the "ſun on yonder climates, far remov'd from him! "How tedious are the *winters* there! How deep "the horrors of the night, and how uncomfortable "even the light of day! The freezing winds em- "ploy their fierceſt breath, yet are not ſpent with "blowing. The ſea, which elſewhere is ſcarce "confin'd within its limits, lies here immur'd in "walls of chryſtal. The ſnow covers the hills, "and almoſt fills the loweſt vallys. How wide and "deep it lies, incumbent o'er the plains, hiding "the ſluggiſh rivers, the ſhrubs, and trees, the "dens of beaſts, and manſions of diſtreſs'd and "feeble men!——See! where they lie confin'd, "hardly ſecure againſt the raging cold, or the at- "tacks of the wild beaſts, now maſters of the waſt- "ed field, and forc'd by hunger out of the naked "woods.——Yet not diſhearten'd (ſuch is the "force of human breaſts) but thus provided for, "by art and prudence, the kind compenſating gifts "of heaven, men and their herds may wait for a

releaſe. For at length the ſun approaching, melts Sect. 1.
the ſnow, ſets longing men at liberty, and af-
fords them means and time to make proviſion a-
gainſt the next return of cold. It breaks the
icy fetters of the main; where vaſt ſea-monſters *Meditation.*
pierce thro floating iſlands, with arms which can
withſtand the chryſtal rock: whilſt others, who
of themſelves ſeem great as iſlands, are by their
bulk alone arm'd againſt all but man; whoſe
ſuperiority over creatures of ſuch ſtupendous
ſize and force, ſhou'd make him mindful of
his privilege of reaſon, and force him humbly
to adore the great Compoſer of theſe wond-
rous frames, and author of his own ſuperior wiſ-
dom.

"BUT leaving theſe dull climates, ſo little fa-
vor'd by the ſun, for thoſe happier regions, on
which he looks more kindly, making perpetual
ſummer; how great an alteration do we find?
His purer *light* confounds weak-ſighted mortals,
pierc'd by his ſcorching *beams*. Scarce can they
tread the glowing ground. The air they breathe
cannot enough abate the *fire* which burns within
their panting breaſts. Their bodys melt. O'er-
come and fainting, they ſeek the ſhade, and wait
the cool refreſhments of the night. Yet oft the
bounteous CREATOR beſtows other refreſhments.
He caſts a veil of *clouds* before 'em, and raiſes
gentle *gales;* favour'd by which, the men and
beaſts purſue their labours; and plants refreſh'd
by dews and ſhowers, can gladly bear the warm-
eſt ſun-beams.

"AND here the varying ſcene opens to new
wonders. We ſee a country rich with *gems*, but
richer with the fragrant *ſpices* it affords. How
gravely move the largeſt of *land-creatures* on the
banks of this fair river! How ponderous are
their arms, and vaſt their ſtrength, with cou-
rage, and a ſenſe ſuperior to the other beaſts!

Part 3. Meditation.

" Yet are they tam'd (we ſee) by mankind, and " brought even to fight their battles, rather as al- " lys and confederates, than as ſlaves.—But let " us turn our eyes towards theſe ſmaller, and more " curious objects; the numerous and devouring *in-* " *ſects* on the trees in theſe wide plains. How " ſhining, ſtrong, and laſting are the ſubtile threds " ſpun from their artful mouths! Who, beſide *the* " *All-wiſe*, has taught 'em to compoſe the beauti- " ful ſoft ſhells, in which recluſe and bury'd, yet " ſtill alive, they undergo ſuch a ſurprizing change; " when not deſtroy'd by men, who clothe and adorn " themſelves with the labours and lives of theſe " weak creatures, and are proud of wearing ſuch " inglorious ſpoils? How ſumptuouſly apparel'd, " gay, and ſplendid, are all the various *inſects* which " feed on the other plants of this warm region! " How beautiful *the plants* themſelves in all their " various growths, from the triumphant *palm* down " to the humble *moſs!*

" Now may we ſee that *happy* country where " precious *gums* and *balſams* flow from trees; and " nature yields her moſt delicious fruits. How " tame and tractable, how patient of labour and of " thirſt, are thoſe large creatures; who lifting up " their lofty heads, go led and loaden thro theſe " dry and barren places! Their ſhape and temper " ſhow them fram'd by nature to ſubmit to man, " and fitted for his ſervice: who from hence ought " to be more ſenſible of his wants, and of the di- " vine bounty, thus ſupplying them.

" But ſee! not far from us, that *fertileſt* of " lands, water'd and fed by a friendly generous " ſtream, which, e'er it enters the ſea, divides it- " ſelf into many branches, to diſpenſe more equally " the rich and nitrous manure, it beſtows ſo kindly " and in due time, on the adjacent plains.—— " Fair image of that fruitful and exuberant nature, " who with a flood of bounty bleſſes all things,

" and, parent-like, out of her many breaſts ſends Sect. 1.
" the nutritious draught in various ſtreams to her
" rejoicing offſpring!——Innumerable are the du-
" bious forms and unknown ſpecies which drink
" the ſlimy current: whether they are ſuch as leav-
" ing the ſcorch'd deſarts, ſatiate here their ardent
" thirſt, and promiſcuouſly engendring, beget a
" monſtrous race; or whether (as 'tis ſaid) by the
" ſun's genial heat, active on the fermenting ooze,
" new forms are generated, and iſſue from the ri-
" ver's fertile bed.——See there the noted tyrant
" of the flood, and terror of its borders! when
" ſuddenly diſplaying his horrid form, the *amphi-*
" *bious* ravager invades the land, quitting his wa-
" try den, and from the deep emerging, with hi-
" deous ruſh, ſweeps o'er the trembling *plain*.
" The natives from afar behold with wonder the
" enormous bulk, ſprung from ſo ſmall an egg.
" With horror they relate the monſter's nature,
" cruel and deceitful: how he with dire hypocriſy,
" and falſe tears, beguiles the ſimple-hearted; and
" inſpiring tenderneſs and kind compaſſion, kills
" with pious fraud.——Sad emblem of that ſpiri-
" tual plague, dire *ſuperſtition!* Native of this ſoil;
" where firſt * religion grew unſociable, and a-
" mong different worſhippers bred mutual hatred,
" and abhorrence of each others temples. The
" infection ſpreads: and nations now profane one
" to another, war fiercer, and in religion's cauſe
" forget humanity: whilſt ſavage *zeal*, with meek
" and pious ſemblance, works dreadful maſſacre;
" and for heaven's ſake (horrid pretence!) makes
" deſolate the earth.——

" HERE let us leave theſe monſters (glad if we
" cou'd here confine 'em!) and deteſting the dire
" prolifick ſoil, fly to the vaſt *deſarts* of theſe
" parts. All ghoſtly and hideous as they appear,

* VOL. III. *pag.* 43, 44, &c.

Part 3. "they want not their peculiar beautys. The wild-
"neſs pleaſes. We ſeem to live alone with nature.
Meditation. "We view her in her inmoſt receſſes, and con-
"template her with more delight in theſe original
"wilds, than in the artificial labyrinths and feign'd
"wilderneſſes of the palace. The objects of the
"place, the ſcaly ſerpents, the ſavage beaſts, and
"poiſonous inſects, how terrible ſoever, or how
"contrary to human nature, are beauteous in them-
"ſelves, and fit to raiſe our thoughts in admira-
"tion of that *divine wiſdom*, ſo far ſuperior to our
"ſhort views. Unable to declare the uſe or ſer-
"vice of all things in this univerſe, we are yet aſ-
"ſur'd of the perfection of *all*, and of the juſtice
"of that *œconomy*, to which all things are ſub-
"ſervient, and in reſpect of which, things ſeem-
"ingly deform'd are amiable; diſorder becomes
"regular; corruption wholeſom; and poiſons (ſuch
"as theſe we have ſeen) prove healing and bene-
"ficial.

"BUT behold! thro a vaſt tract of ſky before
"us, the mighty ATLAS rears his lofty head, co-
"ver'd with ſnow, above the clouds. Beneath
"the *mountain's* foot, the rocky country riſes into
"hills, a proper baſis of the ponderous maſs above:
"where huge embody'd rocks lie pil'd on one an-
"other, and ſeem to prop the high arch of hea-
"ven.—— See! with what trembling ſteps poor
"mankind tread the narrow brink of the deep pre-
"cipices! From whence with giddy horror they
"look down, miſtruſting even the ground which
"bears 'em; whilſt they hear the hollow ſound of
"torrents underneath, and ſee the ruin of the im-
"pending rock; with falling trees which hang
"with their roots upwards, and ſeem to draw
"more ruin after 'em. Here thoughtleſs men,
"ſeiz'd with the newneſs of ſuch objects, become
"thoughtful, and willingly contemplate the inceſ-
"ſant changes of this earth's ſurface. They ſee

" as in one inſtant, the revolutions of paſt ages. Sect. 1.
" the fleeting forms of things, and the decay even
" of this our *globe*; whoſe youth and firſt forma- *Meditation.*
" tion they conſider, whilſt the apparent ſpoil and
" irreparable breaches of the waſted mountain ſhew
" them the world it-ſelf only as a noble ruin, and
" make them think of its approaching period.——
" But here mid-way the *mountain*, a ſpacious bor-
" der of thick wood harbours our weary'd travel-
" lers: who now are come among the ever-green
" and lofty pines, the firs, and noble cedars, whoſe
" towring heads ſeem endleſs in the ſky; the reſt
" of trees appearing only as ſhrubs beſide them.
" And here a different horror ſeizes our ſhelter'd
" travellers, when they ſee the day diminiſh'd by
" the deep ſhades of the vaſt wood; which clo-
" ſing thick above, ſpreads darkneſs and eternal
" night below. The faint and gloomy light looks
" horrid as the ſhade it-ſelf: and the profound ſtill-
" neſs of theſe places impoſes ſilence upon men,
" ſtruck with the hoarſe echoings of every ſound
" within the ſpacious caverns of the wood. Here
" *ſpace* aſtoniſhes. *Silence* it-ſelf ſeems pregnant;
" whilſt an unknown force works on the mind,
" and dubious objects move the wakeful ſenſe.
" Myſterious *voices* are either heard or fancy'd:
" and various forms of *Deity* ſeem to preſent them-
" ſelves, and appear more manifeſt in theſe ſacred
" ſilvan ſcenes; ſuch as of old gave riſe to tem-
" ples, and favour'd the religion of the antient
" world. Even we our-ſelves, who in plain cha-
" racters may read DIVINITY from ſo many bright
" parts of earth, chuſe rather theſe obſcurer
" places, to ſpell out that myſterious Being, which
" to our weak eyes appears at beſt under a veil of
" cloud."——

HERE he paus'd awhile, and began to caſt about his eyes, which before ſeem'd fix'd. He

Part 3. look'd more calmly, with an open countenance and free air; by which, and other tokens, I cou'd eaſily find we were come to an end of our *deſcriptions*; and that whether I wou'd or no, THEOCLES was now reſolv'd to take his leave of *the ſublime*: the morning being ſpent, and the forenoon by this time well advanc'd.

SECT. II.

METHINKS, ſaid he, PHILOCLES! (changing to a familiar voice) we had better leave theſe unſociable places, whither our fancy has tranſported us, and return to our-ſelves here again, in our more converſable woods, and temperate climates. Here no fierce heats nor colds annoy us, no *precipices* nor *cataracts* amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own voices; whilſt we hear the notes of ſuch a chearful quire, and find the *echoes* rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk.

I CONFESS, ſaid I, thoſe foreign *nymphs*, (if there were any belonging to thoſe miraculous woods) were much too awful beautys to pleaſe me. I found our familiar home-*nymphs* a great deal more to my humour. Yet for all this, I cannot help being concern'd for your breaking off juſt when we were got half the world over, and wanted only to take AMERICA in our way home. Indeed as for EUROPE, I cou'd excuſe your making any great *tour* there, becauſe of the little variety it wou'd afford us. Beſides that it wou'd be hard to ſee it in any view, without meeting ſtill that *politick* face of affairs, which wou'd too much diſturb us in our *philoſophical* flights. But for the *weſtern* tract, I cannot imagine why you ſhou'd neglect ſuch noble ſubjects as are there; unleſs perhaps the *gold* and *ſilver*, to which I find you ſuch a bitter enemy, frighted you from a mother-ſoil ſo full of it. If theſe countrys had been as bare of thoſe metals as

old SPARTA, we might have heard more perhaps of the PERU's and MEXICO's than of all ASIA and AFRICA. We might have had *creatures*, *plants*, *woods*, *mountains*, *rivers*, beyond any of thoſe we have paſs'd. How ſorry am I to loſe the noble AMAZON! How ſorry —— Sect. 2.

HERE as I wou'd have proceeded, I ſaw ſo ſignificant a ſmile on THEOCLES's face, that it ſtopt me, out of curioſity, to aſk him his thought.

NOTHING, ſaid he; nothing but *this very ſubject* it-ſelf.—Go on.—I ſee you'll finiſh it for me. The ſpirit of this ſort of *prophecy* has ſeiz'd you. And PHILOCLES, the cold indifferent PHILOCLES, is become a purſuer of the ſame *myſterious* BEAUTY.

'TIS true, ſaid I, (THEOCLES!) I own it. Your *genius*, the *genius* of the place, and the GREAT GENIUS have at laſt prevail'd. I ſhall no longer reſiſt the paſſion growing in me for things of a *natural* kind; where neither *art*, nor the *conceit* or *caprice* of man has ſpoil'd their *genuine order*, by breaking in upon that *primitive ſtate*. Even the rude *rocks*, the moſſy *caverns*, the irregular unwrought *grotto's*, and broken *falls* of waters, with all the horrid graces of the *wilderneſs* it-ſelf, as repreſenting NATURE more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a magnificence beyond the formal mockery of princely gardens. —— But tell me, I intreat you, how comes it, that, excepting a few *philoſophers* of your ſort, the only people who are enamour'd in this way, and ſee the *woods*, the *rivers*, or *ſea-ſhores*, are your poor vulgar LOVERS? *Natural beautys.* *Paſſion of this kind.*

SAY not this, reply'd he, of LOVERS only. For is it not the ſame with POETS, and all thoſe other *ſtudents* in NATURE, and the *arts* which copy after her? In ſhort, is not this the real caſe of all who are *lovers* either of the MUSES or the GRACES?

Part 3. *ENTHUSIASM.*

HOWEVER, said I, all those who are deep in this *romantick* way, are look'd upon, you know, as a people either plainly out of their wits, or over-run with *melancholy* and * ENTHUSIASM. We always endeavour to recall 'em from these *solitary* places. And I must own, that often when I have found my fancy run this way, I have check'd my-self; not knowing what it was possess'd me, when I was passionately struck with objects of this kind.

Shadows.

No wonder, reply'd he, if we are at a loss, when we pursue the *shadow* for the *substance*. For if we may trust to what our reasoning has taught us; whatever in nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint shadow of that *first Beauty*. So that every *real* LOVE depending on *the mind*, and being only *the contemplation of beauty*, either as it really is *in it-self*, or as it appears imperfectly in the objects which strike the *sense*; how can the rational mind rest *here*, or be satisfy'd with the absurd *enjoyment* which reaches the *sense alone?*

First Beauty.

FROM this time forward then, said I, I shall no more have reason to fear those *beautys* which strike a sort of *melancholy*, like the places we have nam'd, or like these solemn *groves*. No more shall I avoid the moving accents of *soft musick*, or fly from the *enchanting features* of the fairest *human face*.

IF you are already, reply'd he, such a *proficient* in this *new* LOVE, that you are sure never to admire the *representative*-BEAUTY, except for the sake of the *original*; nor aim at other *enjoyment*, than of the *rational* kind; you may then be confident.

Original.

I am so; and presume accordingly, to answer for my-self. However I shou'd not be ill satisfy'd, if you explain'd your-self a little better as to

* See *letter of enthusiasm*, towards the end. See also above, *p.* 50. And VOL. III. *p.* 24, &c.

this miſtake of mine you ſeem to fear. Wou'd it be any help to tell you, "That the abſurdity "lay in ſeeking *the enjoyment* elſewhere than in "the *ſubject lov'd?*" The matter, I muſt confeſs, is ſtill myſterious. Imagine then, good PHILOCLES, if being taken with the beauty of the ocean which you ſee yonder at a diſtance, it ſhou'd come into your head, to ſeek how to command it; and like ſome mighty admiral, ride maſter of the ſea; wou'd not the fancy be a little abſurd? Abſurd enough, in conſcience. The next thing I ſhou'd do, 'tis likely, upon this frenzy, wou'd be to hire ſome bark, and go in nuptial ceremony, VENETIAN-like, to wed the *gulf*, which I might call perhaps as properly *my own*. Sect. 2. *Enjoyment.*

LET who will call it theirs, reply'd THEOCLES, you will own *the enjoyment* of this kind to be very different from that which ſhou'd naturally follow from the contemplation of the ocean's *beauty*. The bridegroom-*doge*, who in his ſtately *bucentaur* floats on the boſom of his THETIS, has leſs *poſſeſſion* than the poor *ſhepherd*, who from a hanging rock, or point of ſome high promontory, ſtretch'd at his eaſe, forgets his feeding flocks, while he admires *her beauty*.—But to come nearer home, and make the queſtion ſtill more familiar. Suppoſe (my PHILOCLES!) that, viewing ſuch a tract of country; as this delicious *vale* we ſee beneath us, you ſhou'd for *the enjoyment* of the proſpect, require the *property* or *poſſeſſion* of the land.

THE *covetous* fancy, reply'd I, wou'd be as abſurd altogether, as that other *ambitious* one.

O PHILOCLES! ſaid he; may I bring this yet a little nearer? And will you follow me once more? Suppoſe that being charm'd, as you ſeem to be, with the *beauty* of *theſe* TREES, under whoſe ſhade we reſt, you ſhou'd long for nothing ſo much as to taſte ſome delicious *fruit* of theirs; and having obtain'd of nature ſome certain *reliſh* by which theſe *acorns* or *berrys* of the wood became as palatable as the

Part 3. *figs* or *peaches* of the garden, you ſhou'd afterwards, as oft as you reviſited theſe *groves*, ſeek hence *the Enjoyment. enjoyment* of them, by ſatiating yourſelf in theſe new delights.

THE fancy of this kind, reply'd I, wou'd be ſordidly *luxurious;* and as abſurd, in my opinion, as either of the former.

CAN you not then, on this occaſion, ſaid he, call to mind ſome other *forms* of a fair kind among us, where the admiration of beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a conſequence?

I FEAR'D, ſaid I, indeed, where this wou'd end, and was apprehenſive you wou'd force me at laſt to think of certain powerful FORMS in *human* kind, which draw after 'em a ſet of eager *deſires*, *wiſhes* and *hopes;* no way ſutable, I muſt confeſs, to your rational and refin'd contemplation of *beauty*. The proportions of this *living architecture*, as wonderful as they are, inſpire nothing of a *ſtudious* or *contemplative* kind. The more they are view'd, the further they are from ſatisfying by mere view. Let that which ſatisfies be ever ſo diſproportionable an effect, or ever ſo foreign to its cauſe; cenſure it as you pleaſe, you muſt allow however that it's *natural*. So that you, THEOCLES, for ought I ſee, are become the *accuſer* of NATURE, by condemning *a natural enjoyment*.

FAR be it from us both, ſaid he, to condemn *a joy* which is from *nature*. But when we ſpoke of *the enjoyment* of theſe woods and proſpects, we underſtood by it a far different kind from that of the inferior creatures, who rifling in theſe places, find here their choiceſt *food*. Yet we too live by taſteful *food*; and feel thoſe other joys of *ſenſe* in common with them. But 'twas not here (my PHILOCLES!) that we had agreed to place our *good*; nor conſequently our *enjoyment*. We who were rational, and had minds, methought, ſhou'd place it rather in thoſe MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real *good*, when drawn to ſeek

abſurdly the enjoyment of it in the object of *ſenſe*, and not in thoſe objects they might properly call *their own:* in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly *fair*, *generous*, or *good*. Sect. 2.

So that BEAUTY, ſaid I, and GOOD, with you, THEOCLES, I perceive are ſtill * *one and the ſame*. *Beauty and good.*

'TIS SO, ſaid he. And thus are we return'd again to the ſubject of our yeſterday's morning-converſation. Whether I have made good my promiſe to you, in ſhewing † the true *good*, I know not. But ſo, doubtleſs, I ſhou'd have done with good ſucceſs, had I been able in my poetick extaſys, or by any other efforts, to have led you into ſome deep view of *nature*, and the *ſovereign* GENIUS. We then had prov'd the *force* of *divine* BEAUTY; and form'd in our-ſelves an *object* capable and worthy of *real enjoyment*.

O THEOCLES! ſaid I, well do I remember now the terms in which you engag'd me, that morning when you beſpoke my *love* of this *myſterious beauty*. You have indeed made good your part of the condition, and may now claim me for *a proſelyte*. If there be any ſeeming extravagance in the caſe, I muſt comfort my-ſelf the beſt I can, and conſider that all ſound *love* and *admiration* is ‡ ENTHUSIASM: "The tranſports of *poets*, the ſublime of "*orators*, the rapture of *muſicians*, the high ſtrains "of the *virtuoſi;* all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even "*learning* it-ſelf, the love of *arts* and *curioſitys*, "the ſpirit of *travellers* and *adventurers; gallan-*"*try, war, heroiſm;* all, all ENTHUSIASM!" ——'Tis enough: I am content to be this *new enthuſiaſt*, in a way unknown to me before.

AND I, reply'd THEOCLES, am content you ſhou'd call this *love* of ours ENTHUSIASM: allow-

* *Supra*, p. 155, &c. † *Supra*, p. 160.

‡ VOL. I. *p.* 36, 37.

Part 3. ing it the privilege of its fellow-paſſions. For is there a fair and plauſible *Enthuſiaſm*, a reaſonable *extaſy* and *tranſport* allow'd to other ſubjects, ſuch as architecture, painting, muſick; and ſhall it be exploded *here?* Are there ſenſes by which all thoſe other graces and perfections are perceiv'd? and none by which this higher perfection and grace is comprehended? Is it ſo prepoſterous to bring that *Enthuſiaſm* hither, and transfer it from thoſe *ſecondary* and *ſcanty* objects, to this *original* and *comprehenſive one?* Obſerve how the caſe ſtands in all thoſe other ſubjects of art or ſcience. What difficulty to be in any degree knowing! How long e'er a true *taſte* is gain'd! How many things ſhocking, how many offenſive at firſt, which afterwards are known and acknowledg'd the higheſt *beautys!* For 'tis not inſtantly we acquire the *ſenſe* by which theſe beautys are diſcoverable. *Labour* and *pains* are requir'd, and *time* to cultivate a natural genius, ever ſo apt or forward. But who is there once thinks of cultivating *this* ſoil, or of improving any ſenſe or faculty which nature may have given of *this* kind? And is it a wonder we ſhou'd be dull then, as we are, confounded, and at a loſs in *theſe* affairs, blind as to *this* higher ſcene, *theſe* nobler repreſentations? Which way ſhou'd we come to underſtand better? which way be knowing in *theſe* beautys? Is ſtudy, ſcience, or learning neceſſary to underſtand all beautys *elſe?* And for *the ſovereign* BEAUTY, is there no ſkill or ſcience requir'd? In painting there are *ſhades* and *maſterly ſtrokes*, which the vulgar underſtand not, but find fault with: in architecture there is *the ruſtick;* in muſick *the chromatick* kind, and ſkilful mixture of *diſſonancys:* and is there nothing which anſwers to this, in *the* WHOLE?

Arts.

A judgment, taſte.

Improvement.

Chief ſcience.

I MUST confeſs, ſaid I, I have hitherto been one of thoſe vulgar, who cou'd never reliſh *the ſhades*, *the ruſtick*, or *the diſſonancys* you talk of. I have never dreamt of ſuch *maſter-pieces* in NATURE.

'Twas my way to cenſure freely on the firſt view. But I perceive I am now oblig'd to go far in the purſuit of *beauty*; which lies very abſconded and deep: and if ſo, I am well aſſur'd that my *enjoyments* hitherto have been very ſhallow. I have dwelt, it ſeems, all this while upon the ſurface, and enjoy'd only a kind of ſlight ſuperficial beautys; having never gone in ſearch of *beauty it-ſelf*, but of what *I fancy'd* ſuch. Like the reſt of the unthinking world, I took for granted that what I liked was *beautiful*; and what I rejoic'd in, was my *good*. I never ſcrupled loving what I fancy'd; and aiming only at the enjoyment of what I lov'd, I never troubled my-ſelf with examining what *the ſubjects* were, nor ever heſitated about their *choice*. Sect. 2. *Beauty.*

BEGIN then, ſaid he, and *chuſe*. See what the *ſubjects* are; and which you wou'd prefer: which honour with your admiration, love and eſteem. For by theſe again you will be honour'd in your turn. Such, PHILOCLES, as is the worth of theſe companions, ſuch will your worth be found. As there is emptineſs or fulneſs here, ſo will there be in your enjoyment. See therefore where *fulneſs* is, and where *emptineſs*. See in what ſubject reſides *the chief excellence*: where BEAUTY reigns: where 'tis *intire*, *perfect*, *abſolute*; where *broken*, *imperfect*, *ſhort*. View theſe terreſtrial beautys, and whatever has the appearance of excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or ſtands as in the room of *fair*, *beautiful*, and *good*: "A maſs of metal; a tract of land; "a number of ſlaves; a pile of ſtones; a human "body of certain lineaments and proportions:" Is this the higheſt of the kind? Is BEAUTY founded then in *body* only; and not in *action*, *life*, or *operation*?——

HOLD! hold! ſaid I (good THEOCLES!) you take this in too high a key, above my reach. If you wou'd have me accompany you, pray lower

Part 3. this ſtrain a little; and talk in a more familiar way.

Beauty.

THUS THEN, ſaid he, (ſmiling) whatever paſſion you may have for *other beautys*; I know, good PHILOCLES, you are no ſuch admirer of *wealth* in any kind, as to allow much beauty to it; eſpecially in a rude heap or maſs. But in medals, coins, imboſt-work, ſtatues, and well-fabricated pieces, of whatever ſort, you can diſcover *beauty*, and admire the kind. True, ſaid I; but not for the *metal's* ſake. 'Tis not then *the metal* or *matter* which is beautiful with you. No. But *the art*. Certainly. *The art* then is the *beauty*. Right. And *the art* is that which beautifies. The ſame. So that the beautifying, not the beautify'd, is the really *beautiful*. It ſeems ſo. For that which is beautify'd, is beautiful only by the acceſſion of ſomething beautifying: and by the receſs or withdrawing of the ſame, it ceaſes to be beautiful. Be it. In reſpect of bodys therefore, *beauty* comes and goes. So we ſee. Nor is the body it-ſelf any cauſe either of its coming or ſtaying. None. So that there is no principle of beauty in *body*. None at all. For body can no-way be the cauſe of beauty to it-ſelf. No way. Nor govern nor regulate it-ſelf. Nor yet this. Nor mean nor intend it-ſelf. Nor this neither. Muſt not *that* therefore, which means and intends for it, regulates and orders it, be the principle of beauty to it? Of neceſſity. And what muſt that be? MIND, I ſuppoſe; for what can it be elſe?

HERE then, ſaid he, is all I wou'd have explain'd to you before: "That *the beautiful*, *the* "*fair*, *the comely*, were never in the *matter*, but "in the *art* and *deſign*; never in *body* it-ſelf, but "in the *form* or *forming power*." Does not the

beautiful *form* confeſs this, and ſpeak the beauty of *the deſign*, whene'er it ſtrikes you? What is it but *the deſign* which ſtrikes? What is it you admire but MIND, or the effect of *mind?* 'Tis *mind* alone which forms. All which is void of *mind* is horrid; and matter formleſs is *deformity it-ſelf.* Sect. 2.

OF all *forms* then, ſaid I, thoſe (according to your ſcheme) are the moſt amiable, and in the firſt order of beauty, which have a power of making other forms themſelves: from whence methinks they may be ſtil'd *the forming forms.* So far I can eaſily concur with you, and gladly give the advantage to *the human form*, above thoſe other beautys of man's formation. The palaces, equipages and eſtates ſhall never in my account be brought in competition with the original *living forms* of fleſh and blood. And for the other, the *dead* forms of nature, the metals and ſtones, however precious and dazling; I am reſolv'd to reſiſt their ſplendour, and make abject things of 'em, even in their higheſt pride, when they pretend to ſet off human beauty, and are officiouſly brought in aid of *the fair.* *Beauty.*

Do you not ſee then, reply'd THEOCLES, that you have eſtabliſh'd *three* degrees or orders of beauty? As how? Why firſt, *the dead forms*, as you properly have call'd 'em, which bear a faſhion, and are form'd, whether by man, or nature; and have no forming power, no action, or intelligence. Right. Next, and as the *ſecond* kind, *the forms which form*; that is, which have intelligence, action, and operation. Right ſtill. Here therefore is double beauty. For here is both the form (the *effect* of mind) and *mind* it-ſelf: the firſt kind low and deſpicable in reſpect of this other; from whence the dead form receives its luſtre and force of beauty. For what is a mere *body*, tho a human-one, and ever ſo exactly faſhion'd, if *inward* form be wanting, and the *mind* be monſtrous and imperfect, as in *an idiot*, or *ſavage?* *Orders of beauty.* *Firſt order.* *Second order.*

Part 3. This too I apprehend, ſaid I; but where is the *third* order?

HAVE patience, reply'd he, and ſee firſt whether you have diſcover'd the whole force of this *ſecond* beauty. How elſe ſhou'd you underſtand the force of love, or have the power of enjoyment? Tell me, I beſeech you, when firſt you nam'd theſe *the forming forms*, did you think of no other productions of theirs beſides the *dead kinds*, ſuch as the palaces, the coins, the brazen or the marble figures of men? Or did you think of ſomething nearer *life?*

I COU'D eaſily, ſaid I, have added, that theſe *forms* of ours had a virtue of producing *other living forms*, like themſelves. But this virtue of theirs, I thought, was from *another form* above them, and cou'd not properly be call'd *their* virtue or art; if in reality there was *a ſuperiour art*, or ſomething *artiſt-like*, which guided their hand, and made tools of them in this ſpecious work.

HAPPILY thought, ſaid he! You have prevented a cenſure which I hardly imagin'd you cou'd eſcape. And here you have unawares diſcover'd that *third* order of beauty, which forms not only ſuch as we call mere forms, but even *the forms which form*. For we our-ſelves are notable architects in matter, and can ſhew lifeleſs bodys brought into form, and faſhion'd by our own hands: but that which faſhions even minds themſelves, contains in it-ſelf all the beautys faſhion'd by thoſe minds; and is conſequently the principle, ſource, and fountain of all *beauty*.

Third order.

It ſeems ſo.

THEREFORE whatever beauty appears in our *ſecond* order of forms, or whatever is deriv'd or produc'd from thence, all this is eminently, principally, and originally in this *laſt* order of *ſupreme* and *ſovereign beauty*.

True.

THUS architecture, muſick, and all which is of human invention, reſolves it-ſelf into this *laſt* order. Sect. 2.

Right, ſaid I: and thus all the *Enthuſiaſms* of other kinds reſolve themſelves into ours. The faſhionable kinds borrow from us, and are nothing without us. We have undoubtedly the honour of being *originals*.

NOW therefore ſay again, reply'd THEOCLES: whether are thoſe fabricks of *architecture*, *ſculpture*, and the reſt of that ſort, the greateſt beautys which man forms; or are there greater and better?

None which I know, reply'd I. Think, think again, ſaid he: and ſetting aſide thoſe productions which juſt now you excepted againſt, as maſter-pieces *of another hand*; think what there are which more immediately proceed from us, and may more truly be term'd *our iſſue*. I am barren, ſaid I, for this time: you muſt be plainer yet, in helping me to conceive. How can I help you, reply'd he? Wou'd you have me be conſcious for you, of that which is immediately *your own*, and is ſolely in, and from *your-ſelf?* You mean my *ſentiments*, ſaid I. Certainly reply'd he: and together with your *ſentiments*, your *reſolutions*, *principles*, *determinations*, *actions*; whatſoever is handſom and noble in the kind; whatever flows from your good *underſtanding*, *ſenſe*, *knowledg* and *will*; whatever is ingender'd in your *heart* (good PHILOCLES!) or derives it-ſelf from your *parent*-MIND, which unlike to other *parents*, is never ſpent or exhauſted, but gains ſtrength and vigor by producing. So *you* (my friend!) have prov'd it, by many a work: not ſuffering that fertile *part* to remain idle and unactive. Hence thoſe good parts, which from a natural genius you have rais'd by due improvement. And here, as I cannot but admire the pregnant genius, and *parent*-beauty; ſo am I ſatisfy'd of the *offſpring*, that it is and will be ever beautiful.

Beauty moral.

Offſpring. Generation.

Part 3. I TOOK the compliment, and wiſh'd (I told him) the caſe were really as he imagin'd, that I might juſtly merit his eſteem and love. My ſtudy therefore ſhou'd be to grow *beautiful*, in his way of *beauty*; and from this time forward I wou'd do all I cou'd to propagate that lovely race of mental *Source.* children, happily ſprung from ſuch a high enjoyment, and from a union with what was *faireſt* and *beſt*. But 'tis you, THEOCLES, continu'd I, muſt help my labouring mind, and be as it were the midwife, to thoſe conceptions; which elſe, I fear, will prove abortive.

You do well, reply'd he, to give me the midwife's part only: for the mind conceiving *of it-ſelf*, can only be, as you ſay, *aſſiſted in the birth*. Its *Pregnancy.* *pregnancy* is from its *nature*. Nor cou'd it ever have been thus *impregnated* by any other *mind*, than that which form'd it at the beginning; and which, as we have already prov'd, is original to all *mental*, as well as *other beauty*.

Do you maintain then, ſaid I, that theſe *mental* children, the notions and principles of *fair*, *juſt*, and *honeſt*, with the reſt of theſe *ideas*, are *Innate* *innate?*

ideas. ANATOMISTS, ſaid he, tell us that the eggs, which are principles in body, are *innate*; being form'd already in the *fœtus* before the birth. But *when* it is, whether *before*, or *at*, or *after* the birth, or at *what* time after, that either theſe, or other principles, organs of ſenſation, or ſenſations themſelves, are *firſt* form'd in us, is a matter, doubtleſs, of curious ſpeculation, but of no great importance. The queſtion is, whether the principles ſpoken of are *from art*, or *nature?* If from *nature* purely; 'tis no matter for the time: nor wou'd I contend with you, tho you ſhou'd deny *life* it-ſelf to be *innate*, as imagining it follow'd rather than preceded the moment of birth. But this I am certain of; that *life*, and the *ſenſations*, which accompany life,

come when they will, are from *mere nature*, and nothing elſe. Therefore if you diſlike the word *innate*, let us change it, if you will, for INSTINCT; and call *inſtinct*, that which *nature* teaches, excluſive of *art*, *culture* or *diſcipline*. Sect. 2.

Content, ſaid I.

LEAVING then, reply'd he, thoſe admirable ſpeculations to the *virtuoſi*, the *Anatomiſts*, and *ſchool-divines*; we may ſafely aver, with all their conſents, that the ſeveral organs, particularly thoſe of generation, are form'd by *nature*. Whether is there alſo from nature, think you, any *inſtinct* for the after-uſe of them? Or whether muſt *learning* and *experience* imprint this uſe? 'Tis imprinted, ſaid I, enough in conſcience. The impreſſion, or *inſtinct*, is ſo ſtrong in the caſe, that 'twou'd be abſurdity not to think it *natural*, as well in our own ſpecies, as in other creatures: amongſt whom (as you have already taught me) not only the mere engendring of the young, but the various and almoſt infinite means and methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed diſcern in the preparatory labours and arts of theſe wild creatures; which demonſtrate their anticipating *fancys*, *pre-conceptions*, or *pre-ſenſations*; if I may uſe a word you taught me * yeſterday. *Generation.* *Pre conceptions.*

I ALLOW your expreſſion, ſaid THEOCLES, and will endeavour to ſhow you that the ſame *pre-conceptions*, of a higher degree, have place in human kind. Do ſo, ſaid I, I intreat you: for ſo far am I from finding in my-ſelf theſe pre-conceptions of *fair* and *beautiful*, in your ſenſe, that methinks, till now of late, I have hardly known of any thing like them in nature. How then, ſaid he, wou'd you have known that *outward fair* and *beautiful* of human kind; if ſuch an ob-

* Pag. 200.

Part 3. ject (a fair fleſhly one) in all its beauty, had *for the firſt time* appear'd to you, by your-ſelf, this morning, in theſe groves? Or do you think perhaps you ſhou'd have been unmov'd, and have found no difference between *this form* and any *other*; if firſt you had not been *inſtructed?*

I HAVE hardly any right, reply'd I, to plead this laſt opinion, after what I have own'd juſt before.

WELL then, ſaid he, that I may appear to take no advantage againſt you; I quit the dazling *form*, which carrys ſuch a force of *complicated beauty*; and am contented to conſider ſeparately each of thoſe *ſimple* beautys, which taken all together, create this wonderful effect. For you will allow, without doubt, that in reſpect of *bodys*, whatever is commonly ſaid of the unexpreſſible, the unintelligible, the *I-know-not-what* of beauty; there can lie no myſtery here, but what plainly belongs either to *figure*, *colour*, *motion*, or *ſound*. Omitting therefore the *three* latter, and their dependent charms; let us view the charm in what is ſimpleſt of all, *mere figure*. Nor need we go ſo high as ſculpture, architecture, or the deſigns of thoſe who from this ſtudy of beauty have rais'd ſuch delightful arts. 'Tis enough if we conſider the ſimpleſt of figures; as either a round *ball*, a *cube*, or *dye*. Why is even an infant pleas'd with the firſt view of theſe proportions? Why is the *ſphere* or *globe*, the *cylinder* and *obeliſk* prefer'd; and the irregular figures, in reſpect of theſe, rejected and deſpis'd?

Beauty of Body.

I AM ready, reply'd I, to own there is in certain *figures* a natural * beauty, which the eye finds as ſoon as the object is preſented to it.

* Pag. 20.

Sect. 2.

Beauty of ſoul, as real.

And neceſſarily moving.

Idea natural.

The fit, *and* decent.

Standard own'd.

IS there then, ſaid he, a natural beauty of *figures?* and is there not as natural a one of ACTIONS? No ſooner the eye opens upon *figures*, the ear to *ſounds*, than ſtraight *the beautiful* reſults, and *grace* and *harmony* are known and acknowledg'd. No ſooner are ACTIONS view'd, no ſooner the *human affections* and *paſſions* diſcern'd (and they are moſt of 'em as ſoon diſcern'd as felt) than ſtraight *an inward* EYE diſtinguiſhes, and ſees *the fair* and *ſhapely*, *the amiable* and *admirable*, apart from *the deform'd*, *the foul*, *the odious*, or *the deſpicable*. How is it poſſible therefore not to own, "That as theſe *diſtinctions* have their foundation "*in nature*, the diſcernment it-ſelf is *natural*, "and from NATURE *alone?*"

IF this, I told him, were as he repreſented it; there cou'd never, I thought, be any diſagreement among men concerning actions and behaviour: as which was *baſe*, which *worthy*; which *handſom*, and which *deform'd*. But now we found perpetual variance among mankind; whoſe differences were chiefly founded on this diſagreement in opinion; "The one *affirming*, the other *denying* that this, "or that, was *fit* or *decent*."

EVEN by this then, reply'd he, it appears there is fitneſs and decency in actions; ſince *the fit* and *decent* is in this controverſy ever pre-ſuppos'd: and whilſt men are at odds about the ſubjects, the thing it ſelf is univerſally agreed. For neither is there agreement in judgments about other *beautys*. 'Tis controverted "Which is the fineſt *pile*, the "loveliеſt *ſhape* or *face*:" But without controverſy, 'tis allow'd "There is a BEAUTY of *each* kind." This no-one goes about to *teach*: nor is it *learnt* by any; but *confeſs'd* by all. *All* own the *ſtandard*, *rule*, and *meaſure*: but in applying it to things, diſorder ariſes, ignorance prevails, intereſt and paſſion breed diſturbance. Nor can it otherwiſe happen in the affairs of life, whilſt that which intereſſes and engages men as *good*, is thought different

Part 3. from that which they admire and praiſe as *honeſt*. ——But with us (PHILOCLES!) 'tis better ſettled: ſince for our parts, we have already decreed "That * *beauty* and *good* are ſtill the ſame."

Confirmation. I REMEMBER, ſaid I, what you forc'd me to acknowledg more than once before. And now (good THEOCLES!) that I am become ſo willing a diſciple, I want not ſo much to be *convinc'd*, methinks, as to be *confirm'd* and *ſtrengthen'd*. And I hope this laſt work may prove your eaſieſt taſk.

NOT unleſs you help in it *your-ſelf*, reply'd THEOCLES: for this is neceſſary, as well as becoming. It had been indeed ſhameful for you to have yielded without making good reſiſtance. To help one's-ſelf to be convinc'd, is *to prevent reaſon*, and beſpeak error and deluſion. But upon fair conviction, to give our heart up to the evident ſide, and reinforce the impreſſion, this is *to help reaſon heartily*. And thus we may be ſaid *honeſtly to perſuade our-ſelves*. Shew me then how I may beſt perſuade my-ſelf.

HAVE courage, ſaid he, PHILOCLES! (raiſing his voice) be not offended that I ſay, *have courage!* 'Tis COWARDICE alone betrays us. From whence can *falſe ſhame* be, except from *cowardice?* To be aſham'd of what one is ſure can never be ſhameful, muſt needs be from the want of reſolution. We ſeek the *right* and *wrong* in things; we examine what is *honourable*, what *ſhameful:* and having at laſt determin'd, we dare not ſtand to our own judgment, and are aſham'd to own there is a *ſhameful* and an *honourable*. "Hear me (ſays "one who pretends to value PHILOCLES, and be "valu'd by him) there can be no ſuch thing as real "*valuableneſs* or *worth*; nothing in it-ſelf eſtima- *Opinion, faſhion.* "ble or amiable, odious or ſhameful. All is o- "PINION: 'tis *opinion* which makes beauty, and

* Pag. 155, 159, 259.

" unmakes it. The graceful or ungraceful in Sect. 2.
" things, the decorum and its contrary, the ami-
" able and unamiable, vice, virtue, honour, ſhame, *Meaſure of virtue and vice.*
" all this is founded in *opinion* only. OPINION is
" the *law* and *meaſure*. Nor has *opinion* any rule
" beſides mere CHANCE; which varies it, as *cuſtom*
" varies: and makes now this, now that, to be
" thought worthy, according to the reign of *fa-*
" *ſhion*, and the aſcendent power of *education*."

What ſhall we ſay to ſuch-a-one? How repreſent to him his abſurdity and extravagance? Will he deſiſt the ſooner? Or ſhall we aſk *what ſhame*, of one who acknowledges no *ſhameful?* *Falſhood of this.*

Yet he derides, and cries, *ridiculous!*

By what right? what title? For thus, if I were PHILOCLES, wou'd I defend my ſelf: "Am
" I ridiculous! As how? *What* is ridiculous? *E-*
" *very-thing?* or *nothing?*" Ridiculous indeed! But ſomething then, ſomething there is *ridiculous:* and the notion, it ſeems, is right,
" of *a ſhameful* and *a ridiculous*, in things." *Shame.*

How then ſhall we apply the notion? For this being wrong apply'd, cannot it-ſelf but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries SHAME, refuſe to acknowledg *any* in his turn? Does he not bluſh, nor ſeem diſcountenanc'd on any occaſion? If he does, the caſe is very diſtinct from that of mere grief or fear. The diſorder he feels is from a ſenſe of what is ſhameful and odious in it-ſelf, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its conſequences. For the greateſt danger in the world can never breed ſhame: nor can the *opinion* of all the world compel us to it, where *our own opinion* is not a party. We may be afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a modeſty. But we can never really bluſh for any thing beſide what we think truly *ſhameful*, and what we ſhou'd ſtill bluſh for, were we ever ſo ſecure as to our intereſt, and out of the reach of all inconvenience which cou'd happen to us from the thing we were aſham'd of.

Part 3. THUS, continu'd he, ſhou'd I be able, by anticipation, to defend my-ſelf; and looking narrowly into mens lives, and that which influenc'd 'em on all occaſions, I ſhou'd have teſtimony enough to make me ſay within my-ſelf, "Let who will be "my adverſary in this opinion, I ſhall find him "ſome way or other prepoſſeſs'd with that of which "he wou'd endeavour to diſpoſſeſs me." Has he gratitude or reſentment, pride or ſhame? Whichever way it be, he acknowledges a ſenſe of *juſt* and *unjuſt*, *worthy* and *mean*. If he be grateful, or expects gratitude, I aſk, "*Why?* and on what "account?" If he be angry, if he indulges revenge, I aſk "How? and in what caſe? Reveng'd "of *what?* of a ſtone, or madman?" Who "is ſo mad? But for what? For a chance-"hurt? an accident againſt thought, or intention?" Who is ſo unjuſt? Therefore there is *juſt* and *unjuſt*; and belonging to it *a natural preſumption* or *anticipation*, on which the RESENTMENT or ANGER is founded. For what elſe ſhou'd make the wickedeſt of mankind often preſer the intereſt of their revenge to other intereſts, and even to life it-ſelf, except only *a ſenſe of wrong*, natural to all men, and *a deſire to proſecute that wrong* at any rate? Not for their own ſakes, ſince they ſacrifice their very being to it; but out of hatred to *the imagin'd wrong*, and from a certain *love of* JUSTICE, which even in *unjuſt* men is by this example ſhewn to be beyond *the love of* LIFE *it-ſelf*.

An acknowledgment of moral *beauty and deformity.*

Anger.

Anger, an acknowledgment of juſt *and* un-juſt.

THUS as to PRIDE, I aſk, "Why *proud?* "Why *conceited?* and of *what?* Does any-one "who has pride think meanly or indifferently of "himſelf?" No: but honourable. And how this, if there be no real *honour* or *dignity* preſuppoſs'd? For ſelf-valuation ſuppoſes *ſelf-worth*; and in a perſon conſcious of real worth, is either no pride, or a juſt and noble one. In the ſame

Pride.

manner, ſelf-contempt ſuppoſes a *ſelf-meanneſs* or *defectiveneſs*; and may be either a juſt modeſty, or unjuſt humility. But this is certain, that whoever is proud, muſt be proud of ſomething. And we know that men of thorow pride will be proud even in the meaneſt circumſtances, and when there is no viſible ſubject for them to be proud of. But they deſcry *a merit* in themſelves, which others cannot: and 'tis this *merit* they admire. No matter whether it be really in them, as they imagine: it is *a worth* ſtill, *an honour*, or merit which they admire, and wou'd do, wherever they ſaw it, in any ſubject beſides. For *then* it is, *then* only, that they are humbled, "When they ſee in a more e-"minent degree in *others*, what they reſpect and "admire ſo much *in themſelves*."——And thus as long as I find men either *angry* or *revengeful*, *proud* or *aſham'd*, I am ſafe: for they conceive *an honourable* and *diſhonourable*, a *foul* and *fair*, as well as I. No matter *where* they place it, or *how* they are miſtaken in it: This hinders not my being ſatisfy'd "That the thing *is*, and is univerſally "*acknowledg'd*; that it is of *nature*'s impreſſion, "*naturally conceiv'd*, and by no *art* or *counter-*"*nature* to be eradicated or deſtroy'd."

Sect. 2.

An acknowledgment of worth and baſeneſs.

natural impreſſion.

AND NOW, what ſay you, PHILOCLES, (continu'd he) to this defence I have been making for you? 'Tis grounded, as you ſee, on the ſuppoſition of your being deeply ingag'd in this philoſophical cauſe. But perhaps you have yet many difficultys to get over, e'er you can ſo far take part with *beauty*, as to make this to be your *good*.

Good.

I HAVE no difficulty ſo great, ſaid I, as not to be eaſily remov'd. My inclinations lead me ſtrongly this way: for I am ready enough to yield there is no real *good* beſide *the enjoyment of beauty*.

And I am as ready, reply'd THEOCLES, to

Part 3. yield there is no real enjoyment of beauty beſide what is *good*. Excellent! But upon reflection, I fear I am little beholden to you for your conceſſion. As how? Becauſe ſhou'd I offer to contend for any enjoyment of beauty out of your mental way, you wou'd, I doubt, call ſuch enjoyment of mine *abſurd*; as you did once before. Undoubtedly I ſhou'd. For what is it ſhou'd enjoy, or be capable of enjoyment, except MIND? or ſhall we ſay, *body enjoys?* By the help of *ſenſe*, perhaps; not otherwiſe. Is BEAUTY, then, *the object of ſenſe?* Say how? Which way? For otherwiſe the help of *ſenſe* is nothing in the caſe: and if *body* be of it-ſelf incapable, and *ſenſe* no help to it, to apprehend or enjoy beauty, there remains only the MIND which is capable either to apprehend or to *enjoy*.

Mental enjoyment.

Body.

TRUE, ſaid I; but ſhow me, then, "Why "BEAUTY may not be *the object of the ſenſe?*"

Senſe.

Shew me firſt, I intreat you, "*Why*, *where*, "or in *what* you fancy it may be ſo?" Is it not *beauty* which firſt excites the ſenſe, and feeds it afterwards in the paſſion we call *love?*

Say in the ſame manner, "That it is *beauty* "firſt excites the ſenſe, and feeds it afterwards in "the paſſion we call *hunger*."——You will not ſay it. The thought, I perceive, diſpleaſes you. As great as the pleaſure is of good eating, you diſdain to apply the notion of *beauty* to the good diſhes which create it. You wou'd hardly have applauded the prepoſterous fancy of ſome luxurious ROMANS of old, who cou'd reliſh a fricaſſee the better for hearing it was compos'd of birds which wore a beautiful feather, or had ſung deliciouſly. Inſtead of being incited by ſuch a hiſtorical account of meats, you wou'd be apt, I believe, to have leſs appetite, the more you ſearch'd their origin, and deſcended into the *kitchin*-ſcience, to learn the ſeveral forms and changes they had undergone, e'er they were ſerv'd at this elegant voluptuous table.

But tho the *kitchin*-forms be ever ſo diſgraceful, you will allow that the *materials* of the kitchin, ſuch, for inſtance, as the *garden* furniſhes, are really fair and beautiful in their kind. Nor will you deny beauty to the wild *field*, or to theſe *flowers* which grow around us, on this verdant couch. And yet, as lovely as are theſe forms of nature, the ſhining *graſs*, or ſilver'd *moſs*, the flowry *thime*, wild *roſe*, or *honey-ſuckle*: 'tis not their BEAUTY allures the neighbouring herds, delights the brouzing fawn, or kid, and ſpreads the joy we ſee amidſt the feeding flocks: 'tis not the *form* rejoices; but that is which beneath the form: 'tis *ſavourineſs* attracts, *hunger* impels; and *thirſt* better allay'd by the clear brook than the thick puddle, makes the *fair* NYMPH to be prefer'd, whoſe form is otherwiſe ſlighted. For never can the *form* be of real force where it is uncontemplated, unjudg'd of, unexamin'd, and ſtands only as the accidental note or token of what appeaſes provok'd ſenſe, and ſatisfies the brutiſh part. Are you perſuaded of this, good PHILOCLES? or rather than not give brutes the advantage of *enjoyment*, will you allow them alſo a mind and rational part?

Sect. 2.

Senſe.

Not ſo, I told him.

IF BRUTES therefore, ſaid he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying beauty, as being *brutes*, and having SENSE only (the brutiſh part) for their own ſhare; it follows, "That neither can MAN by the "ſame *ſenſe* or brutiſh part, conceive or enjoy "*beauty*: but all the *beauty* and *good* he enjoys, "is in a nobler way, and by the help of what is "nobleſt, his MIND and REASON." Here lies his *dignity* and higheſt *intereſt*: here his *capacity* toward good and happineſs. His *ability* or *incompetency*, his *power* of enjoyment, or his *impotence* is founded in this alone. As this is *ſound*, *fair*, *noble*, *worthy*; ſo are its ſubjects, acts and employments. For as the *riotous* MIND, captive to *ſenſe*, can never enter in competition, or contend

Reaſon.

Part 3. for beauty with the *virtuous* MIND of reaſon's culture; ſo neither can the *objects* which allure the former, compare with thoſe which attract and charm the latter. And when *each* gratifies it-ſelf in the enjoyment and poſſeſſion of its object; how evidently fairer are the acts which join the *latter pair*, and give *a ſoul* the enjoyment of what is *generous* and *good?* This at leaſt PHILOCLES, you will ſurely allow. That when you place a joy elſewhere than in the mind; *the enjoyment* it-ſelf will be no beautiful ſubject, nor of any graceful or agreeable appearance. But when you think how *friendſhip* is enjoy'd, how *honour*, *gratitude*, *candour*, *benignity*, and all internal beauty; how all the *ſocial* pleaſures, *ſociety* it-ſelf, and all which conſtitutes the worth and happineſs of mankind; you will here ſurely allow beauty in the *act*, and think it worthy to be view'd, and paſs'd in review often by the glad mind, happily conſcious of the generous part, and of its own advancement and growth in beauty.

Compariſon of objects, and enjoyments.

Recapitulation.

THUS, PHILOCLES, (continu'd he, after a ſhort pauſe) thus have I preſum'd to treat of *beauty* before ſo great a judg, for ſuch a ſkilful admirer as your-ſelf. For taking riſe from nature's beauty, which tranſported me, I gladly ventur'd further in the chaſe; and have accompany'd you in ſearch of beauty, as it relates to us, and makes our higheſt *good*, in its ſincere and natural enjoyment. And if we have not idly ſpent our hours, nor rang'd in vain thro theſe deſerted regions; it ſhou'd appear from our ſtrict ſearch, that there is nothing ſo divine as BEAUTY: which belonging not to *body*, nor having any principle or exiſtence except in MIND and REASON, is alone diſcover'd and acquir'd by this diviner part, when it inſpects *it-ſelf*, the only object worthy of it-ſelf. For whate'er is void of mind, is *void* and *darkneſs* to the *mind's* EYE. This languiſhes and grows dim,

whene'er detain'd on foreign ſubjects; but thrives and attains its natural vigour, when employ'd in contemplation of what is like it-ſelf. 'Tis thus the *improving* MIND, ſlightly ſurveying other objects, and paſſing over bodys, and the common forms (where only a ſhadow of beauty reſts) ambitiouſly preſſes onward to its *ſource*, and views *the original* of form and order in that which is intelligent. And thus, O PHILOCLES! may we improve and become artiſts in the kind; learning "To know "*our-ſelves*, and what *that* is, which by improv- "ing, we may be ſure to advance our worth, and "real ſelf-intereſt." For neither is this *knowledg* acquir'd by contemplation of bodys, or the outward forms, the view of pageantrys, the ſtudy of eſtates and honours: nor is he to be eſteem'd that ſelf-improving artiſt, who makes a fortune out of theſe; but he *(he* only, is the *wiſe* and *able* man, who with a ſlight regard to theſe things, applies himſelf to cultivate another ſoil, builds in a different matter from that of ſtone or marble; and having righter models in his eye, becomes in truth the *architect* of *his own life* and *fortune:* by laying within himſelf the laſting and ſure foundations of *order*, *peace* and *concord*.——But now 'tis time to think of returning home. The morning is far ſpent. Come! Let us away, and leave theſe uncommon ſubjects; till we retire again to theſe remote and unfrequented places.

Sect. 2.

Knowledg of our-ſelves.

Intereſt.

Ability.

AT THESE words THEOCLES mending his pace and going down the hill, left me at a good diſtance; till he heard me calling earneſtly after him. Having join'd him once again, I begg'd he wou'd ſtay a little longer: or if he were reſolv'd ſo ſoon to leave both the *woods*, and that philoſophy which he confin'd to 'em; that he wou'd let me however part with 'em more gradually, and leave the beſt impreſſion on me he cou'd, againſt

Part 3. my next return. For as much convinc'd as I was, and as great a convert to his doctrine, my danger ſtill, I own'd to him, was very great: and I foreſaw that when the charm of theſe places, and his company was ceas'd, I ſhou'd be apt to relapſe, and weakly yield to that too powerful charm, *the world*. Tell me, continu'd I, how is it poſſible to hold out againſt it, and withſtand the general opinion of mankind, who have ſo different a notion of that which we call *good?* Say truth now, THEOCLES, can any thing be more odd, or diſſonant from the common voice of the world, than what we have determin'd in this matter?

WHOM ſhall we follow then? reply'd he. Whoſe judgment or opinion ſhall we take, concerning what is *good*, what *contrary?* If *all*, or *any part* of mankind are conſonant with themſelves, and can agree in this; I am content to leave *philoſophy*, and follow them: if otherwiſe; why ſhou'd we not adhere to what we have choſen?——Let us then, in another view, conſider how this matter ſtands.

SECT. III.

WE THEN walk'd gently homewards (it being almoſt noon) and he continu'd his diſcourſe.

Manners of men.

ONE man, ſaid he, affects the *hero;* eſteems it the higheſt advantage of life, to have ſeen war, and been in action in the field. Another laughs at this humour; counts it all extravagance and folly; prizes his own *wit* and *prudence*; and wou'd take it for a diſgrace to be thought adventurous. One perſon is aſſiduous and indefatigable in advancing himſelf to the character of *a man of buſineſs*. Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent; values not fame, or a character in the world: and by his good-will wou'd always be in *a debauch*, and

Contrary purſuits.

never live out of the *ſtews* or *taverns;* where he enjoys, as he thinks, his higheſt good. One values wealth, as a means only to indulge his *palat*, and *to eat finely*. Another loaths this, and affects *popularity*, and *a name*. One admires *muſick* and *paintings*, *cabinet*-curioſitys, and in-door ornaments: another admires *gardens*, *architecture*, and the pomp of *buildings*. Another, who has no *guſto* of either ſort, believes all thoſe they call VIRTUOSI to be half-diſtracted. One looks upon all expence to be madneſs; and thinks only *wealth* it-ſelf to be good. One *games*; another *dreſſes*, and ſtudies *an equipage*; another is full of *heraldry*, *points of honour*, *a family*, and *a blood*. One recommends *gallantry* and *intrigue*; another ordinary *good-fellowſhip*; another *buffoonry*, *ſatir*, and the *common wits*; another *ſports*, and *the country*; another *a court*; another *travelling*, and the ſight of *foreign parts*; another *poetry*, and the *faſhionable learning*.—— All theſe go different ways. All cenſure one another, and are deſpicable in one another's eyes. By fits too they are deſpicable in *their own*, and as often out of conceit with themſelves, as their humour changes, and their paſſion turns from one thing to another.——What is it then I ſhou'd be concern'd for? Whoſe cenſure do I fear? Or by whom, after all, ſhall I be guided?

Sect. 3.

Mutual cenſure.

Diſagreement with one another;

And with themſelves.

IF I aſk, "ARE RICHES *good*, when only heap'd "up, and unimploy'd?" One anſwers, "*They* "*are*." The reſt *deny*. "How is it then they "are to be imploy'd in order to be good?" All *diſagree*. All tell me different things. "Since therefore RICHES are not, of themſelves, "*good* (as moſt of you declare;) and ſince there is "no agreement among you *which way* they become "good; why may not I hold it for my opinion, "that they are neither good *in themſelves*, nor *di*-"*rectly* any cauſe or means of good?"

Riches.

IF there be thoſe who wholly deſpiſe FAME; and if among thoſe who covet it, he who deſires it

Fame and honour.

Part 3. for one thing, deſpiſes it for another; he who ſeeks it with ſome men, deſpiſes it with others: why may not I ſay, "That neither do I know how any "*fame* can be call'd *a good?*"

Pleaſure. If of thoſe who covet PLEASURE, they who admire it in *one* kind, are ſuperior to it *in another;* why may not I ſay, "That neither do I know "*which* of theſe pleaſures, or how *pleaſure* it-ſelf "can be call'd *good?*"

Life. If among thoſe who covet LIFE ever ſo earneſtly, that life which *to one* is eligible and amiable, is *to another* deſpicable and vile; why may not I ſay, "That neither do I know how *life* it-ſelf can, *of* "*it-ſelf*, be thought *a good?*"

Inſlavement. In the mean time, this I know certainly; "That the neceſſary conſequence of eſteeming theſe "things highly, is to be *a ſlave*, and conſequently miſerable."——But perhaps (PHILOCLES!) you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of reaſoning.

MORE, ſaid I, than I believe you can eaſily imagine. I perceiv'd the goodly lady, your celebrated beauty, was about to appear a-new: and I eaſily *LIBERTY.* knew again that fair face of LIBERTY, which I had ſeen but once in the † picture you drew yeſterday of that moral dame. I can aſſure you, I think *Goods of fortune.* of her as highly as poſſible: and find that without her help, to raiſe one above theſe ſeemingly eſſential goods, and make one eaſy and indifferent towards *life*, and towards *a fortune;* 'twill be the hardeſt thing in the world to enjoy *either*. Soliciitude, cares, and anxiety, will be multiply'd: and in this unhappy dependency, 'tis neceſſary to make court, and be not a little ſervile. To flatter the great, to bear inſults, to ſtoop, and fawn, and abjectly reſign one's ſenſe and manhood; all this muſt courageouſly be endur'd, and carry'd off, with as free an air, and good countenance as poſſible, by

† *Supra, p.* 164. And VOL. III. *p.* 138, 209, &c.

one who ſtudies greatneſs of this ſort, who knows the general way of courts, and how to fix unſteddy fortune. I need not mention the envyings, the miſtruſts, and jealouſys —— Sect. 3.

No truly, ſaid he (interrupting me) neither need you. But finding you ſo ſenſible, as I do, of this unhappy ſtate, and of its inward ſores (whatever may be its outward looks) how is it poſſible but you muſt find the happineſs of that other contrary ſtate? Can you not call to mind what we reſolv'd concerning *nature?* Can any thing be more deſirable than *to follow* her? Or is it not by this freedom from our paſſions and low intereſts, that we are reconcil'd to the goodly *order* of the univerſe; that we harmonize with *nature*; and live in friendſhip both with GOD and man?

Goods of the mind.

LET us compare, continu'd he, the advantages of each ſtate, and ſet their *goods* one againſt another: on one ſide, thoſe which we found were *uncertainly* ſo; and depended both on fortune, age, circumſtances and humour: on the other ſide, theſe which being *certain* themſelves, are founded on the contempt of thoſe others ſo uncertain. Is manly *liberty*, *generoſity*, *magnanimity*, not a GOOD? May we not eſteem as happineſs, that *ſelf-enjoyment* which ariſes from a conſiſtency of life and manners, a harmony of affections, a freedom from the reproach of ſhame or guilt, and a conſciouſneſs of worth and merit with all mankind, our ſociety, country, and friends: all which is founded in virtue only? A *mind* ſubordinate to reaſon, a *temper* humaniz'd, and fitted to all natural affection; an exerciſe of *friendſhip* uninterrupted; a thorow *candor*, *benignity*, and *good nature*; with conſtant *ſecurity*, *tranquillity*, *equanimity* (if I may uſe ſuch *philoſophical* terms) are not theſe ever, and at all ſeaſons *good?* Is it of *theſe* one can at any time nauſeate and grow weary? Are there any particular ages, ſeaſons, places, circumſtances, which muſt accompany *theſe*, to make 'em agreeable? Are *Comparison.*

Part 3. *theſe* variable and inconſtant? Do *theſe*, by being ardently belov'd, or ſought, occaſion any diſturbance or miſery? Can *theſe* be at any time overvalu'd? Or, to ſay more yet, can theſe be ever taken from us, or can we ever be hinder'd in the enjoyment of 'em, unleſs by our-ſelves? How can we better praiſe the goodneſs of *providence*, than in this, "That it has plac'd our happineſs and good "in things *we* can beſtow upon *ourſelves?*"

IF this be ſo, ſaid I, I ſee no reaſon we have to accuſe providence on any account. But men, I fear, will hardly be brought to this good temper, while their fancy is ſo ſtrong, as it naturally is, towards thoſe other movable *goods*. And in ſhort, if we may depend on what is ſaid commonly, "All *good* "is merely as we fancy it. 'Tis *conceit* which makes *Opinion* all. "it. All is OPINION and *fancy* only."

WHEREFORE then, ſaid he, do we *act* at any time? Why *chuſe*, or why *prefer* one thing to another? You will tell me, I ſuppoſe, 'tis becauſe we fancy it, or fancy *good* in it. Are we therefore to follow every *preſent* fancy, opinion, or imagination of good? If ſo, then we muſt follow that at *one* time, which we decline at *another;* approve at *one* time, what we diſapprove at *another;* and be at perpetual variance with ourſelves. But if we are not to follow *all* fancy or opinion a-
Opinion. like; if it be allow'd, "That of *fancys*, ſome are "*true*, ſome *falſe*;" then we are to *examine* every fancy; and there is ſome *rule* or other, by which to *judg*, and *determine*. 'Twas the fancy of one man to ſet fire to a beautiful temple, in order to obtain immortal memory or fame. 'Twas the fancy of another man to conquer the world, for the ſame reaſon, or what was very like it. If this were really the man's *good;* why do we wonder at him? If the fancy were *wrong*, ſay plainly in what it was ſo; or why the ſubject was not *good to him, as he fancy'd?* Either therefore, "*That*

" is every man's GOOD which he *fancies*, and be- Sect. 3.
" cauſe *he fancies it*, and is *not content* without it:"
Or otherwiſe, " There is *that* in which the *nature*
" of man is *ſatisfy'd*; and which alone muſt be *his*
" GOOD." If that in which *the nature of man is ſatisfy'd*, and can *reſt contented*, be *alone his* GOOD; then he is a fool who follows that with earneſtneſs, *as his good*, which a man can be without, and yet be *ſatisfy'd* and *contented*. In the ſame manner is he a fool who flies that *earneſtly* as *his* ILL, which a man may *endure*, and yet be *eaſy* and *contented*. Now a man may poſſibly not have burnt a temple (as EROSTRATUS) and yet may be *contented*. Or tho he may not have conquer'd the world (as ALEXANDER) yet he may be eaſy and *contented:* as he may ſtill without any of thoſe advantages of *power*, *riches*, or *renown:* if his FANCY hinders not. In ſhort, we ſhall find, " That without any
" one of thoſe which are commonly call'd *goods*, a
" man may be *contented:*" As, on the contrary,
" He may poſſeſs them all, and ſtill be *diſcontented*, and not a jot the happier." If ſo; it follows,
" That happineſs is from *within*, not from *with-*
" *out*." *A good* FANCY is the main. And thus, you ſee, I agree with you, " That † OPI- *Opinion all, in what ſenſe.*
" NION *is all in all.*"——But what is this, PHILOCLES, which has ſeiz'd you? You ſeem of a ſudden grown deeply thoughtful.

To tell you truth, ſaid I, I was conſidering what wou'd become of me, if, after all, I ſhou'd, by your means, turn *philoſopher*. The change, truly, wou'd be ſomewhat extraordinary, reply'd THEOCLES. But be not concern'd. The danger is not ſo great. And experience ſhews us every day, that for talking or writing *philoſophy*, people are not at all the nearer being PHILOSOPHERS.

† VOL. I. *pag.* 207, 216, 218; *&c.* VOL. III. *p.* 134, 136, *&c.*

Part 3. BUT, ſaid I, the very *name* is a kind of reproach. The word IDIOT ſtood formerly as the oppoſite to *philoſopher*: but now-a-days it means nothing more commonly than *the* PHILOSOPHER *himſelf*.

Philoſophy. YET, in effect (reply'd he) what elſe is it we all do in general, than *philoſophize?* If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, *the ſtudy of happineſs*; muſt not every-one, in ſome manner or other, either ſkilfully or unſkilfully *philoſophize?* Is not every deliberation concerning our main intereſt, every correction of our taſte, every choice and preference in life to be reckon'd *of this kind?* For "If happineſs be not allow'd to be from *ſelf*, and from "*within*; then either is it from *outward things* "alone, or from *ſelf* and *outward things* together." If from *outward things* alone; ſhew it us, in fact, "That all men are happy in proportion to theſe; "and that no-one who poſſeſſes them is ever miſer"able by his own fault." But this, it ſeems, hardly any-one will pretend to evince: all own the contrary. Therefore "If happineſs be partly "from *ſelf*, partly from *outward things*; then each "muſt be conſider'd, and a certain value ſet on the "concerns of an *inward* kind, and which depend "on *ſelf* alone." If ſo: and that I conſider "*How*, "and *in what* theſe are to be prefer'd; when and "on what occaſion they are in ſeaſon, or out of "ſeaſon; when properly to take place, when to "yield:" What's this, after all, but to *philoſophize?* Yet even this, ſtill, is enough to put one out of the ordinary way of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn for buſineſs, and the world. Right! For this alſo is to be conſider'd, and well weigh'd. And therefore *this*, ſtill, is PHILOSOPHY; "To inquire where, and in what reſpect one may "be moſt *a loſer*; which are the greateſt *gains*, "the moſt profitable *exchanges*;" ſince every thing in this world goes *by exchange*. Nothing is had for

nothing. *Favour* requires courtſhip: *intereſt* is made by ſollicitation: *honours* are acquir'd with hazard; *riches* with pains; *learning* and *accompliſhments* by ſtudy and application. *Security*, *reſt*, *indolence* are to be had at other prices. They may be thought, perhaps, to come eaſy. For "What hardſhip is there? Where is the harm?" 'Tis only to abate of *fame* and *fortune*. 'Tis only to wave *the point of honour*, and ſhare ſomewhat leſs of *intereſt*. If this be eaſy; all is well. Some *patience*, you ſee, is neceſſary in the caſe. *Privacy* muſt be endur'd; even *obſcurity* and *contempt*. ——Such are the conditions. And thus everything has its CONDITION. *Power* and *preferments* are to be had at one rate; *pleaſures* at another; LIBERTY and HONESTY at another. A *good* MIND muſt be paid for, as other things. But we had beſt beware leſt, perhaps, we pay *too dear* for it. Let us be aſſur'd we have a good bargain. Come on then.——Let us account.——What is a "MIND worth? What *allowance* may one hand-"ſomly make for it? or what may one well af-"ford it for?"——If I part with it, or abate of it, 'tis not *for nothing*. Some value I muſt needs ſet upon *my liberty*, ſome upon *my inward character*. Something there is in what we call WORTH; ſomething in *ſincerity*, and *a ſound* HEART. *Orderly affections*, *generous thoughts*, and *a commanding* REASON, are fair poſſeſſions, not ſlightly to be given up. I am to conſider firſt, "What may "be *their equivalent?* Whether I ſhall find my ac-"count in letting theſe *inward concerns* run as they "pleaſe; or whether I ſhall not be better ſecur'd "againſt fortune by adjuſting matters *at home*, ra-"ther than by making intereſt *abroad*, and acquir-"ing firſt one great friend, then another, to add "ſtill more and more to my *eſtate* or *quality?*" For where am I to take up? Begin; and ſet *the bounds*. Let me hear poſitively "How far I am to "go, and why no further?" What is *a moderate*

Sect. 3.

Philoſophy.

Part 3. *fortune, a competency*, and thoſe other *degrees* commonly talk'd of? Where is my *anger* to ſtop; or how high may I ſuffer it to riſe? How far may I ingage in *love?* How far give way to *ambition?* How far to other *appetites?* Or am I to let all looſe? Are *the paſſions* to take their ſwing; and no application to be given to 'em, but all to *the outward things* they aim at? Or if any application be requiſite; ſay plainly, "How much to *one*, and how "much to *the other?*" How far are the *appetites* to be minded, and how far *outward things?* Give us the meaſure and rule. See whether this be not to *philoſophize?* and whether willingly, or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, every-one does not as much? "Where, then, "is *the difference?* Which manner is *the beſt?*"

Here lies the queſtion. This is what I wou'd have you weigh and examine. "But the ex-"amination (ſay you) is troubleſom; and I had "better be without it." *Who* tells you thus? "Your REASON, you ſay, whoſe force, or neceſ-"ſity, you muſt yield to." Tell me therefore, have you fitly cultivated that REASON of your's, poliſh'd it, beſtow'd the neceſſary pains on it, and exercis'd it on this ſubject? Or is it like to determine full as well when un-exercis'd, as when thorowly exercis'd, or ever ſo expert? Conſider, pray, in *Mathematicks*; whoſe is the better REASON of the two, and fitter to be rely'd on? The practiſer's? or his who is unpractis'd? Whoſe in the way of *war*, of *policy*, or *civil affairs?* Whoſe in *merchandize*, *law*, *phyſick?*——And in MORALITY and LIFE, I aſk ſtill, *whoſe?* May he not, perhaps, be allow'd the beſt judg *of living*, who *ſtudies* LIFE, and endeavours to form it by ſome *rule?* Or is he indeed to be eſteem'd moſt knowing in the matter, who *ſlightly* examines it, and who *accidentally* and *unknowingly philoſophizes?*

Philoſophy.

THUS, PHILOCLES (said he, concluding his discourse) thus is PHILOSOPHY established. For every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own happiness; "What his *good* is, and what his "*ill*." The question is only, "Who reasons "best?" For even he who rejects this *reasoning* or *deliberating part*, does it from *a certain reason*, and from a persuasion "That this is *best*." Sect. 3.

BY this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our *philosophy* ended, and we return'd to the common affairs of life.

The end of the second volume.

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